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CNE 241: Assignment 6: Pablo Veyrat
Robert 1: . (at us assume the utility function is U(a) = x - ax and x N(p, 02)
 We want to compute \mathbb{E}(U(x)) = \mathbb{E}(x) - \frac{\alpha}{2}\mathbb{E}(x^2) by linearity. And V(x) = \mathbb{E}(x^2) - \mathbb{E}(x)^2
\int_{0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}(x^2) = \mathbb{E}(x^2) + \mathbb{E}(x^2)
               Hence [ (Us) = p - a + + +2
 We have V(x_{(E)}) = E(V(x)) by definition, so: x_{(E)} = \frac{\alpha}{2} \times (x_{(E)}^2 + y_{(E)}^2)
    We write this as a second begree polynomial:
            - = x(2 + x(E + = (52+p2) . p=0
     0= 1 + 4 = ( ( ( 2 + 2 ) - p) = 1 + 02 ( ( 2 + p2 ) - 20 p > 0
  The roots of this equation are therefore:

1+ 1+ 1+q7(1242) - 2ap
      the other root is most likely regative (depending on the values of a and p)

So XCE = 1+ (1+a<sup>2</sup>(T<sup>2</sup>+p<sup>2</sup>) - 7ap
. The absolute risk premium The is defined by: The = p-x(E = p- 1+ (1+22(thy)-2016
. If we have to chance between a risky and a non risky osset, and denote by W the partillio wealth, we have WN N(1+ (1-2) r. 24, 2202) = N(1+ r. + 2 (2-r), 2202)
 In this problem, we are seeking to maximize ZCF which is now afraction of 2.


It VII a 2 (2 T2 + (1+(1-2) T+24)) 2 20 (1+(1-2) T+24)
  This is thus equivalent to maximiting: P(z) = a(2°0° + (1+ (1-2) + 27)2) -2+2(2-1) - 24
   (1) = 022 45 + or 25 (h-4) + (144) + 53(h-4) (144) - 55 (h-4)
  ((1)= latz 5+0 [[55(h-c)] + 5(h-c) (++c)] + 5(c-b)
  We get that f'(z) = 0 when: 2(2ar^2 + 2a(y-r)^2) = 2(y-r)(1.(4r)a)

The optimal value of z is then: z = \frac{2(y-r)(4.(4r)a)}{2ar^2 + 2a(y-r)^2}
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## Question 1, Assignment 6, CME 241 - Pablo Veyrat, pveyrat@stanford.edu

The code for the plot can be found in the assignment6\_code.py file

This gives us the following evolution for the optimal z as a function of  $\alpha$ .



Modern 7:

We get:

Note that  $U(x_{LE}) = F(U(x))$ In the partiolise application of cera with  $U(x) = \log(x)$ Note that  $U(x_{LE}) = F(U(x))$ We get:

Note that  $U(x_{LE}) = F(U(x))$ The partiolise application of lecture, we showed that  $\log U(x_{LE}) = \frac{\pi^2 e^2}{2}$ In the partiolise application of lecture, we showed that  $\log U(x_{LE}) = \frac{\pi^2 e^2}{2}$ We are just trying to maximize:  $f(\overline{U}) = F(Y(x)) = \frac{\pi^2 e^2}{2}$ We are just trying to maximize:  $f(\overline{U}) = F(Y(x)) = \frac{\pi^2 e^2}{2}$ We have  $f'(\overline{U}) = Y = F(\overline{U}) = F(Y(x)) = 0$ We have  $f'(\overline{U}) = Y = F(\overline{U}) = 0$ Note have  $f'(\overline{U}) = Y = F(\overline{U}) = 0$ Note that  $f'(\overline{U}) = \frac{\pi^2 e^2}{2}$ This is the optimal invertigent in the partial invertigent in

. The two outcomes for wealth Watthe end of our single bet of f. Wo are: . Wo(4-f) + Wof (1+2) = No (1+ f2) . Wo(1-f) + Wof (1-f) = Wo(1-fp) Interms of utility, it gives: by (W) = log Wo + log (A+ fk) in the first case ing (W) = log Wo + log (A- fk) in the second case.

Hence [F(log (W)] = log Wo + plog(A+ fk) + (A-p) log (A-fk) = g(f) The derivative of [F(log(W)) with respect to ] is: g'() = p = 1 (1-p) = - 1 - 1 B We get that : g'(f) = 0 =) px (A-PB) = (1-p) f (1+fx) pa - { paß = (1-p)B , Pa(1-p) } Hence | [x (1-p) B+ pa B] = px - (4-p) B Pap = pa- (1-p)p This gives us that I = p - 1-p : we need to reify : I this I is a maximum. be have  $g''(f) = -(4-p) \frac{p^2}{p^2} - p \frac{\alpha^2}{4!p^2}$ This expression is negative for all f, especially for f = f.

This is hence a maximum  $f' = \frac{1}{p} - \frac{(4-p)}{\alpha}$ This is hence a maximum  $f' = \frac{1}{p} - \frac{(4-p)}{\alpha}$ This formula makes complete sense.

If we're in the case before  $\alpha = \beta$ , then f' = 7p - 1:  $f = \frac{1}{p} = \frac{1}{2}$ : there is no inventive to set.

If  $p > \frac{1}{2}$ : f' > 0: then the game is meant to make us lose, we shouldn't play at all.

If  $p > \frac{1}{2}$ ; then f' > 0 and we should bet a faction of ourgains at each step.

Note that f' > 0 and we should bet a faction of ourgains at each step.

When  $\alpha \ne \beta$ : then the smaller  $\alpha$ , the bigar p has to be to active in a situation where we can have f' > 0.

The smaller  $\beta$ , the smaller  $\beta$ .

The smaller  $\beta$ , the smaller  $\beta$  is to common sense of how one would bet in the game.