

# Stable Matching Problem

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# Stable Matching Algorithm

- Each male candidate has a preference list of females.
- Each female candidate has a preference list of males.
- A man a is paired with a woman y, and a woman x is paired with a man b, where the man a prefers the woman x over y, and the woman also prefers the man a over b. In such a condition, pair (a, x) is called as an **unstable unmatched pair**.
- $A(M) \rightarrow Y(F)$
- $B(M) \rightarrow X(F)$
- $A \rightarrow X > Y$
- $X \rightarrow A > B$
- A man proposes a women in the order of decreasing preference, whereas a woman says “may be” in the order of increasing preference

# Stable Matching Algorithm

- Input: preference list of males and females.
  - Output: A stable matching (No unstable unmatched pair exists at the termination of the algorithm)
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- X : A>B>C>D      A: Z>X>Y>W
  - Y: A>C>B>D      B: Y>W>X>Z
  - Z: C>D>A>B      C: W>X>Y>Z
  - W: C>B>A>D      D: X>Y>Z>W

# Stable Matching Algorithm: Men propose women

- |  |            |                              |
|--|------------|------------------------------|
| • X : A>B>C>D                              | A: Z>X>Y>W | • X remains idle             |
| • Y: A>C>B>D                               | B: Y>W>X>Z | • Y proposes B. B says maybe |
| • Z: C>D>A>B                               | C: W>X>Y>Z | • Z remains idle             |
| • W: C>B>A>D                               | D: X>Y>Z>W | • W remains idle             |
| • X proposes A. A says maybe               |            | • X remains idle             |
| • Y proposes A. A rejects Y                |            | • Y remains idle             |
| • Z proposes C. C says maybe               |            | • Z remains idle             |
| • W proposes C. C says maybe and rejects Z |            | • W remains idle             |
| • X remains idle                           |            | • X->A                       |
| • Y proposes C. C rejects Y                |            | • Y->B                       |
| • Z proposes D. D says maybe               |            | • Z->D                       |
| • W remains idle                           |            | • W->C                       |

# Proof of Correctness

- Prove that at the end of the stable matching algorithm, there is no unstable unmatched pair.
- Proof: There is an unstable unmatched pair (X, A), where X is matched to B and A is matched to Y and
  - X: A > B
  - A: X > Y
  - Objective: To prove such situation is not possible. To match X to B over A, the only possibility is X never proposes A or X proposes A but gets rejected in favour of B.
  - Case 1: “X never proposes A” is not possible since the proposal order is in order of decreasing preferences.
  - Case 2: “X proposes A but gets rejected in favour of B” is not possible because A likes X more than Y