

Fast Modular Arithmetic and Public Key Cryptography

Back to primes

- Fast modular arithmetic → generate and recognize large primes efficiently
- We need a *probabilistic algorithm* for primality testing
- Computing the product of two large primes (a semiprime) is easy.
- Finding the two large prime factors of a semiprime is (still considered) hard.
- Important application: public key cryptography.

Integer factorization

- Naive: iterate over $[1, \dots, n]$
- Better: iterate over $\{p \mid \text{prime } p, p \text{ in } [1, \dots, n]\}$
 - Compare the approaches (mers 8 returns the 8th Mersenne prime)
*Lecture6> map factorsNaive [mers 8..]
*Lecture6> map factors [mers 8..]
- No polynomial time algorithm (yet)
- Currently: trial division with a large set of candidates
 - semiprimes (product of two primes) are hardest instances
- Reliable, but inefficient → can we improve?
 - Yes, for primality testing
 - Not (yet), for integer factorization

Mersenne primes

Marin Mersenne - 1600, French, priest and mathematician

- Studied $2^p - 1$ numbers
- If $2^p - 1$ is prime, p is prime
 - Assume p is not prime $\rightarrow p = ab$
 - Take $x = 2^b - 1$, $y = 1 + 2^b + 2^{2b} + \dots + 2^{(a-1)b}$
 - $x \cdot y = 2^b y - y = 2^{ab} - 1 \rightarrow 2^{ab} - 1$ is composite



Fermat's primality test

- Pierre de Fermat: 1600, French, mathematician, not a priest, but a lawyer
 - Little Theorem of Fermat: if p is prime, then for any integer a with $1 \leq a < p$, $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod p$
 - Proof is based on the fact that the list $[[a],[2a] \dots [(p-1)a]]$ (whose product is $a^{p-1}(p-1)! \pmod p$) is a permutation of $[[1], \dots, [p-1]] \rightarrow$ and this is true because a and p are coprimes
 - $(p-1)! = a^{p-1}(p-1)! \pmod p \rightarrow 1 = a^{p-1} \pmod n$, because $(p-1)!$ and p are coprimes
- Fermat's algorithm for primality testing
 - Pick $1 < a < n$
 - Compute $a^{n-1} \pmod n$ using fast exponentiation (exM)
 - If outcome is 1 \rightarrow output "Probably prime", else \rightarrow output "Composite"
 - Trying more candidates increases the accuracy of your test, however increases the runtime

```
primeTestsF :: Int -> Integer -> IO Bool
primeTestsF k n = do
  as <- sequence $ fmap (\_ -> randomRIO (2,n-1)) [1..k]
  return (all (\ a -> exM a (n-1) n == 1) as)
```

Fooling the Fermat test

- Carmichael numbers → see lab exercises
 - $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ is also true for some composite p numbers
- Miller and Rabin proposed a further test
 - Miller proposed a deterministic test
 - whose correctness depends on an unproven hypothesis (Extended Riemann Hypothesis)
 - Difficult to automatically generate the falsifiable cases
 - Rabin modified it to a probabilistic algorithm
 - If n is prime → any x with $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ has to satisfy $x \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ or $x \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$ (Euclid's Lemma)
 - Factoring out powers of 2

decomp :: Integer -> (Integer,Integer)

decomp n0 = decomp' (0,n0) where

decomp' = until (odd.snd) (\ (m,n) -> (m+1,div n 2))

- Find a non-trivial square root of 1 mod n
 - let $q = 2^r$, $n-1 = q*s$ and pick $1 < a < n$ in $a^s \pmod{n}$, $a^{2s} \pmod{n}$, ..., $a^{q*s} \pmod{n}$ → if the list does not end in 1, a^{n-1} fails the Fermat test → n is composite
 - $a^{\text{pow}(2,r)*s}$ is a nontrivial square root for 1 mod n if $a^{\text{pow}(2,r)*s} \not\equiv n-1$ and $a^{\text{pow}(2,r)*s} \not\equiv 1$ and $a^{\text{pow}(2,r+1)*s} \equiv 1$

Miller-Rabin Compositeness Test

- If the mrComposite x n test succeeds for some x, $2 \leq x < n$, then n is composite

```
mrComposite :: Integer -> Integer -> Bool
```

```
mrComposite x n = let
```

```
  (r,s) = decomp (n-1)
```

```
  fs    = takeWhile (/= 1)
```

```
    (map (\j -> exM x (2^j*s) n) [0..r])
```

```
in
```

```
  exM x s n /= 1 && last fs /= (n-1)
```

```
-- if  $(x^s \bmod n) == 1 \rightarrow (x^s \bmod n)^{\text{pow}(2,r)} == 1$ 
```

```
-- if last fs == (n-1)  $\rightarrow x^{\text{pow}(2,r)*s}$  does not fail Fermat
```

The Miller-Rabin Primality Test

- K is the number of candidates to consider

```
primeMR :: Int -> Integer -> IO Bool
```

```
primeMR _ 2 = return True
```

```
primeMR 0 _ = return True
```

```
primeMR k n = do
```

```
  a <- randomRIO (2, n-1) :: IO Integer
```

```
  if exM a (n-1) n /= 1 || mrComposite a n
```

```
  then return False else primeMR (k-1) n
```

- Testing the Tests → lists of prime numbers are useless, we need (interesting) composite numbers → see lab exercises

Modular Exponentiation $x^y \bmod n$

- Primality testing using a probabilistic algorithm is based on efficient modulo exponentiation.
- **Naive:** $\text{expM } x \ y = \text{rem } (x^y)$
- **Faster: repeatedly squaring modulo n :** $[x] \rightarrow [x^2] \rightarrow [x^4] \rightarrow \dots$
 - One of your lab exercises is to implement exM , the faster version of expM
 - Based on the idea $x^2 \bmod n = (x \bmod n) * (x \bmod n)$

Modular Arithmetic

- Int data type ranges from -2^{63} to $2^{63}-1$
 - Stored modulo 2^{64}
 - 2's complement: for negative numbers, put a 1 at the sign position, flip all the bits, and add 1

```
*Lecture6> maxBound :: Int
```

```
9223372036854775807
```

```
*Lecture6> 2^63-1
```

```
9223372036854775807
```

```
*Lecture6> minBound :: Int
```

```
-9223372036854775808
```

```
*Lecture6> -2^63
```

```
-9223372036854775808
```

```
*Lecture6> 2^64-1
```

```
18446744073709551615
```

```
*Lecture6> 2^64-1 :: Int
```

```
-1
```

Modular operations

- Addition $\rightarrow \text{add}_M x y = \text{rem}(x+y)$
- Multiplication $\rightarrow \text{mult}_M x y = \text{rem}(x*y)$
 - $(x \bmod a) * (y \bmod a) = (x*y \bmod a)$
- Inverse
 - Every "equivalence" class $[a]$ for \mathbb{Z}/n except $[0]$ has an inverse, $[b]$
 - $[a]*[b]=1 \rightarrow [a*b]=1 \rightarrow a*b=1+k*n \rightarrow a*b - k*n = 1 \rightarrow (a,k), (\mathbf{a,n}), (b,k), (b,n)$ coprimes
- Division
 - Multiplication by modular inverse $\rightarrow x$ has an modular inverse if it is coprime with the modulus
 - $\text{gcd}(x,n) = 1$ iff there are u,v such that $ux + vn = 1$
 - We use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find u,v

Extended Euclidean Algorithm

- Standard: only keeps remainders $\rightarrow \gcd(q*b+r, b) = \gcd(b, r)$
- Extended: keep also quotients $\rightarrow \text{fctGcd}(q*b+r, b) = \text{fctGcd}(b, r)$

`fctGcd :: Integer -> Integer -> (Integer, Integer)`

`fctGcd a b =`

`if b == 0`

`then (1, 0)`

`else`

`let`

`(q, r) = quotRem a b`

`(s, t) = fctGcd b r`

`in (t, s - q*t)`

`-- gcd(b,r) = b*s + r*t = b*s + (a-b*q)*t = a*t + b*(s-q*t)`

`-- gcd(a,b) = a*u + b*v = (b*q+r)*u + b*v = b*(q*u+v) + r*u = gcd(b,r)`

We now can write coprime as:

`coprime n m = fGcd n m == 1`

or

`coprime' n m = let (x,y) = fctGcd n m`

`in x*n + y*m == 1`

Application to cryptography

(Diffie and Hellman 1976): public key cryptography

- **Easy** to find large primes, multiply them, and compute exponentiation modulo a prime
- **Hard** to factor numbers that are multiples of large primes, and find x from $x^a \bmod p$

Exchange protocol

- Alice and Bob agree on a large prime p and a base $g < p$ such that g and $p-1$ are coprime.
- Alice sends a secret a by sending $A = g^a \bmod p$
- Bob sends a secret b by sending $B = g^b \bmod p$
- Alice calculates the key $k = B^a \bmod p = (g^b)^a \bmod p$
- Bob calculates the key $k = A^b \bmod p = (g^a)^b \bmod p$
- To encode a message m , Alice and Bob calculate $m * k \bmod p$

encodeDH :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer

encodeDH p k m = m*k `mod` p

- Alice decodes a cipher c with $c * (g^b)^{(p-1)-a} \bmod p = (m * g^{ab})(g^{p-1})^b g^{-ab}$ via Fermat $m * 1^b \bmod p = m \bmod p$

decodeDH :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer

decodeDH p ga b c = let

gab' = exM ga ((p-1)-b) p

in

rem (c*gab') p

Symmetric key ciphers using fast exponentiation

- If p and k are known, encoding and decoding are easy (computationally)

```
encode :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer
encode p k m = let
    p' = p-1
    e = head [ x | x <- [k..], gcd x p' == 1 ]
in
    exM m e p
```

```
decode :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer
decode p k m = let
    p' = p-1
    e = head [ x | x <- [k..], gcd x p' == 1 ]
    d = invM e p'
in
    exM m d p
```

Why can the public key be public?

Euler's totient function: counts the positive integers $k < n$ that are coprime with n .

- Special case for semiprimes (product of two primes p, q) $= (p-1)(q-1)$
- Let n be a semiprime pq , and let e be a coprime with the totient $\phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$
- x^e is a bijection on $\{0, \dots, n-1\}$
- let $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$, then $(x^e)^d = x \bmod n$, since $ed = 1 \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$ and we can apply Fermat's little theorem for both $(p-1)$ and $(q-1)$
- e and d can be used for encryption and decryption
 - From e and n it is hard to compute $d \rightarrow d$ is kept a secret

Asymmetric public key cryptography

- Generate a public key and make it public
- From it, anyone can construct an encoding function
- Decoding is considered hard
- Len Adleman, Adi Shami, Ron Rivest
- Select an integer e that is coprime with the totient of semiprime $n=pq$
 - p, q are large primes of the same bitlength
 - Let $d = e^{-1} \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$
- (e, n) is the public key, (d, n) is the private key

`rsaEncode :: (Integer,Integer) -> Integer -> Integer`

`rsaEncode (e,n) m = exM m e n`

`rsaDecode :: (Integer,Integer) -> Integer -> Integer`

`rsaDecode = rsaEncode`

`-- $(m^e)^{\text{pow}(e,-1)} \bmod n = m \bmod n$`

Bibliography

- Number theoretic algorithms: (Cormen, Leiserson, and Rivest 1997), Chapter 33, and (Dasgupta, Papadimitriou, and Vazirani 2008), Chapter 1.
- Fast primality testing (Miller 1976),(Rabin 1980).
- Cryptographic key exchange (Diffie and Hellman 1976).
- RSA public key cryptography (R. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 1978).

Recap

Subjects

- Hoare triples \leftrightarrow unit tests
- Software verification \leftrightarrow tests follow specification (remember LTS and Axini)
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