

your belief is irrational and evidences pathology. It does not follow that this kind of evidence is not really evidence. And if we do take it to be evidence, then no doubt it will be true that in a well-formed noetic structure, belief is always on the side of evidence. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? Could it really be that you should believe a proposition, even though it had none of this phenomenal attractiveness, this seeming-to-be-true? Even if, that is, there was no felt or feelable inclination to believe it on your part? So the evidentialist is right; where there is warrant, there is evidence. Having this evidence, however, or having this evidence and forming belief on the basis of it, is not sufficient for warrant: proper function is also required. And given proper function, we also have evidence: impulsional evidence, to be sure, but also whatever sort is required, in the situation at hand, by the design plan; and that will be the evidence that confers warrant. (p. 192 Kindle edition) So impulsional evidence is evidence, given that the proposed model of warrant is satisfied. And impulsional evidence is a sense of "rightness" or "fitness" that reigns in cognitive modules whose