Internal Evaluation Participatory Early Warning for More Effective Response to Religious Conflict in Plateau State, Nigeria

A Pilot Project funded by USIP

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1. Acronyms

- Christian Association in Nigeria (CAN)
- Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP)
- Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Council (CMM-RC)
- Early Warning System (EWS)
- Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC)
- Jama'atu Nasril Isla (JNI)
- Justice Development and Peace Caritas (JDPC)
- Local Government Administration (LGA)
- Nigerian Stabilization and Reconciliation Program (NRSP)
- Operation Rainbow (OR)
- Plateau Peace Practitioner's Network (PPPN)
- Plateau Radio and Television Cooperation (PRTVC)
- Search for Common Ground (SFCG)
- Short Message Service (text message) (SMS)
- Specialized Task Force (STF)
- State Security Services (SSS)

2. Executive Summary

In late 2012, SFCG and CAPP received $52,000 in funding from the US Institute for Peace (USIP) to conduct a pilot project to test the use of an SMS-based conflict early warning system (EWS) in the Jos region of Nigeria. Jos has increasingly become a conflict flashpoint area over the last several decades as instances of violence have risen between Muslims and Christians and along tribal fault lines.

The pilot project was tested in eight Jos Local Government Administrations (LGAs) (Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bassa, Mangu, and Wase) for the period of December 2012-July 2013. The project's goal was "to increase the capacity of local peacemakers to analyze and respond to emerging conflict before it escalates into a cycle of violence."

This goal was supported by three main objectives:
1. Conflict prevention actors have enhanced information (in terms of quantity and quality) and analysis to plan and target timely conflict prevention activities.
2. Conflict prevention actors have enhanced capacity to take action based upon information collected through new media
3. The program and its results are documented and shared for use elsewhere in Nigeria and other conflicts worldwide

The project activities involved training 109 focal points from across the eight target LGAs to send SMS messages of conflict early warning signs into a centralized SFCG/CAPP system. The focal points also conducted outreach efforts in each of their communities to encourage members of the public to also send text messages to SFCG/CAPP when they witnessed signs of potential conflict. Starting half way through the project, there was also the option to submit incident reports through the project's Crowdmap website. The messages sent by both focal points and the general public were received by a Frontline SMS software database managed by SFCG/CAPP, who investigated the validity of each alert and then notified key stakeholders (security, government, and NGO partners) of the occurrence via SMS (when urgent) or in a daily email report. Finally, the security and NGO partners met every other month at a stakeholders meeting organized by SFCG/CAPP to analyze the messages that had been received that month. [1]

Given that one of the objectives of this project was to produce lessons learned and disseminate them widely, SFCG- Nigeria commissioned an internal evaluation that went beyond the standard OECD-DAC evaluative criteria and utilized a process approach. The aim was to produce an evaluative report that identified what worked well and what could be improved for when the project continues under funding from the European Union. In preparation for this evaluation, key documents were utilized to create evaluation standards for comparison and as a basis for criteria.

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[1] Image from: "Nigerian Riot Victims Swamp Medits." BBC. 1 December 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7758098.stm

This evaluation report is the result of eight days of fieldwork conducted in Jos, Nigeria in July 2013 that involved focus groups with project focal points and the Jos public, as well as targeted interviews with NGO, government, and security organization partners.

The evaluation is divided into four sections, which are structured to mirror the process of developing the SMS system.

Phase 1, "Public Engagement", describes SFCG's outreach efforts to engage focal points and the general public in sending in early warning information.

- The sub-section on "Training" discusses the results of the project launch meeting/training that took place on (DATE), where the project was introduced to stakeholders and the general public, and the focal points received their first training. It also discusses the follow-up training that took place for focal points from Barkin Ladi and Riyom, when the project team discovered that they were not reporting incidents that had occurred in their areas.
- The sub-section on "SMS Blasts" discusses the use of blast text messages sent by SFCG/CAPP to members in their cell phone database. These messages were sent in order to engage the public in sending in messages. The SMS Blasts were one of the most successful components of the program because they helped keep the public alert and engaged in the program. This part of the program should be considered for continuation and possibly expansion under the new grant from the European Union.
- The sub-section on "Outreach" discusses SFCG/CAPP's efforts to engage the wider public through the use of brochures, posters, and T-shirts. Because SFCG only budgeted $1,000 (out of $52,000) for this outreach effort, the impact was very limited. Outreach should receive greater budget and programmatic emphasis in the next phase of the program in order to increase the number of incident reports texted into SFCG/CAPP. Increased public outreach also presents an opportunity to further capitalize on the already high levels of trust in SFCG/CAPP within the Jos community and to mobilize people to play a greater role in bringing peace to their areas.

Phase 2, Incident Reporting, discusses how the SMS system worked in practice after the initial training, outreach, and launch efforts.

- The first sub-section describes the "Frequency" of the messages that were sent in by focal points and the public. They demonstrate that after the first month of the program (December), there was a major drop in the number of incidents reported. This was due most likely to a combination of a decrease in the actual number of violent incidents that occurred, problems with cell phone connectivity, and lack of sufficient public outreach and training of focal points.
- The following sub-section on "Content" analyzes what information was actually shared with SFCG/CAPP through SMS incident reports. It shows that the primary "senders" of information were the focal points and the general public, although there were a high frequency of messages that contained information not directly related to the purpose of the SMS system (such as requests for further information or greetings). This suggests

that both of focal points and the general public are interested in and engaged with the program, but may require further instruction on what type of information to send in.

- The sub-section on "Access and Affordability" looks at how well the focal points and the general public were able to use the system. It details the way in which problem with cellphone network coverage in Jos limited public participation. More positively, the focal points and general public felt sufficient ownership of the project to spend their own money sending in SMS reports.

Phase 3, "Bimonthly Stakeholder Usage" discusses how the messages were used by their ultimate audience.

- The sub-section on "Incident Alerts" provides comparative analysis on the degree to which SMS alerts, the daily incident emails, and the monthly incident reports were used. The first part compares communication methods, and the second part analyzes the use of incident information among stakeholder groups. It concludes that stakeholders prefer SMS based communication and that the monthly trend reports were infrequently used. These two trends suggest more broadly that stakeholders have used the EWS more for awareness and incident response than long term conflict analysis and prevention.
- The sub-section on "Bimonthly Meetings" describes the four meetings that SFCG/CAPP organized for its group of stakeholders. While these meetings increased exposure and connection between the groups, they do not appear to have been used for thorough conflict analysis, as the monthly mapping reports were only shared at the last meeting which was weakly attended. More positively, these meetings have made an important contribution in helping CSOs to better connect and communicate with security bodies.

The fourth and final section, on "Technology Systems" discusses the technological backbone of the entire conflict mapping system: Frontline SMS and the Crowdmap website. It also talks about the development of other EWS systems in Jos in the near future.

- The sub-section on "Frontline SMS" talks about the software system that was used by SFCG/CAPP to receive, store, and send SMS messages. It highlights several technological difficulties with the use of this software and recommends that SFCG/CAPP further investigate the source of these problems and keeps a back-up record of all message transactions on a separate log.
- The sub-section on "Crowdmap Website" introduces the platform used by SFCG/CAPP that allowed users to send in incident reports online and mapped all incident trends from both the online reports and the Frontline SMS system. Unfortunately, none of the focal points, members of the public, or bimonthly stakeholders used the website or seemed interested in using it in the future.
- The final section, "Other Early Warning Systems", discusses the rise of competitive SMS-based early warning systems in Jos and offers suggestions for how SFCG/CAPP can maintain the use of their system while still collaborating with other EWS organizers to maximize impact and area coverage.

Topic specific recommendations are listed at the end of each section. The evaluation also has four overarching recommendations for the next phase of the project, which are further elaborated on page 34.

Recommendation #1: SFCG and CAPP should more purposefully define program objectives around conflict prevention and rapid response. With EWS, there is often a bias toward short-term indicators at the expense of long-term structural factors, leading some EWS models to help anticipate rapidly approaching crises rather than long term trends.[2] This issue of whether the EWS is for short term response or long term prevention was one of the primary tensions within the SFCG/CAPP project, and it underlies many conclusions shared in this evaluation. The initial project documents describe the project as being created to empower NGOs and security actors in Jos to do conflict prevention work, as stated in both the project's first objective and its goal "to increase the capacity of local peacemakers to analyze and respond to emerging conflict before it escalates into a cycle of violence." The proposal also describes the need for a prevention-oriented EWS by the Plateau Peace Practitioners Network (PPPN), a primary intended user, stating that "[PPPN's] slow response and an explosive dynamic means that once triggered, conflicts escalate rapidly. Interventions often come too late to avoid substantial violence and loss of life… In response to the increasing risks and the slow response of local peace actors, there is a need for enhanced, timely, information and analysis to identify potential conflicts through an early warning system" Even the title, "Early Warning System" suggests an approach where peace and stability mechanisms are deployed before simmering conflicts erupt into violence.

There is, however, an important disconnect with the design of many of the project activities, which are largely focused on collecting information about violent incidents and sharing them quickly with stakeholders. The proposal's description of activities states "We will use SMS and mobile phone technology to collect information in real time about rumors and threats of violence in Plateau State and use a database and mapping software to analyze reports of rumors and produce easily-digestible daily bulletins including maps and analysis." The training content and outreach materials encouraged message senders to report incidences of violence in their area- but importantly, not information about long-term conflict dynamics that trigger violence, such as social or economic shifts. On the other hand, the bimonthly stakeholder meetings and monthly trend reports were designed to have stakeholders analyze the messages and create conclusions to inform their long term strategies.

Overall, while short-term conflict response and long-term conflict prevention are not mutually exclusive, they suggest some different trajectories for project activities. Conflict prevention work, which is inherently proactive, stems more from critical analysis of multiple variables known to cause or stem violence over the long term. Conflict response work, which is inherently reactive, stems more from rapidly collecting and disseminating information about violent events so that authorities and peace actors can take appropriate responses to quell the situation in the period after. The SFCG/CAPP project applied elements of both, while not following either trajectory fully and with strong results. The decision about which system to use has important design consequences for what sort of incident reports to request from the general public and what formats of communication and analysis are used by stakeholders. This evaluation recommends

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[2] Barton, R., Hippel, K. v., Sequeira, S., & Irvine, M. (2008, February 1). Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems . Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from http://csis.org/publication/early-warning

that as the project continues, SFCG/CAPP make more clear decisions about the purpose of the project and then re-design their project activities along this sharper focus.

Recommendation #2: Prioritize solidifying relationships with security actors. Over the course of the project, SFCG and CAPP made valuable progress in cultivating relationships with security actors. For CSOs in the bimonthly stakeholder group, bringing security actors into the meetings offered a new and important opportunity for civil-military cooperation. On a separate note, it was clear that the majority of focal points and members of the public had developed expectations that sending in EWS would lead to deployment or response by security actors to the incident reported. In this regard, SFCG/CAPP need to work on communicating appropriate public expectations so that community members don't rely on the EWS as a means for immediate help and that their trust in the EWS is not eroded over time if security response continues to lag. For both of these reasons, it will be crucial for SFCG/CAPP to continue reaching out to security actors so that they have greater trust and usage of the EWS.

Recommendation #3: Conduct a larger and more strategic outreach campaign to engage the general public. Many of SFCG/CAPP's outreach activities were limited in scope and reach due to the limited $1,000 budget set for these activities. This may be one reason why, after December 2012, SFCG/CAPP received such a limited number of EWS messages into the Frontline SMS. In order to gain greater buy-in and use of the EWS by the general public, SFCG/CAPP should conduct a larger outreach campaign with more strategically designed outreach materials based on a refined strategy for the project, as discussed in Recommendation #1.

Recommendation #4: Conduct strategic data analysis of SMS messages. When SFCG/CAPP received messages into the Frontline SMS system, they were organized by some simple variables such as location and sender. Later, SFCG/CAPP would conduct analysis on a daily basis of the incidents received, and once a month print out a list of the SMS messages for review by stakeholders. In the future, SFCG/CAPP would strongly benefit by coding messages around a greater list of variables and then conducting more complex analysis in order to improve program implementation and utility. From a short-term perspective, SFCG/CAPP would benefit by analyzing who is sending messages, what type of messages are being received, and how the messages receive correlate with violence reported through the media and other channels. This could inform decisions about where to conduct additional outreach or what content to include in future trainings. From a long-term perspective, SFCG/CAPP would benefit by analyzing important conflict variables, such as the type of incident and whether or not it leads to an escalated event. This could help the messages' end users, NGOs and security bodies in Jos, be more aware of what areas are violence prone and what issues act as violence triggers. In the next stage of the program, SFCG/CAPP will need to being coding and identifying important variables and conducting appropriate analysis in the messages they receive to take full advantage of the information they collect.

3. Conflict Context

Over the last decade, Nigeria's "Middle Belt", including the Plateau State, has fallen into a vicious cycle of multi-layered violence that spans both issues of "indigenous" vs "settler" rights as well as religious and ethnic fault lines. Strings of bloody riots between Christians and Muslims in 2001, 2008, 2010, and most recently 2011 (which still continues) have left the Jos community violence-weary and polarized after the deaths of thousands of people.[3] As the capital of Plateau State, Jos has experienced the conflict acutely, as regular incidents of bombings, neighbor-on-neighbor killings, cattle rustling, crop destruction, robbery, and revenge attacks have become normal.[4]

Number of Violent Clashes in Jos

Source: Ulrich Lamm

The current conflict has much of its origins in the British colonialism of the 20th century. Colonial rule played a strong role in institutionalizing settler/indigenous dichotomies between Christians and Muslims and along ethnic lines. For example, the building of roads and railway lines caused the relocation of immigrant traders and laborers from the south up into northern areas[5] while the development of tin mines in and around Jos resulted in the southern migration of Muslim laborers from the north.[6] This history of relocation and migration has caused competition over land, labor, and livelihoods that are still playing out in Jos today.

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
[3] Campbell, John and Asch Harwood, "Why a Terrifying Religious Conflict in Raging in Nigeria." The Atlantic. 10 July 2013. Available http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/why-a-terrifying-religious-conflict-is-raging-in-nigeria/277690/

[4] Image from: "Nigerian Riot Victims Swamp Medits." BBC. 1 December 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7758098.stm

[5] Sodipo, Michael Olufemi, "Mitigating Radicalization in Northern Nigeria." No 26. African Security Brief. African Center for Strategic Studies. August 2013.

[6] Campbell and Harwood.

NUMBER OF VIOLENT EVENTS

NOTES:

The figure illustrates the current trend of numerous small-scale clashes, reprisals, and revenge attacks that occurred mostly in Jos North and Jos South LGAs (Jos and its outskirts) during 2010, based on newspaper reporting collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset and research on LexisNexis by the author. Violent incidents that have not been reported in Nigerian newspapers have not been considered. This may imply an under-reporting of rural violent incidents, particularly for the years 2007–09. Only clashes related to the ethno-religious rift and political conflict are recorded; incidents of interpersonal violence that appear to be purely private or criminal in nature have been left out.

Environmental and climate changes have also impacted tensions between communities. Desertification and the southern creep of the Sahara desert has pushed Fulani and Hausa (Muslim) herdsmen further south into lands occupied by Barome (Christian) farmers in recent years, resulting in cattle rustling, crop destruction, and conflicts over land rights and usage. While colonial authorities originally relied on indirect rule through the northern emirate structures, in later years the "native" Christian tribes, particularly the Barome, of the Plateau gained political power. This has led to a fierce contest between groups over who is viewed as indigenous and who is allowed access to political representation and elite level jobs in the civil service, which in turn has a trickle-down effect that determines the prosperity of their respective groups.[7]

The fortification of communal divides and religious identity was also aided by a growth in religious fundamentalism among both Christians and Muslims in the 1970s, which gave rise to increased zealotry among political actors.[8] The Jos conflict, though initially about indigenous status, political power, and land rights, has been largely reframed in terms of its religious dimensions through the use of selective, one-sided historical narratives and an emphasis on religious differences. The growth of radical Islam has played a particularly important role in this polarization through the recruitment of Muslim youth by Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations since 2009.[9] A series of bombings and other attacks in recent years has terrorized Jos and the broader northern Nigeria region. Most famous of these was a series of five bombing attacks on Christmas Day, 2011 that left 41 people dead. The mutual tension has led to a degree of geographic segregation, where people fear walking or traveling through areas

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[7] Krause, Jana. "A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria." Geneva Declaration Publications. Small Arms Survey. ISBN 978-2-9700771-0-7. Pg. 10.

[8] Sodipo, 3.

[9] Ibid.

predominantly settled by another community. There are also widespread feelings that the security forces are either impotent or untrustworthy.

4.Methodology

The findings contained in this report are the result of eight days of data collection in Jos, Nigeria conducted between July 18 and 26. The evaluation was done through an external-internal process. While SFCG's Institutional Learning Team conducted the evaluation, the evaluator was SFCG's Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation Specialist for the Middle East and North Africa region. The evaluator does not support the SFCG-Nigeria office in a regular basis and prior to beginning the evaluation assignment, the evaluator had no knowledge of or involvement in the project or any of its activities.

Before arriving in Jos, the evaluator reviewed key project documentation including the project proposal, a training report, a literature review, a donor report, and the meetings/attendance sheets of three bimonthly meetings. During her period in the field, the evaluator conducted 12 interviews with members of the Bimonthly Stakeholder meeting, including two journalists, two security officials, three government officials, and six civil society/NGO representatives. The selection of these interviewees was made based on the member's availability and on their consent to participate in an interview during the short data collection period. Unfortunately, two critical security stakeholders, the Special Task Force (STF) and Operation Rainbow (OR), who became involved later in the project, were not available to be interviewed. The evaluator also interviewed three SFCG staff members and one staff member from CAPP.

The final component of the evaluation consisted of eight focus group discussions. There was one focus group with focal points and one with members of the public involved in the project for each of four LGAs: Jos North, Jos South, Barkin Ladi, and Riyom. These four LGAs were selected by SFCG because they are the most volatile and violence prone of the eight total project communities. The data presented in this report is based on qualitative data only. Given that the people primarily sending the SMSs were different than those using it, sometimes data triangulation was not possible. As a result, all of the conclusions contained in this report may not all be representative of the views and behaviors of all participants, particularly the broader public.

Because the program evaluated was a pilot project, there was no baseline study conducted or indicators set to measure key project milestones. The evaluator therefore worked closely with the project team to define key evaluation questions and agreed to adopt a more descriptive, process-based evaluation rather than a standard OECD-DAC-based evaluation. The final evaluation report, as described in the Executive Summary, is structured according to this process. It begins with an overview of SFCG/CAPP's outreach and training efforts to get the public and selected focal points involved in sending messages, then describes what messages were actually sent, when, and by whom, and finally discusses to what extent these messages were used by NGOs and security bodies. The last section, called "Technology Systems" describes the usage of the Frontline SMS and Crowdmap website systems, offering suggestions for how (and whether) to use these tools in future iterations of the project.

5. Findings and Analysis

Phase 1: Public Engagement

Training

There were two trainings held for focal points as part of this project: one in November 2012 for 109 focal points from all communities (which is above the grant award total of 100) and one re-training in June 2013 for 20 focal points from two LGAs. The first training also doubled as a project launch meeting and was widely attended by all focal points as well as 25 members from Plateau Peace Practitioners Network (PPPN). **Focal points were satisfied with the training they received as a part of the project and are eager for future training opportunities.**

At the first training, focal points were taught about the concept of early warning prevention and taught how to use the SMS system to send in conflict reports. Others reported that they were taught about conflict, rumor mongering, trauma, and stress. Their comments describe a more extensive training than what was reported by SFCG/CAPP, and may be indicative of the fact that many focal points had attended SFCG/CAPP training events for previous projects. For example, two of the four focus groups mentioned how much they enjoyed the drama presentation and requested more at future trainings. Regardless, all focal points felt positively about their participation in the training. They left feeling eager to spread news of the EWS to their communities and to report early warning incidents. Many focal points also recommended that future trainings be expanded to include more focal points, especially in more rural areas where violence is more frequent**. In Riyom, it was noted that there was a need to recruit a better mix of focal points from different tribes**, as the Riyom focal point focus group mentioned that Fulanis had not come to the trainings but are important to include in the project.

Early on in the project, there was a problem where incidents of violence had occurred in Barkin Ladi and Riyom that were not reported via an SMS. As a result, SFCG visited these communities to conduct a follow up training and to have a check-in meeting with the focal points. During these visits SFCG/CAPP communicated to the focal points that they should not only report incidents of violence or impending violence but also when there was peace. These messages of peace would enable SFCG/CAPP to know if the communities were stable or if there was a need to investigate issues with training, the Frontline system, or network connections. **SFCG and CAPP staff shared that these follow-up visits were of critical importance to helping them remain connected with focal points and aware of what the challenges are in each community.**

Project focal points demonstrated a moderate understanding of the purpose and functions of the early warning system. All four focal point focus groups understood that their role in the EWS was to send in an SMS with signs of activities that cause crisis, such as rumors and tension, before such problems escalate into full scale violence. These focal point focus groups provided weak and inconsistent explanations, however, about how their messages would be used or what the overall purpose of the project was. Still, it appears that the trust they placed in SFCG/CAPP was sufficient for many focal points to be enthusiastic about participating.

The four focus groups with members of the general public had only a very vague understanding that the messages would help to bring peace in their community but could not explain how the EWS worked, what SFCG/CAPP did once they received messages, who were the ultimate

message recipients, and how they use the messages they received. None of the focus groups mentioned that the text messages were for use by NGOs, however all focus groups stated that their messages went to alert security officials so that these officials could provide assistance in preventing or responding to violence.

Despite moderate (focal points)/weak (public) levels of project comprehension, both focal points and members of the public were eager to participate in peacebuilding projects with SFCG/CAPP. Among all focal point and public focus groups, participants seemed mostly eager to engage in the EWS initiative because they knew about some of SFCG/CAPP's previous work and were enthusiastic about efforts that claim to be working toward peace. Many focal points and members of the public also made it clear that they were motivated to work with SFCG because they believed it was important to bring "awareness" and "enlightenment" to their communities about the importance of peace.

Most focal point and public participants believed that the purpose of the EWS was to improve security, and that their text messages were shared directly with security officials who could/would respond. Across all eight FGD, neither the focal points nor the public were able to articulate which actors received the incident reports that they sent into SFCG, though most believed that the messages were largely to alert security bodies to recent or impending violence. **Many had even developed more concrete expectations that their messages sent into SFCG/CAPP would actually lead to the rapid deployment of security forces.** The role of the EWS in alerting security officials was especially stressed by the focal points in Riyom, an extremely conflict-prone community. While this understanding is consistent with the project's overall intentions, it raises concerns that community members may have expectations that SFCG/CAPP may not be able to delivery on, at least outside of a long-term time horizon.

Overall, the security-focused expectations of focal points and the public suggest that short-term safety is still the highest priority among community members in flashpoint areas. Local stakeholders feel it is important for the EWS to meet that need, perhaps even more than the need to improve conflict analysis and program effectiveness among NGOs. It also suggests that strengthening ties with the STF and OR and actively working with them to improve incident response is crucial to preserving the current high levels of trust and enthusiasm for SFCG/CAPP programming.

Recommendation:

- *SFCG/CAPP should make field visits a more regular component of their EWS rather than relying only on the SMS system to be sufficiently informative of the events and challenges in each community.*

SMS Blasts

SFCG and CAPP sent SMS blast messages to alert members of the public and focal points to the existence of the EWS and to remind them to text in reports. The phone numbers that received the SMS blasts came from the SFCG and CAPP attendance records of participants from past projects. According to CAPP, the highest number of SMS blast messages was sent in December, and there were less in January because there were less incidences of violence in that month. CAPP estimates that there were approximately 30 messages sent in total, though no official record of the content or number of these messages has been saved. Due to technological difficulties with the Frontline SMS system, the last SMS blast message was sent in April.

Examples of SMS blast messages:

Sent Dec 12, 2012: "introducing Frontline SMS-report Tensions in your area by sending SMS to this Number. Will call you back to verify information, please state your area. From Search for Common Ground & Community Action for Popular Participation."

Sent Dec 26, 2012 "How is your community and other communities around? Do you feel save and secure? Report any unlawful conduct to this number, don't partake in violence of any sort, chose to be peace makers. PEACE PAYS, VIOLENCE DESTROYES. From: SFCG and CAPP.

Sent Feb 17, 2013 "Good Morning, SFCG & CAPP wishes you a peaceful week ahead, please report tensions & any threat to peace in your area to this number. Peace is joint our business."

18 March 2013 "'Peace cannot be achieved through violence, it can only be attained through understanding' Report tensions & threats to peace to this number. SFCG & CAPP.

All focal points and community members were incredibly enthusiastic about the SMS blast messages that they received. Depending on the strength of network coverage in their areas and the frequency of violence, all focal points and community members received SMS blast messages between 1-2 times per week and 1-2 times per month. Many of the focal points and public members had even saved several of their messages in their phone and shared them directly with the evaluator. All eight focus groups were glad that they received messages so frequently and commented that they appreciated the constant reminder to be vigilant and to report incidences.

Some individual participants also reported that the messages helped to give them a sense of ownership for peace. One commented that the messages had made him feel that it was his personal responsibility to bring stability to his area. Another said, "*If someone doesn't care for you, they won't send you a text messages.*" **In sum, the SMS blasts were taken very seriously and received with strong enthusiasm by all recipients. Most focus groups said they wanted to maintain, if not increase, the frequency with which they received messages.** Moving forward, SFCG has an opportunity to use these text messages to not only strengthen outreach and communication about this particular project, but also to experiment with more targeted and intentional messaging campaign. Such a campaign could be used to impact not only what messages people send, but how they behave during crisis.

Recommendation:

- *SFCG/CAPP should maintain or increase the number of blast messages that they send to focal points and the general public.*

- *SFCG/CAPP should also consider experimenting with sending other types of messages. These could include actual conflict response tips or messages of calm and reassurance to community members where appropriate.*

Outreach

SFCG/CAPP purchased a variety of marketing material to conduct outreach for the EWS, though with only $1000 budgeted their impact was limited. The money was used to purchase T-shirts, brochures, banners, and posters as marketing materials for their outreach. They also paid two media houses to cover events on air and to play promotional jingles to cover the launch event. With only $1000 of $52,000 budgeted for these activities, the reach of the promotional efforts was limited. SFCG staff stated that they focused on making sure that focal points, CSOs, security, and government officials had these materials targeted at them. SFCG staff believe that in future EWS efforts, there needs to be a

bigger budget to make sure that the full range of target groups in the Plateau state are reached by visibility efforts.

The marketing material was not well-designed to get the interest and attention of the general public in Jos. The marketing brochures, for example, presented solid blocks of text throughout without headings or pictures. Information about the EWS did not begin until the third fold of the brochure and the Frontline SMS number was only printed on the very back of the brochure and was not highlighted in a different font, larger font size, or noticeable color. This design is not user-friendly and does not present the type of images or layout that would attract interest from a reader. In the same vein, but not as severely, the SFCG T-shirts had the number printed on the back but not in a very large font. Finally, several members of the public who saw the posters commented that they did not bother to write the numbers down, which, combined with the fact that the public and focal point focus groups were both pleased with the existence of the EWS, suggests that the posters were not sufficiently attention grabbing.

Focal points eagerly participated in distributing market material and publicizing the EWS system, but members of the public did not always take notice of these efforts. All four focus groups of focal points reported that they eagerly distributed T-shirts and posters. Several even claimed to have conducted personal outreach to friends and community leaders. Others shared stories of friends and neighbors asking them for T-shirts or for which number to use to send in SMS reports. One focal point from Barkin Ladi shared that, "*People will not know what to do when the problems come. But because we did advocacy, they know where to send in messages. It gives them a kind of confidence that somewhere they will be helped on the issues.*"

In contrast, the public focus group participants presented scattered results; the majority of participants appear to have heard of the program through the SMS blasts or personal outreach rather than marketing material. This may be the result of selection bias because these were the same two methods used to recruit focus group participants. Several public participants said that they had seen a poster or T-shirt, but there were no strong trends between focus groups in how people had heard of the program. While the evaluation does not have sufficient data to conclude how many people the outreach efforts reached, the fact that the public members who did attend focus groups did not strongly respond to questions about having seen marketing materials suggests that a more aggressive outreach campaign may be useful in the future.

Recommendations:
- *SFCG/CAPP should budget higher for outreach materials in order to more effectively engage the general public.*

- *SFCG/CAPP should more carefully design outreach materials to be readable and user friendly for a Jos audience. One tip is to think about what information is the most important on each outreach item and to make sure that information is made the most visible.*

Phase 2: Incident Reporting

Phase 2, on Incident Reporting, was the part of the program where members of the general public, trained focal points, and (to a lesser extent) CSO partners sent in incident reports to SFCG/CAPP. This introductory section describes the initial design for this project, and then how

that differed from implementation. The subsequent sub-sections provide further detail on the frequency and content of messages sent, as well as how accessible and affordable the SMS system was to its many message senders.

According to the original design of the early warning system (EWS), SFCG anticipated that the system would work in the follow way:

1) A member of the public or trained focal point ("message sender") witnesses an incident
2) The message sender reports the incident to SFCG/CAPP using an SMS (text message) or the Crowdmap website developed for the program
3) The reported message is received directly into the Frontline SMS software database
4) SFCG/CAPP or a university student volunteer sees the message in the Frontline database and sends a text message of acknowledgement to the sender
5) SFCG/CAPP or a university student volunteer calls two or three other contacts in the community where the incident occurred to verify the accuracy of the initial report.

In practice, the implementation of the program differed from this plan in several key respects.

1. As reported directly by SFCG, the Crowdmap website was never used to send incident reports. This was due to a combination of limited computer/internet access and limited literacy in target communities.
2. An unknown portion of the SMS messages sent was not received into the Frontline SMS system due to inconsistent cellphone network coverage
3. Many of the confirmation messages sent by SFCG/CAPP were not delivered, also due to technology or cellphone network coverage problems. A total of 38 confirmation messages were sent out through the Frontline SMS system, though it is impossible to know how many of those messages were actually received by the original sender.
4. Although the technical support trainer from SFCG set up the Crowdmap website to automatically receive reports from Frontline SMS, in practice the incidents still needed to be uploaded manually by SFCG and CAPP. SFCG and CAPP decided not to try to re-link FrontlineSMS with the Crowdmap because of the low volume of messages received.
5. Due to the low number of incidents reported, one other small change was that SFCG and CAPP decided not to recruit a university student to assist them with the messages. Therefore, on occasions when incidents were reported in the evening, they were not sent in an incident report to bimonthly stakeholders until the following day. Overall, however, CAPP and SFCG reported that after they received each incident, they always followed through in calling 2-3 community members to verify the incident promptly.

Frequency

 Overall levels of incident reporting spiked in December and remained very low for the rest of the project. December had a total of 72 messages received, whereas the next closest month was July with a total of 8 messages received.

The primary reason for the low levels of reporting later on in the project was most likely that relative

Total SMS Messages Received

peace had returned to many of the project areas. It was not possible to compare the actual number of incidents reported through the Frontline SMS system with the actual number of incidents that occurred in each community because such records have not been kept by SFCG. All eight focus groups validated that there had been periods where they did not text in incident reports because there was relative peace in their communities. This loosely matches the observations by SFCG and CAPP that the number of incidents, both those reported and those that actually occurred, dramatically declined after December. The total number of incidents was not zero, however, which is evident from the daily incident reports sent out each month. This means that there were likely incidents that were not reported. The fact that 109 focal points were trained and only 25 messages from focal points were received is significant and shows that the vast majority of focal points did not report an incident.

Received Messages by Type and Month

Overall however, both focal points and members of the public from all four LGAs commented that they valued the project, trusted SFCG and the EWS, and were eager to report when the correct type of incident occurred.

Outside of reduced violence, there may have been additional factors that also played a role in limiting the frequency of message sent. First, the limited phone network coverage may be a partial culprit, as focal points shared during focus groups that they often did not receive confirmation messages responding to their reports. Representatives from CAPP and SFCG also suspect that some individuals may have elected not to report incidences, either because they lacked phone credit or because they did not trust the EWS. Despite confirmation of confidentiality provided by SFCG/CAPP, CAPP shared that there had been other focal points who reported during the project that they did not send in an SMS because they were afraid of being reported to the police. If SFCG and CAPP work to address this trust deficit in the future, they can gain by not only receiving more reports, but also in retaining community allegiance as other EWSs in the Jos region are launched.

Fatalism and lack of trust in security agencies also reduced the frequency of reporting among focal points specifically in Riyom. The focal points from Riyom reported that while they are grateful for SFCG/CAPP's work on the EWS and that they are are happy to participate, sometimes they feel apathetic about reporting. The individuals interviewed did not believe that the security forces would respond even if SFCG shared their messages with them. One focal point said:

"*People don't have confidence in the security. So even if SFCG tries their best to share it with security…they will delay and not respond immediately until it is over and they have killed people and destroyed houses. When the attackers are gone then they will come…Soldiers will not respond if they are 100m from an attack if they don't have an order. All these things make people feel like the soldiers are complicit.*" He stressed that such occurrences were extremely frequent.

Another focal point stated: "*Particularly in my own community, you feel like you just have to give up. People don't sleep. People don't cultivate their farm produce. So how do you report this to SFCG?...[They] will go and cut your crops in the night. You send this to SFCG to do what about it?...They can't do anything about it!*"

These comment underscores a broader sense of fatalism in Riyom and raises a key question: in a long-term intractable conflict, what events count as incidents worth reporting? As the project continues, SFCG/CAPP should further consider how individual reports can or should capture feelings of simmering discontent and hopelessness that often lead to further conflict.

Content

SFCG/CAPP did not perform any data coding or analysis procedures on their SMS data. As a result, the Excel files with the sent and received messages that were shared with the evaluator had not been labeled or otherwise disaggregated by the sender, location, or incident type. It was therefore not possible to determine with full accuracy which group of participants was the most active in sending in messages. From the messages where SFCG and CAPP were able to manually and retroactively identify the sender, members of the general public were more active than either focal points or other civil society organizations (including bimonthly stakeholders) in sending in messages. It is important to note, however, that the focal points sent substantially more messages that were relevant to peace or violence/incidents. The majority of "other" messages were not directly useful by the EWS and included messages of holiday greetings, asking for clarification, expressing an opinion, or announcing a location. This suggests that the trainings provided by SFCG did have an impact on the type of information sent into the EWS.

The data above also shows that other CSOs, from PPPN and the bimonthly stakeholder group, were not actively involved in contributing to the EWS with information from their network or field activities. In fact, the majority of the messages from the CSO group were either from SFCG or CAPP. This may be a missed opportunity to conduct outreach for the project and involve more members of the public, especially those in rural areas, in contributing to the EWS.

Received Messages by Type

Focal points and members of the public often texted about incidents of both violence and peace, which raises the issue of how messages were used and why. SFCG staff stated that when there were longer periods where they had received no messages from Barkin Ladi or Riyom, they would send a blast message to that area encouraging people to report. Many focal points and members of the public also regularly texted that there was relative peace in their area, and SFCG/CAPP received a total of 13 of these confirmation messages. It does not appear, however, that SFCG/CAPP had a specific use for the messages of peace, as they were not included in the daily incident reports and no bimonthly stakeholder mentioned learning from these more positive reports. One bimonthly meeting participant raised the salient point that although the project is referred to as an "early warning" system, much of the information that focal points and the public were encouraged to report was in fact incidents of aggression that had already taken place, and that a true "early warning" system would take a broader and more nuanced approach to examine conflict drivers or the root causes of the conflict, such as economic and social changes within target communities.

The fact that the majority of SMS messages were not directly related to reporting instances of violence or peace suggests that SFCG/CAPP should consider providing additional training and public awareness raising about the type of information that is best to report. On one hand, future message senders might become confused by too much information or defer to not sending information if they are not sure that their information is right or useful. On the other, given the limited storage space in the Frontline SMS system, it may be advantageous to have fewer and more targeted messages.

Recommendations:
- *SFCG/CAPP should discuss the desirability of targeting messaging and training efforts to decrease the number of "other" messages or how best to use these messages strategically.*

- *As part of its effort to more clearly define the purpose and functions of the EWS, SFCG and CAPP should decide what types of messages best serve these purposes and functions and give clear instructions to focal points and members of the public on their reporting responsibilities for each type of messages. It may be desirable, for example, simply to call focal points in times of low incident reporting or to only ask focal points but*

not the public to report peace in order to not flood the Frontline SMS system with messages that are not directly useful. Another option is to actually train focal points on the drivers and causes of conflict so that the messages they send in can be more tailored to useful information.

- *SFCG and CAPP would benefit greatly by more formally complimenting the information they receive via SMS with information from sources like their bimonthly meeting participants, field visits to each community, and the local news and then comparing this information with the incidents that are reported. This would help the project team determine if the number of incidents that is reported actually matches with the number of incidents that occurred. It will also help the project team to determine if/where additional follow up training and outreach with focal points and the public is needed.*

- *To build ownership in the EWS, SFCG/CAPP may want to more actively engage other CSOs in the Jos region in sending in early warning messages and promoting the EWS among their networks and in the communities where they are active. This may also help to combat the current sense of territoriality and competition among organizations working for peace in Jos and avoid duplication of effort.*

Access and Affordability

SMS is widely used in the eight target LGAs. Almost all focal points and members of the public who participated in focus groups felt confident and able to use the SMS in their mobile phones as directed by SFCG/CAPP. All eight focus groups reported that cell phones are widely owned and frequently used among focal points and members of the public. Furthermore, individuals who did try to send in SMS messages reporting early warning incidents found the SMS system to be accessible and easy to use. For focal points who worked in areas with large illiterate populations, several told members of the public in their area to use them as an intermediary by calling the focal point directly and having them send in an SMS, though this was not widespread. This can be considered as an outreach strategy to expand project access if the project moves further into more rural areas, but there are important Do No Harm issues to be considered, such as confidentiality and putting focal points in harm's way.

Focal points and member of the Jos public are contented to spend their own phone credit to report incidents, and prefer this method over the free "flash" callback system. Among the focal point focus groups, at least two had heard of the flash SMS option. However, all four focal point focus group said that regardless of whether a flash system existed, they preferred to use their own SMS credit and would gladly do so if sending messages brings about peace in their areas. While there was a much lower level of message sending frequency among the public focus groups, all insisted that using credit was not a problem, and that a flash message is seen as less reliable and direct in the case of an emergency. A small number of focus group participants expressed the concern that they might not have easy access to purchase new credit if they ran out. Overall, all participants were contented with the current system even if sending messages comes at their personal experience. This vindicates the

decision early on of SFCG to not provide credit and cell phones to senders and instead expect that having people send their own credit would build ownership in the project.[10]

Despite the high frequency of cell phone usage in Jos, weak network coverage in key flashpoint areas of Jos poses a barrier to the ability of project participants to report early warning incidents. In all eight focus groups, participants reported that their communities experienced regular network problems and this had caused problems with their message sending. In Jos North, for example, one focal point noted that people from his community were calling him to report that the messages they sent into the Frontline SMS system had bounced back. In Jos South, two focal points received delivery confirmation messages from their cell phone provider but learned later that SFCG had not received the messages. Focal points in Riyom reported that the majority of messages they tried to send in had not gone through. The problem of network coverage is also more acute in Barkin Ladi, where there is only one network carrier. This means that citizens are unable to switch networks to improve sending accuracy. These challenges have had serious consequences on at least one occasion, as a focal point reported that robbers had attacked the town and broken someone's arm the day before but that he/she had been unable to send in an SMS because the message would not go through.[11]

The intervention of security forces in cellphone networks also threatens project effectiveness on several fronts. Focus groups and SFCG/CAPP shared that security forces often intentionally shut down cell phone networks in a time of crisis specifically to prevent rumor mongering and conflict escalation. This works to the direct disadvantage of the EWS, as community members are unable to report incidents when they occur. Not only does this interference limit the ability of SFCG/CAPP to report incidents to security for rapid response, it could also over time increase public confusion and apathy about using the SMS system. Worse, this could actively decrease trust in the system if community members believe that security institutions are monitoring the messages the community send in.

Phase 3: Bimonthly Stakeholder Usage

Phase 3, on Bimonthly Stakeholder Usage, was the part of the program where representatives from the PPPN, government agencies, and security bodies received and used information from the EWS. This introductory section provides an overview of how each of these "bimonthly stakeholders" was intended to receive and use information from SFCG/CAPP. The subsequent sub-sections then provide further detail on how the bimonthly stakeholder groups used the SMS and emailed reports they received, and then later the role of the bimonthly meetings.

According to the initial design of the program, bimonthly stakeholders were to receive and utilize information from SFCG/CAPP in the following ways:

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[10] Interestingly, SFCG and the bimonthly meeting participants learned on their advocacy visit to the STF that when the STF attempted an EWS, they purchased 500 cell phones and cell phone credit for community reporters but received almost no reports, though whether this was due to issues of ownership or trust remains unclear

[11] This example also raises important Do No Harm issues. If participants would text SFCG/CAPP in place of a security body, SFCG/CAPP cannot guarantee a security response and should not be treated as first line responders.

1) After verifying a report, SFCG/CAPP sends an incident SMS out to a select number of its bimonthly stakeholders, primarily security agencies.
2) Later that day, SFCG/CAPP sends a daily incident report email to all bimonthly stakeholders with information and analysis of the incident. The incident reports would be sent once daily whenever there was a day that an incident had occurred. These reports would include multiple incidents if more than one had occurred on one day.
3) If the alert was received via SMS, SFCG/CAPP manually uploads the security incident onto the Crowdmap website. If the alert was from the website, SFCG/CAPP would approve for the incident to be publically visible on the Crowdmap.
4) SFCG/CAPP includes the reported message on a list of all messages, called the monthly mapping trend reports, at the bimonthly stakeholders meetings.

Together, the incident SMSs, the daily incident reports, the monthly mapping trend reports, and finally the bimonthly meetings were designed to keep the bimonthly stakeholders regularly informed about conflict events in their area. The bimonthly meetings, including the meeting minutes, were designed to have the added value of promoting cross-organizational dialogue and long term trend analysis. While there were no significant changes between design and implementation in this regard, each of the communication platforms described above was used to differing degrees by each actor. These differences are described in the section below on Incident Alerts, followed by a comparative analysis of how they were used by each main bimonthly stakeholder group. The last section in Phase 3, Bimonthly Meetings, discusses the results of the bimonthly meetings and feedback from participants.

Incident Alerts

As stated above, SFCG/CAPP deployed three methods for alerting bimonthly stakeholders about an event: targeted SMS messages (to a limited number of stakeholders), daily incident reports over email, and finally monthly mapping trend reports over email. These three communication formats were used to a different extent among the bimonthly stakeholders.

Message sent by SFCG/CAPP on December 21: "Tension in Ganawuri as former councillor is buried. Youth prevented some politicians and a chief from attending alleging they poisoned the young politician- Sati Mbok. The politician was the best performing councillor in Riyom Lgc before the councils were dissolved mid this year. His killing is being associated with up coming local council elections. The youth have promised revenge. Sir, This info is from the community."

Message sent by SFCG/CAPP on December 29: "There is infomation from reliable source that Jol Comunity wil be attack tonight, and that Hoss(makera) wil be exploded to intercep intavention. pls intavene This information is from one of our contacts. C/o: Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP)"

Message sent by SFCG/CAPPon December 31: "Tension in trade centre kuru. 2 people shot yesterday near Nipss. One died. This forwarded info is from one of our contacts. SFCG & CAPP."

The incident reports and meeting minutes were more widely read than the monthly trend reports. For email, six of the eleven stakeholders interviewed actively acknowledged receiving and reading the incident reports, which were sent out each time an incident occurred. Five of the eleven stakeholders acknowledged receiving and reading the monthly meeting minutes, and several commented that it helped them to stay abreast of what they had missed if they were

absent for a meeting. Only two of the stakeholders acknowledged receiving the monthly trend reports in email, which listed all of the incidents that occurred within the last month. It was not clear if even these two actors read them.

Stakeholders rely slightly more on SMS than email to stay updated on incident reports, though both modes of communication are valuable and should continue. Most participants, including both security officials, liked receiving incident reports via SMS because it was faster and more readily accessible than email. Many would often forward an SMS of an incident directly onto other authorities in security and government. One organization would directly share SMSs into the CMM-RC EWS database. These observations suggest that text messages are also an easier and more widely used form than email forwarding for sharing incident reports, though interviewees did share examples of forwarding email incident reports as well. Importantly, three of the 10 non-media stakeholders interviewed had not received incident reports via SMS, though none of these four were security actors. It is recommended that SFCG and CAPP check in with stakeholders at the bimonthly meeting about whether all the designated recipients are receiving SMS messages and why.

The preference of stakeholders for SMS over email and the higher read-rates of emailed incident reports than monthly reports suggest that actors may be using the EWS more for awareness and response of individual incidents, but that they use the EWS less for long-term conflict analysis. It also hits at the tension between the intended purpose of the EWS and its actual use; if stakeholders are not regularly reading and reacting to monthly reports, this suggests that the EWS is functioning more as a mechanism to mobilize short-term responses but not to strengthen the predictive abilities of early warning actors or to affect programmatic decision making by CSOs through the analysis of long term trends.

Incident reports received through the Frontline SMS system were first verified and then shared exclusively via SMS to high-level responders in security and government institutions. Later that day, all members of the bimonthly meeting received an incident report email detailing and analyzing the event. This two-tier system for sharing incident report was developed to share information only on a "need to know" basis with the officials who could respond directly. These alert messages were always sent directly through the SFCG/CAPP staff member's personal cell phone because (1) the unreliability of the Frontline SMS system and (2) the message recipients would often want to call back directly to ask for more information. As a result, there was no record of how many urgent incident SMS reports were sent.

SFCG/CAPP rarely shared alert SMS messages with the members of the bimonthly meetings in order not to spread panic and rumors. Instead, SFCG/CAPP opted to send group members the daily incident report emails with the conflict analysis. SFCG and CAPP's efforts to avoid spreading rumors, causing false alarm, and otherwise cause harm to the fragile conflict situation in Jos by sharing sensitive information with the wrong actors or at the wrong time is commendable, and a critical component of any EWS.

All stakeholder organizations said that they receive incident alert information from multiple sources, and that the notifications they received from SFCG/CAPP were often not the first time a stakeholder has been made aware of an incident. Nonetheless, the stakeholders still valued the messages from SFCG/CAPP because they added both detail and validation to the reports they had received from elsewhere. Stakeholders also said that at the time they received the alerts from SFCG/CAPP were timely and were sent the same day as the incident being reported.

Each of the civil society organizations at the bimonthly meetings used the incident reports or monthly mapping trend reports differently, though only one has put the information directly to use in their programming. One CSO used the incident reports and conflict analysis to alert their staff about security concerns in the various communities around Jos. At this organization, the reports and analysis did not determine programming content, focus, or location as was the intent of the EWS as stated in the initial proposal. The organization reported that this usage was because those decisions were already decided before the EWS came into place based on their agreements with donors. Two CSOs had not used the information directly in their work, though one will be using EU funds to create an online EWS mechanism that builds off the SFCG platform. One CSO had not yet used the SFCG information in programming, and instead fed the SFCG incident reports into their own EWS. This organization believed that in the future SFCG information is likely to be used in their programs. Finally, one CSO had directly used information from SFCG in their programming work:

> *"We were planning to take relief to a certain community but one of the SFCG EWS reports alerted us to another attack in another community. Based on the information in that email, we came to realize that this is a community that is in need of emergency response more than the one we were thinking of earlier. So that informed how we went about our response and also how we redesigned. We decided to address other needs of other people in order not to do more harm than good."*

Of the two media organizations, one had used their role at the bimonthly meetings for a lead on stories, and felt more convinced of the importance of reporting on solutions instead of only problems. The other had not used the information from the EWS in their program but had previously been involved in broadcasting information on/from SFCG programs and will do so again under the SFCG grant from the European Union. The representative from this organization commented that attending the bimonthly meetings had helped him/her to no longer assume that rumors might represent reality and to also be more open minded about persons from another religion.

Of the three government agencies, none used the incident reports or monthly mapping trend reports directly in their work but instead passed on the information to other agencies or officials. Two of the three government offices believed that their role as stakeholders was to pass on incident information to security bodies rather than use it directly in their work. Of these two government offices, there is one that may be positioned to use the conflict reports in their own work but they have not yet done so. The other office is purely advisory. The third government agency did not seem to believe that they had any role in using the information, but claimed to be active in promoting SMS reporting among youth around Jos.

The two security agencies interviewed review each incident report that they receive, verify the content with their own sources, and then either dispatch support or send the information to a more relevant security body. SSS is primarily an intelligence gather body and Immigration, a sub-group of the STF, is tasked with ensuring that potential instigators of violence from Niger, Chad, and other parts of Nigeria do not illegally enter Plateau and cause violence. Both organizations believe that the overall amount of information they have on conflict incidents has increased and they are now more alert to security incidences. One of them referenced receiving an incident report from SFCG that provided the wrong location, and though he generally sees SFCG as a knowledgeable and credible organization, believes that some of the people sending messages are so rushed to report quickly that they do not provide proper information. He stated that his agency therefore needs to investigate SFCG/CAPP information further before acting. The other said that he focused on trying to marry the information from

SFCG/CAPP with what he receives from his own sources to get a clearer picture of the situation. This organization claimed that the SFCG/CAPP reports have not only helped his agency to respond earlier, but to actually pass on information that halted a planned attack between Fulanis and Birom in Gyel. Aside from the reference to this incident, it was not possible to collect more specific information on reports that received security response, or to verify the accuracy of the incident. However, the positive and encouraging responses from both officials indicate that the early warning messages are valued and being put to use in some capacity by security actors.

Though they were not interviewed for the evaluation, the STF and Operation Rainbow likely receive some of the early warning messages from the SFCG/CAPP system. Aside from SSS and Immigration, two other organizations also claim to send incident reports to top security officials. There are also new EWS channels being created in Jos (one through Justice Development Peace Caritas/Operation Rainbow and one through Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Council) that have or will pick up message alerts sent by SFCG/CAPP. It is therefore possible that organizations like the police, STF and Operation Rainbow have actually been receiving the SFCG/CAPP incident reports and perhaps dispatching response through up to four separate channels. When the JDPC/Operation Rainbow EWS becomes fully operational, this may create a fifth channel if JDPC sends in SFCG/CAPP incident reports. There is however no available record of how many messages the Immigration and SSS offices have shared, to whom, if a response was dispatched, when, and to what resolution. Without this information, it is not possible to determine how many security incidents (if any) that went through the SFCG/CAPP EWS met with an appropriate security response.

Preserving interest and credibility among message senders will require strengthened engagement with more influential security actors. SFCG and CAPP have indicated a willingness and eagerness to strengthen their engagement with STF, Operation Rainbow, SSS, and the Immigration office. The success of these efforts over the next phase of the project is likely to be determinative of the overall success of the EWS. One CSO representative who works with many organizations in different communities and is familiar with multiple other EWSs pointed out that many members of the public are already tired of sending in SMS because the response is poor and people can't get the help they immediately need. This occurs because the NGOs that manage EWSs have the capacity to receive information but not to act on it. Such information was confirmed by the focal points in Barkin Ladi, a high conflict area, who admitted that there had been incidents in their community where they did not text in because they felt fatalistic, and that even if SFCG/CAPP alerted the security authorities quickly these bodies did not care enough to mobilize an appropriate response. Outside of Barkin Ladi, the focal points and members of the public all believed that the primary purpose of the EWS was to mobilize security resources to come to their aid. It therefore stands to reason that as the SFCG/CAPP gains a longer track record, and as at least two other EWS (JDPC/Operation Rainbow and IMC/CMM-RC) are more fully launched, the overall response level to violent incident reports will receive greater scrutiny by message senders in need, and maintaining the currently high levels of confidence from both stakeholders and community members alike could become difficult. Again, this is a challenge as it may not be the desired purpose or within the scope of the SFCG/CAPP system and SFCG/CAPP needs to make careful decisions moving forward about the purpose and function of the EWS.

Incident reports and monthly mapping reports do not appear to have been used for long-term conflict analysis purposes by the bimonthly participants or security officials. At the fourth bimonthly meeting, SFCG/CAPP distributed the four monthly trend reports together to encourage joint conflict analysis, but a large portion of the bimonthly stakeholders were absent due to a conflicting event at the office of DG Research and Planning. SFCG/CAPP encouraged

the absent members to review the trend data and send in their own analysis. According to SFCG/CAPP, response rates to this request were very low. Furthermore, while many interviewed members of the bimonthly meetings indicated that their attendance had helped them in a general sense to better understand conflict trends, none made any reference to having participated in the conflict analysis exercises.

Overall, although each organization received information from multiple sources, all of the stakeholders believe that the incident reports (SMS and email) and/or their participation in the bimonthly meetings has helped them to gain a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of conflict dynamics in the Jos region. However, actors were only able to provide examples of the short-term utility of EWS information in individual incidents and did not appear to have used the reports for long-term conflict analysis in their work. This is appropriate given that the EWS was a pilot project, but it should become a new area of focus when the program continues.

Recommendations:

If SFCG/CAPP intend for the EWS to assist peace and security actors to "plan and target timely conflict prevention activities"[12], they need to find new ways to do the following:
- ***Increase the quantity and quality of information sent in by focal points and the general public.*** *This will require greater outreach efforts to participants, additional training to focal points, and efforts to increase connectivity, such as an increased frequency of site visits.*
- ***Engage participants and stakeholders around long term analysis and preventive action****. No members of the bimonthly meetings stated a desire for more long-term conflict analysis activities. SFCG/CAPP may need to work with them to create a demand for such efforts in order to increase both stakeholder engagement in the process and utilization of the results.*
- ***Present data from the monthly mapping reports in a more user-friendly and engaging manner.*** *Many bimonthly participants indicated that they either have very busy schedules or do not frequently open their computers. Presenting monthly incident report lists alongside charts, graphs, and summary data on a monthly and quarterly basis will make the information easier to analyze and more accessible to individuals who do not like reading through large quantities of information.*

Additional Recommendations:

- ***SFCG/CAPP will need to strongly prioritize deepening engagement with security actors in order to preserve the trust and credibility it has earned in the eyes of the communities where they work.*** *The general public is primarily interested in immediate security response when they send in messages, and if this is not addressed SFCG/CAPP will not be able to increase public engagement and participation.*

- *In the short and medium term,* ***SFCG/CAPP can and should be more transparent with community members about the objectives and capacities of the project in order for the public to set more realistic and accurate expectations for what will happen when they send in SMS messages.*** *This can also be used to deepen public ownership in the project and increase awareness of conflict resolution and response*

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[12] This is the project's first objectives as stated in the initial proposal to USIP

opportunities that come from the community themselves instead of depending solely on security force response.

- *SFCG/CAPP should more carefully analyze the possible risks of sending the emailed daily incident reports emails to all of their bimonthly members if the text messages are only considered appropriate for immediate responders. More broadly, SFCG and CAPP would benefit for coming up with a clearer, tiered system for who receives what incident alerts in what detail and at what time based on a clearer articulation of the goals of the EWS and the conflict sensitivity risks inherent in the project.*

- *SFCG/CAPP should keep a clear record of outgoing incident messages, their timing, and their response will be important moving forward in order to monitor whether the SMS messages are effectively being used to prevent or respond to violence.*

Bimonthly Meetings

Because this was a pilot project, there were only between 10-15 participants (including an average of 3 SFCG/CAPP staff) out of a total of 24 project "stakeholders" at each bimonthly meeting. Of these participants, eleven were available for interviews. However, STF and Operation Rainbow were not interviewed for the evaluation and their behaviors and preferences regarding the bimonthly meetings, SMS, email, and other aspects of message utility will be critical to ascertain for the future success of the project.

Bimonthly Meeting Attendance Record

	Security	Civil Society	Government	Media	Project Staff	Total
1st Bimonthly Meeting	1	5	0	2	3	11
2nd Bimonthly Meeting	4	5	3	1	3	16
3rd Bimonthly Meeting	NO RECORD- Advocacy Visit to Special Task Force					
4th Bimonthly Meeting	2	3	1	1	6	13
Unique Orgs.[13]	4	5	3	2	2	

Overall, there were four different security bodies, five different civil society organizations, and three different government bodies who participated in the bimonthly meetings. Because bimonthly meetings were held every other month, as opposed to twice in each month, there were only four total meetings held. The third meeting was unique in that it was an advocacy visit

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[13] Unique organizations is the number of separate organizations who participated in bimonthly meetings, as some organizations sent multiple representatives or alternates.

to the STF, and consequently there were functionally three total meetings where the stakeholders met to review SMS incident reports and analyze conflict trends. As a result, the conclusions below based on stakeholder interviews are largely reflective of the views of individuals who participated in less than two meetings on average.

The bimonthly meetings helped to increase participants' level of exposure and awareness to the work of other organizations present. Two organizations specifically referenced that they had either developed new relationships or created synergy with other organizations. This is a valuable change, because according to SFCG, there has been considerable competition among CSOs working on peace issues in the Jos region. Though the meetings have so far not led to an actual increase in coordination or collaboration between bodies,[14] this presents an area for potential growth in future meetings, as was recommended directly by one participant. Some stakeholders also shared that the bimonthly meetings have improved their degree of nuance and understanding of conflict trends. Some even recommended increasing the frequency of the bimonthly meetings or expanding the number of people who are involved.

One of the biggest successes of the bimonthly meetings has been the gradual involvement of the STF and other security bodies. The STF is an especially significant security body because it is perceived as having the capacity and manpower to quickly respond to threats to peace. Operation Rainbow is also a major player in the Jos security architecture. From the beginning of the project, it was difficult for SFCG and CAPP to get these groups to take an interest in attending the bimonthly meetings and engaging with the other organizations present. However, after the bimonthly meeting participants used their third meeting as an advocacy visit to the STF office and with encouragement from the Special Advisor for Peacebuilding, the STF sent a representative to the fourth and final bimonthly meeting. Though the current level of involvement of the STF in bimonthly meetings is very low, the fact that SFCG has gotten them on board is a testament to the considerable effort and difficulty required in connecting with security bodies as well as the significant progress that was made as of the last meeting.

Establishing a connection with security bodies and bringing them to participate in the bimonthly meetings has been essential to building credibility with stakeholders and among the CSO community in Jos. CSOs and community members in Jos have had difficulty gaining direct access and opportunities for dialogue with the STF and other security bodies. According to the 2nd bimonthly meeting notes, it is possible that interagency rivalry among security bodies or a fear of being attacked/criticized has muted the enthusiasm of organizations like Operation Rainbow and STF to engage with CSOs. In this context, four of the stakeholders emphasized, unprompted, that one of the biggest gains of the SFCG EWS was bringing security forces together to meet with civil society organizations, and that such civil/military cooperation was fairly unprecedented and extremely valuable.

Several bimonthly meeting participants believe that the bimonthly meetings have helped to increase collaboration among CSOs in Jos. Though there are not yet many concrete examples of this collaboration, getting many CSOs into a shared meeting to discuss conflict

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[14] One organization mentioned an instance of direct collaboration with their organization- a joint sporting match with a security organization. Given the frequency of vague or irrelevant responses in this person's interview, the example might not be credible, or at least connected back to the EWS project.

trends appears to have been progress, and many members indicated that they are now more aware of the work others are doing.

Both of the security bodies interviewed believe that their participation in the bimonthly meetings generally helped them to share information with others and be more alert to the security challenges in their community. Said one, attending the bimonthly meetings had "helped us to see far more than where we were seeing- the work of SFCG has helped us to come closer to look at the issues more properly than ever before." Neither agency could provide a concrete example of something they had learned that had helped them in their security role, though one noted that he was glad to have gotten to know CAPP better.

Recommendations:
- *Consider increasing the frequency of the bimonthly meetings, especially during periods of greater violence.*

- *Consider using the bimonthly meetings to go beyond analyzing the incident reports but also to coordination action and response.*

Technology Systems

Crowdmap Website

During the spring of 2013, SFCG/CAPP created a website for the EWS using the Crowdmap platform. All the incidents from that point forward have been put on the map, but this does not include all of the incidents from the over 100 messages received during December. SFCG/CAPP discussed this website at their second training and at stakeholder bimonthly meetings. Around April, SFCG and CAPP switched from categorizing all incidents among three categories: a) peaceful reports/rumors, b) violence/killing/murder/death/massacre, and c) bomb blast/gunshot/tear gas to calling all incidents "trusted reports." These previous categories had been chosen by SFCG/CAPP because staff felt that these were the three most common categories of incidents in Plateau. To date, not all of the incident reports are on the website, as the website was launched in the spring and only includes incidents that were received from that point forward.

Though almost all of the stakeholders have heard of the Crowdmap website, none have visited the website and are unlikely to do so. Of the eleven stakeholders who were interviewed for this evaluation, ten of them had heard of the Crowdmap website. Most of the stakeholders had been introduced to the Crowdmap website at one of the bimonthly meetings where the website was mentioned or projected. However, among these ten stakeholders, none of them had ever actually visited it. Common reasons for not visiting the website included busyness, lack of regular computer use, and feeling sufficiently informed by the SMS and email incident alerts that the website was not seen as having a unique added value. Two interviewees also mentioned that they hadn't been "properly introduced" to the website or had heard that it was being developed but did not know that it was completed. Regardless of the reason for not viewing the website, none of the interviewees indicated a strong desire or willingness to check out the website later.

Similarly to the stakeholders, none of the project focal points or members of the public who participated in focus group discussions had visited the website, and only few of them had heard about it. In two of the four focus groups, focal point participants had not heard of the website at all. Among, the other two, one person had received SFCG/CAPP's blast SMS with the website information and all participants from both focus groups had heard about the website from the training, but none had visited. Most importantly, among focal point participants and even more strongly among public participants, the idea of a website with the incidents mapped had very low resonance. The combination of very low levels of internet access, internet use, and internet literacy meant that almost everyone from the public and a majority of focus group participants rarely use the internet.

Overall, the website appears to not have been used by stakeholders, focal points, and members of the public. None of these groups showed any particular interest in looking at the website in the future. When this issue was raised with the SFCG project team, it was pointed out that there may be some other organizations, such as UnLock, who look at and reference the website. However, because none of these organizations were interviewed as part of the evaluation, it was not possible to verify whether they were actually looking at and using the website.

Recommendations:

- *If the purpose of the EWS is to prevent violence rather than just respond to it, the three categories used previously are likely not the most useful. SFCG and CAPP should consider choosing incident categories that are more useful with an early response function and be sure that trained focal points know the difference. More broadly, the*

project should do more to distinguish between preventive and responsive objectives of the EWS so that the project decision making can be better tailored.

- *When the EWS project continues, program managers need to make a strategic decision about whether or not to continue using the Crowdmap website. Continuing the website may not be a strategic use of staff time and budget, considering its current low rates of use, the lack of interest in the website among focal points, members of the public, and stakeholders, and limited internet/computer access (for many focal points and members of the public).*

- *If the website will be continued, managers should carefully and more narrowly define the website's primary user and what that user will seek to gain from the website. This way, the website can be more carefully tailored to the needs of that group.*
  - *If users are defined as a broader public audience, SFCG/CAPP should think through issues of limited access to and familiarity with computers and using the internet.*
  - *If users are defined as focal points, there is a tradeoff to consider in training them to report via the website with training them on other, likely more crucial topics, such as community outreach and incident categorization. Sometimes simple systems work better and are easier to understand.*
  - *If users are defined as stakeholders, it may be difficult to convince them to take time to regularly check the website given their active schedules. It would also create a fourth interface for them to engage, given that they already receive SMS, emails, and attend bimonthly meetings, and that SFCG has identified the need to strengthen stakeholder engagement in the latter two. Again, SFCG should consider the net value of having stakeholders use the website with the time and energy it takes to get them more engaged in bimonthly meetings and regular conflict analysis.*
  - *If users are defined as an audience that is more external to the project participants, SFCG should consider whether or not targeting such actors works to support the overall project goal and objectives.*

- *Regardless of how users are defined, if the website is continued it will need a much more targeted marketing campaign so that people not only know that the website exists but so that they understand the added value of visiting the site and visit it more regularly.*

- *Users of the Crowdmap platform should learn how to use the website management/analytics tools to more effectively monitor usage data in order to improve site visibility and utility.*

Frontline SMS

Regular problems with the Frontline SMS system have impeded the successful functioning of the EWS. For the last two months of the project, CAPP was unable to successfully send a blast SMS message. Even though the Frontline SMS system shows the message as "sent", test messages sent by CAPP to a phones of staff members and friends were not received. CAPP has also had to regularly move data from the Frontline SMS system into Microsoft Excel in order to have more storage space, though unfortunately this has resulted in a loss of some data on individual messages such as the names of the sender or location where the message was sent from. For the same reason, SFCG/CAPP had to move all the sent blast messages from the Frontline SMS system, but did not save these messages. As a result, it

was not possible to determine in the evaluation how many messages were sent, who they were sent to, and when they were sent.

Recommendation:

- *SFCG/CAPP should keep separate records of all information sent through the Frontline SMS system in order to enable analysis when the Frontline SMS system runs out of storage space or encounters errors.*

Other Early Warning Systems

There are at least two other large scale EWSs run by NGOs or civil society organizations in the Jos region. One is funded run by the CMM-RC in conjunction with other organizations such as IMC. The second is run by JDPC in conjunction with Operation Rainbow. Though neither of these two systems are yet fully operational, they speak to the growing trend of using SMS EWS to predict and respond to conflict. There have also been various attempts by security agencies to set up an independent security hotline.

The majority of bimonthly meeting participants had heard of at least one other NGO-run EWS besides SFCG/CAPP. In general they did not express wariness about the potential for overlap or competition among multiple systems but believed that the organizing bodies should work to integrate their efforts to avoid duplication. Importantly, however, one bimonthly meeting participant who works with a wide range of NGO groups and many communities around Jos said that there are community members who are already experience some degree of EWS fatigue.

Recommendation:
- *SFCG will need to work to be both collaborative and competitive when the market of other EWSs in Jos continues to grow. To do this will require meaningfully forming a tighter bond with security so that they come to increasingly trust and rely on information from SFCG/CAPP. SFCG will also need to conduct stronger, clearer messaging to make sure that the public is not easily confused between SMS systems and understands how to engage with SFCG/CAPP. Finally, SFCG should work closely with other EWS coordinators to avoid overlap, public fatigue, and to maximize the combination of resources.*

6. Recommendations

In addition to the many specific recommendations written throughout the report, there are four higher level changes that SFCG/CAPP should prioritize implementing in future iterations of their EWS program:

1. **More purposefully define program objectives around conflict prevention or rapid response**. The project's original design language focused heavily on improving the ability of NGOs and security bodies to conduct strategic, long term conflict analysis, yet in practice many of the activities and design components of the EWS focused much more on rapid response. This creates confusion in the program design and over the long term is likely to inhibit the achievement of project objectives. For instance, most of the categories in the Crowdmap website- like killings and cattle rustling- are not terribly useful for conflict prevention because the conflict has already occurred. Meanwhile, key conflict prevention data like demographic trends, social changes, and new economic realities are not considered. To add to the complication, community members voiced strongest support for having the EWS improve the timing and professionalism of security responses to violent incidents and did not voice the same interest in improving NGO response capacity. As a result while there may be some overlap between the type of information and activities that are useful for both conflict prevention and rapid response, these are different objectives that each necessitate separate strategic planning and program design.

2. **Prioritize solidifying relationships with security actors**. Bimonthly stakeholders stated repeatedly that one of the main values for them in attending the bimonthly meetings was the opportunity to meet with security actors. Likewise, as mentioned above, security response is both a top priority *and an expectation* among focal points and the general public regarding outcomes of the EWS. SFCG and CAPP will need to continue to put improving dialogue, trust, and cooperation with security actors among their highest priorities in order to preserve public trust and engagement.

3. **Conduct a larger and more strategic outreach campaign to engage the general public**. Outreach for the pilot project was conducted on a limited budget of $1000 and while some of the public focus group participants had seen posters or T-shirts, many were still not well informed about the project and had not bothered to copy the EWS number. Given that the EWS only received a very small number of messages for the entirety of 2013, a bigger effort is needed to engage the public in sending messages and to educate them on what types of messages to send. Furthermore, if members of the public are to be engaged as early warning reporters, they need to receive regular, consistent, and well-rehearsed community outreach efforts so that they not only receive the number to text into, but know what information to text in and why. It is also important that they develop appropriate expectations of project outcomes so that they continue to trust the EWS and SFCG/CAPP.

4. **Conduct strategic data analysis of SMS Messages.** SFCG should categorize and review all SMSs on a weekly, biweekly, or monthly basis to strengthen core programmatic decision making. When text messages are exported into Microsoft Excel, manually supplement the information categories provided by the Frontline SMS System with additional categories. Suggested categories include but are not limited to:

- o Incident, Rumor, Peace/Other: Useful to determine what percentage of messages are reporting actual incidents, what areas the spread of rumors represents a conflict risk, levels of comprehension between focal points and the public in each area about what to report on. Subsequent analysis could be used to make decisions about the quantity and content of future outreach, field visits, communication, and training as well as trust building with message senders.
- o Type of incident: Useful to determine long term conflict patterns and to identify prevailing threats to security at a point in time in each community. Subsequent analysis could be used to identify which incidents SFCG should choose to follow up on with security in order to monitor whether the EWS is fulfilling a rapid response function.
- o Incident location: See above with "Type of incident."
- o Incident identification code: Useful to determine how many incident reports each incident typically receives, which focal points in a community reported an incident, what percentage of incident reports per incident contained full and accurate information, and to count how many total incidents were reported in a given time period. Subsequent analysis could be used to determine which communities to target with follow up support, which focal points and members of the public to provide with additional training.
- o Gender or religion of sender: Useful to determine whether men/women and Christians/Muslims are sending in more messages and which type of message each group is more likely to send. Subsequent analysis could be used to determine the targeting of future outreach and training efforts. It could also be applied to determine whether each group is reporting on incidents caused by their own group as well as incidents caused by other groups.
- o Verification status, person/agency, and timing: Useful to determine the percentage of incidents reported that are verified, how long verification takes, whether verification is sufficient, and how many people verified an incident. Subsequent analysis could be used to determine how and whether to improve verification procedures.
- o Follow up status and organization: Useful to determine what happens to messages once they are sent to stakeholders and other authorities. Subsequent analysis could be used to determine which agencies to target for follow up engagement, which agencies to target each incident to.

Furthermore, when exporting messages to Microsoft Excel, SFCG/CAPP should make sure that data about the message sender and location are properly transferred into the spreadsheet. This may require additional technical assistance on using the Frontline SMS system. SFCG/CAPP should also keep regular records of the content, time/date, and intended recipients of all SMS blast messages. This will help to track project outputs and also make strategic decisions about the quantity, timing, and audience of future message blasts. Lastly, as the project scales up, SFCG/CAPP should track the actual incidents of violence in each community through media content analysis so that they can compare this to the data they receive through the EWS and adjust their outreach and follow up strategies accordingly.

Annex I: Organizations at Bimonthly Meetings

Please find below a complete list of the organizations who participated in the bimonthly meetings, followed by, in parentheses, the number of meetings that organization attended.

Government
- DG Research and Planning Office (2)
- Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (2)
- Special Advisor for Peacebuilding Office (1)

Civil Society
- Center for the Advocacy of Justice and Rights (1)
- CBD-NGO Forum (1)
- Christian Association in Nigeria (CAN) (1)
- Community Action for Populat Participation (CAPP) (4)
- Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC) (1)
- Jama'atu Nasril Isla (JNI) (2)
- Justice Development and Peace Caritas (JDPC) (1)
- Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP) (2)
- Plateau Peace Practitioner's Network (PPPN)/Aporimac (3)
- Red Cross (1)
- Search for Common Ground (SFCG) (4)

Security
- Nigerian Immigration Service Plateau State Command (2)
- Operation Rainbow (1)
- Special Task Force Operation (STF) (1)
- State Security Services (SSS) (3)

Media
- Plateau Radio and Television Cooperation (PRTVC) (3)
- Channel TV (1)

Annex II: Sample Daily Incident Report

Country or territory: Nigeria

Affected area (s): Plateau state

Incident: Incident Report (December 30, 2012)

Incident description: According to reports reaching us ▮▮▮▮ community is calm. However there is tension in ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ as two people were shot yesterday near ▮▮▮▮ and one died. The Vigilante group was making frantic effort to put the situation under control. A contact reported the presence of ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ who were shooting while community members were protesting. Two choppers were seen in the surveying the area. Four reports were received today.

Analysis: Plateau State has been faced with lingering ethno-religious crisis, especially in the four local government areas namely Jos North, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi and Riyom. This prompted the Federal Government to declare state of emergency in these council areas along with eleven others in the country to halt the act of bestiality in vogue in these areas occasioned by the endemic activities of terrorist groups. The four affected local government areas in Plateau State have been under severe siege and attack in the past two years and efforts to arrest the pathetic situations by the government have yet to achieve positive result. Both the state and the federal governments have adopted various approaches to tame the ugly trend without any headway. There have been clashes by unknown gunmen suspected to be Fulani herdsmen and the Beroms. Remote villages have been most of the victims of these attacks with attackers often escaping before the arrival of security agents.

Advice: People are advised to remain calm and report any suspicious movement or persons to security personnel. People are further advised to maintain a low profile, and avoid places of attacks immediately after attacks to prevent reprisal, and avoid travel after dark as far as practically possible

For further information and/or advice please contact SFCG/CAPP on 002348136341015 (08136341015) or at https://frontlinesmsplateaustate.crowdmap.com/ & Email: SearchinJos@sfcg.org

Annex III: Sample Weekly Report

Country or territory: Nigeria

Affected area (s): ██

Incident: Weekly Report (Dec 8 –Dec 15 2012)

Incident description: This week five (5) reports were received some reporting tensions and others reporting peace in their communities. An SMS blast was sent inquiring if there was a problem in the communities. We received a report from a contact reporting that █████ community in ██████ was attacked and a woman was killed while two were hospitalised. The information received was forwarded to our security contacts. The striking workers continued with protest and were addressed at the gate of the ███████████████████, where they were addressed by ███████████ and the new ██████████████████████████. Policemen were deployed in the secretariat and other government offices to forestall outbreak of violence. Media reports reported the burning of 3 houses by angry striking workers in ████████, the houses belonged to the ██ ███.

Analysis: Plateau State has been faced with lingering ethno-religious crisis, especially in the four local government areas namely Jos North, Jos South, Barakin-Ladi and Riyom. This prompted the Federal Government to declare state of emergency in these council areas along with eleven others in the country to halt the act of bestiality in vogue in these areas occasioned by the endemic activities of terrorist groups. The four affected local government areas in Plateau State have been under severe siege and attack in the past two years and efforts to arrest the pathetic situations by the government have yet to achieve positive result. Both the state and the federal governments have adopted various approaches to tame the ugly trend without any headway. There have been clashes by unknown gunmen suspected to be Fulani herdsmen and the Beroms. Remote villages have been most of the victims of these attacks with attackers often escaping before the arrival of security agents.

Advice: People are advised to remain calm and report any suspicious movement, object or persons to security personnel. People are further advised to maintain a low profile, and avoid places of attacks immediately after attacks to prevent reprisal, and avoid travel after dark as far as practically possible

For further information and/or advice please contact SFCG/CAPP on 002348136341015 (08136341015) or at https://frontlinesmsplateaustate.crowdmap.com/ & Email: SearchinJos@sfcg.org

Annex IV: Bimonthly Meeting Participants Interview Questions

General

1. Assuming that I have no prior knowledge of the project, and that I have never heard of SFCG or the EWS, how would you describe this project to me?
2. How did you become involved in the project?

SMS System

1. Did you receive any SMS messages? How many did you receive?
2. What was in them?
3. What did you think about them when you received them?
4. Were they useful? Were they helpful? Did they give you any new ideas to help with your work?

EWS Website[15]

1. Have you heard about the EWS website?
2. Did you ever go to the website? Why/not? If so, how many times?
3. How long did you stay on the website, for the times that you went?
4. Why did you go back (or not?) What did you use it for?
5. What did you look at on the website?
6. Was it useful? Did you learn anything?
7. Did other people from your organization go to the website? Why/not?
8. How were the incidents on the website categorized? Were these categories useful?

Emailed Reports

1. Did you receive any reports from SFCG as part of this project? What reports did you receive?
2. Were they sent to you directly or to another person in your office?
3. Did each person in your office have access to them?
4. How often did they come? Did they arrive in a regular, timely way?
5. Did the reports share information that was new for you or did you usually already know about what was in them?
6. Once the reports came into your office, who read them? How often were they read? By who? How long after the information came in would you read the reports?
7. What did you do with the information from the reports? Why? From which reports?
8. Overall did you find them useful? Informative? Which parts of the reports?
9. If SFCG were to send out these reports again in the future, what would you recommend that they do the same? Differently?

Bimonthly Meetings

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[15] Since none of the participants had visited the website, the majority of the questions in this section were never asked.

1. How many meetings did someone from your organization attend? How many did you attend? Why were you/not consistent?
2. Did you find these meetings useful? Why/not?
3. Did they help you to be more informed or you already knew everything going on?
4. Did you do anything differently as a result of these meetings?
5. Did these meetings help you at all in working more or better with other people who attended the meetings?
6. Did these meetings help you at all in your level of understanding about the conflict trends in this area?
7. Since you have been involved in this project, has the overall amount of information on conflict trends that you have received changed? What about the quality of information?
8. What was the role of EWS website, reports, and meetings in these changes? Which were the most/least useful and why?
9. If SFCG were to do this project again, what would you recommend that they do the same? Differently?
10. Overall, has your organization been more, less, or about the same in its ability to respond to conflicts as a result of this project?

Conclusion

1. When SFCG continues this project, what would you recommend that they do the same? Differently?
2. Is there anything else that I did not ask about that you would like to share with me today!

Thank you for your time!

Annex V: Focal Points/Public Focus Group Discussion Questions

<u>General</u>

1. If I were coming from another area in Nigeria, how would you explain this EWS project to me?
2. How did you become involved in this project? What was your role? (focal points)
3. How did you hear about this project and the SMS number? (public)

<u>Training (focal points only)</u>

1. Did you receive any training? How many did you go to?
2. What did you learn at the training? Did you like the training? Was it useful to you?
3. How were the first and second trainings different? Which did you like better and why?

<u>SMS Sending</u>

1. How many people here sent in an SMS? How many did you send? How many went through?
2. Did you have any network problems with your messages? How frequently?
3. What was it like using the SMS system? Was it easy or confusing? Why?
4. How many of you used flash messages?
5. In general, which one did you use more- SMS or flash? Why/not?
6. In practice, were there incidents that you knew about that you did not report? Why?
7. What happened after you sent in your SMSs? Was there any follow up response? How many people had this response?

<u>Outreach (focal points only)</u>

1. How many of you shared what you learned at the training with other members of your community? Tell me about your experience.
2. How many of you helped share posters, brochures, or announcements to other people?

<u>SMS Blasts</u>

1. How many people here received an SMS blast message?
2. What was the content of the SMS blasts?
3. What did you think of these SMS blasts? Did you do anything differently after you got them? Did they give you any new ideas or information?
4. If SFCG continues these messages, would you want more of them, less, or about the same frequency?

<u>EWS Website</u>[16]

1. How many of you have heard before about the EWS website?

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[16] Since only one person reported visiting the website and could offer few details on his/her experience, most of the questions in this section were not asked. Instead, the evaluator focused on understanding the frequency with which focus group participants go on the internet and their level of interest in visiting the website in the future.

2. For those of you who did hear about it, how did you hear about it?
3. For those of you who know about it, did you ever actually go to the website? Why/not?
4. For those of you who knew about the website but did not go, why did you not go to the website?
5. For people who did go to the website, what were you expecting?
6. What was your experience actually like?
7. How long did you stay on the website?
8. What did you look at on the website?
9. Did you like the website? Why/not? Would you go back? Why/not? Did you learn anything useful?

Closing

1. Have you heard of any other SMS early warning systems operating in Jos? Do you use them? What is it like having multiple systems?
2. If SFCG were to run this program again, what would you recommend that they do the same?
3. What would you recommend that they do differently?
4. Do you have any questions? Anything else you would like to add that I didn't ask about already?
5. Thank you for your time!!!!!

Annex VI: Biography of Evaluator

Kelsi Stine is the Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation Specialist for SFCG in the Middle East and North Africa. At SFCG, she provides DM&E technical support to projects for Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Yemen, and Bahrain. In 2012, she evaluated a SFCG project in Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia on a crosss-cultural youth theatre project. Prior to joining SFCG, she worked as a Program Officer at Beyond Conflict, where she worked on peacebuilding projects in Bahrain, Cuba, and Kosovo, and at the Asia Foundation in Sri Lanka. A graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, she has an academic background in DM&E, peacebuilding, and anti-corruption.