

Missionary Activity, Education, and Long-run Political Development: Evidence from Africa*

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Abstract

In Africa, missionaries used schooling to gain adherents. We study how historical missionary activity shaped long-run education and political development by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation on exposure to Catholic missionaries, generated by their territorial administration system. Restricting to the sample of modern-day villages near Catholic diocese borders circa 1910, we proxy for villages exposure to Catholic missionaries with the proximity to their historical diocese’s headquarters. We show that such proximity led to increased presence of Catholic missionaries and has long-term positive effects on Catholic identification and educational outcomes. In line with recent literature, the effects on political outcomes depend on regime type. Only individuals exposed to greater historical missionary activity in open anocracies—relative to those in democracies and closed anocracies—are more likely to participate in politics. Only these individuals are all more sophisticated, supportive of democratic institutions, and disenchanted with the state of democracy and incumbent in their countries.

Keywords: human capital; missions; political development

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As Europeans established settlements and colonies worldwide beginning in the fifteenth century, they sought to spread their Judeo-Christian faiths, particularly through missionary activity. Alongside and complementary to their drive to convert the local populations to Christianity, many European missionaries provided Western-style education to local populations and laid the foundations for future educational institutions. In Africa, the presence of missionaries has been found to have positive effects on long-run educational outcomes (Cagé and Rueda, 2016; Nunn, 2010; Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta, 2015). In particular, in settings where Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed, there is a higher quality provision of education and attainment (Bassey, 1999; Gallego and Woodberry, 2010).

The institutions that Catholic and Protestant missionaries established not only had long-run effects on education, but potentially also in political development. Tusalem (2009) and Woodberry (2012) argue that Protestant missionaries contributed to democratic transition and consolidation around the world. They highlight the importance of missionaries in establishing educational institutions and imparting civic-minded values. Alesina et al. (2021) further point to Christian missions as one of the strongest correlates behind intergenerational mobility in educational attainment in Africa.

Education has long been considered “the great equalizer” among members of a society (Mann, 1848). It is considered not only a source of human capital generation, but also a catalyst and a prerequisite for democratic political participation and “civic culture” (Almond and Verba, 2015; Deutsch, 1961). As countries develop and there are greater educational opportunities, citizens are expected to be better able to engage in politics both directly by casting an informed vote and indirectly by participating in their flourishing civil society (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 2006; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007).

Yet, despite some empirical support for the positive effect of education on political engagement (Dee, 2004; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004), the literature remains inconclusive about the role that education, and its associated higher

socioeconomic status levels, plays in political participation (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011).¹ Recent literature even underscores the importance of accounting for regime type in developing democracies to understand how education affects the degree and the nature of political engagement by the citizens living in those societies (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017).

We revisit this perennial question in political science in the context of missionary activity in the African context. We assess not only whether historical education-granting institutions matter for long-run political engagement, but also how and why regime types matter to understand how education shapes political development. To understand whether countries that satisfy what is seen as a “prerequisite” for democracy effectively transition to it, we must understand how their educated citizens interact with the political sphere. Even with enhanced abilities for political participation, educated individuals might not necessarily participate more unless schooling imparts them with civic values and they perceive a positive return from it.

Despite the recent proliferation of studies concerning the long-run consequences of missionary activity, causal identification has been challenging due to confounding demographic and geographic conditions, and institutional choices. Across the African continent, missionaries settled in densely populated areas where there were less environmental and geographic obstacles (Johnson, 1967). Moreover, the establishment of European settlements subsequently affected the local institutions’ degree of inclusiveness and drove economic development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007).

To deal with endogeneity concerns, we exploit unique features of the allocation of Catholic missionaries across space. While Protestant missionary activity was largely decentralized and endogenous to the local demographic and geographic characteristics, Catholic activity was

¹Education is usually considered a bundle variable, as it is associated with other factors often thought to influence political participation such as civic attitudes, higher income, etc. (Dee, 2004; Finkel, 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).

coordinated at the diocese level. Consequently, the presence of Catholic missionaries depended highly on the proximity to the diocese’s headquarters. The identifying assumption of our regression discontinuity design (RDD) is that, for villages near a historical Catholic diocese border, the diocese on which a village landed was exogenous to the village characteristics, and so was the proximity to the assigned diocese’s headquarters.

Using respondents from the third to sixth rounds of the Afrobarometer, we restrict our sample to modern-day villages near the borders dividing Catholic dioceses circa 1910. We proxy for exposure to Catholic missionaries by using proximity to the diocese’s headquarters. The closer a village is to its corresponding diocese’s headquarters, the more likely the Catholic missionary activity. Consequently, individuals living in such border villages closer to their diocese’s headquarters should have experienced better educational opportunities, which we argue persist to today. Not only did European missionaries begin imparting education in the region, but they also laid the groundwork for the post-colonial educational institutions (Dupraz, 2019; Feldmann, 2016). Initial spatial differences in education were further reinforced by subsequent investments in education and by civil service recruitment practices that focused on levels of literacy (Huillery, 2009; Ricart-Huguet, 2021).

We estimate the impact of historic educational institutions across various individual-level economic, social, and in particular, political engagement outcomes. Given the emerging literature on the importance of regime type in explaining education’s impact on political engagement (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017), we further disaggregate our results on political outcomes across democracies, open anocracies (i.e. competitive authoritarian regimes), and closed anocracies (i.e. *quasi* dictatorships), as measured by corresponding country Polity scores.

Using our RDD, we first corroborate that proximity in 1910 to the diocese’s headquarters predicts Catholic missionary activity around 1920. More importantly, we provide evidence that, within the sample of modern-day villages near the borders dividing Catholic dioceses

circa 1910, the proximity to the diocese’s headquarters is arguably exogenous to various factors known to have affected colonial and missionary settlement (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2018; Johnson, 1967).²

Second, although we show that proximity to the diocese’s headquarters has a positive causal effect on Catholicism today and various measures of education independently of regime type, which corroborates the importance of missionaries in establishing educational institutions, the effects on political outcomes differ largely based on the regime type. We show that the legacy of missionary education in open anocracies—but not in democracies and closed anocracies—led to individuals being more likely to vote and participate in local politics, as measured by contacting their local councilor and participating in community meetings.

Third, we unpack what drives these effects in differential political participation by focusing on two types of outcomes thought to be affected by schooling—political sophistication and civic values—and political attitudes. Only within open anocracies, the legacy of missionary education increased both citizens’ political sophistication—measured by their labor market outcomes, news consumption, and interest in public affairs—and their civic values—measured by increased support for democratic institutions, while also reducing satisfaction with democracy and support for the incumbent. Within closed anocracies, missionary exposure contributed to stronger civic values, as well as dissatisfaction with democracy and the incumbent, but it did not translate into greater political sophistication. In turn, in democracies, the legacy of missionary education led to greater relative political sophistication, but not to stronger civic values or dissatisfaction with democracy and the incumbent.

Our results, which are robust to multiple specification and sample choices, convey and advance two main ideas. First, we show that historical Catholic missionary activity had causal, positive long-run effects on religious identification and educational and economic outcomes.

²We also show that our results are robust to using country fixed effects and thus deal with the concern that some of the dioceses’ borders coincide with country borders.

Second, we convey the heterogeneous effects, depending on regime type, of Catholic missionary activity on political participation. Contrary to early work (Lipset, 1959; Deutsch, 1961; Woodberry, 2012), these effects are concentrated in open anocracies, which offer both opportunities and incentives for educated citizens to participate in politics. In line with more recent work (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017) In Africa, these findings reinforce that, to understand how education affects political engagement, close attention should be paid to the regime type where individuals operate.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the political economy of missionary activity, and how it allows us to test for the long-run effects of greater educational opportunities on political development. We then outline the debate in the literature concerning the effects of education on political engagement and present our hypotheses on the long-run effects of historical missionary activity on political outcomes. Next, we describe our identification strategy and data. Finally, we present our main findings and discuss their implications for understanding the effect of education on political participation.

1 The political economy of missions

As Europeans colonized a sizable share of the habitable world, missionaries preceded them or followed suit. Missionaries tried to convert local populations to Christianity. In doing so, they relied on a wide variety of tactics: from forced conversions throughout colonial Latin America to enticements by providing education in many parts of Africa and Asia. The tactics employed varied greatly depending on the colonial setting and had important long-run economic effects.

Throughout modern-day Latin America, Catholic missionaries had an advantage over Protestant ones. Being the state religion of Spain and Portugal, they enjoyed support from the Crown in spreading Catholicism and converting the local populations. In a monopolist setting, most Catholic missionaries in Latin America did not emphasize education as a means

to entice individuals to join their faith.³

In contrast, Africa experienced both Catholic and Protestant missionary presence. [Johnson \(1967\)](#) underscores the role of population densities, proximity to coastal and inland trade routes, and geographic endowments in determining where missionaries established physical institutions to attract the local population. Missionaries wanted to maximize their number of converts and established themselves in the most suitable locations ([Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2018](#); [Johnson, 1967](#); [Woodberry and Shah, 2004](#)).

Although there is a strong correlation between the number of Catholic or Protestant missions in a modern-day African country and the predominant religion of its colonizers, for the most part, the colonizing power permitted rival missionaries in its territories. [Gallego and Woodberry \(2010\)](#), for example, highlight how the Portuguese allowed Protestant missionaries to operate in its African domains as long as they restricted their operations to a set distance—usually 20 kilometers—from Catholic missions.

While Protestant missionaries were largely geographically unrestricted in their operation, Catholic missionaries were organized within the boundaries of their respective dioceses.⁴ For example, in modern South Africa, a Catholic mission within the Central Cape Colony diocese could not operate or seek converts in the Eastern or Western Cape Colony dioceses. The initial dioceses' boundaries on the continent were set by the Vatican based on the areas of the European colonies on the continent.⁵ The exact colonial boundaries established by Europeans were relatively arbitrary ([Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002](#); [Hargreaves, 1985](#); [McCauley and Posner, 2015](#); [Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013](#)).

³Some Catholic missionaries did provide quality education. [Valencia Caicedo \(2019\)](#), for example, documents the positive, long-run effects of Jesuit missionaries on human capital development in the Southern Cone.

⁴This is aside from any restrictions placed by the European power with jurisdiction over a set territory.

⁵Although these boundaries changed after most countries in the region gained independence in the 1950s and the 1960s, we are concerned with the legacy of the initial, historic distribution of missions circa 1910. Since the boundaries sometimes overlapped with country borders, we show robustness to including country fixed effects.

Woodberry and Shah (2004) and Gallego and Woodberry (2010) assert that the operational freedom of Protestant missions relative to that of Catholic ones generated competition between them, pushing Protestant missionaries to offer higher quality education in order to attract more converts in Catholic colonies. In Africa, the presence of both Catholic and Protestant missionaries had spurred investment in educational institutions. Not wanting to lose out on potential converts, Catholic missionaries invested in education in areas where they competed with Protestant ones. Importantly, the education imparted by missionaries was not necessarily aimed at the masses or particular nation (identity)-building initiatives (Taylor, 1984), as it was with other education-expansion initiatives in other moments in history (Paglayan, 2020).

Recent empirical evidence underscores the positive educational effects of historical missionary activity. Nunn (2010) provides one of the first empirical tests on how historical missionary activity in Africa led to better educational attainment outcomes today. He shows that Protestant missionaries equally educated men and women, whereas Catholic missionaries were biased toward educating men. Cogneau and Moradi (2014), and Wantchekon, Klačnja and Novta (2015), furthermore, underscore the role of missions in Africa in providing venues to gain literacy and improve economic development. More recently, using census data to examine intergenerational mobility in educational attainment across 27 countries in Africa, Alesina et al. (2021) show that Christian missions are one the strongest correlates behind such mobility.⁶

The effects of missionary activity are not limited to educational and economic outcomes. Cagé and Rueda (2016) document higher propensity of voting among individuals close to missions with the printing press. Woodberry (2012) further shows that countries with a higher

⁶While beyond the scope of this paper, there are many reasons that the literature has explored what is behind the persistence in educational outcomes, including availability of teachers (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2013), which was one of the main constraints faces by many universal primary education programs implemented in Africa (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017), parental investments (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2012), and occupational choices (Valencia Caicedo, 2019), among others.

historical presence of Protestant missions are associated with modern liberal democratic institutions. He highlights the efforts of Protestant missionaries in increasing educational access, literacy, and communal organizations, among other factors, in explaining this pattern. [Tusalem \(2009\)](#) further underscores the role of Protestant populations in contributing to democratic consolidation among transitional states.

Overall, missionaries have had a positive impact on modern-day literacy rates, and access to media—in particular print—resources. Although there are recent studies highlighting the positive, macro effects of missions on democratic institutions ([Woodberry, 2012](#)), no previous study has fully delved into the causal implications of missionary activity on individual political engagement and attitudes. Moreover, most of this literature suffers from endogeneity concerns. In turn, we exploit plausibly exogeneity in historical Catholic missionary presence to underscore its role in long-run political development. In doing so, we build on recent work suggesting that the effect of education on political participation varies in Africa across regime types.

2 Human capital and political engagement

A perennial debate in political science concerns how education, and its associated socioeconomic gains, affect individuals’ degree of political engagement. Dating back to [Mann \(1848\)](#) and [Lipset \(1959\)](#), education has been deemed a “prerequisite” for democracy and for an active and engaged populace. In the developing world, in particular, early theories on modernization underscore the need for educated masses for meaningful transitions to democracy and political stability ([Huntington, 2006](#); [Lipset, 1959](#)).

Education and its associated higher socioeconomic status are thought to be powerful drivers of civic attitudes and a concern for public life ([Deutsch, 1961](#); [Verba and Nie, 1972](#); [Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995](#)). The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive on the causal effects of education on political engagement and democratic attitudes. Although

some findings underscore the positive role of education on political participation, broadly defined (Dee, 2004; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004), others question their causality (Marshall, 2016) and whether there is an association at all (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011).

More recent work further suggests that the effect of education on individuals' degree of political engagement in African developing democracies depends on the regime type of their polity (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017). Under authoritarian regimes, educated voters may deliberately disengage, since their participation might not only have a limited effect in the political sphere, but may also legitimize the leader by signaling support for the regime (Croke et al., 2016). In turn, when democratic institutions are sufficiently strong, education increases political participation because it is a venue for political change (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017). Lastly, in relatively consolidated African democracies where policy differentiation across parties is limited, those who are more educated might see no differential return to participating in politics since there is little margin for changes in policy.

The literature on missionary activity and on the link between education and political engagement then allow us to make several predictions about the long-run effects of missionary activity on education and political development in Africa. First, following the extensive evidence on missionaries' attempts to convert the population via offering education, we hypothesize that missionary activity has lasting positive effects on contemporaneous religiosity and education outcomes:

Hypothesis 1 *Missionary activity led to a persistent increase in religiosity and education.*

Second, in line with the literature that points to regime type as a key moderating factor between education and political participation, we hypothesize that the positive effects of missionary education on modern political participation concentrated among open anocracies:

Hypothesis 2 *Relative to closed anocracies or democracies, the effect of missionary activity on political participation is most positive in open anocracies.*

Third, we investigate what distinguishes open anocracies from democracies and closed anocracies that would lead to a more positive effect of education on political participation. We hypothesize that open anocracies allow more politically sophisticated, educated individuals to perceive the return to political participation and act on their civic values:

Hypothesis 3 *Historical missionary activity increases both contemporaneous political sophistication and civic values, as well as incentives for political participation, only in open anocracies.*

3 Empirical strategy

This section describes the various data sources from which we draw to capture historic missionary presence, and individual-level religiosity, schooling, and economic and political development across regime type, before outlining our empirical identification strategy. Summary statistics for the pooled sample are in Table A1, for democracies in Table A2, for open anocracies in Table A3, and for closed anocracies in A4.

Data

Our analysis predominantly relies on three data sources: 1) four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys, 2) historical information reflecting missionary activity in Africa circa 1910 and 1920, and 3) data on regime type.

Afrobarometer data

We draw our main dependent variables from the third to the sixth rounds of Afrobarometer data, for which we have geo-coordinates for the sampled villages. These surveys sample

socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes of individuals aged 18 or above. Next, we describe our main outcome variables (see more details in Appendix A).

Since missionaries across the continent used education to convert the natives, our first set of outcome variables concerns religious and educational outcomes, which should capture long-run effects of historical missionary activity. Specifically, for religiosity, we consider an indicator for *Catholic* identification. For educational outcomes, we create an ordinal variable that captures the possible educational levels of a respondent’s *Schooling*. Furthermore, we create indicator variables for having *Any Primary* schooling, and *Any Secondary* schooling.

Our study predominantly concerns the impact of historical missionary exposure on political engagement, both in national and local politics. In particular, for the former, we measure whether a respondent voted (*Voted*) in the last election and whether she contacted a local councilor (*Contacted Local Councilor*). For the latter, we measure whether the respondent attended a community meeting (*Attended Community Meeting*), and whether she *Raised an Issue* at the meeting. Recent work by Finkel (2002) shows that these two types of political participation complement each other strongly.

Education might lead to greater political participation through increased individual sophistication and democratic values, particularly when educated individuals perceive a return from participation. To capture sophistication in various ways, we first look at whether a respondent is employed (*Employed*), which reflects the market value of her skills. Second, we assess a respondent’s interest in politics, as reflected by *Radio News Consumption*, a variable that captures how often she consumes news via the radio, and *Discuss Politics*, a variable that indicates the extent to which a respondent reports discussing politics when with friends and family.

Then, to account for individuals’ democratic values, we consider an index that reflects a respondent’s support for democratic institutions (*Support for Democratic Institutions*), which includes whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, whether the respondent rejects


one-party rule, whether the respondent agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, whether the respondent agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, whether the respondent agrees that the president has to obey laws, whether the respondent agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and whether the respondent supports term limits. Lastly, to capture the return to political participation, first, we consider the extent to which a respondent is satisfied with the democracy in her country (*Satisfied with Democracy*). Second, we measure how a respondent evaluates incumbents performance (*Incumbent Performance*) and whether she expresses that she feels close to the incumbent or the opposition party (*Close to the Incumbent Party* and *Close to an Opposition Party*).

Missionary activity

Our second set of data concerns historical information about the location of Catholic dioceses and their headquarters circa 1910, and missions across Africa around 1920. We obtained and geocoded the Catholic dioceses' boundaries and headquarters circa 1910 from [Streit \(1913\)](#)'s *Atlas Hierarchicus*. We use the data on geocoded Catholic and Protestant missions around 1920 from [Nunn \(2010\)](#). The geocoded dioceses' boundaries and headquarters, as well as the missions from [Nunn \(2010\)](#), are rendered in Figure 1.

Using their villages' geo-coordinates, we spatially mapped the Afrobarometer respondents to their corresponding diocese circa 1910. We then computed the proximity of each respondent's village to their corresponding diocese's headquarters circa 1910, the proximity to the closest diocese's border, and the number of both Catholic and Protestant missions within 50 kilometers. To validate our identification strategy, for Catholic missions, we distinguish between those operating in the dioceses to which the respondent's village belongs from those operating in other neighboring dioceses.

Figure 1: Catholic dioceses' borders, their headquarters, and missions in Africa c. 1910




Notes: The gray boundaries delineate the Catholic dioceses' boundaries and the red triangles the approximate location of their headquarters circa 1910. The blue circles indicate the approximate location of Catholic and Protestant missions around 1920. **Source:** Streit (1913) and Nunn (2010).

Regime type

Lastly, to measure regime type, we use Polity IV data. To show how such data meaningfully captures the strength of democratic institutions in our sample, in Figure 2, we restrict to the Polity IV data that overlaps with the Afrobarometer data,⁷ and plot the main characteristics from which the Polity IV index draws from to create the regime type classifications. On average, democracies—and to a lesser extent, open anocracies—have established rules

⁷The only exception is São tomé and Príncipe for which there is no Polity IV data.

Figure 2: Characteristics of Regime Type




Notes: The Polity IV data is restricted to the observations that overlap with the third to sixth round of Afrobarometer, with exception is São tomé and Príncipe for which there is no polity IV data. We show the mean of the different variables that makeup the Polity IV score by regime type. In parentheses after the variable names, we indicate the maximum score possible based on the Polity IV codebook (“Regulation of Participation” does not have a best score, but a value of three indicates strong sectarian influences and divisions in candidate selection, while a value of one indicates fluid political participation without an overbearing favoritism to a particular group). Democracies always have the largest (“best”) means, followed—for most characteristics—by open anocracies. We include 95% confidence intervals. “E.R.” refers to executive recruitment.

of executive succession (“Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (ER)”), more competition and plurality of representation in executive recruitment (“Competitiveness of ER,” “Openness of ER,” “Regulation of Participation,” and “Competitiveness of Participation”), and “Executive Constraints”.

Identification strategy

To estimate the impact of Catholic missionary activity, we cannot simply leverage the spatial distribution of such missions across Africa. Missionaries established missionary settlements around densely populated areas and where settlement conditions were propitious (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2018; Johnson, 1967). To overcome this endogeneity constraint, we first exploit that, while Protestant missionaries operated relatively freely, Catholic missionaries were circumscribed to their demarcated diocese and overseen from their diocese’s headquarters. As a consequence, the closer to a diocese’s headquarters, the more likely the presence of a Catholic mission.

Figure 3: The intuition behind our identification strategy



Notes: Two border villages are circumscribed within two different dioceses, A and B. The border village in diocese A is relatively closer to its corresponding diocese’s headquarters than the border village diocese B. As a consequence, the former is more likely to experience the presence of Catholic missionaries.

Second, since the distance to the corresponding diocese’s headquarters might be con-

founded, we restrict our sample to modern-day villages near a Catholic diocese border circa 1910. Our identifying assumption is that the diocese on which any such border village landed was exogenous to the village characteristics, and so was the distance to the corresponding diocese’s headquarters. Figure 3 illustrates this considering the case of two villages located at the border of two dioceses, A and B. The border village in diocese A is relatively closer to its corresponding diocese’s headquarters than the border village in diocese B. As a consequence, the former is more likely to experience the presence of Catholic missionaries.

Our baseline specification is a local linear regression discontinuity design that estimates the causal effect of proximity to the dioceses’ headquarters by running the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression within a 10 kilometer bandwidth from the diocese’s border:^{8,9}

$$Y_{i,b,r} = \beta_1 \text{Proximity to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r} + \beta_2 \text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r} + \beta_3 \text{Closer to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r} \times \text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r} + \mathbf{X}_{i,b,r} + \eta_b + \epsilon_{i,b,r}$$

where $Y_{i,b,r}$ is an outcome of interest for respondent i who is close to a dioceses border b during round r , $\text{Proximity to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r}$ is the minus logarithm distance of a respondent’s village to the corresponding diocese’s headquarters, $\text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r}$ is the distance of the village to the closest border, $\text{Closer to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r}$ is an indicator that the village is closer to its dioceses headquarters relative to the villages in the neighboring dioceses at the other side of the border, $\mathbf{X}_{i,b,r}$ is a vector of respondent-level controls including Afrobarometer-round fixed effects, and η_b are border fixed effects. We cluster our standard errors at the border level.

To ease concerns that our results are driven by cherry picking variables or focus on specific point estimates, we draw inferences based on indexes of variables of interest. In particular,

⁸This specification is analytically the same as using a continuous treatment variable—with 0 on the side far away from the diocese headquarters and the average difference between the distances on both sides for the side closest to the headquarters—instead of the minus log distance

⁹We show that results are robust to the choice of bandwidth.

we compute the index by using the α command in Stata, which calculates the standardized index for every observation for which there is a response to at least one variable in the index, as well as the Cronbach’s alpha for variables in the index.

Moreover, following recent work that suggests that education has an effect on political attitudes and engagement that varies across regime type (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017), we are particularly interested in identifying how the effect of interest varies with the extent of democratic institutions. To that end, we estimate equation (1) for three separate samples based on the Polity IV index of respondent corresponding countries at the time they were surveyed: countries that are a *Democracy*, an *Open anocracy*, or a *Closed anocracy*, which mostly includes autocracies.

4 Results

We now present our main findings. We first show that the proximity to the diocese’s headquarters is well balanced across determinants of missionary settlements within the set of villages near a Catholic diocese border circa 1910. We then show that proximity significantly predicts Catholic missionary presence around 1920. We next show that proximity had long-run effects on individuals’ religious identification and schooling.

We then look at the effect that these missionary-induced increases in educational attainment had on political behavior. Although the positive results on socioeconomic outcomes are consistently estimated across regime type, the effects on political engagement differ largely depending on the strength of democratic institutions. While the individuals who experienced greater exposure to historical missionary presence tend to be more politically engaged in open anocracies, they are less engaged in democracies and closed anocracies.

To explain this differential effect across regime types, we first show that historical missionary activity significantly predicts higher levels of political sophistication only in democracies and open anocracies. More educated citizens do not exhibit greater consumption and

discussion of political news in closed anocracies. We then show that missionary activity led to higher support for democratic institutions but greater dissatisfaction with their democracy and their incumbent in open and closed anocracies, but not in democracies. Together, these results paint a picture of only open anocracies in Africa having both the political space as well as the incentives for more educated citizens to become more politically active.

Balance

First, we investigate balance of climatic and geographical covariates. In Table 1, we present the results of OLS regressions using equation 1 for the pooled sample on various predetermined geographic covariates. We show that the historical proximity to the diocese’s headquarters is balanced across climatic and geographic factors known to have affected colonial and missionary settlement (Johnson, 1967). In Panel A, we show balance on climatic and geographic variables known to affect settler mortality. Consistent with chance, only one outcome is significantly associated with proximity at the 10% level.

In Panel B, we show balance on variables capturing privileged locations that facilitated the access to missionaries: distance to historical explorer routes, distance to colonial railways, distance to the closest waterway, distance to the coast, distance to the modern-day capital, and distance to the national border. Also consistent with chance, only one outcome is significantly associated with proximity. In Panel C, we show balance on access to natural resources within 50km: number of diamond mines, number of oil fields, number of gas fields, and an index of cash crop suitability. Lastly, also in Panel C, we show balance on the gender and age of the Afrobarometer respondents in our sample. Overall, these results lend support to the plausibly exogeneity of the proximity to the diocese’s headquarters within the set of villages near a Catholic diocese border circa 1910.

Table 1: Balance

Panel A: Climate and Geography		Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Precipitation	Temperature	Log	Ruggedness	Malaria	TseTse	
		Elevation	Elevation		Index	Index	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0223 (0.0384)	0.0441 (0.0482)	-0.203 (0.131)	-0.132 (0.0814)	-0.145* (0.0838)	-0.0288 (0.0777)	
Observations	9524	9524	9914	9988	10070	8926	
R ²	0.937	0.911	0.855	0.580	0.882	0.758	
Panel B: Location		Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Distance to Explorer Routes	Distance to Colonial Railway	Distance to a Waterway	Distance to Coast	Distance to Capital	Distance to National Border	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0361 (0.0880)	-0.00228 (0.0483)	-0.0717 (0.0950)	-0.288 (0.175)	-0.529*** (0.152)	-0.105 (0.128)	
Observations	10070	10070	10070	10070	10070	10070	
R ²	0.907	0.874	0.819	0.805	0.796	0.824	
Panel C: Natural Resources & Individual Controls		Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Diamonds within 50 km	Oil within 50 km	Gas within 50 km	Cash Crop Suitability	Gender	Age	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.00328 (0.0169)	0.0798 (0.0535)	0.0212 (0.0473)	-0.00171 (0.0925)	0.00326 (0.00310)	-0.0355 (0.0366)	
Observations	10070	10070	10070	9402	10070	9964	
R ²	0.922	0.712	0.855	0.570	0.000	0.061	

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' headquarters in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Missionary presence, religious identification and schooling

Panel A: Missionary Presence & Religious Identification	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Catholic Missions within 50 km	Catholic Missions in neighboring diocese	Catholic today
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.465*** (0.164)	0.0880 (0.0582)	0.0525*** (0.0186)
Observations	10070	10070	9746
R^2	0.755	0.319	0.120
Panel B: Education	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Schooling Ordinal	Any Primary	Any Secondary
Proximity to Diocese Head	0.272*** (0.0820)	0.0326** (0.0131)	0.0591*** (0.0202)
Observations	9945	9945	9945
R^2	0.232	0.191	0.236

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Missionary exposure, religious identification, and education

We now turn to whether historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters significantly predicts Catholic missionary activity. In Table 2, Panel A, we present the results for the pooled sample on exposure to Catholic missionary presence. In Column (1), we show that proximity to the diocese's headquarters circa 1910 significantly predicts more Catholic missionary activity around 1920. In turn, Column (2) shows that, consistent with the rules of operation of Catholic missions that we exploit for identification, this significantly greater activity is solely driven by missionaries operating in the corresponding diocese. In terms of religious adherence, Column (3) of Panel A shows a significant positive effect of historical proximity

to a diocese’s headquarters on modern Catholic identification. Overall, these results corroborate that the historical proximity to the diocese’s headquarters significantly predicts greater Catholic missionary presence and long-term Catholic conversion.

With regard to educational attainment, Column (1) in Panel B shows that proximity to a diocese’s headquarters significantly predicts more schooling, as captured by an ordinal scale of levels of school completion. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B show that this effect on schooling is consistently estimated when instead considering indicators of the various levels of educational attainment—respectively, whether an individual has any primary schooling and any secondary schooling. Overall, these results are consistent with [Nunn \(2010\)](#), [Gallego and Woodberry \(2010\)](#) and [Valencia Caicedo \(2019\)](#)’s findings on the long-run effects of missionary activity on religious identification and education.

Political participation

Turning to our main results, Table 3 shows the effects of historical proximity to a diocese’s headquarters on political participation across regime types. Specifically, to measure their participation in national politics, we focus on whether individuals voted in the previous general elections and whether individuals contacted a local councilor. Then, to measure participation in local politics we look at whether they attended a community meeting and have raised an issue in such a meeting. Results in Panel A, first, indicate that there is a significant positive effect of proximity on the combined index of political participation, but only in open anocracies. In democracies and closed anocracies, the effect is negative.

Consistently, the results in Panel B indicate that proximity leads to an increased likelihood of voting and contacting a local councilor in open anocracies, whereas the effect reverses in democracies.¹⁰ Similarly, in Panel C, the findings show a positive effect of proximity on attending community meetings and raising issues at them in open anocracies. However, this

¹⁰Separate results for each of the component variables in Table 3 are reported in Table A5.

effect is negative in democracies and closed anocracies (although only statistically significant in the latter). Altogether, these results indicate that more educated individuals, as a result of increased historical missionary presence, are more likely to participate in national and local politics, but only in open anocracies, where recent literature on Africa indicates that the return to political participation should be greater (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017).

Political sophistication, civic values and political attitudes

The literature on political behavior, particularly in developing contexts, points to two main channels through which education might affect political participation: increased political sophistication and greater civic values and incentives to participate. Table 4 shows the effect of historical proximity to a diocese’s headquarters on outcomes capturing political sophistication. We first measure political sophistication focusing on individuals’ labor market outcomes. Specifically, individuals are more likely to be employed when the market values their overall skills. We also assess whether individuals are more politically sophisticated as reflected by their interest in politics, which we measure with their news consumption and whether they discuss politics.

Results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that proximity leads to significantly higher values of a combined index of political sophistication in all settings except closed anocracies. Panels B and C show separately that proximity significantly predicts higher levels of employment, news consumption, and discussion of politics in democracies and open anocracies.¹¹ Altogether, these results show that proximity led to greater political sophistication in democracies and open anocracies, while closed anocracies do not offer an opportunity for more educated citizens to gain employment and increase their consumption and discussion of political news.

¹¹The effects on the combined index for news consumption and discussion of politics are sizable, but are only significant when pooling all observations. Separate results for each of the component variables in Panel C or Table 4 are reported in Table A6.

Table 3: The effect on political participation by regime type

Panel A:	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Index of Political Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0252 (0.0248)	-0.0858* (0.0445)	0.0810*** (0.0188)	-0.0484** (0.0196)
Observations	9961	4652	1418	3891
R^2	0.203	0.193	0.173	0.249
Panel B:	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Index of Voted and Contacted Councilor			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0144 (0.0251)	-0.0627** (0.0282)	0.0713*** (0.0204)	-0.00244 (0.0253)
Observations	9958	4651	1416	3891
R^2	0.116	0.110	0.111	0.162
Panel C:	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Index of Community Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0369 (0.0336)	-0.104 (0.0666)	0.0909** (0.0410)	-0.0881** (0.0323)
Observations	9912	4635	1403	3874
R^2	0.204	0.192	0.182	0.264

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index in Panel A combines whether the respondent Voted, Contacted Local Councilor, Attended a Community Meeting and Raised and Issue. Panel B combines whether the respondent Voted and Contacted Local Councilor. Panel C combines whether the respondent Attended a Community Meeting and Raised and Issue. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A5. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The effect on political sophistication by regime type

Panel A:	<i>Dependent variable: Index on Political Sophistication</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0457** (0.0193)	0.0845*** (0.0308)	0.0739** (0.0350)	0.0301 (0.0450)
Observations	9964	4652	1421	3891
R^2	0.130	0.132	0.145	0.159
Panel B:	<i>Dependent variable: Employed</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0186 (0.0184)	0.0665*** (0.0168)	0.0320** (0.0136)	0.00985 (0.0211)
Observations	9919	4638	1394	3887
R^2	0.098	0.123	0.122	0.109
Panel C:	<i>Dependent variable: Radio News Consumption and Discuss Politics</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0483** (0.0235)	0.0567 (0.0397)	0.0765 (0.0570)	0.0326 (0.0571)
Observations	9963	4651	1421	3891
R^2	0.101	0.095	0.114	0.123

This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index in Panel A combines whether the respondent is Employed, the respondent's *Radio News Consumption*, and the extent to which the respondent *Discuss Politics* and . Panel C combines respondent's *Radio News Consumption* and the extent to which the respondent *Discuss Politics*. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A6. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In turn, results in Table 5 test whether the differential effect of proximity to the diocese’s headquarters on political participation is explained by greater civic values originating from increased schooling and increased perceived returns from participation. In Panel A, we show that proximity leads to significantly greater support for democratic institutions in open and closed anocracies, although the magnitude and sign of the effect is comparable in democracies. In turn, results in Panel B show that proximity leads to significantly lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in open and closed anocracies, but not in democracies. Similarly, results in Panel C show that proximity negatively predicts an index capturing views on incumbent performance and incumbent support again only in open and closed anocracies.¹²

Altogether, these results underscore the importance of understanding the drivers of political participation by more educated individuals across regime types, as to better understand the role that education might play in political transitions. More educated individuals might not necessarily participate more in politics unless they have both greater political sophistication and civic values and perceive a positive return from participation. We interpret this as a limitation of long-run effects of missionary exposure and educational institutions on political development.

5 Robustness

This section presents the results from several robustness checks. First, we decompose the indexes used in Section 4 and show the results for each component separately. Second, we show the results using 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50 km as bandwidth. Third, we vary the specifications by including country fixed effects, dropping extreme outliers, and controlling for the few unbalanced covariates. Fourth, we rerun the analysis restricting the sample of countries to exclude North African countries, kingdoms, and island nations separately.

¹²Separate results for each of the component variables in Panel C or Table 5 are reported in Table A7.

Table 5: The effect on civil values and political attitudes by regime type

Panel A:	<i>Dependent variable: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0707*** (0.0203)	0.0453 (0.0388)	0.0638* (0.0357)	0.0499* (0.0250)
Observations	9899	4625	1407	3867
R^2	0.070	0.065	0.118	0.066
Panel B:	<i>Dependent variable: Satisfied with Democracy</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.110** (0.0530)	-0.0226 (0.0325)	-0.0928*** (0.0237)	-0.0907** (0.0405)
Observations	8991	4245	1248	3498
R^2	0.114	0.088	0.097	0.198
Panel C:	<i>Dependent variable: Incumbent Performance and Support</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0940** (0.0369)	-0.0178 (0.0523)	-0.109** (0.0529)	-0.110*** (0.0290)
Observations	9703	4552	1376	3775
R^2	0.091	0.086	0.220	0.156

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index of *Support for Democratic Institutions* in Panel A combines whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, rejects one-party rule, agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, the individual agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, agrees that the president has to obey laws, agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and supports term limits. Panel C combines how the respondent evaluates the *Incumbent Performance* and whether she expresses she feels *Close to the Incumbent Party* or *Close to an Opposition Party*. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A7. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Lastly, we run the specification separately for former British colonies and other countries. Throughout the robustness checks, the results remain qualitatively the same.

Our main specification restricts the sample to Afrobarometer villages within 10 kilometers of the closest diocese boundary. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the coefficients on proximity to diocese headquarters when varying the bandwidth. 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50-kilometer bandwidths are shown. The results remain consistent across specifications, albeit some precision is lost when extending the bandwidth to 50 kilometers.

We show in Section 4 that proximity to diocese headquarters is balanced on a range of geographic covariates. Nevertheless, to make sure that our results are not driven by the combination of these geographic factors that might explain missionary location, we also control for indexes for the three sets of geographic covariates in the second set of coefficients in Figure A2, while the first set of coefficients in the figure show the results of our main specification. The third set of coefficients come from a specification that only includes the two covariates that are unbalanced: malaria suitability and distance to the national capital. Since many diocese boundaries coincide with country borders we also include country fixed effects in the fourth set of coefficients in Figure A2. To ensure that our results are not driven by extreme outliers, we remove the 5% of observations with the largest distance to their diocese headquarters in the fifth set of coefficients in Figure A2.

Furthermore, we consider different restrictions to the sample. North Africa differs from the rest of the continent in two important ways. First, its proximity to Europe meant that it had a different colonial experience, most notably being exposed for longer. Second, North African countries represented a different religious environment in which missionaries had to operate, namely competition with Islam and the pre-existing presence of Christian communities. Due to these differences, we rerun the analysis after removing North African countries from the sample in the sixth set of coefficients shown in Figure A2. Island nations—Madagascar and Cape Verde—similarly had different geographic constraints that influenced

missionary activity. The results after removing these countries from the sample are in the seventh set of coefficients in Figure A2. Third, political participation operates very differently in monarchies. We therefore exclude the kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland in the eighth set of coefficients.

Lastly, colonial administrations often differed by the colonizing countries. Specifically, British colonial policy regarding the regulation of missionary activities was often different than that of other, mostly Catholic, colonizers. The last two sets of coefficients in Figure A2 thus show the results separately for former British colonies and other countries. Across all specifications in Figure A2, the results remain virtually unchanged.

6 Conclusion

Despite the positive legacy of missionary activity on socio-economic well-being in Africa, our results suggest that its long-run effects on political development largely depend on a country's regime type. More educated individuals, as a result of the proximity of their villages to the diocese's headquarters circa 1910, are more likely to engage in national and local politics, but only in open anocracies. These results are consistent with recent findings on political disengagement depending on the nature of the regime type in Africa (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017).

Concerning for those scholars who emphasize the importance of education for democratic consolidation, such an increase in political participation is not only driven by increased civic values, but also by the combination of increased political sophistication and incentives to participate resulting from greater discontent with their democracy and incumbent. Only open anocracies offer educated citizens the opportunities and incentives to increase their political participation.

Our results underscore the need to pay close attention to regime types as well as to citizens' motives when trying to understand how education affects political participation

and ultimately democratic consolidation. Future research should also investigate how the education provided by missionaries compares to other policies aimed at increasing education, especially those aimed at the masses and nation-building (Paglayan, 2020). If education is to be deemed a *sine qua non* for democracy (Almond and Verba, 2015; Deutsch, 1961), its origins and institutional interactions cannot be overlooked.

Lastly, there is the need for more casual work on the macro relationship between historical education institutions on political participation and democratic attitudes. To provide causality, we focus on individual-level estimates, and thus some of our findings should be cautiously extrapolated to draw macro conclusions. For example, the lack of an effect of proximity on satisfaction with democracy in democracies does not imply that, at a macro level, education has not led to democratization or that citizens in democratic countries exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy. In turn, it simply indicates that, in such a context, more educated individuals do not exhibit differential satisfaction. While this is useful for explaining how historical missionary exposure and educational opportunities shape contemporaneous individual political participation, it does not speak to the macro relationship between education and satisfaction with democracy.

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Online Appendix

Contents

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A Description of variables


Our variables for analyses are coded as follows:

- **Catholic:** Coded 1 if respondent reported she is a Catholic; 0 otherwise.
- **Schooling:** Ordinal variable of the level of schooling attained by the respondent ranging from 0 if she has no formal schooling to 8 if she has post-graduate studies.
- **Any Primary:** Coded 1 if respondent reported having some primary education; 0 otherwise.
- **Secondary:** Coded 1 if respondent reported having some secondary education; 0 otherwise.
- **Voted:** Coded 1 if respondent reported voting in the past election; 0 otherwise.
- **Contacted Local Councilor:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent contacted a local government councilor in the past year ranging from 0 if never to 3 if often.
- **Attended Community Meeting:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent attended a community meeting in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Raised an Issue:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent has joined others to raise an issue in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Employed:** Coded 1 if respondent reported being employed at least part-time; 0 otherwise.
- **Radio News Consumption:** Ordinal variables describing how often the respondents consumes news via the radio. The variable ranges from 0 if never to 4 if every day.
- **Discuss Politics:** Ordinal variable describing the extent to which the respondent discusses politics with friends or family ranging from 0 if never to 2 if frequently.

- **Support of Democracy:** Coded 1 if the respondent agrees that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 0 otherwise.
- **Support for Democratic Institutions:** Index of variables including whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, whether the individual rejects one-party rule, whether the respondent agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, whether the respondent agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, whether the respondent agrees that the president has to obey laws, whether the respondent agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and whether the respondent supports term limits.
- **Satisfied with Democracy:** Ordinal variable describing the extent to which the respondent reports being satisfied with the way democracy works in her country ranging from 1 if the respondent does not consider it a democracy to 4 if very satisfied.
- **Incumbent Performance:** An index of how the respondent evaluates the performance of the president or prime minister, their MP, and their local government councilor. Each variable ranges from 1 if strongly disapprove to 4 if strongly approve.
- **Close to Incumbent Party:** Coded 1 if the respondent reports supporting the party in power; 0 otherwise.
- **Close to Opposition Party:** Coded 1 if the respondent reports supporting an opposition party; 0 otherwise.


B Additional figures

Figure A1: Changing the Bandwidth



Notes: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. The bandwidth is varied between 5 and 50 kilometers with 10 kilometers being the main specification. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each bandwidth.

Figure A2: Changing the Specification



Notes: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. Each panel shows the coefficients for different model specification. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each bandwidth.

C Additional tables

Table A1: Summary Statistic of full sample

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	2.60	1.01	0.00	5.38
Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km)	4.90	3.00	0.00	9.98
Cath. Mission within 50 km	0.68	1.28	0.00	5.00
Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese	0.26	0.73	0.00	5.00
Catholic today	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Schooling Ordinal	2.54	1.84	0.00	8.00
Any Primary	0.85	0.36	0.00	1.00
Any Secondary	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Skilled Labor	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Index of political participation	-0.02	0.69	-1.70	1.61
<i>Voted</i>	0.73	0.45	0.00	1.00
<i>Contacted local gov. councilor</i>	0.49	0.90	0.00	3.00
<i>Index of community engagement</i>	-0.09	0.91	-1.70	1.45
<i>Attend a community meeting</i>	2.13	1.32	0.00	4.00
<i>Join others to raise an issue</i>	1.86	1.31	0.00	4.00
Index of political sophistication	0.01	0.65	-2.07	1.41
<i>Employed</i>	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>News consumption on radio</i>	2.96	1.44	0.00	4.00
<i>Discuss politics with others</i>	0.90	0.72	0.00	2.00
Satisfaction with democracy	2.34	1.06	0.00	4.00
Support for democratic institutions	2.81	0.73	0.00	4.00
Index of incumbent evaluation and support	-0.07	0.81	-2.29	1.73
<i>Performance of incumbent</i>	2.10	1.20	0.00	4.00
<i>Corruption of incumbent</i>	1.35	0.75	0.00	3.00
<i>Close to incumbent party</i>	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>Close to opposition party</i>	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Observations	10,070			

Table A2: Summary Statistic of democracies

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	2.62	0.81	0.88	5.38
Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km)	4.90	2.91	0.00	9.98
Cath. Mission within 50 km	0.33	0.59	0.00	3.00
Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese	0.12	0.43	0.00	3.00
Catholic today	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Schooling Ordinal	2.31	1.72	0.00	8.00
Any Primary	0.83	0.38	0.00	1.00
Any Secondary	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
Skilled Labor	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Index of political participation	0.05	0.68	-1.66	1.61
<i>Voted</i>	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00
<i>Contacted local gov. councilor</i>	0.53	0.93	0.00	3.00
<i>Index of community engagement</i>	-0.02	0.91	-1.70	1.45
<i>Attend a community meeting</i>	2.26	1.32	0.00	4.00
<i>Join others to raise an issue</i>	1.89	1.32	0.00	4.00
Index of political sophistication	0.02	0.65	-2.07	1.41
<i>Employed</i>	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
<i>News consumption on radio</i>	3.04	1.39	0.00	4.00
<i>Discuss politics with others</i>	0.92	0.73	0.00	2.00
Satisfaction with democracy	2.49	1.06	0.00	4.00
Support for democratic institutions	2.77	0.74	0.00	4.00
Index of incumbent evaluation and support	-0.02	0.78	-2.29	1.73
<i>Performance of incumbent</i>	2.15	1.18	0.00	4.00
<i>Corruption of incumbent</i>	1.27	0.75	0.00	3.00
<i>Close to incumbent party</i>	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Close to opposition party</i>	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Observations	4,711			

Table A3: Summary Statistic of open anocracies

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	1.71	0.89	0.00	5.24
Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km)	4.32	3.12	0.00	9.93
Cath. Mission within 50 km	0.11	0.38	0.00	2.00
Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese	0.13	0.37	0.00	2.00
Catholic today	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Schooling Ordinal	2.76	1.89	0.00	8.00
Any Primary	0.85	0.36	0.00	1.00
Any Secondary	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00
Skilled Labor	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Index of political participation	-0.14	0.65	-1.70	1.61
<i>Voted</i>	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00
<i>Contacted local gov. councilor</i>	0.34	0.76	0.00	3.00
<i>Index of community engagement</i>	-0.17	0.91	-1.70	1.45
<i>Attend a community meeting</i>	2.00	1.31	0.00	4.00
<i>Join others to raise an issue</i>	1.77	1.27	0.00	4.00
Index of political sophistication	0.02	0.64	-2.07	1.19
<i>Employed</i>	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>News consumption on radio</i>	2.99	1.37	0.00	4.00
<i>Discuss politics with others</i>	0.88	0.69	0.00	2.00
Satisfaction with democracy	2.08	0.99	0.00	4.00
Support for democratic institutions	2.65	0.71	0.00	4.00
Index of incumbent evaluation and support	-0.15	0.87	-2.29	1.73
<i>Performance of incumbent</i>	1.96	1.26	0.00	4.00
<i>Corruption of incumbent</i>	1.44	0.80	0.00	3.00
<i>Close to incumbent party</i>	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Close to opposition party</i>	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Observations	1,445			

Table A4: Summary Statistic of closed anocracies

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	2.91	1.08	0.04	5.27
Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km)	5.12	3.03	0.00	9.97
Cath. Mission within 50 km	1.31	1.75	0.00	5.00
Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese	0.47	1.01	0.00	5.00
Catholic today	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Schooling Ordinal	2.74	1.93	0.00	8.00
Any Primary	0.86	0.34	0.00	1.00
Any Secondary	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
Skilled Labor	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Index of political participation	-0.07	0.69	-1.66	1.61
<i>Voted</i>	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00
<i>Contacted local gov. councilor</i>	0.50	0.91	0.00	3.00
<i>Index of community engagement</i>	-0.13	0.91	-1.70	1.45
<i>Attend a community meeting</i>	2.01	1.32	0.00	4.00
<i>Join others to raise an issue</i>	1.85	1.31	0.00	4.00
Index of political sophistication	-0.00	0.65	-1.67	1.19
<i>Employed</i>	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
<i>News consumption on radio</i>	2.86	1.52	0.00	4.00
<i>Discuss politics with others</i>	0.89	0.72	0.00	2.00
Satisfaction with democracy	2.26	1.05	0.00	4.00
Support for democratic institutions	2.91	0.72	0.00	4.00
Index of incumbent evaluation and support	-0.10	0.83	-2.29	1.73
<i>Performance of incumbent</i>	2.10	1.21	0.00	4.00
<i>Corruption of incumbent</i>	1.41	0.73	0.00	3.00
<i>Close to incumbent party</i>	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
<i>Close to opposition party</i>	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Observations	3,914			

Table A5: Effect on voted, contacted local councilor, attended community meeting and raised issue

Panel A:	<i>Dependent variable: Voted</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.00103 (0.00957)	-0.0164 (0.0111)	0.0348** (0.0162)	-0.00256 (0.0160)
Observations	9921	4643	1402	3876
R^2	0.109	0.108	0.106	0.126
Panel B:	<i>Dependent variable: Contacted Local Councilor</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0371 (0.0376)	-0.0867** (0.0346)	0.0717* (0.0377)	-0.00814 (0.0380)
Observations	9280	4403	1391	3486
R^2	0.091	0.078	0.084	0.186
Panel C:	<i>Dependent variable: Attended Community Meeting</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0657 (0.0462)	-0.122 (0.0906)	0.131** (0.0615)	-0.112** (0.0477)
Observations	9893	4629	1398	3866
R^2	0.199	0.165	0.193	0.274
Panel D:	<i>Dependent variable: Raised Issue</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0342 (0.0472)	-0.152 (0.0924)	0.105 (0.0688)	-0.124*** (0.0397)
Observations	9862	4614	1392	3856
R^2	0.157	0.172	0.138	0.189

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Effect on radio news consumption and discuss politics

Panel A:	<i>Dependent variable: Radio News Consumption</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0762* (0.0410)	0.153** (0.0672)	0.0613 (0.0982)	0.0280 (0.0827)
Observations	9950	4646	1417	3887
R^2	0.118	0.094	0.101	0.161
Panel B:	<i>Dependent variable: Discuss Politics</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0289 (0.0182)	0.00355 (0.0267)	0.0717** (0.0315)	0.0320 (0.0481)
Observations	9852	4621	1383	3848
R^2	0.063	0.057	0.097	0.098

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Effect on incumbent performance and support

Panel A:	<i>Dependent variable: Incumbent Performance</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0835 (0.0562)	0.0111 (0.0640)	-0.110 (0.0809)	-0.109** (0.0441)
Observations	9595	4478	1351	3766
R^2	0.097	0.076	0.285	0.164
Panel B:	<i>Dependent variable: Close to Incumbent Party</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0721*** (0.0223)	-0.00570 (0.0303)	-0.123*** (0.0156)	-0.0935*** (0.0187)
Observations	4983	2608	708	1664
R^2	0.147	0.185	0.221	0.175
Panel C:	<i>Dependent variable: Close to Opposition Party</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled	Democracies	Open	Closed
			Anocracies	Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0331* (0.0168)	0.0168 (0.0233)	0.0639** (0.0302)	0.0611*** (0.0190)
Observations	4983	2608	708	1664
R^2	0.129	0.179	0.203	0.156

Notes: This table presents results using specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border circa 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Head* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Robustness: No North African Countries

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.498*** (0.171)	0.0547*** (0.0193)	0.302*** (0.0830)	
Observations	9402	9239	9280	
R^2	0.755	0.102	0.244	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0278 (0.0260)	-0.0863* (0.0448)	0.0804*** (0.0195)	-0.0534*** (0.0184)
Observations	9294	4652	1336	3306
R^2	0.181	0.193	0.170	0.209
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0587*** (0.0180)	0.0852*** (0.0311)	0.0743** (0.0359)	0.0738*** (0.0215)
Observations	9297	4652	1339	3306
R^2	0.126	0.132	0.148	0.159
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0792*** (0.0189)	0.0451 (0.0387)	0.0697* (0.0347)	0.0748*** (0.00871)
Observations	9243	4625	1326	3292
R^2	0.074	0.065	0.121	0.069
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.123** (0.0522)	-0.0226 (0.0325)	-0.0933*** (0.0244)	-0.121*** (0.0229)
Observations	8380	4245	1174	2961
R^2	0.121	0.088	0.085	0.226
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0840** (0.0393)	-0.0180 (0.0525)	-0.104* (0.0543)	-0.0831*** (0.0225)
Observations	9052	4552	1296	3204
R^2	0.085	0.086	0.209	0.131

Table A9: Robustness: No Kingdoms

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.507*** (0.172)	0.0445** (0.0185)	0.265*** (0.0883)	
Observations	8615	8305	8499	
R^2	0.747	0.122	0.242	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0140 (0.0247)	-0.0387 (0.0323)	0.0814*** (0.0189)	-0.0599*** (0.0172)
Observations	8515	3558	1418	3539
R^2	0.201	0.191	0.173	0.256
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0384** (0.0181)	0.0597** (0.0223)	0.0741** (0.0353)	0.0301 (0.0483)
Observations	8518	3558	1421	3539
R^2	0.139	0.150	0.145	0.161
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0584*** (0.0212)	0.00861 (0.0218)	0.0646* (0.0363)	0.0453 (0.0272)
Observations	8454	3532	1407	3515
R^2	0.084	0.089	0.118	0.072
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.116** (0.0559)	-0.0276 (0.0421)	-0.0928*** (0.0237)	-0.0969** (0.0402)
Observations	7685	3240	1248	3197
R^2	0.132	0.085	0.097	0.222
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.110*** (0.0352)	-0.0588 (0.0406)	-0.110** (0.0534)	-0.108*** (0.0316)
Observations	8309	3505	1376	3428
R^2	0.100	0.090	0.220	0.169

Table A10: Robustness: No Islands

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.466*** (0.167)	0.0512*** (0.0190)	0.269*** (0.0830)	
Observations	9770	9450	9648	
R^2	0.757	0.118	0.231	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0268 (0.0246)	-0.0860* (0.0454)	0.0792*** (0.0191)	-0.0486** (0.0196)
Observations	9663	4432	1340	3891
R^2	0.206	0.198	0.170	0.250
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0421** (0.0192)	0.0799** (0.0324)	0.0712* (0.0343)	0.0302 (0.0451)
Observations	9666	4432	1343	3891
R^2	0.131	0.132	0.136	0.159
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0717*** (0.0205)	0.0501 (0.0399)	0.0617 (0.0374)	0.0496* (0.0250)
Observations	9613	4411	1335	3867
R^2	0.066	0.062	0.119	0.066
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.109** (0.0538)	-0.0228 (0.0334)	-0.0891*** (0.0225)	-0.0907** (0.0405)
Observations	8786	4081	1207	3498
R^2	0.111	0.073	0.093	0.198
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0931** (0.0372)	-0.0185 (0.0542)	-0.109* (0.0539)	-0.109*** (0.0287)
Observations	9420	4338	1307	3775
R^2	0.090	0.084	0.212	0.155

Table A11: Robustness: Controlling for Distance to Capital and Malaria Index

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.465*** (0.164)	0.0329 (0.0235)	0.0822 (0.0696)	
Observations	10070	9730	9929	
R^2	0.755	0.121	0.240	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.000603 (0.0175)	-0.0574* (0.0334)	0.0741*** (0.0266)	-0.00448 (0.0210)
Observations	9945	4636	1418	3891
R^2	0.204	0.195	0.174	0.251
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0316 (0.0238)	0.0667** (0.0247)	0.0447* (0.0234)	-0.0178 (0.0334)
Observations	9948	4636	1421	3891
R^2	0.130	0.132	0.153	0.166
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0189 (0.0176)	0.0133 (0.0221)	0.0421 (0.0376)	-0.0141 (0.0320)
Observations	9883	4609	1407	3867
R^2	0.076	0.068	0.123	0.073
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0250 (0.0224)	0.0186 (0.0322)	-0.0874*** (0.0269)	-0.0247 (0.0533)
Observations	8975	4229	1248	3498
R^2	0.119	0.091	0.099	0.200
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0677* (0.0356)	-0.0169 (0.0440)	-0.0734* (0.0406)	-0.0737 (0.0449)
Observations	9687	4536	1376	3775
R^2	0.092	0.088	0.230	0.156

Table A12: Robustness: Drop 95 percentile in distance to DH (581 km)

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.552*** (0.170)	0.0606*** (0.0195)	0.291*** (0.0920)	
Observations	9582	9267	9461	
R^2	0.770	0.121	0.235	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0319 (0.0269)	-0.104** (0.0491)	0.0738*** (0.0243)	-0.0528*** (0.0186)
Observations	9478	4436	1190	3852
R^2	0.206	0.194	0.171	0.249
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0403** (0.0201)	0.0766** (0.0344)	0.0568** (0.0255)	0.0322 (0.0479)
Observations	9478	4436	1190	3852
R^2	0.133	0.136	0.164	0.158
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0757*** (0.0209)	0.0563 (0.0394)	0.0594 (0.0435)	0.0505* (0.0265)
Observations	9414	4409	1177	3828
R^2	0.068	0.068	0.119	0.066
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.121** (0.0578)	-0.0357 (0.0366)	-0.112*** (0.0323)	-0.0878** (0.0417)
Observations	8556	4038	1051	3467
R^2	0.116	0.091	0.108	0.199
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0908** (0.0404)	-0.0125 (0.0649)	-0.107** (0.0432)	-0.110*** (0.0319)
Observations	9224	4336	1150	3738
R^2	0.090	0.084	0.236	0.157

Table A13: Robustness: 5 km Bandwidth

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.363*** (0.122)	0.0514** (0.0236)	0.222*** (0.0596)	
Observations	4619	4464	4571	
R^2	0.710	0.127	0.251	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0441 (0.0306)	-0.109*** (0.0258)	0.105*** (0.0209)	-0.102*** (0.0253)
Observations	4580	2207	748	1625
R^2	0.223	0.226	0.192	0.292
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0421* (0.0214)	0.0832 (0.0497)	0.0919*** (0.0284)	0.0413 (0.0458)
Observations	4580	2207	748	1625
R^2	0.106	0.104	0.139	0.157
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0821*** (0.0284)	0.0402 (0.0449)	0.0822 (0.0487)	0.0551 (0.0379)
Observations	4553	2194	738	1621
R^2	0.081	0.052	0.131	0.089
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.152* (0.0769)	-0.0591 (0.0426)	-0.139** (0.0644)	-0.129* (0.0626)
Observations	4140	1988	682	1470
R^2	0.116	0.116	0.125	0.218
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.134** (0.0520)	-0.0964 (0.0831)	-0.119 (0.0716)	-0.143** (0.0579)
Observations	4451	2158	720	1573
R^2	0.102	0.100	0.226	0.160

Table A14: Robustness: 15 km Bandwidth

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.542*** (0.201)	0.0419** (0.0176)	0.313*** (0.0893)	
Observations	13764	13359	13602	
R^2	0.758	0.113	0.243	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0425* (0.0233)	-0.0970*** (0.0359)	0.0778*** (0.0222)	-0.0672*** (0.0130)
Observations	13626	6528	1755	5343
R^2	0.197	0.193	0.180	0.230
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0428** (0.0180)	0.0747** (0.0324)	0.0411 (0.0309)	0.0444 (0.0349)
Observations	13629	6528	1758	5343
R^2	0.135	0.140	0.131	0.160
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0771*** (0.0198)	0.0573* (0.0327)	0.0547* (0.0313)	0.0695*** (0.0197)
Observations	13533	6485	1739	5309
R^2	0.064	0.060	0.122	0.068
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.129*** (0.0426)	-0.0239 (0.0276)	-0.0884*** (0.0292)	-0.129*** (0.0334)
Observations	12274	5948	1556	4770
R^2	0.113	0.093	0.105	0.201
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.118*** (0.0369)	-0.0442 (0.0599)	-0.108* (0.0551)	-0.125*** (0.0231)
Observations	13308	6403	1711	5194
R^2	0.087	0.082	0.225	0.145

Table A15: Robustness: 20 km Bandwidth

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.482** (0.195)	0.0295 (0.0209)	0.277*** (0.0873)	
Observations	19313	18733	19067	
R^2	0.730	0.111	0.269	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0222 (0.0235)	-0.0643** (0.0279)	0.0551* (0.0274)	-0.0545*** (0.0160)
Observations	19102	9844	2441	6817
R^2	0.195	0.187	0.179	0.220
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0371** (0.0182)	0.0734** (0.0304)	0.0272 (0.0251)	0.0448 (0.0293)
Observations	19107	9844	2446	6817
R^2	0.137	0.150	0.125	0.153
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0628*** (0.0197)	0.0411 (0.0295)	0.0459 (0.0321)	0.0588** (0.0224)
Observations	18966	9786	2411	6769
R^2	0.059	0.053	0.109	0.073
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.102** (0.0488)	-0.00796 (0.0369)	-0.106*** (0.0310)	-0.112*** (0.0307)
Observations	17195	8963	2177	6054
R^2	0.105	0.083	0.107	0.199
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.124*** (0.0357)	-0.0555 (0.0521)	-0.156** (0.0623)	-0.106*** (0.0211)
Observations	18649	9655	2387	6607
R^2	0.088	0.100	0.201	0.132

Table A16: Robustness: 25 km Bandwidth

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.533** (0.224)	0.0275 (0.0169)	0.264*** (0.0846)	
Observations	22968	22313	22677	
R^2	0.692	0.109	0.272	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0119 (0.0232)	-0.0448* (0.0227)	0.0589* (0.0300)	-0.0452*** (0.0116)
Observations	22718	11814	3102	7802
R^2	0.188	0.175	0.178	0.212
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0377** (0.0183)	0.0563* (0.0293)	0.0237 (0.0227)	0.0594** (0.0258)
Observations	22723	11814	3107	7802
R^2	0.138	0.152	0.129	0.149
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0677*** (0.0181)	0.0400 (0.0277)	0.0707** (0.0298)	0.0580*** (0.0193)
Observations	22544	11742	3052	7750
R^2	0.059	0.053	0.106	0.065
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0913* (0.0496)	0.00497 (0.0525)	-0.0947** (0.0363)	-0.127*** (0.0269)
Observations	20436	10740	2775	6921
R^2	0.101	0.080	0.086	0.200
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.120*** (0.0294)	-0.0521 (0.0521)	-0.171** (0.0660)	-0.108*** (0.0184)
Observations	22203	11587	3039	7577
R^2	0.081	0.100	0.168	0.125

Table A17: Robustness: 50 km Bandwidth

Panel A: Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling	(1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km	(2) Catholic Today	(3) Schooling Ordinal	
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.415*** (0.158)	0.0122 (0.0105)	0.205*** (0.0686)	
Observations	46657	45507	46152	
R^2	0.604	0.108	0.254	
Panel B: Index of Political Participation	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0241 (0.0155)	-0.0384** (0.0156)	0.00896 (0.0475)	-0.0516*** (0.00898)
Observations	46222	25625	6541	14056
R^2	0.185	0.181	0.177	0.206
Panel C: Index of Political Sophistication	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0104 (0.0132)	0.0161 (0.0233)	-0.00138 (0.0169)	0.0259 (0.0190)
Observations	46232	25628	6546	14058
R^2	0.128	0.132	0.149	0.141
Panel D: Index of Support for Democratic Institutions	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	0.0411*** (0.0140)	0.0317** (0.0158)	0.0374 (0.0445)	0.0293* (0.0171)
Observations	45939	25505	6451	13983
R^2	0.058	0.061	0.089	0.061
Panel E: Satisfied with Democracy	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0697** (0.0317)	-0.00647 (0.0263)	-0.131* (0.0665)	-0.108*** (0.0250)
Observations	41694	23549	5907	12238
R^2	0.100	0.072	0.087	0.187
Panel F: Index of Incumbent Performance and Support	(1) Pooled	(2) Democracies	(3) Open Anocracies	(4) Closed Anocracies
Proximity to Diocese Headquarters	-0.0862*** (0.0268)	-0.0110 (0.0262)	-0.202*** (0.0720)	-0.0996*** (0.0241)
Observations	45301	25200	6397	13704
R^2	0.072	0.082	0.182	0.116