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Do return migrants transfer political norms to their origin country? Evidence from Mali

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ABSTRACT

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This paper explores the link between return migration and political outcomes in the origin country, using the case study of Mali. We use electoral and census data at the locality level to investigate the role of return migration on participation rates and electoral competitiveness. First, we run OLS and IV estimations for the 2009 municipal election, controlling for current emigration and using historical and distance variables as instruments for return migration and current emigration. Second, we build a panel dataset combining the 1998 and 2009 censuses and the electoral results for the municipal ballots of those two years to control for the potential time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the localities. We find a positive impact of the stock of return migrants on participation rates and on electoral competitiveness, which mainly stems from returnees from non-African countries. Finally, we show that the impact of returnees on turnout goes beyond their own participation, and that they affect more electoral outcomes in areas where non-migrants are poorly educated, which we interpret as evidence of a diffusion of political norms from returnees to non-migrants. *Journal of Comparative Economics* **42** (3) (2014) 630–651. IRD, UMR DIAL, PSL, Université Paris-Dauphine, LEDa, France; Paris School of Economics, IRD, UMR DIAL, IZA, France.

1. Introduction

This paper explores the link between return migration and political outcomes in the origin country, using the case study of Mali. Before the March 2012 coup *d'état*, Mali was referred to as one of the most successful democratization stories in Africa since the beginning of the process in the nineties. Mali also has a long-lasting history of migration, both within West Africa and to the rest of the world. Malian migrants are actively involved in the economic development of their country. Besides sending remittances to their families at home, they also gather in hometown associations which contribute to financing public goods in their villages of origin. In this paper, we investigate the political implications of return migration.

Recently, new research has emerged on the political consequences of migration for the country of origin. Following Albert Hirschman's Voice – Exit – Loyalty terminology, Li and Mc Hale (2006) define four channels through which emigration is likely to

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affect the quality of political institutions at home: (1) the 'absence' channel: skilled emigration removes the most productive individuals from the country, those who are most likely to advocate for good governance (reduces 'voice'); (2) the 'prospect' channel: the possibility to emigrate ('exit') offers the most productive individuals more bargaining power (increases 'voice'); (3) the 'diaspora' channel: emigrants can support political groups or social movements from abroad; (4) the 'return' channel: returnees come back with new ideas and are likely to promote specific political objectives (such as accountability, transparency, etc.).

Most studies use a cross-country approach to explore the impact of migration on the quality of political institutions. Li and Mc Hale (2006) look at the impact of the stock of skilled emigrants in 1990 on the quality of the political and economic institutions of the origin country in 2000, and find that skilled emigration is associated with higher quality political institutions. Docquier et al. (2011) find a positive impact of unskilled migration on democracy in developing countries. Beine and Sekkat (2013) also find that migration tends to improve political institutions in the sending country, with the notable exception of "voice and accountability" which is reduced by emigration, consistently with the voice/exit hypothesis. Their results are shown to hold for skilled migration and with a higher impact. Interestingly enough, the impact of migration on political institutions seems to depend on the characteristics of the destination country, advocating for an interpretation of the results in terms of transfer of norms. In the same vein, Lodigiani and Salomone (2012) show that international migration to countries with a higher female political empowerment significantly increases the share of women in the origin countries' parliaments. Similarly, Spilimbergo (2009) shows that foreign-educated individuals tend to promote democracy in their origin country if foreign education is acquired in democratic countries. Finally, in a recent paper, Mercier (2013) puts forward a positive impact of political leaders having studied abroad on the level of democracy in their country during their tenure.

Micro-economic evidence of the political impact of migration for the origin country is even more recent. Batista and Vicente (2011) investigate the impact of migration on the demand for political accountability in the home country, relying on a "postcard voting experiment" in Cape Verde. They find that migration intensity in general, and the presence of returnees in particular, have a positive impact on the demand for political accountability and better governance. Again, the characteristics of the destination country seem to matter: the impact of migrants on the demand for political accountability in their origin country is higher when the destination country has a better level of governance. In a recent paper on Mexican municipal elections, Pfutze (2012) shows that migration significantly increases the probability that a party in opposition to the former state party will win a municipal election. Finally, Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) find that support for the Communist party in the parliamentary elections in Moldova is lower in localities with more migration to Western countries.

In this paper, we explore the relationship between return migration and electoral outcomes in Mali, controlling for emigration intensity. We focus on participation and on two indicators of electoral competitiveness, the fragmentation of the votes and the winning margin. So far, no analysis has ever looked at the direct impact of return migrants on political outcomes, most studies focusing on emigration rates. Moreover, with the exception of Batista and Vicente (2011), Africa has never been the field of study to look at the political consequences of migration. We use census data collected in 1998 and 2009 by the *Institut National de la Statistique Malien* (INSTAT). These census data provide a lot of information regarding education, ethnic characteristics, and infrastructures that allow us to control for various potential determinants of electoral behavior. The data at hand allow us to build two different and complementary identification strategies: first, we implement an instrumentation procedure in order to take into account the potential endogeneity in the relationship between return migration and voting behavior. Second, we run fixed-effect estimations over a two-period panel to control for the time-invariant unobservable variables that may be correlated both with electoral outcomes and return migration intensity.

First, we find a positive influence of returnees from non-African countries on electoral participation, suggesting that return migration can affect the political involvement at home. The effect associated with returnees coming back from African countries is found to be less robust. Second, we explore the impact of returnees on electoral competitiveness, measured by the index of fragmentation of the votes between the different lists involved in the race, and by the difference between the share of votes obtained by the first and the second list. We put forward evidence that returnees from non-African countries are associated with stronger electoral competitiveness, but this result appears to be more sensitive than the results on participation, in particular regarding the variable chosen to measure competitiveness. Finally, we examine whether there is a phenomenon of diffusion of electoral norms from returnees to non-migrants. We find in particular that the impact of returnees (both on turnout and on electoral competitiveness) is stronger in poorly educated localities, suggesting that the presence of return migrants may substitute for the education of non-migrants.

The following Section briefly presents the economic literature on the transfer of political norms by migrants and return migrants. Section 3 describes the Malian context. The econometric strategy and data used are presented in Section 4. We discuss the impact of return migration on participation in Section 5. In Section 6, we investigate the effect of return migration on electoral competitiveness. Section 7 explores the existence of a transfer of norms from returnees to non-migrants. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the results and concludes.

2. Returnees and the transfer of political norms to the origin country

2.1. Return migrants and the development of the origin country

Most of the literature on return migration has focused on the occupational choice of migrants upon their return, and on the determinants of their entrepreneurial activities. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) explore the determinants of return

migrants' choice of activity. Using a survey in which Turkish migrants in Germany were questioned before leaving Germany and after their return to Turkey, the authors show that out of those who were economically active when they returned (around half of them), most chose an entrepreneurial activity. They also find that better educated individuals were more likely to be active upon return, suggesting an accumulation of human capital during migration. However, using survey data on Tunisian return migrants, Mesnard (2004) finds little evidence of any human capital accumulation through temporary migration. She highlights another channel through which migration may influence the occupational choice when returning: savings accumulated abroad by temporary migrants allow them to overcome the credit constraints for new business start-ups upon returning.[1] Finally, Démurger and Xu (2011), using survey data on China, show that return migrants are more likely to be self-employed than non-migrants. Moreover, they find that some characteristics of returnees' migration experience (in particular the number of job changes during migration, and the repatriated savings) matter to explain the likelihood of being self-employed. Return migrants therefore seem to be a source of dynamism and job-creation for the home economy. Human capital accumulation and physical capital accumulation during migration – even temporary – allow migrants to start up new businesses when returning home.

The migration experience has also been shown to impact other behaviors, notably fertility habits. According to the adaptation hypothesis, migrants' fertility rate tends to converge towards that of the natives of the destination country. For example, Lindstrom and Saucedo (2002) show that when returning to Mexico, women with a migration experience in the U.S. tend to have a slightly lower fertility rate. Interestingly enough, the convergence hypothesis has also been shown to work the other way around by Bertoli and Marchetta (2012) in the case of Egypt. They find that migrants returning from countries characterized by a higher fertility rate than Egypt tend to have more children than non-migrants. Thus, return migrants, through different dimensions, seem to adopt specific norms abroad that are determined by their migration experience, and to stick to them after their return.

2.2. Knowledge transfer

One of the questions raised by the economic literature is whether the norms adopted by migrants during their experience abroad diffuse to their origin households and communities. The study mentioned above by Lindstrom and Saucedo on the fertility norms of Mexican migrants in the U.S. shows rather large diffusion effects to the origin community: "women living in communities with a 0.10 prevalence of female migration have 15% fewer children than women living in communities with a zero prevalence of female migration" (Lindstrom and Saucedo, 2002, p. 1361). The transfer of fertility norms has also been examined at the macro level. In a cross-country analysis for the year 2000, Beine et al. (2012) show that a one-percent decrease in the fertility norm[2] reduces the home country fertility by over 0.3%.

The spillover effects of migration in terms of health knowledge are examined by Hildebrandt et al. (2005). They measure health knowledge using the first principal component of a set of questions asking mothers whether they can name ten different contraceptive methods. They show that their indicator of health knowledge is positively correlated with belonging to a migrant household. They also find evidence of the diffusion to non-migrant households of the health knowledge acquired during migration: an increase in the migration intensity of the locality increases the level of the non-migrant mothers' health knowledge.

2.3. Transfer of political norms

The adoption by migrants of knowledge and new ideas during their migration experience is also likely to matter for their voting behavior. Fidrmuc and Doyle (2005) analyze the voting behavior of Czech and Polish migrants. They show that those who settled in Western Europe, North America and Australia tend to vote differently from the non-migrant population, which is not the case for migrants living in former Communist countries. Migrants' political preferences thus appear to be affected by the characteristics of the host countries.

New political norms may spill over to migrants' origin households and communities. Migrants keep narrow links with their family back home. In a recent work, Dedieu et al. (2013) conducted a survey of Senegalese migrants voting from France and from the U.S. for the presidential and parliamentary Senegalese elections in 2012. They show that the connections between migrants and their family manifest themselves through sending remittances, but also through speaking on the phone regularly: out of the 500 Senegalese migrants surveyed, 19% declared that they spoke with their family on the phone on a daily basis, and 50% on a weekly basis. The connections between migrants and their family in the origin country induce the transfer of political ideas and norms. Many respondents to the survey declared that they tried to influence their families' political practices: 66% encouraged their family members back home to register on the electoral lists and over 40% gave voting advice. Moreover, in the Malian context, migrants have been found to be strongly involved in hometown associations (HTAs) which contribute to financing public goods such as schools and health facilities in their village of origin (Chauvet

[1] Piracha and Vadean (2010) and Batista et al. (2010) also find that return migrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs respectively using the case studies of Albania and Mozambique.

[2] The fertility norm is measured as the average fertility rate in the destination countries, weighted by the proportion of emigrants living in each destination country.

et al., 2013). These HTAs may be a vector of social change and may convey new social and political norms acquired abroad by the migrants.

The transfer of political norms was first tested at the macro level (Li and Mc Hale, 2006; Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier et al., 2011; Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Lodigiani and Salomone, 2012). These studies suggest that there is an impact of migration on the quality of political institutions in the origin country. This impact seems to be determined by some political characteristics of the host countries, as well as by the migrants' characteristics notably in terms of education.

Another approach to the political transfer of norms by migrants uses micro data and focuses on how political opinions and behaviors at home change with migration. In this literature, there is a trade-off between using electoral outcomes (rather than self-reported declarations on political attitudes or opinions) and measuring the diffusion of political norms accurately. Using data on electoral outcomes implies working at the locality level, which precludes looking directly at how non-migrant individuals are influenced by the intensity of migration or return migration. Individual data therefore allow a precise estimation of the diffusion of political norms, which locality-level analysis does not. This accuracy comes at the cost of indirect and/or declarative measures of political behavior.

Batista and Vicente (2011) conducted an experimental study in Cape Verde, which creates the conditions of a referendum about political accountability to capture the demand for better governance at the individual level. In the framework of a household survey focusing on perceived corruption in the public sector, they offered respondents the possibility of anonymously sending a pre-stamped postcard asking for the disclosure of the survey results by the media. They show that the proportion of international migrants in the individuals' locality has a positive impact on the probability of sending the postcard. Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) also examine the impact of migration on individual political attitudes and participation (like satisfaction with democracy, non-electoral activity, or protest), relying on survey data in Mexico. They report that the migration experience impacts political attitudes and participation, and that this effect diffuses to the family back home, thus making a strong case that migrants are agents of democratic diffusion. These two individual-level studies describe an important impact of the migration experience on the political opinions of migrants themselves, but also on those of their non-migrant relatives. In both articles, the diffusion of political norms is directly tested as the impact of the locality-level migration intensity on individual political behavior.

Pfutze (2012) and Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) both investigate the impact of migration on electoral outcomes at the locality level, respectively focusing on the probability that a party in opposition to the former state party in Mexico win a municipal election, and on the share of votes for the Communist party in the parliamentary elections in Moldova. Their results are very consistent with each other since they both find a positive impact of migration intensity on the electoral success of opposition parties. This approach allows testing the impact of migration on observed electoral data rather than self-reported declarations on political attitudes. However, the evidence suggesting the diffusion of political norms is weaker. As noted by Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) the effect of migration on electoral results "may not be due to migration-induced spillovers on those who stay behind, but to the return of former migrants to the electorate". In order to disentangle the precise contribution of migration intensity to non-migrants' individual behavior, Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) complement their locality-level analysis with an individual-level exit poll. They show that the probability that a non-migrant vote for the Communist party is negatively correlated with the prevalence of Westward migration in the locality, thus putting forward a spillover effect.

In this paper, we examine the impact of the share of return migrants on electoral outcomes. We find a positive impact of returnees from non-African countries on participation to local elections and on electoral competitiveness, the impact of returnees on turnout being more robust. This positive correlation may stem from the fact that returnees have acquired electoral norms during their migration experience, without involving any diffusion effect whatsoever. To question the existence of a transfer of norm regarding participation, we simulate the gain in terms of turnout that would be associated with having all the returnees vote, and compare it with the gain associated with the presence of returnees that is predicted by our empirical model. Moreover, we document a substitution effect between return migration and the non-migrants' level of education regarding both participation and electoral competitiveness. This substitution effect is in line with the interpretation of the impact of return migration on electoral outcomes as evidence of a transfer of political norms.

Different methodologies have been implemented in the literature to try to identify the effect of migration properly, and in particular to control for the potential unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables. Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) rely on the fact that Moldovan waves of migration started relatively recently to control for the pre-migration political preferences of the localities. Pfutze (2012) also introduces a proxy for the political preferences of the localities, using the federal electoral results as a control. Moreover, he takes into account whether an opposition government has ever won an election since 1980 to identify the competitive localities. He shows that the impact of migration on the probability of a political switch is concentrated on less competitive municipalities, while the localities which are more competitive ex-ante are not affected by migration. Additionally, Pfutze (2012) implements an instrumental variable procedure, relying on historical migration data and on the distance to Juarez, the main point of entry to the U.S. in the early period of Mexican migration. Batista and Vicente (2011) also check the robustness of their findings with an instrumentation strategy. Similarly to Pfutze (2012), they use past migration as an instrument. They also use some macro indicators related to the host countries. Moreover, they aggregate their migration variables at the locality level in order to mitigate self-selection concerns regarding the unobservable characteristics of migrants and returnees.

In our article, we implement two complementary identification strategies. We first rely on an instrumentation procedure, using historical and geographical variables as instruments, applied to the 2009 estimations. This strategy aims in particular at accounting for the potential selection into migration and return bias that may affect the OLS estimates. Second, we build a

panel dataset for the 1998/1999[3] and 2009 elections, which allows us to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across Malian localities.

The micro-oriented literature on the transfer of political norms by migrants suggests that the impact of migration on political outcomes depends on the characteristics of the destination country. Batista and Vicente (2011) find evidence in particular that the intensity of migration affects the individual demand for accountability positively when migrants settled in the United States, while the proportion of migrants to Portugal does not have a clear impact. Similarly, Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) report that the percentage of migrants increases the share of votes for the Communist Party when migrants moved to countries with relatively low-quality political institutions, while it decreases the share of votes for the Communist Party when migrants moved to countries with high-quality political institutions. In this study, we also explore the respective impact of returnees coming back from different destinations, differentiating between African and non-African countries. Despite the fact that this distinction is relatively crude, we do find a differential impact of return migration based on these two groups of destinations.

3. The malian political context

Until March 2012, Mali was considered as having some of the best performing political institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Appendix A presents the evolution since 1960 of the index of democracy provided by the Polity IV database, against the average levels observed in Africa and West Africa. Malian democratization started in 1991, 31 years after the independence, with Amadou Toumani Touré's coup against Moussa Traoré's authoritarian regime. Between 1991 and 1992, Touré headed the *Comité Transitoire pour le Salut du Peuple*, which was devoted to leading the country to democratization. The election of 1992, won by Alpha Oumar Konaré, was a milestone in this political process which made of Mali one of the few countries in Africa where democratization was successful. Since 1992 and for twenty years, the country managed to maintain democracy, in spite of the troubles affecting the 1997 presidential and parliamentary elections. These incidents, which led to a boycott by a part of the opposition,[4] did not prevent the elections from taking place in the end, but undoubtedly helped the incumbent, A. O. Konaré, get re-elected. After two terms, his party, ADEMA,[5] chose Soumaïla Cissé as a candidate for the 2002 presidential election. However, he was defeated by the non-partisan, though close to ADEMA candidate, Amadou Toumani Touré. Touré, supported by a broad coalition of parties (including ADEMA) was then re-elected in 2007, for a second mandate. He remained the leader of the executive power in Mali until he was overthrown by the military coup of March 22, 2012, one month before the presidential election in which he was not running.

Despite a soft transition to democracy, the Malian system had already proven to be fragile before the March 2012 coup. Since 1991, voter turnout has remained low and the population has had limited involvement in the political life. In 2001, the Malian population exhibited the lowest level of political interest of all the countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer. Bratton et al. (2002) underline that even if a vast majority of Malians support democracy, 30% of them do not know the meaning of the word 'democracy'.

Voter turnout increased on average between the end of the nineties and 2009, both in local and parliamentary elections, but remained relatively low. Appendix B presents a table and a map showing the participation rates by locality (*commune*) in 1999 and 2009. Parliamentary elections are characterized by a lower turnout than local elections: in the 1999 local ballot, the turnout was around 36%, and it nearly reached 42% in 2009, while in the parliamentary elections, it was below 23% in 2002 and reached 30% in 2007. Thus, the low, though slightly increasing, popular interest for politics appears to have been the first weakness of the Malian political system before 2012. Moreover, before the 2012 coup, Sandbrook (1996) described the Malian party system as highly fragmented, with political parties based on personal, ethnic or regional cleavage rather than on ideological considerations, characterized by relationships with the voters based on patronage, and finally depending on unstable governing coalitions. Bratton et al. (2002) also underline the patronage legacy that affected the relationships between voters and political leaders and which represented a major threat to the legitimacy of the Malian state.

Political leaders have tried to address these weaknesses in the political system. They implemented in particular an ambitious decentralization program, designed to bridge the gap between the population and the political arena, and to tackle the legacy of centralization and patronage in governance. The decentralization program was launched with the creation of the *communes* in 1996, after four years of debate.[6] In 1999, the Malian villages were finally gathered into 703 *communes*, 49 *cercles* and nine regions, which obtained the status of decentralized constituencies with elected leaders. Since then, all the administrative levels of the Malian territory have been managed by leaders elected by the population.

In spite of these efforts, the political system which existed in Mali before March 2012 undoubtedly suffered from a tendency towards fragmentation, patronage, and instability within the political parties. The number of parties has exploded since 1991, reaching 120 in 2009! Most of these parties are locally-based, and do not have the capacity to become credible national parties. Within the multitude of existing parties, less than 30 have been represented at the Assembly since 1992.

[3] The first local election took place in June 1998 in the 19 urban localities, in May 1999 in the rural areas of the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Ségou, and in June 1999 in the rural areas of the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

[4] The boycott was due to the fact that the ballot was very poorly organized, and to flaws in voter registration.

[5] *Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali.*

[6] The MDD – *Mission de Décentralisation et de Déconcentration* – was created in 1992. The new territorial subdivisions have been designed in a participative and non-bureaucratic way, so as to take into account the demands of each locality.

The political life has been dominated, since 1991, by the *Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali* (ADEMA) party, both at the national and at the local level. A few other political formations are stable national parties and have regularly been represented in national and local elections since 1992.[7] ADEMA became the dominant party of Mali after having fought Traoré's dictatorship. It obtained a broad majority at the assembly during the legislative elections of 1992. Its candidate Alpha Oumar Konaré won the presidential election the same year. Even if many divisions and merges occurred between different factions within ADEMA in the nineties, it remained the dominant party both at the parliamentary and local elections. As illustrated by Table B.1 in Appendix B, this pattern was altered in 2002 when Amadou T. Touré, running as an independent candidate, was elected President. In the second round, Touré won 65% of the votes against the ADEMA candidate. Even if this could be interpreted *prima facie* as a popular signal against the domination of ADEMA, Touré was not an anti-ADEMA candidate, and he was supported by some eminent members of ADEMA. ADEMA remained a strong party, and the first political force in Mali, with solid local support as can be seen from the results of the 2004 and 2009 local elections. However, its domination at the local level declined between 1999 and 2009, as it appears in Fig. B.1 in Appendix B which shows the share of votes for ADEMA by *communes* in 1999 and 2009. There was a significant decrease in the share of votes obtained by the party in 2009 in particular in the *communes* of the regions of Kayes and Koulikoro, and, to a lesser extent, of Ségou and Mopti, which were largely dominated by ADEMA in 1999.

Thus before the March 2012 coup that disrupted Malian political institutions, the situation in Mali was quite specific, combining soft democratization, but with low participation rates; and a vivid party-system, but with a major party dominating a highly fragmented set of parties. Moreover, the democratization was strongly weakened by legacies of patronage, latent corruption, and a climate of inertia with respect to the security threats in the Northern regions. These are probably some of the elements at the root of the coup *d'état* that led to Amadou T. Touré's overthrow.

4. Model and data

4.1. General specification

We investigate the impact of return migration on political outcomes measured during the 2009 municipal election at the level of the localities. The general specification is the following:

$$PoliticalOutcome_{c,2009} = \alpha + \beta X_{c,2009} + \delta ReturnMigration_{c,2009} + \gamma PoliticalOutcome_{c,1998} + \varepsilon_{c,2009} \quad (1)$$

where $PoliticalOutcome_{c,2009}$ is either the participation rate or an index of electoral competitiveness in *commune* c for the 2009 election. We use the fragmentation of the votes and the winning margin[8] as indicators of the ex-post level of competitiveness of the ballot. $X_{c,2009}$ is a vector of socio-economic and demographic control variables (among which emigration) for *commune* c measured in 2009. $X_{c,2009}$ also includes the number of lists involved in the ballot. $ReturnMigration_{c,2009}$ is the variable of interest, the share of return migrants in the population of *commune* c in 2009. Finally, we control for the political outcome observed during the 1998 municipal ballot. The error term, $\varepsilon_{c,2009}$, is clustered at the *commune* level so as to account for the potential correlation of error terms within *communes*. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the *communes* as localities.

Our vector of control variables $X_{c,2009}$ is a set of variables which are likely to influence political outcomes. Two main types of variables have been identified in the literature as explaining electoral behavior: institutional variables – which are not relevant in our case, since political institutions do not vary from one locality to another – and socio-economic and demographic variables. In a groundbreaking study, Powell (1984) shows that country size and economic development are key determinants of voter turnout. First, he finds that the participation rate is higher in very small countries, maybe because voters feel more concerned about politics and more influent on the outcome of elections. Oliver (2000) confirmed this result by underlining the same pattern at the local level: smaller constituencies tend to have a higher participation rate. Second, Powell (1984) suggests that richer countries tend to vote more. At the macro level, this result has since been somewhat challenged, and it seems that the relationship between aggregate income and participation is more complex, with a likely non-linear relationship (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998). At the individual level, a few variables are rather consensually recognized as influent: namely gender, age and education. However, the direction of their impact is not certain. For Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975), men, older people and those who are more educated vote more. While their conception of a linear positive link between education and the propensity to vote has become widespread, the effect of age is less clear. Indeed, some authors suggest a non-linear relationship, the youngest and the oldest participating less than middle-age citizens (Highton (2000) for instance).

In line with the literature on voting behaviors, the size of the locality, proxies for wealth and education are taken into account in our estimations. Gender and age are not relevant in our framework since neither the average age nor the percentage of men varies much from one locality to the other. Finally, ethnicity is often underlined as affecting votes, notably in African countries. As shown by Bossuroy (2007) in the case of Ghana, ethnic cleavage is an important determinant of votes, though not the primary one. In the case of Mali, Dunning and Harrison (2010) show through an experimental study that the

[7] Like RPM (*Rassemblement Pour le Mali*), URD (*Union pour la République et la Démocratie*), CNID (*Congrès National d'Initiative Démocratique*), US-RDA (*Union Soudanaise – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*), MPR (*Mouvement Patriotique pour le Renouveau*) and BDIA (*Bloc pour la Démocratie et l'Intégration Africaine*).

[8] Difference between the share of votes obtained by the winning list and the share of votes obtained by the second list.

traditional "cousinage" linkages tend to counterbalance ethnic cleavage, thus weakening ethnic voting. Yet, we include the percentage of the population from each of the main ethnic groups, taking the majority group (the Bambara) as point of reference.

Finally, the 2009 census data allow us to introduce the current emigration rate at the locality level into the vector of control variables. The availability of this variable is of particular interest in order to assess the specific effect of return migration, given that one may suspect return migration to simply proxy migration intensity. Emigrants were identified in the questionnaire by asking the household head whether a member of the household had settled abroad in the last five years and was still living outside Mali. When the answer was yes, the household head was asked how many members were emigrants. Notice that this question provides a somewhat restricted measure of emigration, since only relatively recent emigrants are counted. Still, it allows us to evaluate the relationship between return migration and electoral outcomes controlling for the potential effect of emigration.

All the right-hand side variables are computed within the population aged eighteen and above, so as to be sure that we control for the composition of the voting-age population of the locality. These variables come from the exhaustive census conducted in 2009 ("Recensement Général de la Population – RGPH", INSTAT, 2009). It provides data at the individual, household and village level which we aggregate at the locality level.[9] The electoral results, as well as the number of lists competing, are available at the locality level, from the *Institut National de la Statistique Malien*. The following describes the control variables included in the estimations (unless stated otherwise, the source of the data is RGPH, 2009):

- EMIGRANTS: number of current emigrants aged eighteen and above over the total population of the locality aged eighteen and above.
- POPULATION (LOG): logarithm of the population eighteen and over living in the locality.
- LITERACY: literacy rate within the population eighteen and over.
- WEALTH: composite index of wealth per capita calculated using data on habitation and computed at the level of the localities. The type of wall, roof, ground and toilets in the household habitations is taken into account.
- FULANI, DOGON, MAURE/ARAB, SONRAI/DJEMA, MARAKA/SONINKE, MINIANKA, TAMACHEQ, OTHER: share of the population of the locality eighteen and over from a given ethnic group, based on spoken language. We include the eight main ethnic groups of Mali (around 70% of the total population), using the Bambara (more than 40% of total population) as the point of reference.
- LISTS: number of lists competing in the ballot for the considered constituency (INSTAT).
- RAIN SHOCKS: standard deviation of the rain shocks undergone by the locality. The data on rainfall come from the Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia. First, we regress the level of yearly observed rainfall on its lagged value and a time trend. From these estimations, we predict the residuals and calculate their standard deviation over the decade before the ballot. This variable aims at controlling for the variability of the climatic conditions which is likely to affect people's propensity to go to the polls.

Data on electoral outcomes

We use data on electoral outcomes in Mali (INSTAT) at the locality level for the two local ballots[10] of 1998/1999[11] and 2009. Local elections are one-round proportional elections. Our first dependent variable is the participation rate, PARTICIPATION, which reflects the well-functioning of democratic consultation. Participation to an election can also be interpreted as an indicator of people's dissatisfaction with their political leaders. Still, we believe that participation gives a good idea of the vivacity of democratic activities. We also investigate the impact of return migration on two indicators of the competitiveness of the election. First, we use the fragmentation of the votes, FRAGMENTATION, which equals one minus the Herfindahl index based on the share of votes obtained by each list running. An increased fragmentation indicates a greater dispersion of the votes between the different candidates, and thus a stronger level of electoral competitiveness. Our second indicator of electoral competitiveness, WINNING MARGIN, measures the difference between the share of votes obtained by the winning list and the share of votes obtained by the second list. A smaller difference between the percentages of votes obtained by the first two lists reflects a more competitive election.

Data on return migration

Mali exhibits a strong migration dynamics, both internal and external. Even if the precise quantification of the Malian diaspora is debated, Mali is broadly recognized as a country of net emigration, though emigration flows diminished in volume after the nineties. According to the World Bank, almost one million Malians were living abroad in 2000.[12]

Most of the Malians who migrate move to another African country, and most often in Western Africa. At the end of the nineties, Ivory Coast was the main destination of emigration (more than 30% of Malian migrants), followed by Burkina Faso

[9] On average, each locality is composed of 15 villages.

[10] Local ballots are those in which the mayor and the municipal council are elected.

[11] The first local election took place in June 1998 in the 19 urban localities, in May 1999 in the rural areas of the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Ségou, and in June 1999 in the rural areas of the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

[12] Using census data in more than 70 destination countries around the year 2000 (Özden et al., 2011).

(about 28%) (Ballo, 2009). The region of Kayes is particularly known to send migrants to Europe. On the contrary, international migration from the North of the country is mostly directed towards Ghana, Niger and Nigeria.

In this paper, we focus on the impact of return migration, measured as a share of the population over eighteen, on Malian voting behavior. The information regarding return migration comes from the "Recensement Général de la Population" (RGPH, 2009). One question in the census is: "*Did X reside elsewhere for more than six months?*". If the answer is yes, the respondent is asked "*Where did X reside immediately before moving to where he currently is?*". We can thus identify return migrants, knowing to which continent they migrated, and ascertaining that their migration episode lasted more than six months. This simple measure of return migration unfortunately does not allow accounting for circular migration or multiple migration episodes: we only have information on the latest migration episode.

The RGPH data reported 287,497 Malian return migrants from foreign countries in 1998 (about 3% of population), 95% of them coming back from African countries. In 2009, the stock of returnees reached 436,385 (still 3% of the population), 87% of them coming back from Africa. There was thus an upward trend in return migration between 1998 and 2009, and especially for those returning from non-African countries. As shown by Ndione and Lombard (2004), returning is often an important step in the migration process, and it classically is a part of the initial migration project. But even if most returns are spontaneous, the phenomenon is not independent from historical contingency: the observed upward trend can thus probably be partly explained by the political and economic crises most Western African countries underwent, and by the simultaneous development of growing xenophobia.[13] Strong "push" factors from the receiving countries also exist in non-African host countries (especially Europe) where the living conditions for immigrants have become harsher.

Appendix C shows descriptive statistics on Malian return migrants. Return migration in Mali varies both in space and in time: in 1998 as in 2009, the Southern region of Sikasso, the Western region of Kayes and the Northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal are the main returning areas for migrants coming back from African countries. Return migration to the region of Kayes is very specific. Though it becomes less obvious in 2009, a large part of return migration from non-African countries is targeted to Kayes (see Fig. C.1 in Appendix C). The fact that this region is the main provider of migrants and return migrants from non-African countries (mainly from France) is due to historic reasons dating back to the colonial era, and to special relationships built between French colonizers and the Soninké ethnic group, which is mainly represented around Kayes.

Returnees from Africa mainly come back from Ivory Coast (61.5% of the returnees from Africa in 2009, see Table C.1 in Appendix C). Other neighboring countries like Burkina Faso or Senegal are also a source of return migration to Mali, but for a much smaller share. Return migrants from non-African countries come back predominantly from Europe, with returnees from France representing 24% of the stock of out-of-Africa returnees. Aside from the traditional destinations, new countries have recently emerged within current Malian return migrants, both in Europe (e.g. Spain) and in the rest of the world (e.g. China).

4.2. Endogeneity concerns

Eq. (1) is first estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. In this setting, the estimated correlation between return migration and political outcomes could be biased through two main endogeneity channels: first, the individual-level selection into migration (including the destination choice) and into return (including the location choice once back in Mali); and second, the existence of unobservable heterogeneity at the locality level.

Migration is the result of a deeply studied selection process. In our context, selection (whether it is individual or within a household) occurs twice: first, individuals choose whether or not to migrate and decide where to migrate; and second they decide to return or not and where to settle when they come back. These four different decisions can of course be successive or simultaneous. Arguably, the individuals who migrate and then come back to Mali may have specific characteristics which affect their electoral preferences, and which would also have affected their electoral behavior had they not migrated. To have a better idea of the differences between emigrants, returnees and non-migrants, Table 1 provides a few descriptive statistics on their age, gender and literacy rate.

Return migrants are indeed specific. On average, they are older, more educated and include fewer women than non-migrant Malians. This is all the more true for returnees who come back from non-African countries. However, in the last decade, the differences between returnees from Africa and returnees from the rest of the world have shrunk. As for current migrants, they are on average younger than the whole population, and the bulk of them are men. Unfortunately, the data at hand do not provide us with any information regarding their education level.

The first way to control for this source of bias is to introduce control variables in the estimations which are likely to simultaneously affect migration choices and electoral behavior at the individual level, in particular ethnic and education variables (Batista and Vicente, 2011), as shown in Eq. (1) – age and gender being quite stable on average at the locality level. To go further, we then implement an instrumentation procedure. We instrument the stocks of return migrants (either global or disaggregated between Africa and the rest of the world) by their past value observed in 1998. These data come from the RGPH census carried out in 1998. In these specifications, the current emigration rate must also be instrumented, but unfortunately the question on emigration was introduced in the census for the first time in 2009 and this information is

[13] The political crisis in Ivory Coast in particular which started at the beginning of the 2000s had important repercussions for Malian people living in Ivory Coast, many of them being forced to return to Mali.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics of Malian emigrants, returnees and total population, 1998 and 2009.

	Total		Mean age		% Women		% Literate	
	1998	2009	1998	2009	1998	2009	1998	2009
RETURNEES[a]	216,273	329,946	41	41	28.5	33.5	24.5	27.5
RETURNEES – AFRICA[a]	205,766	294,939[b]	40.5	41	29	33.5	23.5	27
RETURNEES – RoW[a]	10,507	32,952[b]	47	43.5	17.5	34	40.5	32.5
EMIGRANTS[a]	n.a.	108,433	n.a.	27.5	n.a	6.5	n.a.	n.a.
Malian population[a]	4,605,116	6,484,807	38	36.5	52	51.5	17.5	24
Total Malian population	9,735,499	14,528,973	22	21	50.5	50.5	12	16.5

Source: Authors' calculations from RGPH, 1998 and 2009. n.a.: non available.
[a] Aged 18 or over.
[b] In 2009, the sum of returnees from Africa and returnees from the rest of the world does not equal the total stock of returnees because the migration destination is unknown for 2,055 returnees over 18.

not available for 1998. For this reason, we build on the rich empirical literature on migration and instrument current emigration with distance variables (see McKenzie and Sasin (2007) for a discussion of some of the instruments used in the literature). We use three distance variables related to the historical background of current Malian migration: the distance to the traditional migratory route, the distance to the closest checkpoint[14] on this traditional route, and the distance to the Senegal River. Historically, Malian migration mainly emanated from the region of Kayes, and from the Soninké ethnic group. Gubert (2000) provides a thorough historical picture of Soninké migration since the pre-colonial era. She shows that the historical features of Soninké migration during the pre-colonial and colonial eras are the ground for today's Malian migration. To capture this historical background that has paved the way for current emigration movements in Mali, we compute the distance from each Malian locality to the traditional Soninké migratory route, and to the closest checkpoint on this route. The traditional route and its checkpoints are provided by Pollet and Winter (1971). We also introduce the distance to the Senegal River, both a traditional and a current region of transit for Malian emigrants. These three variables have been chosen to reflect the historical heritage of the current Malian migratory phenomenon.

Aside from the selection process at play in migration and return migration, the estimated correlation between electoral outcomes and return migration may also be biased by a second channel of endogeneity, namely the unobservable heterogeneity at the locality level. Localities which welcome a greater number of return migrants may have unobservable specific characteristics correlated with their political outcomes. To account for this issue, we build a panel data set gathering electoral results from the 1998/1999[15] and 2009 municipal ballots, as well as the two exhaustive censuses held in 1998 and 2009. In this specification, we estimate the following equation:

$$PoliticalOutcome_{c,t} = \alpha + \beta X_{c,t} + \delta ReturnMigration_{c,t} + \mu_c + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{c,t} \quad (2)$$

The panel dimension allows us to introduce locality fixed effects, μ_c. Thus, we can control for all the unobservable characteristics of the localities which did not vary between 1998/1999 and 2009, and which are potentially simultaneously correlated with electoral outcomes and with return migration. However, this advantage comes at the cost of losing one important control variable, namely current emigration. Indeed, the question on current emigration was not asked in the 1998 census.

Assessing the relationship between return migration and electoral outcomes at the locality level raises two main channels through which endogeneity may be at play, namely selection and heterogeneity. Unfortunately, we cannot deal simultaneously with these two concerns given the data at hand, the main reason being the difficulty to identify time-varying instruments for both return migration and emigration. Nevertheless, we implement two different and complementary identification strategies designed to tackle each of these issues. First, to deal with the question of selection into migration and return migration, we rely on an instrumentation procedure which is mainly based on the historical path that characterizes Malian migration. Returnee stocks are instrumented by their observed value eleven years earlier, while current emigration is instrumented by three variables reflecting the distance between each locality and the migration routes inherited from history. Second, to account for the unobservable heterogeneity between Malian localities that may affect both electoral outcomes and return migration intensity, we build a two-point panel dataset that allows us to assess the impact of return migration on electoral outcomes controlling for locality fixed effects.

5. The impact of return migration on participation

We first explore whether returnees influence the participation rate in the localities where they live, and then disaggregate this stock between returnees coming back from African countries and returnees coming back from the rest of the world. We

[14] Pollet and Winter (1971) provide a map of the traditional commercial routes in the Sudanese region at the end of the nineteenth century. These routes, crisscrossing all the West African area, were used by caravans of merchants and slaves carrying different tradable goods such as salt, gold or kola nuts. Travelers met at different points in the route, referred to here as "checkpoints", where they had to pay fees.
[15] The first local election took place in June 1998 in the 19 urban localities, in May 1999 in the rural areas of the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Ségou, and in June 1999 in the rural areas of the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

Table 2
Returnees and participation.

Dependent: PARTICIPATION	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) FE	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) FE
RETURNEES	0.207*	0.503**	0.0624			
	(0.110)	(0.214)	(0.134)			
RETURNEES – AFRICA				0.174	0.498**	0.0416
				(0.115)	(0.218)	(0.136)
RETURNEES – RoW				0.728***	2.269**	0.694*
				(0.257)	(1.077)	(0.415)
EMIGRANTS	−0.297	−0.213		−0.273	0.0684	
	(0.301)	(1.681)		(0.305)	(1.653)	
PARTICIPATION – 1998	0.227***	0.227***		0.229***	0.233***	
	(0.0365)	(0.0358)		(0.0365)	(0.0360)	
First-stage results						
First-stage dependent: EMIGRANTS						
Distance Migratory Route		0.00003***		0.00003***		
		(9.15e-06)		(8.87e-06)		
Distance Checkpoint		-0.00003***		-0.00003***		
		(8.67e-06)		(8.45e-06)		
Distance Senegal River		-8.68e-06**		-7.93e-06**		
		(3.44e-06)		(3.42e-06)		
First-stage dependent: RETURNEES						
Lag Returnees		0.338***				
		(0.042)				
First-stage dependent: RETURNEES – AF						
Lag Returnees – Af					0.353***	
					(0.042)	
First-stage dependent: RETURNEES – RoW						
Lag Returnees – RoW					0.694***	
					(0.115)	
Instrumentation tests						
First-stage F-tests for:						
EMIGRANTS		7.43			6.27	
RETURNEES		35.91				
RETURNEES – AF					30.00	
RETURNEES – RoW					8.88	
Underidentification test (p-val)		0.000			0.000	
Overidentification test (p-val)		0.293			0.247	
Observations	697	697	1394	697	697	1394
R-squared	0.349	0.341	0.373	0.351	0.323	0.375
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered at the locality level in parentheses. RETURNEES is the stock of returnee migrants over 18 over the population of the locality over 18. RETURNEES – AFRICA (resp. RoW) is the stock of return migrants from African (resp. non-African) countries over 18 over the population of the locality over 18. EMIGRANTS is the number of current emigrants over 18 divided by the population of the locality over 18. Control variables included: number of lists competing in the ballot, log of the population over 18, share of the population over 18 that is literate, composite index of wealth per capita, standard deviation of the rain shocks over the decade before the ballot, share of the population over 18 belonging to each of the main ethnic groups. Columns (3) and (6) present 2SLS estimations, instrumenting RETURNEES, RETURNEES – AF and RETURNEES – RoW by their value in 1998 and instrumenting EMIGRANTS by the distance from each locality to the traditional migration route and checkpoint, and to the Senegal River.
* $p < 0.1$.
** $p < 0.05$.
*** $p < 0.01$.

rely on the spatial variability of the turnout observed in 2009 and of the stock of returnees, measured as the share of returnees in the population over eighteen in each locality in 2009, to estimate Eq. (1).

The OLS estimation of Eq. (1) is shown in the first column of Table 2, and the complete results regarding the control variables are presented in Appendix D.[16] The OLS estimation yields a positive and significant coefficient for RETURNEES. This suggests that localities with a larger stock of returnees tended to exhibit a higher turnout level in the 2009 local election. The impact of current emigration, EMIGRANTS, is not significant in Column (1). As discussed in Section 4.2, the relationship between return migration and participation is potentially biased by two main channels of endogeneity, namely the selection process into

[16] As expected, we observe a hysteresis in PARTICIPATION, localities which voted more in 1998 tend to also exhibit a higher turnout level in 2009. The number of lists does not appear to be determinant regarding participation. Consistently with the literature, POPULATION is negatively correlated with turnout. LITERACY positively affects turnout, but it is not always significant. More surprisingly, WEALTH exhibits a negative correlation with the participation rate. One potential explanation for this is that living in richer and better endowed localities makes people less discontented and less interested in the political life of their locality. Some ethnic groups tend to vote more than the Bambara (the reference group), notably the Sonrai. Finally, RAIN SHOCKS are found to be negatively correlated with participation.

migration and return migration, and the locality-level heterogeneity. To take these two potential biases into account, we implement two different strategies: an instrumentation procedure and a fixed-effects specification.

In Column (2), we run a 2SLS estimation, instrumenting the stock of returnees by its past value and the current emigration rate by the distance to the traditional migratory route and checkpoint, and to the Senegal River. The instrumentation results are presented in the bottom part of the Table.[17] The instrumentation tests appear valid regarding RETURNEES, which is positively correlated with its eleven-year lagged value. Note that the instrumentation of the current emigration rate, EMIGRANTS, is less satisfactory, as attested by an F-test below ten. Thus, the interpretation of the results on EMIGRANTS in the 2SLS specification must remain cautious. Turning to the second stage, the coefficient associated with RETURNEES remains positive and significant, while the coefficient associated with EMIGRANTS still is not significant. This suggests that the OLS results which put forward a positive and significant correlation between return migration and turnout are not driven by the selection at play at the different stages of the migration and return process.

The second potential source of bias, namely locality-level heterogeneity, is tackled in Column (3) where we rely on the panel dataset combining data from 1998/1999 and from 2009 to estimate Eq. (2). In this specification, we introduce fixed effects, which allow controlling for all the time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the localities. The results are quite different from those obtained with OLS and 2SLS. The coefficient associated with RETURNEES remains positive, but loses its significant impact on turnout. Thus, when controlling for the time-invariant characteristics of the localities, which are likely to affect both participation and the stock of returnees, the global stock of returnees appears to have no direct impact on participation. Note that, unfortunately, the panel specification does not allow us to control for EMIGRANTS since this variable was only measured in 2009.[18] Thus, while returnees are significantly and positively associated with turnout in the OLS and 2SLS specifications, their impact turns out not to be significant once we account for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity across localities.

In Columns (4) to (6) of Table 2, we then disaggregate the stock of returnees by destination, differentiating migrants coming back from Africa and from the rest of the world. Using OLS in Column (4), we find that the share of returnees from non-African countries is significantly and positively associated with turnout, while RETURNEES – AFRICA, as well as current emigration are not significantly correlated with participation. The coefficient for RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD suggests that a one-percentage-point increase in the share of returnees from non-African countries is associated with a 0.73-percentage-point increase in turnout.

In Column (5), we implement the 2SLS specification, instrumenting RETURNEES – AFRICA and RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD by their past value, and EMIGRANTS by the distance to the traditional migratory route and checkpoints and to the Senegal River. The validity of the instruments is confirmed by the first-step tests, notably for RETURNEES – AFRICA and RETURNEES – RoW. Only for EMIGRANTS is the F-test largely below 10, suggesting that the coefficient of this variable should here again be interpreted with caution. When instrumented, RETURNEES – AFRICA turns out to be significantly and positively associated with participation. Finally, and consistently with the OLS results, the 2SLS estimation yields a positive and significant coefficient associated with RETURNEES – RoW, while EMIGRANTS remains not significant.

Finally in Column (6), we control for the time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the localities. We find that RETURNEES – AFRICA is no longer significant when locality-level unobservable heterogeneity is accounted for. This result is consistent with the fact that the total stock of returnees, RETURNEES, also loses its significance in the fixed-effects estimation (Column (3)). Indeed, returnees from African countries represent on average respectively 95 and 87 percent of the total stock of returnees in 1998 and in 2009. On the contrary, the estimated coefficient obtained for the stock of returnees coming back from non-African countries remains positive and significant in the fixed-effects specification. Quantitatively speaking, it suggests that a one-percentage-point increase in the share of returnees from non-African countries within the population over eighteen is associated with a 0.69-percentage-point increase in the participation rate.[19]

To sum up, the OLS, 2SLS and fixed-effects estimations presented in Table 2 suggest that Malian returnees from non-African countries are positively and significantly correlated with the participation rate, while no robust impact of migrants coming back from African countries emerges.[20]

[17] Here we only present the coefficients of the instruments purposively chosen for each instrumented variable, but the whole set of instruments is introduced in both first-stage estimations. In the first-stage estimation for EMIGRANTS, the coefficient associated with the lagged value of RETURNEES is significant and equals 0.045 (with a standard error of 0.015). The first-stage estimation for RETURNEES yields significant coefficients for the distance to the migratory route (equal to −0.0001, with a standard error of 0.00002), for the distance to the closest checkpoint (equal to 0.0001, with a standard error of 0.00002), and for the distance to the Senegal River (equal to 0.00002, with a standard error of 7.25e−06).

[18] In order to compare the 2SLS and fixed-effect results on the same set of control variables, we re-estimated the 2SLS specification without the emigration rate. Whether or not we control for EMIGRANTS in the 2SLS estimations, the results of the instrumentation procedure are unchanged regarding RETURNEES. Results available upon request.

[19] To check that the difference between the IV and fixed-effect results regarding the returnees variables is not due to the omission of EMIGRANTS in the panel specification, we re-estimated the 2SLS specification without this variable. This yields very similar results to those of Column (5). Results available upon request.

[20] We developed a few other tests to check the robustness of this result. We looked in particular at whether it is driven by outlier observations. We also verified that the results are not affected when we additionally control for internal return migrants. In both cases, the estimated coefficients of interest remain stable.

6. The impact of return migration on electoral competitiveness

If return migrants from non-African countries have a positive impact on turnout, it is plausible that they also affect the nature of the votes, and in particular their dispersion between the different competitors. To investigate this question, we follow the same econometric strategy as in Section 5 using alternatively as dependent variables two proxies for electoral competitiveness: the fragmentation and the winning margin. The index of fragmentation is computed relying on the share of votes obtained by each competing list. It equals one minus the electoral Herfindhal index, i.e. the sum of the squared shares of votes obtained by each candidate. It ranges from 0 to 1, 0 indicating utter domination by one single party. Electoral fragmentation increases when FRAGMENTATION is closer to one, denoting a greater dispersion of the votes between the lists in the race, and so a higher degree of competition between the different candidates. The winning margin measures the difference between the share of votes obtained by the winning list and the share of votes obtained by the second list. It also ranges from 0 (if the first two lists obtained exactly the same shares of votes) to 1 (if the winning list got a hundred percent of the votes). Electoral competitiveness thus increases when this winning margin is smaller. Both dependent variables are chosen to capture the competitiveness of the electoral race ex-post. Table 3 presents the results on the impact of RETURNEES – AFRICA and RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD on FRAGMENTATION and on WINNING MARGIN, estimated through OLS, 2SLS and fixed effects.[21]

Focusing first on FRAGMENTATION, the OLS estimation displayed in Column (1) yields non significant coefficients for all migration variables. The results obtained when we implement the instrumentation procedure in Column (2) are quite different, though: the coefficient associated with RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD turns out to be significantly positive. This suggests that, once we account for the endogeneity in the relationship between return migration and electoral fragmentation, a higher share of returnees from non-African countries in the population is associated with a more important dispersion of the votes. Localities with a greater stock of returnees from non-African countries are also characterized by a stronger level of competition between the candidates who ran in the 2009 municipal election. The coefficient associated with EMIGRANTS also turns out to be significant in this specification, with a negative sign. This negative correlation between emigration and FRAGMENTATION may reflect the 'absence channel' as described by Li and Mc Hale (2006), if those who leave Mali tend to exhibit more fragmented votes than those who stay. However, as attested by the first-stage F-tests, the instrumentation of this variable does not fulfill the standard requirements, urging us not to draw a sharp conclusion from the second-stage estimated coefficients. Finally, the positive and significant correlation between RETURNEES – RoW and FRAGMENTATION which appears in the 2SLS specification is confirmed by the fixed-effects estimation presented in Column (3) which accounts for the locality-level unobservable heterogeneity. Thus, the fixed-effects specification, consistently with the 2SLS estimation, emphasizes a significant and positive impact of Malian returnees coming back from non-African countries on the fragmentation of votes.

Columns (4) to (6) then present the estimations on our alternative measure of electoral competitiveness, WINNING MARGIN. The OLS results displayed in Column (1), consistently with the results on FRAGMENTATION, put forward a negative and significant correlation between returnees coming back from non-African countries and WINNING MARGIN, underpinning a positive correlation between these returnees and electoral competitiveness. However, when we implement the 2SLS in Column (2), the coefficient associated with RETURNEES – RoW turns out to be non significant. This coefficient is significantly negative again in the fixed-effects estimation displayed in Column (6).

Thus, the negative correlation between returnees from non-African countries and WINNING MARGIN appears to be robust when we account for locality time-invariant heterogeneity, but not when we implement an instrumentation strategy. On the contrary, the positive and significant correlation between returnees from non-African countries and FRAGMENTATION proves to be robust to both empirical procedures. All these results thus suggest the existence of a positive correlation between returnees from non-African countries and electoral competitiveness, but which is more complex than the observed correlation between returnees and turnout, and in particular more sensitive to the variable chosen to measure electoral competitiveness. The discrepancy between the results on FRAGMENTATION and on WINNING MARGIN may come from the fact that despite a negative correlation between the two variables (localities with a high degree of FRAGMENTATION also tend to have a lower WINING MARGIN), their relationship in the case of Mali is not fully linear. Indeed, around 25% of the localities both exhibit a high level of FRAGMENTATION (above 0.5) and a high WINNING MARGIN (above 0.2). Consistently with the description of the Malian political context presented in Section 3, this may reflect the vivid party system existing at the local level (on average, 7 lists run in each locality), combined with the domination of a few major parties. In any case, the results of Table 3 suggest that FRAGMENTATION and WINNING MARGIN capture rather different aspects of electoral competitiveness.

7. A transfer of political norms?

So far, the strongest result we have emphasized is the positive and significant impact of returnees from non-African countries on turnout, which proves to be robust to different specifications, taking the endogeneity of return migration into account and ruling out the unobservable locality-level heterogeneity. We also put forward evidence of an impact of returnees from non-African countries on electoral competitiveness, though this result is less robust, and depends notably on the variable used to measure electoral competitiveness.

[21] For the sake of space, we do not present the results regarding RETURNEES, the share of returnees as a whole (regardless of their provenance), given that RETURNEES and RETURNEES – AFRICA are highly correlated as shown above. The results on RETURNEES are available upon request.

Table 3
Returnees and electoral competitiveness.

Dependent:	FRAGMENTATION			WINNING MARGIN		
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) FE	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) FE
RETURNEES – AFRICA	0.232	0.535	0.530**	−0.227	−0.0879	−0.608*
	(0.164)	(0.388)	(0.252)	(0.200)	(0.444)	(0.342)
RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD	0.221	3.193*	1.882*	−0.978**	−1.274	−3.684***
	(0.319)	(1.747)	(1.087)	(0.395)	(1.736)	(1.138)
EMIGRANTS	0.279	−6.326***		−0.411	1.828	
	(0.324)	(2.225)		(0.449)	(2.697)	
FRAGMENTATION – 1998	0.0289	0.00918				
	(0.0224)	(0.0318)				
WINNING MARGIN – 1998				0.0452**	0.0407*	
				(0.0213)	(0.0219)	
First-stage results						
First-stage dependent: EMIGRANTS						
Distance Migratory Route		0.00003***			0.00003***	
		(8.96e−06)			(8.94e−06)	
Distance Checkpoint		−0.00003***			−0.00003***	
		(8.44e−06)			(8.45e−06)	
Distance Senegal River		−7.78e−06**			−7.74e−06**	
		(3.39e−06)			(3.38e−06)	
First-stage dependent: RETURNEES – AF						
Lag Returnees – Af		0.352***			0.352***	
		(0.042)			(0.042)	
First-stage dependent: RETURNEES – RoW						
Lag Returnees – RoW		0.697***			0.700***	
		(0.115)			(0.115)	
Instrumentation tests						
First-stage F-tests for:						
EMIGRANTS		6.44			6.41	
RETURNEES – AF		30.02			30.07	
RETURNEES – RoW		8.72			8.69	
Underidentification test (*p*-val)		0.000			0.000	
Overidentification test (*p*-val)		0.617			0.241	
Observations	697	697	1,394	697	697	1,394
R-squared	0.537	0.231	0.562	0.270	0.238	0.341
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered at the locality level in parentheses. RETURNEES – AFRICA (resp. RoW) is the stock of return migrants from African (resp. non-African) countries over 18 over the population of the locality over 18. EMIGRANTS is the number of current emigrants over 18 over the population of the locality over 18. Control variables included: number of lists competing in the ballot, log of the population over 18, share of the population over 18 that is literate, composite index of wealth per capita, standard deviation of the rain shocks over the decade before the ballot, share of the population over 18 belonging to each of the main ethnic groups. Columns (3) and (6) present 2SLS estimations, instrumenting RETURNEES, RETURNEES – AF and RETURNEES – RoW by their value in 1998 and instrumenting EMIGRANTS by the distance from each locality to the traditional migration route and checkpoint, and to the Senegal River.

* $p < 0.1$.
** $p < 0.05$.
*** $p < 0.01$.

These results are in line with the literature, especially with Batista and Vicente (2011) and Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013) who respectively find that returnees from countries with a better level of governance tend to increase the demand for accountability and the probability of political change in their home country. But the observed effect of returnees from non-African countries on electoral outcomes does not directly attest to a transfer of political norms from returnees to non-migrants. It may merely be due to the fact that return migrants have acquired a different electoral behavior during their migration experience. In this perspective, the observed positive correlation between the share of returnees and participation may be due to the fact that return migrants themselves have a higher propensity to vote, rather than to a diffusion of norms from returnees to non-migrants. In this Section, we explore whether the impact of returnees on electoral outcomes is merely due to the fact that returnees have a specific electoral behavior, or reflects a transfer of political norms from return migrants to their relatives back home.

7.1. Is the effect on turnout only due to returnees participating more?

To assess whether the positive impact of returnees from non-African countries on participation is exclusively due to return migrants having a higher propensity to vote, or whether it attests to a diffusion of the participation behavior from returnees to non-migrants, we run a simple simulation exercise. This test aims at comparing the gain in terms of participation that is

Table 4
Assessing the participation surplus from return migration.

	Gain B – Gain A
Average	0.00058
Localities in the sample where Gain B > Gain A, 1998	597 (85.65%)
Localities in the sample where Gain B > Gain A, 2009	675 (96.84%)
Localities in the sample where Gain B > Gain A, Total	1,272 (91.25%)

Comparison of the simulated gain associated with the assumption that all the returnees voted and the predicted gain associated with the presence of returnees. Gain A is the simulated gain, in terms of participation, of having all the returnees vote. Its average is 0.0019. Gain B is the gain, in terms of participation, associated with the presence of returnees as predicted by the econometric model. Its average is 0.0025. The numbers in brackets are the percentage of localities in the sample for which Gain B is greater than Gain A.

associated with the presence of returnees, as suggested by the estimated coefficients, to the gain in terms of participation computed under the assumption that all returnees vote. We rely on the fixed-effects results presented in Column (6) of Table 2, which should provide a lower-bound estimate of the impact of RETURNEES – RoW since they yield the smallest coefficient of the three specifications presented in Table 2. We focus on the impact of returnees from non-African countries, as suggested by the results of Column (6) of Table 2, and thus assume that return migrants from Africa and non-migrants have the same participation behavior on average.

Assuming that returnees from non-African countries have a participation rate of 100%, and given the observed participation rate of the locality, we can compute the simulated participation rate of non-migrants and of returnees from African countries for each locality:

$$\textit{Participation of non migrants and returnees from Africa}_{c,t} = \frac{(\textit{Observed Participation}_{c,t} - \textit{Share of returnees from the rest of the world}_{c,t})}{\textit{Share of non migrants and returnees from Africa}_{c,t}}$$

We then calculate the difference between the observed participation and this simulated participation of the non-migrants: this difference reflects the net gain, in terms of participation, of having all the returnees from non-African countries vote. We refer to this surplus as Gain A. We find that, within our two-period sample, the average for Gain A equals 0.0019.

In a second step, we derive from our econometric model the predicted gain, in terms of participation, associated with the presence of return migrants. This is computed as the share of RETURNEES – RoW in each locality multiplied by the coefficient of this variable in regression (6) of Table 2 (0.694). We refer to this surplus as Gain B. The average value of Gain B, within the two-period sample, is 0.0025.

Finally, we compare the predicted gain in terms of participation associated with the presence of returnees (Gain B), with the simulated gain in terms of participation associated with having all the returnees vote (Gain A). Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the difference between Gain B and Gain A. When positive, this difference means that the predicted gain in terms of participation associated with the presence of returnees is greater than the simulated gain in terms of participation associated with the assumption that all returnees from non-African countries vote. This comparison shows that in more than 91% of the 1,394 localities in the sample, the predicted gain associated with the presence of returnees is greater than the simulated gain associated with all the returnees voting. This suggests a diffusion of political norms from returnees to non-migrants: the participation rate increased more than it would have if all the returnees from non-African countries, individually, had voted.

7.2. Returnees and the characteristics of the localities

If the positive correlation between returnees and electoral outcomes is due to a transfer of norms from return migrants to their locality of origin, this transfer may depend on the characteristics of the non-migrants. Moreover, if the impact of returnees depends on the characteristics of the non-migrants, then the interpretation in terms of transfer of norms is the most plausible one. In this Section, we look at whether the effect of return migrants differs depending on the education of non-migrants. The assumption of a transfer of norms relies on the idea that, when coming back, migrants bring back a specific knowledge that they have acquired abroad. Regarding electoral behavior, this would notably take the form of information on democracy, on the way political institutions and parties function, and on the right and/or duty to vote. In this perspective, we may expect the specific knowledge brought back by return migrants to have a stronger impact on non-migrants who have a lower access to this type of information. It should in particular affect poorly educated non-migrants more strongly. This suggests that returnees' specific knowledge acquired abroad may substitute for education of non-migrants. To test this hypothesis, we introduce the interaction between the share of returnees and the share of educated non-migrants in the locality into the fixed-effects estimation of PARTICIPATION, FRAGMENTATION and WINNING MARGIN. We pay special

Table 5
Returnees and education of non-migrants.

Dependent:	PARTICIPATION		FRAGMENTATION		WINNING MARGIN	
	(1) PRIM.	(2) SEC.	(3) PRIM.	(4) SEC.	(5) PRIM.	(6) SEC.
RETURNEEES – AF	0.270	0.049	0.723*	0.436	−0.783	−0.499
	(0.191)	(0.139)	(0.390)	(0.291)	(0.524)	(0.400)
RETURNEEES – AF	−5.937**	−1.374	−4.747	0.632	3.739	−1.691
x EDUCATION	(2.773)	(3.046)	(7.269)	(7.039)	(8.336)	(8.061)
RETURNEEES – RoW	1.913**	1.132*	2.887*	3.561***	−3.872	-4.926***
	(0.782)	(0.656)	(1.547)	(1.061)	(2.408)	(1.415)
RETURNEEES – RoW	−16.01*	−9.463	−12.98	−36.14**	2.627	26.88
x EDUCATION	(9.101)	(11.86)	(17.60)	(16.03)	(28.325)	(19.77)
EDUCATION (non-migrants)	0.751**	−0.663**	0.457	−2.063***	−0.188	1.949***
	(0.308)	(0.298)	(0.656)	(0.498)	(0.859)	(0.645)
Observations	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394
R-squared	0.381	0.383	0.563	0.577	0.342	0.351
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Joint significance tests (p-val)						
RET – AF and RET – AF x EDUC.	0.101	0.880	0.089	0.204	0.202	0.288
RET – RoW and RET – RoW x EDUC.	0.036	0.137	0.107	0.003	0.005	0.001

Fixed-effects estimations. Robust standard errors clustered at the locality level in parentheses. All control variables in the baseline fixed-effect estimations are included. We also control for the education measured among non-migrants introduced in the interaction with RETURNEES – AF and RETURNEES – RoW. PRIM. is the share of the non-migrant population over 18 that completed primary education. SEC. is the share of the non-migrant population over 18 that completed secondary education.
* $p < 0.1$.
** $p < 0.05$.
*** $p < 0.01$.

attention to the joint significance tests of the RETURNEES variables and their interactions with the level of education of the non-migrants. We use two alternative measures of education for non-migrants: the share of non-migrants over 18 who completed primary education and secondary education.[22] These results are shown in Table 5. Descriptive statistics on the education of non-migrants in Malian localities are displayed in Appendix E, Table E.1.

Column (1) of Table 5 presents the impact on participation of the interaction between the stock of returnees disaggregated by previous destination and the share of non-migrants with primary education in the locality. While the coefficient associated with RETURNEES – AFRICA is positive, the coefficient associated with its interaction with the share of non-migrants in the locality is negative, these two variables (RETURNEES – AFRICA and RETURNEES – AFRICA x EDUCATION) being almost jointly significant (p-value of the joint significance test = 0.101). This result suggests that the stock of returnees from Africa has a positive estimated impact on participation, which decreases when the locality has a higher share of educated individuals. The negative coefficient for the interaction between RETURNEES – AFRICA and the share of non-migrants with primary education suggests a substitution effect regarding turnout between the education of non-migrants and the presence of returnees from African countries at the locality level. Taking this interaction term into account, we find that the total impact of returnees from African countries is positive when the share of non-migrants with primary education in the locality does not exceed 4.6%, which is the case for around 43% of the observations (55.1% of the localities in 1998 and 31% in 2009).

A substitution effect also appears regarding returnees from non-African countries and the share of non-migrants with primary education. The coefficient associated with RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD in Column (1) is significantly positive, while its interaction with the education of non-migrants has a negative and significant coefficient. The impact on turnout of returnees from non-African countries thus depends on the level of primary education in the locality. Based on the estimates in Column (1), we find that when the percentage of primary educated non-migrants in the locality is lower than 11.9%, which is the case for nearly 91.4% of the observations (95% of the localities in 1998, 87.8% in 2009), the share of returnees from non-African countries has a strong positive impact. This positive impact then decreases as the share of primary educated non-migrants increases. The relationship between the primary education of non-migrants and the marginal impact of RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD on participation is represented in Appendix E, Fig. E.1.

Column (2) of Table 5 re-iterates the same estimation as Column (1), using non-migrants' secondary instead of primary education. The substitution effect between returnees (either from Africa or from the rest of the world) and the education of non-migrants does not hold any more, with the p-values of the joint significance test respectively reaching 0.880 and 0.137. Overall, the first two columns of Table 5 thus suggest the existence of a substitution effect between relatively low levels of

[22] This test has also been implemented for the share of literate non-migrants and for the share of non-migrants who completed tertiary education, yielding consistent results. We only present the results on primary and secondary education here, but the rest of the results is available upon request.

education of non-migrants and the presence of returnees coming back both from Africa and from non-African countries, regarding participation behavior.

Columns (3) and (4) then present the same estimations for FRAGMENTATION. In Column (3), the impact of returnees from African countries appears to decrease as the share of non-migrants with primary education increases (p-value of the joint significance test = 0.089). However, this substitution effect between education and RETURNEES – AFRICA does not hold when considering secondary education in Column (4). On the other hand, in both cases (primary education in Column (3) and secondary education in Column (4)), we observe a substitution effect between RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD and the education of the non-migrants, which is stronger for secondary education. More precisely, the estimated coefficients displayed in Column (4) suggest that returnees from non-African countries positively affect electoral fragmentation when the share of non-migrants who completed secondary education is lower than 9.9% (91.7% of observations – 95.7% of localities in 1998, and 87.7% in 2009). Lastly, Columns (5) and (6) display the results of the same exercise on our second measure of electoral competitiveness, WINNING MARGIN. While the impact of returnees from African countries does not appear to vary depending on the proportion of educated non-migrants, we find evidence once more of a substitution effect between returnees from non-African countries and the education of non-migrants, the impact of RETURNEES – RoW being negative in the localities where the share of (primary and secondary) educated non-migrants is relatively low.

Overall, the results of Table 5 are in line with the transfer of norm hypothesis, and put forward an impact of returnees from non-African countries on electoral outcomes which is stronger when non-migrants are less educated and less informed. Moreover, the mechanism of norm transfer regarding electoral competitiveness appears slightly different as compared to turnout. Indeed, the results of Table 5 suggest that the presence of return migrants (in particular from non-African countries) may be a substitute for low levels of education of non-migrants when considering participation behavior, and for higher levels of education of non-migrants when considering electoral competitiveness.

8. Conclusion

This paper investigates the impact of return migration on participation and electoral competitiveness in Mali. We combine census data and electoral results at the locality level to emphasize a positive correlation between the stock of returnees from non-African countries and participation rates, as well as electoral competitiveness. To take the potential endogeneity into account, we implement an instrumentation strategy. To control for the unobservable locality-level heterogeneity that may affect the results, we then rely on fixed-effects estimations. Finally, we test for the existence of a transfer of political norms from return migrants to their communities of origin. The results suggest that the correlation between return migration and electoral outcomes does not only capture returnees' specific electoral behavior, but reflects a diffusion of political norms from returnees to non-migrants. More precisely, we put forward a phenomenon of substitution regarding electoral outcomes between the specific knowledge brought back by returnees and the level of education of non-migrants.

Our results suggest that migrants who have experienced different economic and political environments while living abroad bring different political norms back home and are likely to influence non-migrants' electoral behavior. This is consistent with the results of Batista and Vicente (2011) regarding the positive impact of return migration on non-migrants' demand for political accountability, and of Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013), as well as Pfutze (2012), regarding the positive correlation between migration and the probability of voting for the opposition party. As Batista and Vicente (2011) and Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013), we interpret this result in terms of transfer of political norms and new ideas acquired during migration episodes. In the case of Mexico, Pfutze (2012) favors an alternative explanation: migrants' remittances would make patronage and vote buying more expensive for the local power and would therefore strengthen opposition parties. The Mexican and Malian environments are quite different, both in terms of political institutions and economic development. These differences may account for the different impact of return migration in these two contexts. The set of results discussed in this emerging literature calls however for further research, notably on the alternative channels through which migration and return migration may affect political behaviors in the origin country.

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Appendix A. Polity IV index in Mali, Africa and West Africa (1960–2010)



Note: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011) is an index of democracy provided by the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) of the Center for Systemic Peace. It assigns each country an annual score in the autocracy-democracy spectrum, ranging from −10 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy).

Appendix B. Elections in Mali

(see Table B.1) and Fig. B.1.

Table B.1
Local and national elections in Mali, 1992–2009.

	Pres. 1992	Parl. 1992	Pres. 1997	Parl. 1997	Local 1998–1999	Pres. 2002	Parl. 2002	Local 2004	Pres. 2007	Parl. 2007	Local 2009
Number of Rounds	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1
Turnout (%)	23.6/20.9	21	28.4	21.6	36	38.3/30	22.7/n.a.	41.6	36.2	31.5/n.a.	41.7
Winner	Konaré		Konaré			Touré			Touré		
Party	ADEMA	ADEMA	ADEMA	ADEMA	–		*Espoir*2002[a]	-	*ADP*[b]	*ADP*[b]	–
[%]	[44.9/69]	[n.a./n.a.]	[95.9]	[n.a./n.a.]		[28.7/64.3]	[26.3/44.8]		[71.2]	[n.a./76.9]	
% of localities dominated by ADEMA	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	76.4	n.a.	42.5	36.7	n.a.	32.4	40
% of votes for ADEMA	44.9/69	n.a.	95.9	n.a.	53.9	21.3/35.7	n.a.	24.5	ADEMA part of ADP	ADEMA part of ADP	29.7
% of seats for ADEMA	–	65.5	–	87.1	–	–	30.6	–	–	34.7	-

"Pres." refers to presidential and "Parl." to parliamentary ballots.Sources: Electoral data from the INSTAT, completed using the African Election Database (available at http://africanelections.tripod.com/ml.html) for the presidential election of 2007 and for elections prior to 1999. n.a.: non available.

[a] Coalition of parties among which CNID, MPR and RPM.

[b] Coalition of parties among which ADEMA and URD.



Fig. B.1. Participation rate and domination of ADEMA by *commune*, 1999 and 2009.

Appendix C. Return migration in Mali

Table C.1 and Fig. C.1.

Table C.1
Composition of the share of returnees by destination.

Share of returnees (in percent) from:	1998	2009
Africa	95.7	87.38
Among which: Ivory Coast	59.02	61.52
Burkina Faso	8.51	7.28
Senegal	6.57	5.99
Mauritania	4.86	2.62
Guinea	5.41	4.09
Niger	3.25	2.12
Gabon	2.39	3.38
Ghana	2.18	1.56
Congo Brazzaville	1.76	2.41
Other	*6.05*	*9.03*
Non-African countries	4.3	12.62
Among which: Europe		*56.78*
France	64.82	24.14
Spain		2
Russia	3.25	0.88
America		*12.48*

(*continued on next page*)

Table C.1 (*continued*)

Share of returnees (in percent) from:	1998	2009
USA	3.3	2.44
Asia		*26.61*
China	0.71	5.67
Saudi Arabia		4.73
Israel		2.34
Kazakhstan		2.11
Other	*27.92*	*4.13*

Source: authors' calculations based on RGPH 1998 and 2009.



Fig. C.1. Share of returnees by locality and by previous host region, 1998 and 2009.

Appendix D. Returnees and participation, control variables

Table D.1.

Table D.1

Dependent: PARTICIPATION	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) FE	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) FE
RETURNEES	0.207*	0.503**	0.0624			
	(0.110)	(0.214)	(0.134)			
RETURNEES – AFRICA				0.174	0.498**	0.0416
				(0.115)	(0.218)	(0.136)
RETURNEES – RoW				0.728***	2.269**	0.694*
				(0.257)	(1.077)	(0.415)
EMIGRANTS	−0.297	−0.213		−0.273	0.0684	
	(0.301)	(1.681)		(0.305)	(1.653)	
PARTICIPATION – 1998	0.227***	0.227***		0.229***	0.233***	
	(0.0365)	(0.0358)		(0.0365)	(0.0360)	
LISTS	−0.00188	−0.00157	−0.00217	−0.00168	−0.000735	−0.00217
	(0.00176)	(0.00194)	(0.00155)	(0.00177)	(0.00205)	(0.00155)
POPULATION (LOG)	−0.0413***	-0.0423***	−0.0163	−0.0412***	-0.0424***	−0.0159
	(0.00701)	(0.00700)	(0.0290)	(0.00701)	(0.00704)	(0.0290)
LITERACY	0.134*	0.147*	0.0991	0.132*	0.150*	0.102
	(0.0774)	(0.0815)	(0.150)	(0.0776)	(0.0812)	(0.150)
WEALTH	−0.0210**	−0.0224***	-0.0360**	−0.0220***	-0.0262***	−0.0374***
	(0.00836)	(0.00853)	(0.0145)	(0.00842)	(0.00916)	(0.0144)
RAIN SHOCKS	0.000144	3.33e-05	−0.000317**	0.000150	3.15e-06	−0.000294**
	(0.000124)	(0.000190)	(0.000124)	(0.000125)	(0.000192)	(0.000125)
FULANI	0.0213	0.0204	0.219	0.0231	0.0229	0.217
	(0.0225)	(0.0364)	(0.179)	(0.0226)	(0.0372)	(0.179)
SONRAI/DJEMA	0.0749***	0.0709**	0.849**	0.0758***	0.0703**	0.840**
	(0.0231)	(0.0285)	(0.386)	(0.0231)	(0.0287)	(0.386)
MARAKA/SONINKE	−0.00480	−0.0224	0.327	−0.0159	−0.0714	0.322
	(0.0257)	(0.0768)	(0.224)	(0.0260)	(0.0743)	(0.224)
DOGON	0.0822***	0.0779***	0.0854	0.0816***	0.0732***	0.0946
	(0.0163)	(0.0206)	(0.323)	(0.0163)	(0.0206)	(0.323)
MAURE/ARAB	0.0416	0.0401	0.0825	0.0440	0.0451	0.0660
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.403)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.403)
TAMACHEQ	0.00160	0.000297	0.408	0.000476	−0.00371	0.396
	(0.0506)	(0.0499)	(0.343)	(0.0506)	(0.0498)	(0.343)
MINIANKA	0.0936***	0.0999***	0.185	0.0938***	0.104***	0.188*
	(0.0170)	(0.0225)	(0.116)	(0.0169)	(0.0223)	(0.114)
OTHER	0.0212	0.0145	0.255	0.0192	0.00589	0.245
	(0.0193)	(0.0205)	(0.160)	(0.0194)	(0.0222)	(0.160)
YEAR 2009			0.122***			0.121***
			(0.0117)			(0.0118)
Constant	0.877***	0.890***	0.656**	0.879***	0.903***	0.660**
	(0.0797)	(0.0800)	(0.271)	(0.0799)	(0.0828)	(0.270)
Observations	697	697	1,394	697	697	1,394
R-squared	0.349	0.341	0.373	0.351	0.323	0.375

Robust standard errors clustered at the locality level in parentheses. Columns (3) and (6) present 2SLS estimations, instrumenting RETURNEES, RETURNEES – AF and RETURNEES – RoW by their value in 1998, and instrumenting EMIGRANTS by the distance from each locality to the traditional migration route and checkpoint, and to the Senegal River.

* $p < 0.1$

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix E. Return migration and the education of non-migrants

Table E.1 and Fig. E.1.

Table E.1
Education of non-migrants.

	1998	2009
% of literate non-migrants	11.16	15.16
% of non-migrants with primary education	5	7.12
% of non-migrants with secondary education	2.62	5.70
% of non-migrants with tertiary education	0.42	0.42
Observations	697	697

Source: RGPH census data, 1998 & 2009.



Dash lines give 95% confidence interval.

Fig. E.1. Marginal effect of RETURNEES – REST OF THE WORLD on PARTICIPATION, depending on the share of non-migrants who completed primary education.

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