

# Devices outside the Enterprise perimeter

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# Outline

- Device diversity among users
- Many services and perimeters
- Usage across many perimeters
- The *Beyond Corp* architecture
- Administration / risk model
- Challenges and complications
- Directions and further work

# Vision: User Experience



work from anywhere

cloud based workflows

limit access by policy only


# Moats & Castles

high walls


strong gates

bad guys on the outside

intrinsic trust




# Usual Architecture




# Devices not equivalent

Some are trusted more than others; complicated



# Trying to fix architecture



One VPN configuration per service and per device type?  
But then ... how to use more than one at a time?


A photograph of a large, historic stone castle with multiple towers and a drawbridge over a moat. The sky is clear and blue.

evolved attackers/attacks

hitting the weakest link

infect users when outside

user can pass firewall

The background of the slide features a dark, circular tunnel with concentric rings, resembling a vinyl record or a stylized wormhole. The tunnel leads to a bright white light at the center, which serves as a focal point for the text.

# Access SRE ...

## No "Perimeter"

### Authentication

### Authorization

### Encryption

**"Re-architect corporate services  
to remove any privileges associated  
with having a corporate network  
address."**



# Architecture Blueprint


move trust to device level

device identity


device inventory

authZ on device state

# Beyond Corp Architecture



# as a Reverse Web Proxy



# Access Policy Examples

Payroll	Dashboard	Café Menu
Device Authentication	Device Authentication	Device Authentication
User Authentication		
Actively Managed	Actively Managed	
Patch Level Up-to-date	Patch Level Up-to-date	
Full Disk Encryption		

# Rule Example - Cafe

```
( url.hostname is 'google-menu.appspot.com'  
& url.port = 443  
& url.protocol is 'https'  
) then permit  
    named 'Menu_Permit'  
    tested_by 'menu_permit_test';
```

# Rule Example - Dashboard

```
( url.port = 443
& url.protocol is 'https'
& service is 'cluster-dashboard'
& ( employee
| intern
| user in 'ldap/cluster-dashboard-roles'
| user in 'group/cluster' )
& (google_managed_primary_device
| role_managed_device )
then permit named 'cluster-dashboard' tested_by
'cd_any_employee_from_remote_managed_device'
'cd_any_intern_from_onsite_managed_device'
'cd_app_engine_role_from_app_engine_device' [etc]
```

# Rule Example - Payroll ?

- No, that ACL doesn't fit on the slide
- Why not?
  - Real world ACLs are complicated
  - Once you study the corner cases
- Need an expressive language
  - Avoid assuming user behavior
  - No broad permissive generalizations



# Bootstrapping Challenges

device identity

inventory data quality

gatekeeping

dependency on user creds

# Workflow Challenges




systems management

network latency

“untrusting” the network

long tail/legacy workflows



# Internet != https

## Generic tcp socket proxy

### Often, just a websocket

### Most protocols will work

### Else need user&device IDs

# Advice & Directions

build support

get the data/build the gate

develop web first

# Comparing the models

	Perimeter	Beyond Corp
<b>Usability</b>	remote access solution may be required	"It just works"
<b>Applicability</b>	internal network only	on all networks, including internet
<b>Trust based on</b>	IP Address	device ID and state
<b>Strong attribution of access</b>	very difficult (think NAT)	easily possible (even across tiers)
<b>Segregation</b>	only works on the internal network	per device/service from all networks
<b>Inventory data quality</b>	data quality hard to improve	much better as inventory drives the process

# Questions?



[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caernarfon\\_Castle](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caernarfon_Castle)

Images: Herbert Ortner and others

