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Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2014-2021 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Essays in Political Activism and Social Interactions*
MA in Economics, University of Chile, 2011-2012
BA in Economics, University of Chile, 2006-2010

References

Professor Debraj Ray
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
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Professor Ennio Stacchetti
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Professor Alessandro Lizzeri
Princeton University, Department of
Economics
Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Princeton, NJ 08544
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Teaching and Research Fields

Microeconomics, Political Economy and Economic Theory

Teaching Experience

Fall 2020	Microeconomics with Algebra, NYU Stern, TA for Prof. Luis Cabral
Summer 2019	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lecturer
Fall 2018	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Prof. Ennio Stacchetti
Summer 2018	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lecturer
Fall 2017	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Prof. Mikhail Panov
Spring 2017	Statistics, NYU, TA for Prof. Anthony Donoghue

Research Experience and Other Employment

2019-2020	Research Assistant for Prof. Debraj Ray
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Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2014-2020	Henry McCracken Fellowship, PhD studies, NYU.
2011-2012	National Master's Scholarship, CONICYT, Government of Chile

Professional Activities

Conferences and Seminars

2020	Young Economists' Symposium (U Penn) Upcoming: Development Seminar (NYU); Theory Reading Group (Boston University); Micro Theory Lunch (NYU)
2019	Micro Theory Lunch (NYU)
2017	SAET Conference (Faro, Portugal); Economics Seminar (University of Chile)
2014	Game Theory Society Conference, IWGTS (Sao Paulo, Brasil)
2013	Chilean Economics Society Conference (Santiago, Chile)
2012	Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (Lima, Peru), IMCA (Lima, Peru), Chilean Economics Society Conference (Viña del Mar, Chile), Economics Seminar (University of Vigo, Spain)

Coordination Activities

2017-2019	Student Micro Theory Lunch, NYU.
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Professional Employment

2012-2014	Economist, Chilean Antitrust Agency
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Publications

Correa, Sofia and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2014), "Essential Equilibria of Large Generalized Games," *Economic Theory*, 57(3), 479-513.

Research Papers

Persistent Protests (Job Market Paper)

I study a dynamic model of public protests in continuous time. There is a continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs, who can participate in a protest demanding a public good. The government can concede at any time, and as long as it does not, it pays a flow cost for the protest that is increasing in time and participation rates. Citizens are motivated to participate in the protest because they enjoy a merit reward if the government concedes while they are active. I show that there is always delay in government concession. Citizens entry times are increasing in opportunity costs, and their exit times are decreasing. Any equilibrium with protests can be decomposed into two stages: a building-up stage, in which citizens continuously join the protest and the government ignores them, and a concession stage, in which there is a war of attrition between the citizens and the government. There is multiplicity of equilibria with protests: for each time within a bounded interval, there is a unique equilibrium where the concession stage starts at that time.

An Economic Theory of Segregation (with Daniel Hojman)

This paper provides a general framework to measure segregation as the lack of interactions between different individuals. The basic unit of measure is a pairwise interaction. Each interaction contributes to segregation according to two dimensions: the intensity of the interaction, and the social characteristics of the agents involved. Using simple axioms, we obtain a representation of segregation. We then show that the measure is

proportional to a covariance between two distances: (i) a social distance, which captures how different agents are, and (ii) a spatial distance, which captures the intensity of their interaction. As the proximity of agents in the space in which they interact is more correlated with their proximity in a space of social characteristics, the more segregated the society is. We develop two applications. The first one measures socioeconomic segregation in the Chilean school system, using administrative information on the socioeconomic status of parents. The second one analyzes ideological segregation in media consumption in European countries.