

Evaluation of hill climbing, simulated annealing, tabu search and random selection attack algorithms on cryptographic hash functions Keccak, BLAKE, and Grøstl

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Abstract

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Hash functions, have applications in computer security, in fields of authentication and integrity. Due to importance of hash function usage in everyday computing, standards for using hashing algorithm and their bit size have been released by (NIST) which are denoted by nomenclature Standard Hashing Algorithm (SHA).

Due to advances in cryptanalysis of SHA-2, NIST announced a competition in November, 2007 to choose SHA-3. In October, 2012 the winner was selected to be Keccak amongst 64 submissions. All the submissions were open to public scrutiny, and underwent intensive third party cryptanalysis, before the winner was selected. Keccak was chosen for its flexibility, efficient and elegant implementation, and large security margin.

All algorithms submitted to competition have undergone public scrutiny. And other four finalist in the competition were almost equivalent to Keccak, in attributes of security margin and implementation. In this project, I will be comparing Keccak with two other SHA-3 finalists, BLAKE, and Grøstl with respect to their resistance to simulated annealing and tabu search.

Application of tabu search and simulated annealing to hash algorithms will be akin to

generic attacks. That is these methods of breaking hash functions are design agnostic or do not depend on the workings of the hash function. Thus ensuring no bias in the experiment. At present, it is computationally infeasible to break the above mentioned hash functions. But the reduced versions of these can be subjected to attacks for near collisions. Thus I will be able to examine and conclude, if reduced instance Keccak has better resistance to generic attacks than reduced instance of BLAKE and Grøstl.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions

A cryptographic hash function, is an algorithm capable of intaking arbitrarily long input string, and output a fixed size string. The output string is often called message digest, since the long input message appears in compact digested form or hash value of the input. The message digest for two strings even differing by a single bit should ideally be completely different, and no two input message should have the same hash value. The properties of hash function are described in more mathematical detail in next chapter. Following is the section about initial attempts at standardizing and choosing a strong hashing algorithm.

1.2 The need for cryptographic hash function

Applications of hash function have been discussed in the next chapter. One of the main use of hashing function is digital signature. Digital signatures based on asymmetric algorithm like RSA, have a input size limitation of around 128 to 324 bytes. However most documents in practice are longer than that. [17]

One approach would be to divide the message into blocks of size acceptable by that of the signing algorithm, and sign each block separately. However, the cons to approach are following.

1. *Computationally intensive*: Modular exponentiation of large integers used in asymmetric algorithms are resource intensive. For signing, multiple blocks of message,

the resource utilization is pronounced. Additionally, not only the sender but the receiver will also have to do the same resource intensive operations.

2. *Overheads:* The signature is of the same length as the message. This increases the overheads in storage and transmission.
3. *Security concerns:* An attacker could remove, or reorder, or reconstruct new message and signatures from the previous message and signature pairs. Though attacker, cannot manipulate the individual blocks, but safety of the entire message is compromised.

Thus to eliminate the overheads, and security limitations; a method is required to uniquely generate fixed size finger print of arbitrarily large message blocks. Hash functions, fill this void of signing large messages.

1.3 Standards and NIST Competition

1.3.1 Secure Hashing Algorithm(SHA)-0 and SHA-1

SHA-0 was initially proposed by National Security Agency(NSA) as a standardised hashing algorithm in 1993. It was later standardised by National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST). In 1995 SHA-0 was replaced by SHA-1 designed by NSA. [10, 12]

In 1995 Florent Chabaud and Antoine Joux, found collisions in SHA-0 with complexity of 2^{61} . In 2004, Eli Biham and Chen found near collisions for SHA-0, about 142 out of 160 bits to be equal. Full collisions were also found, when the number of rounds for the algorithm were reduced from 80 to 62.

SHA-1 was introduced in 1995, which has block size of 512 and output bits of 160, which are similar to that of SHA-0. SHA-1 has an additional circular shift operation, that is meant to rectify the weakness in SHA-0.

In 2005 a team from Shandong University in China consisting of Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu, announced that they had found a way to find collisions on full

version of SHA-1 requiring 2^{69} operations. This number was less than the number of operations required if you did a brute force search, which would be 2^{80} in this case.[22] An ideal hash function should require the number of operations to find a collision be equal to a brute force search, to idealize the random oracle.

Analysis was done by Jesse Walker from Skein team, on the feasibility of finding a collision in SHA-1, using HashClash developed by Marc Stevens. It was estimated that the cost for hiring computational power, as of October 2012, to find the collision, would have been \$ 2.77 million. [23]

Algorithm	Message Size	Block Size	Word Size	Hash Value Size
SHA-1	$<2^{64}$ bits	512 bits	32 bits	160 bits
SHA-224	$<2^{64}$ bits	512 bits	32 bits	224 bits
SHA-256	$<2^{64}$ bits	512 bits	32 bits	256 bits
SHA-384	$<2^{128}$ bits	1024 bits	64 bits	384 bits
SHA-512	$<2^{128}$ bits	1024 bits	64 bits	512 bits

Table 1.1: Secure Hash Algorithms as specified in FIPS 180-2

1.3.2 SHA-2

SHA-2 was designed by NSA, and released in 2001 by NIST. It is basically a family of hash functions consisting of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512. Table 1.1 above gives a brief overview of specifications of SHA-1 and family of SHA-2 hash functions. The number suffix after the SHA acronym, indicates the bit length, of the output of that hash function. Although SHA-2 family of algorithms were influenced by SHA-1 design, but the attacks on SHA-1 have not been successfully extended completely to SHA-2.

Collisions for 22-step attack on SHA-256 and SHA-512 were found with a probability of 1. Computational operations, for 23-step and 24-step for SHA-256 attack were $2^{11.5}$ and $2^{28.5}$ for the corresponding reduced version of SHA-256, have been found. For SHA-512 reduced versions the corresponding values for 23 and 24 step were $2^{16.5}$ and $2^{32.5}$. [21] Here steps, are analogous to rounds of compression on the input given. Since, SHA-2

family relies on the *Merkle – Damgård* construction, the whole process of creation of hash can be considered as repeated application of certain operations generally called as compression function, on the input cumulatively. The steps here refer to the number of rounds of compression applied to the input.

Preimage attacks on reduced versions of 41-step SHA-256 and 46-step SHA-512 have been found. As per the specifications, SHA-256 consisted of 64 rounds, while SHA-512 consisted of 80 rounds.[2] As, it can be seen, the SHA-2 functions can be said as partially susceptible to preimage attacks.

1.3.3 NIST competition and SHA-3

In response to advances made in cryptanalysis of SHA-2. NIST through a Federal Register Notice announced a public competition on November 2, 2007. For a new cryptographic hash algorithm, that would be SHA-3. Submission requirements stated to provide a cover sheet, algorithm specifications and supporting documentation, optimized implementations as per specifications of NIST, and intellectual property statements.

Submissions for the competition were accepted till October 31, 2008, and 51 candidates from 64 submissions for first round of competition were announced on December 9, 2008. On October 2, 2012 NIST announced the winner of the competition to be Keccak, amongst the other four finalist, which were BLAKE, Grøstl, JH and Skein. Keccak was chosen for its' large security margin, efficient hardware implementation, and flexibility.

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Hashing

A cryptographic hash function, is a function that can take string data of arbitrary length as input. And output a bit string of fixed length, that is ideally unique to the input string given. The aforementioned is description of a single fixed hash function. But, hash functions can be tweaked with an extra key parameter. This gives rise multiple hash functions or *hash family* as defined below. [24]

A *hash family* is a four-tuple $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{H})$, satisfying the following conditions.

- \mathcal{X} is a set of possible messages
- \mathcal{Y} is a finite set of hash function output
- \mathcal{K} , the *keyspace*, is a finite set of possible keys
- For each $K \in \mathcal{K}$, there is a hash function $h_K \in \mathcal{H}$. Each $h_K : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$

In the above definition, \mathcal{X} could be finite or infinite set, but \mathcal{Y} is always a finite set, since the length of bit string or hash function output, that defines \mathcal{Y} is finite. A pair $(x, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ is a *valid pair* under key K , if $h_K(x) = y$.

If $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{X}\mathcal{Y}}$ denotes set of all functions that map from domain \mathcal{X} to co-domain \mathcal{Y} . And if $|\mathcal{X}| = N$ and $|\mathcal{Y}| = M$, then $|\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{X}\mathcal{Y}}| = M^N$. Then any hash family $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{X}\mathcal{Y}}$ is called as (N, M) - hash family.

An *unkeyed hash function* is a function $h_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, where \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are as defined above, and where $|\mathcal{K}| = 1$. Thus a single fixed function $h(x) = y$, or an unkeyed hash function as hash family with only one key. For the purpose of this document, we will be concentrating on unkeyed hash family or fixed hash functions only, and will be referring to them as hash functions, unless mentioned otherwise.

The output of a hash function is generally called as a message digest. Since, it can be viewed as a unique snapshot of the message, that cannot be replicated if the bits in message are tampered with.

2.1.1 Properties of an ideal hash function

An ideal hash function should be easy to evaluate in practice. However, it should satisfy the following three properties primarily, for a hash function to be considered *secure*.

1. Preimage resistance

PREIMAGE

Given: A hash function $h : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and an element $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

Find: $x \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $h(x) = y$.

The problem preimage suggests that can we find an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, given we have the hash output y , such that $h(x) = y$. If the preimage problem for a hash function cannot be efficiently solved, then it is preimage resistant. That is the hash function is one way, or rather it is difficult to find the input, given the output alone.

2. Second preimage resistance

SECOND PREIMAGE

Given: A hash function $h : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and an element $x \in \mathcal{X}$.

Find: $x' \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $x' \neq x$ and $h(x) = h(x')$.

Second preimage problem suggests that given an input x , can another input x' be found, such that $x \neq x'$ and hash output of both the inputs are same, that is $h(x) = h(x')$. A hash

function for which a different input given another input, that compute to same hash cannot be found easily, is called as having second preimage resistance.

3. Collision resistance

COLLISION

Given: A hash function $h : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$

Find: $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $x' \neq x$ and $h(x') = h(x)$.

Collision problem states that, can two different input strings be found, such that they hash to the same value given the same hash function. If the collision problem for the hash function, is computationally complex, then the hash function is said to be collision resistant.

Basically, the above properties make sure that hash function has one to one mapping from input to output, and is one way. That is if a two different input strings with even minute differences should map to two different hash values. And it should be practically infeasible, to find a input given a hash value.

2.2 Security Model

On the basis of above properties described for a hash function. A generic model of security fulfillment, for any hash function to be considered secure can be set. Two such ideas, that a hash function should comply as far as possible to be considered as a hash function are described below.

2.2.1 Random Oracle

Hash functions being built on mathematical operations, cannot be truly random, but are efficient approximations of fixed random output mapping to an input. An ideal hash function can be abstracted as a random oracle, and the proofs can be formalized. To show that algorithm is secure modulo the way it creates random outputs. [7]

Random oracle model, proposed by Bellare and Rogaway, is a mathematical model of ideal hash function. It can be thought of this way, that the only way to know the hash value for an input x would be to ask the Oracle or rather compute the hash of the input itself. There is no way of formulating or guessing the hash value for input, even if you are provided with substantial number of input and output pairs. It is analogous to looking up for corresponding value of the key in a large table. To know the value for an input, you look into the table. A well designed hash function mimics the behaviour as close as possible to a random oracle.

2.2.2 Birthday Paradox

If we randomly choose 23 people, then the probability that two people from the group will have identical birthday is around 50%. This is because, the first person can be paired with rest of 22 people in group, to form 22 pairs. The next person in group can be paired with remaining 21 people to get 21 pairs. Thus we end up with $22 + 21 + 20 + \dots + 1 = 253$ pairs. Thus the probability is ratio of pairs 253 to the sample space 365 days in a year (ignoring the leap year).

Two people with same birthday can be seen analogous to two inputs hashing to the same value, that is collision. Say the sample space of hash as M , and denote the number of samples to be taken as N . Then by birthday problem described above, the minimum number of people required (N) to have the same birthday within a year ($M = 365$) with probability 0.5, would be $N = 23$.

It can be formally proved for any sample size M , to find two values that are identical with probability 0.5 can be given by the equation $N \approx 1.17\sqrt{M}$. This can be interpreted as hashing over \sqrt{M} values roughly will give us two entries with 50% probability of a collision.

The above theorem can be applied following way. If we brute force to find collision in a hash function that has a message digest length of 2^{128} bits, then at minimum we would need to calculate 2^{64} instances of hash, to find a collision with a probability of 50%. Any

good hash function in practice should be resistant to attacks, that require operations less than that predicted by the birthday attack for that hash.

2.3 Applications

Applications of cryptographic hash functions, can be broadly classified in areas of verification, data integrity and pseudo random generator functions.

2.3.1 Verification and data integrity

1. Digital Forensics: When digital data is seized and to be used as evidence, a hash of the original digital media is taken. A copy of the digital evidence is made under the regulations, and the hash of the copied digital media is made, before it can be examined. After the evidence has been examined, then another hash value of the copy of the evidence that was used in examination is made. This ensures, that evidence has not been tampered. [20]
2. Password verification: Passwords are stored as hash value, of password concatenated with some salt string. The choice of salt depends on implementation. When a password is to be verified, it is first concatenated with the respective salt. A hash value of this new modified password string is taken and compared with the value stored in the database. If the values match, then the password is authenticated.
3. Integrity of files: Hash values can be used to check, that data files have not been modified over the time in any way. Hash value of the data file taken at a previous time is checked with the hash value of the file taken at present. If the values do not match, it means that file in question has been modified over the time period between, when hash value of the file was taken and present.

2.3.2 Pseudo random generator function:

Cryptographic hash functions can be used as pseudo random bit generators. The hash function is initialised with a random seed, and then hash function is queried iteratively to get a sequence of bits, which look random. Since, the cryptographic hash algorithm is a mathematical function, so the sequence of two pseudo random bits would be similar if they come from same hash function with the same key. And they would not be perfectly random.

Chapter 3

SHA-3 finalists : Grøstl, BLAKE, and Keccak

3.1 Grøstl

Grøstl is collection of hash functions which produce digest size, ranging from 1 to 64 bytes. The variant of Grøstl that returns a message digest of size n , is called Grøstl- n .

Grøstl is an iterated hash function, with two two compression functions named P and Q, based on wide trail design and having distinct permutations. Grøstl has a byte oriented SP network, and its diffusion layers and S-box are identical to AES. The design is a wide-pipe construction, where the internal state size is larger than output size. Thus preventing most of the generic attacks. None of the permutations are indexed by a key, to prevent attacks from a weak key schedule. [25]

3.1.1 The hash function construction

The input is padded and then split into l -bit message blocks m_1, \dots, m_t , and each message block is processed sequentially. The initial l -bit chaining value $h_0 = iv$ is defined, and the blocks m_i are processed as

$$h_i \leftarrow f(h_{i-1}, m_i) \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, t.$$

Thus f consumes two $l - bits$ input, and maps to output of $l - bits$. For variants up to 256 bits output, size of l is 256 bits. And for digest sizes larger than 256 bits, l is 1024 bits.




Figure 3.1: Grøstl hash function [25]

After the last message block is processed, the last chaining value output is sent through a Ω function, to get the hash output $H(M)$.

$$H(M) = \Omega(h_t),$$

The entire process is shown in the above figure 3.1.

The f function shown above, is composed of two 1-bit permutations called P and Q , which is defined as follows.

$$f(h, m) = P(h \oplus m) \oplus Q(m) \oplus h.$$

The Ω function consists of a $\text{trunc}_n(x)$ that outputs only the trailing n bits of input x . The Ω function can now be defined as

$$\Omega(x) = \text{trunc}_n(P(x) \oplus x).$$

In order to fit the varying input length message to the block sizes of l padding is defined. First bit '1' is appended, then $w = -N - 65 \bmod l$ 0 bits are appended; where N is the length of the original message. Finally a 64 bit representation of $(N + w + 65)/l$. Given the need for message length, the maximum size of message digest in bits for Grøstl-512 version is $2^{73} - 577$ bits, and that for 1024 version is $2^{74} - 1089$ bits.

3.1.2 Design of P and Q permutations

There are two variations for P and Q permutations, one each for the digest size lower and higher than 256 bits. There are four round transformations, that compose a round R . The permutation consists of a number of rounds R . R can be represented as




Figure 3.2: Compression functions, where P and Q are $l - bit$ permutations [25]

Permutations	Digest size	Recommended value of r
P_{512} and Q_{512}	8 - 256	10
P_{1024} and Q_{1024}	264 - 512	14

Table 3.1: Recommended number of rounds[25]

$$R = MixBytes \cdot ShiftBytes \cdot SubBytes \cdot AddRoundConstant$$

The transformations SubBytes and MixBytes are same for all transformation while, ShiftBytes and AddRoundConstant differ for each of the transformations. The transformations operate on matrix of bytes, with the permutation of lower size digest having matrix of 8 rows and 8 columns, while that for larger variant is of 16 columns and 8 rows. The mapping of the input to the state and the transformations are explained below. The number of rounds for each R is given as recommendation in table 3.1 and the initial values are given in table 3.2

- **Mapping:** of a 64-byte sequence of 00 01 02 ... 3f to a 8×8 matrix is shown in the following matrix. For a 8×16 matrix, the mapping is extended the same way.




Figure 3.3: Omega truncation function [25]

n	iv_n
224	00 ... 00 00 e0
256	00 ... 00 01 00
384	00 ... 00 01 80
512	00 ... 00 02 00

Table 3.2: Above are initial values for Grøstl-n function. The numbers on left denote digest size in bits.[25]

Mapping the intermediate state values to byte sequence would be reverse of this.

$$InputMapping = \begin{bmatrix} 00 & 08 & 10 & 18 & 20 & 28 & 30 & 38 \\ 01 & 09 & 11 & 19 & 21 & 29 & 31 & 39 \\ 02 & 0a & 12 & 1a & 22 & 2a & 32 & 3a \\ 03 & 0b & 13 & 1b & 23 & 2b & 33 & 3b \\ 04 & 0c & 14 & 1c & 24 & 2c & 34 & 3c \\ 05 & 0d & 15 & 1d & 25 & 2d & 35 & 3d \\ 06 & 0e & 16 & 1e & 26 & 2e & 36 & 3e \\ 07 & 0f & 17 & 1f & 27 & 2f & 37 & 3f \end{bmatrix}$$

- **AddRoundConstant:** transformation round XOR a round dependant constant to the state matrix say A. It is represented as $A \leftarrow A \oplus C[i]$, where $C[i]$ is the round constant in round i. The constants for both P and Q for both variations are given below.

$$P_{512} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} 00 \oplus i & 10 \oplus i & 20 \oplus i & 30 \oplus i & 40 \oplus i & 50 \oplus i & 60 \oplus i & 70 \oplus i \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \end{bmatrix}$$

and

$$Q_{512} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \\ ff \oplus i & ef \oplus i & df \oplus i & cf \oplus i & bf \oplus i & af \oplus i & 9f \oplus i & 8f \oplus i \end{bmatrix}$$

Similarly, the P and Q for the wider variants are written.

$$P_{1024} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} 00 \oplus i & 10 \oplus i & 20 \oplus i & 30 \oplus i & 40 \oplus i & 50 \oplus i & 60 \oplus i & 70 \oplus i \dots f0 \oplus i \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \dots 00 \end{bmatrix}$$

and

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0a	0b	0c	0d	0e	0f
00	63	7c	77	7b	f2	6b	6f	c5	30	01	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
10	ca	82	c9	7d	fa	59	47	f0	ad	d4	a2	af	9c	a4	72	c0
20	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	f7	cc	34	a5	e5	f1	71	d8	31	15
30	04	c7	23	c3	18	96	05	9a	07	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
40	09	83	2c	1a	1b	6e	5a	a0	52	3b	d6	b3	29	e3	2f	84
50	53	d1	00	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	6a	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
60	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	02	7f	50	3c	9f	a8
70	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
80	cd	0c	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	c4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
90	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
a0	e0	32	3a	0a	49	06	24	5c	c2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
b0	e7	c8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	a9	6c	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	08
c0	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	b4	c6	e8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
d0	70	3e	b5	66	48	03	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	c1	1d	9e
e0	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9b	1e	87	e9	ce	55	28	df
f0	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	e6	42	68	41	99	2d	0f	b0	54	bb	16

Table 3.3: Grøstl S-box. For an input x , you do a logical AND of x with $f0$ and with $0f$. The first value obtained is used for column location and second for row location. The row and column location is used to identify the cell that will be used for substitution. [25]

$$Q_{512} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff & ff \dots ff \\ ff \oplus i & ef \oplus i & df \oplus i & cf \oplus i & bf \oplus i & af \oplus i & 9f \oplus i & 8f \oplus i \dots 0f \oplus i \end{bmatrix}$$

where i is the round number represented as 8 bits value, and all other numbers are represented as hexadecimals.

- **SubBytes:** substitutes each byte in state by value from S-box shown in table 3.3. Say $a_{i,j}$ a element in row i and column j of the state matrix, then the transformation done




Figure 3.4: ShiftBytes transformation of permutation P_{512} (top) and Q_{512} (bottom)[25]

is $a_{i,j} \leftarrow S(a_{i,j}), 0 \leq i < 8, 0 \leq j < v$.

- **ShiftBytes:** transformation cyclically shifts the bytes in a row to left by that number. Let list vector of a number denote the shift, with the index of the element indicating the row. The vector representation for $P_{512} = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]$ and $Q_{512} = [1, 3, 5, 7, 0, 2, 4, 6]$. The shift is shown in figure 3.4. Those for the larger permutation are $P_{1024} = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11]$ and $Q_{1024} = [1, 3, 5, 11, 0, 2, 4, 6]$. This shifting is shown in figure 3.5.




Figure 3.5: ShiftBytes transformation of permutation P_{1024} (top) and Q_{1024} (bottom)[25]

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 02 & 03 & 04 & 05 & 03 & 05 & 07 \\ 07 & 02 & 02 & 03 & 04 & 05 & 03 & 05 \\ 05 & 07 & 02 & 02 & 03 & 04 & 05 & 03 \\ 03 & 05 & 07 & 02 & 02 & 03 & 04 & 05 \\ 05 & 03 & 05 & 07 & 02 & 02 & 03 & 04 \\ 04 & 05 & 03 & 05 & 07 & 02 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 04 & 05 & 03 & 05 & 07 & 02 & 02 \\ 02 & 03 & 04 & 05 & 03 & 05 & 07 & 02 \end{bmatrix}$$

- **MixBytes:** transformation, multiplies each column of the state matrix A, by a constant 8×8 matrix B. The transformation, can be shown as $A \leftarrow B \times A$. The matrix B, can be seen as a finite field over \mathbb{F}_{256} . This finite field is defined over \mathbb{F}_2 by the irreducible polynomial $x^8 \oplus x^4 \oplus x^3 \oplus x \oplus 1$. The mix bytes matrix B is shown above.

3.2 BLAKE

BLAKE[3] hash function is built on HAIFA (HAsH Iterative FrAmework) structure [6] which is an improved version of Merkle-Damgård function. And provides resistance to long-message second pre-image attack as well as provides a salting option, that BLAKE uses[14]. The design is local wide-pipe which avoids internal collisions. The compression function in BLAKE is tweaked version of ChaCha, a stream cipher.

Algorithm	Word	Message	Block	Digest	Salt
BLAKE-224	32	$< 2^{64}$	512	224	128
BLAKE-256	32	$< 2^{64}$	512	256	128
BLAKE-384	64	$< 2^{128}$	1024	384	256
BLAKE-512	64	$< 2^{128}$	1024	512	256

Table 3.4: Specification of available input, output, block and salt sizes for various BLAKE hash functions.[3]




Figure 3.6: Local wide construction of BLAKE's compression function[3]

As seen from table 3.3, BLAKE has 4 variations of the algorithm that can give only 4 different digest lengths. The input length is also smaller than Grøstl. Figure 3.6 shows how the individual message blocks are consumed. The construction takes in 4 inputs, one message; two a salt, that makes function that parameter specific; and three a counter, which is count of all the bits hashed till then; and lastly a chaining value which is input of the previous operation or initial value in case of hash initiation. The compression function is

composed of a 4×4 matrix of words. Where one word is equal to 32 bits for BLAKE-256 variant, while 64 bit for variant BLAKE-512.

Symbol	Meaning
\leftarrow	variable assignment
$+$	addition modulo 2^{32} or (modulo 2^{64})
$\gg k$	rotate k bits to least significant bits
$\ll k$	rotate k bits to most significant bits
$\langle l \rangle_k$	encoding of integer l over k bits

Table 3.5: Convention of symbols used in BLAKE algorithm

3.2.1 BLAKE-256

The compression function takes following as input

- a chaining value of $h = h_0, \dots, h_7$
- a message block $m = m_0, \dots, m_{15}$
- a salt $s = s_0, \dots, s_3$
- a counter $t = t_0, t_1$

These four inputs of 30 words or 120 bytes, are processed as $h' = \text{compress}(h, m, s, t)$ to provide a new chain value of 8 words.

Compression function

- **Constants**

$$\begin{array}{llll} IV_0 = 6A09E667 & IV_1 = BB67AE85 & IV_2 = 3C6EF372 & IV_3 = A54FF53A \\ IV_4 = 510E527F & IV_5 = 9B05688C & IV_6 = 1F83D9AB & IV_7 = 5BE0CD19 \end{array}$$

Table 3.6: Initial values which become the chaining value for the first message block[3]

$c_0 = 243F6A88$	$c_1 = 85A308D3$	$c_2 = 13198A2E$	$c_3 = 03707344$
$c_4 = A4093822$	$c_5 = 299F31D0$	$c_6 = 082EFA98$	$c_7 = EC4E6C89$
$c_8 = 452821E6$	$c_9 = 38D01377$	$c_{10} = BE5466CF$	$c_{11} = 34E90C6C$
$c_{12} = C0AC29B7$	$c_{13} = C97C50DD$	$c_{14} = B5470917$	$c_{15} = 3F84D5B5$

Table 3.7: 16 constants used for BLAKE-256[3]

σ_0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
σ_1	14	10	4	8	9	15	13	6	1	12	0	2	11	7	5	3
σ_2	11	8	12	0	5	2	15	13	10	14	3	6	7	1	9	4
σ_3	7	9	3	1	13	12	11	14	2	6	5	10	4	0	15	8
σ_4	9	0	5	7	2	4	10	15	14	1	11	12	6	8	3	13
σ_5	2	12	6	10	0	11	8	3	4	13	7	5	15	14	1	9
σ_6	12	5	1	15	14	13	4	10	0	7	6	3	9	2	8	11
σ_7	13	11	7	14	12	1	3	9	5	0	15	4	8	6	2	10
σ_8	6	15	14	9	11	3	0	8	12	2	13	7	1	4	10	5
σ_9	10	2	8	4	7	6	1	5	15	11	9	14	3	12	13	0

Table 3.8: Round permutations to be used[3]

- **Initialization:** The constants mentioned are used with the salts, and counter along with initial value used as chaining input, to create a initial matrix of 4×4 , 16 word state.

$$\begin{pmatrix} v_0 & v_1 & v_2 & v_3 \\ v_4 & v_5 & v_6 & v_7 \\ v_8 & v_9 & v_{10} & v_{11} \\ v_{12} & v_{13} & v_{14} & v_{15} \end{pmatrix} \leftarrow \begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_1 & h_2 & h_3 \\ h_4 & h_5 & h_6 & h_7 \\ s_0 \oplus c_0 & s_1 \oplus c_1 & s_2 \oplus c_2 & s_3 \oplus c_3 \\ t_0 \oplus c_4 & t_0 \oplus c_5 & t_1 \oplus c_6 & t_1 \oplus c_7 \end{pmatrix}$$

- **Round function:** After initialisation, the state is subjected to column and diagonal operations, 14 times. A round operation G acts as per following
where the round function $G_i(a, b, c, d)$ sets

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
G_0(v_0, v_8, v_{12}) & G_1(v_1, v_5, v_9, v_{13}) & G_2(v_2, v_6, v_{10}, v_{14}) & G_3(v_3, v_7, v_{11}, v_{15}) \\
G_4(v_0, v_5, v_{10}, v_{15}) & G_5(v_1, v_6, v_{11}, v_{12}) & G_6(v_2, v_7, v_8, v_{13}) & G_7(v_3, v_4, v_9, v_{14})
\end{array}$$

$$a \leftarrow a + b + (m_{\sigma_r(2i)} \oplus c_{\sigma_r(2i+1)})$$

$$d \leftarrow (d \oplus a) \ggg 16$$

$$c \leftarrow c + d$$

$$b \leftarrow (b \oplus c) \ggg 12$$

$$a \leftarrow a + b + (m_{\sigma_r(2i+1)} \oplus c_{\sigma_r(2i)})$$

$$d \leftarrow (d \oplus a) \ggg 8$$

$$c \leftarrow c + d$$

$$b \leftarrow (b \oplus c) \ggg 7$$

The implementation of the G function is shown below.




Figure 3.7: The G_i function in BLAKE[3]

- **Finalization:** The chaining values for the next stage are obtained by XOR of the words from the state matrix, the salt and the initial value.

$$h'_0 \leftarrow h_0 \oplus s_0 \oplus v_0 \oplus v_8$$

$$h'_1 \leftarrow h_1 \oplus s_1 \oplus v_1 \oplus v_9$$

$$h'_2 \leftarrow h_2 \oplus s_2 \oplus v_2 \oplus v_{10}$$

$$h'_3 \leftarrow h_3 \oplus s_3 \oplus v_3 \oplus v_{11}$$

$$h'_4 \leftarrow h_4 \oplus s_0 \oplus v_4 \oplus v_{12}$$

$$h'_5 \leftarrow h_5 \oplus s_1 \oplus v_5 \oplus v_{13}$$

$$h'_6 \leftarrow h_6 \oplus s_2 \oplus v_6 \oplus v_{14}$$

$$h'_7 \leftarrow h_7 \oplus s_3 \oplus v_7 \oplus v_{15}$$

Hashing the message

A given input message is padded with a bit '1' followed followed by at most 511 bits of zeros, so that the message size is equal to 447 modulo 512. This padding is followed by a bit '1' and a 64-bit unsigned big-endian representation of block length l . The padding to a message, can be represented as $m \leftarrow m \parallel 1000 \dots 0001 \langle l \rangle_{64}$

Algorithm 3.1 BLAKE Compression procedure[3]

```

1:  $h^0 \leftarrow IV$ 
2: for  $i = 0, \dots, N - 1$  do
3:    $h^{i+1} \leftarrow \text{compress}(h^i, m^i, s, l^i)$ 
4: end for
5: return  $h^N$ 

```

As shown in algorithm 3.1, the BLAKE compression function ingests the padded message block by block, in a loop starting from the initial value, and then sends the last chained value obtained from the finalization to the Ω truncation function, to obtain the hash value.

3.2.2 BLAKE-512

operates on 64-bit words and returns a 64-byte hash value. The chaining value is 512 bit long, message blocks are 1024 bits, salt is 256 bits, and counter size is 128 bits. The difference from BLAKE-256 are in constants (tables 3.8 and 3.9), compression function and the way message is padded.

Compression function in BLAKE-512 gets 16 iterations instead of 14 as in BLAKE-256, as well the rotations are updated and word size increased from 32 bits to 64 bits. The $G_i(a, b, c, d)$ is given as

$IV_0 = 6A09E667F3BCC908$ $IV_1 = BB67AE8584CAA73B$ $IV_2 = 3C6EF372FE94F82B$
 $IV_3 = A54FF53A5F1D36F1$ $IV_4 = 510E527FADE682D1$ $IV_5 = 9B05688C2B3E6C1F$
 $IV_6 = 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B$ $IV_7 = 5BE0CD19137E2179$

Table 3.9: Initial values used for BLAKE-512[3]

$c_0 = 243F6A8885A308D3$ $c_1 = 13198A2E03707344$ $c_2 = A4093822299F31D0$
 $c_3 = 082EFA98EC4E6C89$ $c_4 = 452821E638D01377$ $c_5 = BE5466CF34E90C6C$
 $c_6 = C0AC29B7C97C50DD$ $c_7 = 3F84D5B5B5470917$ $c_8 = 9216D5D98979FB1B$
 $c_9 = D1310BA698DFB5AC$ $c_{10} = 2FFD72DBD01ADFB7$ $c_{11} = B8E1AFED6A267E96$
 $c_{12} = BA7C9045F12C7F99$ $c_{13} = 24A19947B3916CF7$ $c_{14} = 0801F2E2858EFC16$
 $c_{15} = 636920D871574E69$

Table 3.10: 16 constants used for BLAKE-512[3]

$a \leftarrow a + b + (m_{\sigma_r(2i)} \oplus c_{\sigma_r(2i+1)})$
 $d \leftarrow (d \oplus a) \gg 32$
 $c \leftarrow c + d$
 $b \leftarrow (b \oplus c) \gg 25$
 $a \leftarrow a + b + (m_{\sigma_r(2i+1)} \oplus c_{\sigma_r(2i)})$
 $d \leftarrow (d \oplus a) \gg 16$
 $c \leftarrow c + d$
 $b \leftarrow (b \oplus c) \gg 11$

Once more than 9 rounds are done, the permutation table rules kick in, for example if round $r > 9$ then permutation used is $\sigma_r \bmod 10$, say $r = 15$ then permutation would be $\sigma_{15 \bmod 10} = \sigma_5$.

For the padding, the message is first padded with bit 1 and then as many zeros required to make the bit length equivalent to 895 modulo 1024. After that another bit of value 1 is

appended followed by 128-bits unsigned big-endian representation of message length as $m \leftarrow m \parallel 100 \dots 001 \langle l \rangle_{128}$.

3.2.3 BLAKE-224 and BLAKE-384

BLAKE-224

BLAKE-224 is similar to BLAKE-256, but differs slightly. It has different initial values, different padding and the output bits are truncated to first 224 bits. The padding differs

$$\begin{array}{llll} IV_0 = \text{C1059ED8} & IV_1 = \text{367CD507} & IV_2 = \text{3070DD17} & IV_3 = \text{F70E5939} \\ IV_4 = \text{FFC00B31} & IV_5 = \text{68581511} & IV_6 = \text{64F98FA7} & IV_7 = \text{BEFA4FA4} \end{array}$$

Table 3.11: Initial values for BLAKE-224 which are taken from SHA-224[3]

from BLAKE-256 in way that the bit preceding the message length is replaced by a 0 bit. Which is represented as $m \leftarrow m \parallel 100 \dots 000 \langle l \rangle_{64}$.

BLAKE-384

In BLAKE-384 the output of BLAKE-512 is truncated to 384 bits. The padding differs from BLAKE-512, in way that bit preceding the length encoding is 0 and not 1. It can be shown as $m \leftarrow m \parallel 100 \dots 000 \langle l \rangle_{128}$. The initial chaining values are given in table 3.11.

$$\begin{array}{llll} IV_0 = \text{CBBB9D5DC1059ED8} & IV_1 = \text{629A292A367CD507} & IV_2 = \text{9159015A3070DD17} \\ IV_3 = \text{152FEC8F70E5939} & IV_4 = \text{67332667FFC00B31} & IV_5 = \text{8EB44A8768581511} \\ IV_6 = \text{DB0C2E0D64F98FA7} & IV_7 = \text{47B5481DBEFA4FA4} & & \end{array}$$

Table 3.12: Initial values for BLAKE-384[3]

3.3 Keccak

Keccak hash function, is built on sponge construction, which can input and output arbitrary length strings. The sponge construction has two phases. First is absorb, where the input message is ingested in blocks of defined bit rate interleaved with the permutations. And the second phase is squeeze phase, where the blocks of output are squeezed out as per the bit rate blocks. The Keccak, state is different in the sense that, the permutations work on a 3 dimensional block, cube structure rather than linear strings, or 2 dimensional arrays.

3.3.1 Keccak state, sponge functions and padding




Figure 3.8: Sponge construction $Z = \text{Sponge}[f, \text{pad}, r](M, l)[4]$

The sponge construction is used to build function $\text{SPONGE}[f, \text{pad}, r]$ which inputs and outputs variable length strings [4]. It uses fixed length permutation f , a padding "pad", and parameter bit rate 'r'. The permutations are operated on fixed number of bits, width b . The value $c = b - r$ is the capacity of the sponge function. The width b in Keccak defines the state size which can be any of the following $\{25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600\}$ number of bits.




Figure 3.9: Sponge construction $Z = \text{Sponge}[f, pad, r](M, l)[5]$

The state in Keccak can be represented as a cube having bits, as shown in figure 3.9. The initial state to the sponge construction has value 'b' number of 0 bits (represented as 0^b), and called the root state. The root state has fixed value and should not be considered as initial value to sponge construction. The different number of state produces the Keccak family of hash function variations denoted by $KECCAK - f[b]$.

The varying number of states can be visualized as state having varying number or l number of slices. The width b is defined as $b = 25 \times 2^l$, where l takes values from 0 to 6.

Algorithm 3.2 The sponge construction $SPONGE[f, pad, r][4]$

Require: $r < b$

```

1: Interface:  $Z = \text{sponge}(M, l)$  with  $M \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$ , integer  $l > 0$  and  $Z \in \mathbb{Z}_2^l$ 
2:  $P = M \parallel pad[r](|M|)$ 
3:  $s = 0^b$ 
4:
5: for  $i = 0$  to  $|P|_r - 1$  do
6:    $s = s \oplus (P_i \parallel 0^{b-r})$ 
7:    $s = f(s)$ 
8:
9: end for
10:  $Z = \lfloor s \rfloor_r$ 
11:
12: while do  $|Z|_r < l$ 
13:    $s = f(s)$ 
14:    $Z = Z \parallel \lfloor s \rfloor_r$ 
15:
16: end while
17: return  $\lfloor Z \rfloor_l$ 

```

Algorithm 3.2 shows how the sponge construction applied to $KECCAK - f[r + c]$, with multi-rate padding. In algorithm 3.2 length of a string M is denoted by $|M|$. The string M can also be considered as having blocks of size say x , and those number of blocks are shown as $|M|_x$. The $\lfloor M \rfloor_l$ denotes the string M truncated to its first l bits.

The multi-rate padding in Keccak is denoted as $pad\ 10^*1$, where a bit '1' is appended to message, followed by minimum number of zeros. And lastly a single bit 1, so that resultant block is multiple of block length b . Thus Keccak in terms of sponge function can be defined

as

$$KECCAK[r, c] \doteq SPONGE[KECCAK - f[r + c], pad10^*1, r]$$

Where $r > 0$ and $r + c$ is the width. The default value of r is $1600 - c$, and the default value of c is 576.

$$KECCAK[c] \doteq KECCAK[r = 1600 - c, c],$$

$$KECCAK[] \doteq KECCAK[c = 576]$$

3.3.2 Permutations

The $KECCAK - f[b]$ permutations are operated on state represented as $a[5][5][w]$, with $w = 2^l$, where l can be any value from 0 to 6. The position in this 3 dimensional state is given by $a[x][y][z]$ where $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_5$ and $z \in \mathbb{Z}_w$. The mapping of the bits from the input message 's' to state 'a' is like this $s[w(5y + x) + z] = a[x][y][z]$. The x, y coordinates are taken modulo 5, while the z coordinate is taken as modulo w . [5]

There are five steps, for a permutation round R .

$$R = \zeta \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$$

The permutations are repeated for $12 + 2l$ times, with l dependent on the variant chosen.

$$\theta : a[x][y][z] \leftarrow a[x][y][z] + \sum_{y'=0}^4 a[x-1][y'][z] + \sum_{y'=0}^4 a[x+1][y'][z-1],$$

$$\rho : a[x][y][z] \leftarrow a[x][y][z - (t+1)(t+2)/2],$$

$$t \text{ satisfying } 0 \leq t < 24 \text{ and } \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{pmatrix}^t \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} \text{ in } GF(5)^{2 \times 2},$$

$$\text{or } t = -1 \text{ if } x = y = 0,$$

$$\pi : a[x][y] \leftarrow a[x'][y'], \text{ with } \begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x' \\ y' \end{pmatrix},$$

$$\chi : a[x] \leftarrow a[x] + (a[x+1] + 1) a[x+2],$$

$$\zeta : a \leftarrow a + RC[i_r].$$

The addition and the multiplications are in Galois field $GF(2)$, except for the round constants $RC[i_r]$. The round constants are given by

$$RC[i_r][0][0][2^j - 1] = rc[j + 7i_r] \text{ for all } 0 \leq j \leq l,$$

and the rest are zeros. The value of $rc[t] \in GF(2)$ is output of linear feedback shift register given as

$$rc[t] = (x^t \bmod x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + 1) \bmod x \text{ in } GF(2)[x].$$

Algorithm 3.3 χ transformation KECCAK[5]

```

1:
2: for  $y = 0$  to 4 do
3:
4:   for  $x = 0$  to 4 do  $A[x, y] = a[x, y] \oplus ((NOT\ a[x+1, y])\ AND\ a[x+2, y])$ 
5:
6:   end for
7:
8: end for

```




Figure 3.10: χ applied to a single row.[5]




Figure 3.11: θ applied to a single bit[5]

Algorithm 3.4 θ transformation KECCAK[5]

```

1:
2: for  $x = 0$  to 4 do
3:    $C[x] = a[x, 0]$ 
4:
5:   for  $y = 1$  to 4 do  $C[x] = C[x] \oplus a[x, y]$ 
6:
7:   end for
8:
9: end for
10:
11: for  $x = 0$  to 4 do
12:    $D[x] = C[x - 1] \oplus ROT(C[x + 1], 1)$ 
13:
14:   for  $y = 0$  to 4 do
15:      $A[x, y] = a[x, y] \oplus D[x]$ 
16:
17:   end for
18:
19: end for


```

Algorithm 3.5 π transformation KECCAK[5]

```

1:
2: for  $x = 0$  to 4 do
3:
4:   for  $y = 1$  to 4 do
5:      $\begin{pmatrix} X \\ Y \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix}$ 
6:      $A[X, Y] = a[x, y]$ 
7:
8:   end for
9:
10: end for

```

Figure 3.12: π applied to a single slice[5]

Algorithm 3.6 ρ transformation KECCAK[5]

```

1:  $A[0, 0] = a[0, 0]$ 
2:  $\begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ 
3:
4: for  $t = 0$  to 23 do
5:    $A[x, y] = ROT(a[x, y], (t + 1)(t + 2)/2)$ 
6:    $\begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix}$ 
7:
8: end for
```




Figure 3.13: ρ transformation applied to lanes[5]

	$x = 2$	$x = 4$	$x = 0$	$x = 1$	$x = 2$
$y = 2$	153	231	3	10	171
$y = 1$	55	276	36	300	6
$y = 0$	28	91	0	1	190
$y = 4$	120	78	210	66	253
$y = 3$	21	136	105	45	15

Table 3.13: Offsets for ρ transformation[5]

Chapter 4

Related work and hypothesis based on Hill Climbing to find near collisions

4.1 Rotational cryptanalysis of round-reduced KECCAK

Rotational cryptanalysis[15] is used to follow relation between states (A, A^\leftarrow) of KECCAK-f[1600] in course of their transformation, and thus derive a distinguisher.

Definition 4.1.1. A pair of two 1600-bit states (A, A^\leftarrow) is called rotational pair when each lane in state A^\leftarrow is created by bitwise rotation of operation of corresponding lane in state A . The operation moves the bit from position (x, y, z) to the position $(x, y, z + n)$, where $z + n$ is done on modulo 64. x and y values range from 0 to 4, and z value ranges from 0 to 63. n is the rotational number and is same for every lane. Thus rotational pairs are $\forall(x, y, z) : A_{(x,y,z)} = A_{(x,y,z+n)}^\leftarrow$. [16]

Definition 4.1.2. Set S_n is a set of 2^{1600} pairs of states which are created by an operation of KECCAK-f[1600] applied to all possible rotational pairs. [16]

Definition 4.1.3. Probability $p_{(x,y,z)}^n$ is the probability for pair of states (A, A^\leftarrow) randomly selected from the set S_n we have $A_{(x,y,z)} = A_{(x,y,z+n)}^\leftarrow$. [16]

Definition 4.1.4. Given probability distribution \mathcal{D}_n that assigns probability $\frac{1}{n!}$ for each $p \in \mathcal{P}_n$. A permutation is called random if it is chosen according to uniform distribution \mathcal{D}_n . [16]

It is assumed that random permutation $p_{(x,y,z)}^n$ follows binomial distribution $\mathcal{B}(t, s)$ where t is trials and s is success probability that is equal to 0.5. Experimental results for a chosen $p_{(x,y,z)}$ are compared to follow distribution $\mathcal{B}(t, s)$. The experimental values are supposed to fall within range of $0.5t \pm 2\sigma$ with 95% confidence interval.

The probability change through steps of Keccak, can be derived from analysis of bitwise operation. It is assumed that corresponding bits from (A, A^\leftarrow) are equal, both combinations ('00' or '11') or opposite combinations have same probability to be actual values. Operations like NOT, or rotation in Keccak do not affect the probabilities, so only probabilities for AND and XOR are considered.

Lemma 4.1.1. *Given input bits a, b and output bit out ; with p_a and p_b defined as per definition 4.1.1.2, then for AND operation $P_{out} = \frac{1}{2}(p_a + p_b - p_a p_b)$ [16]*

Lemma 4.1.2. *Given input bits a, b and output bit out ; with p_a and p_b defined as per definition 4.1.1.2, then for XOR operation $P_{out} = p_a + p_b - 2p_a p_b$ [16]*

A 4 round rotational is built, and found that some values deviate from the 0.5 like $p_{(4,4,14)}^{54} = 0.5625$. 10,000 random samples of rotational pairs are ran on 4 round KECCAK-f[1600]. The mean from that sample is 5682 which is beyond range from mean of $\mathcal{B}(10000, 0.5)$ which is 5000 ± 2.5 . Thus demonstrating a distinguisher for 4 rounds. After 4 rounds all $p_{(x,y,z)}^n = 0.5$, and hence the distinguisher cannot be directly extended. But instead probability that relation between two pairs of states $(A_{(x,y,z)}, A_{(x,y,z+n)}^\leftarrow)$ and $(A_{(x,y',z)}, A_{(x,y'',z+n)}^\leftarrow)$ are observed, that should follow distribution $\mathcal{B}(10000, 0.5)$. Values for $p_{(2,1,37)}^{63}$ and $p_{(2,2,37)}^{63}$ have the highest deviation from 0.5 at end of fourth round. The probability that they are in the same relation is given by $p_{(x,y,z)}^n p_{(x,y'',z)}^n + (1 - p_{(x,y,z)}^n)(1 - p_{(x,y'',z)}^n)$ which comes to 0.499024. The ρ and π steps in Keccak only change the position of the probability to bit pairs $(A_{(1,2,43)}, A_{(1,2,44)}^\leftarrow)$ and $(A_{(2,0,16)}, A_{(2,0,17)}^\leftarrow)$. The bias is observed by generating sufficient number of samples 'm' based on Chernoff bound based on inequality

$$m \geq \frac{1}{(P_c - 0.5)^2} \ln \frac{1}{\sqrt{\epsilon}}$$

where ϵ is error set to 0.05. m turns out to be 403,000,000. The following steps are implemented.[16]

1. 403,000,000 rotational pairs are generated.
2. For each pair

- (a) Run Keccak for 5 rounds on states A and A^\leftarrow .
- (b) if $(A_{(1,2,43)} \oplus A_{(1,2,44)}^\leftarrow \oplus A_{(2,0,16)} \oplus A_{(2,0,17)}^\leftarrow = 0)$ then
 $\text{mean} := \text{mean} + 1$

The mean for $\mathcal{B}(403, 000, 000, 0.5)$ with the standard deviation has range of $201,500,000 \pm 2.10037$, but experimentally from above procedure it comes to around 201,450,503, thus concluding this as a distinguisher.

For the preimage attack an unknown message with cyclical pattern like that of 4 0's followed by 4 1's alternatively of 512 bits is chosen. There are 256 possible messages of the cyclic pattern discussed. For the preimage attack, a rotational counterpart of the preimage is searched for, that would reduce the complexity from random search. Following are the steps [16]

1. Guess first 8 lanes of A^\leftarrow
2. Run Keccak-f[1600] for 3 rounds on state A^\leftarrow
3. for $n := 0$ to $n \leq 64$ do
 - (a) candidate := true
 - (b) 10 sets of coordinates (x, y, z) being on list created on precomputation do
 - $(p_{(x,y,z)}^n = 0)$ and $(A_{(x,y,z)} \neq A_{(x,y,z)}^\leftarrow)$ then candidate := false
 - $(p_{(x,y,z)}^n = 1)$ and $(A_{(x,y,z)} = A_{(x,y,z)}^\leftarrow)$ then candidate := false
 - (c) if (candidate = true) then rotate the guessed state by n bits. Verify by input to Keccak function, that runs for 3 rounds.

For a given state there are 64 possible rotational pairs, derived from length of lane. We are searching for preimage of 512 bits, thus the probability of guessing the rotational counterpart A^\leftarrow is $2^{-512} \cdot 64 = 2^{-506}$, or rather 2^{506} guesses. There are 2^{256} messages possible of the cyclic pattern that we consider here. There are 10 sets of (x, y, z) coordinates for each of the rotational number. The probability of the candidate having $p_{(x,y,z)}^n$ similar

to that on list is 2^{-10} . So $2^{512}/2^{10} = 2^{502}$ number of checks are required at most to find the candidate. Thus the total work is equivalent to 2^{506} calls to KECCAK-512 for 3 rounds to find the preimage.

The above method for finding the preimage cannot be directly extended to 4 rounds since ι operation in Keccak renders $p_{(x,y,x)}^n \neq 0, 1$. To overcome this, the rotational state is ran on modified Keccak-512 for four rounds which does not implement ι function. Below is the pseudo-code for finding preimage [16]

1. The first 512 bits are chosen at random for state A^{\leftarrow} , and KECCAK-f[1600] without the ι transformation is run on them.
2. for $n := 0$ to $n \vdash 64$ do
 - (a) candidate := true
 - (b) for 9 sets of cordinales (x, y, z) that are in list created from precomputation
 - if $(p_{(x,y,z)}^n = 0$ and $(A_{(x,y,z)} \neq A_{(x,y,z+n)}^{\leftarrow})$ then candidate := false
 - if $(p_{(x,y,z)}^n = 1$ and $(A_{(x,y,z)} = A_{(x,y,z+n)}^{\leftarrow})$ then candidate := false
 - (c) if (candidate = true) then rotate to guess state by n bits and run 4 round modified Keccak-512 for verification of preimage.

Just like the 3 round preimage finding method, the above method for finding the preimage for 4 rounds has complexity of 2^{506} calls to Keccak-512.

4.2 Finding near collisions with Hill Climbing

A generic algorithm applied to find collisions, in reduced rounds of some SHA-3 competitors was Hill Climbing [26]. Near collisions in which more than 75% of the bits were same for two different messages, were found for reduced rounds of BLAKE-32, Hamsi-256 and JH. Near collision results are important for knowing the security margins. In some cases, output of hash functions may be truncated for compatibility or efficiency purposes. In such cases near collisions could be improved to obtain collisions.

A ϵ/n bit near collision for hash function h and two messages M_1 and M_2 , where $M_1 \neq M_2$ can be defined as

$$HW(h(M_1, CV) \oplus h(M_2, CV)) = n - \epsilon$$

where HW is the Hamming weight, and CV is the chaining value, and n is the hash size in bits.

ϵ/n	Complexity (\approx)
128 / 256, 256 / 512, 512 / 1024	2^4
151 / 256, 287 / 512, 553 / 1024	2^{10}
166 / 256, 308 / 512, 585 / 1024	2^{20}
176 / 256, 323 / 512, 606 / 1024	2^{30}
184 / 256, 335 / 512, 623 / 1024	2^{40}
191 / 256, 345 / 512, 638 / 1024	2^{50}
197 / 256, 354 / 512, 651 / 1024	2^{60}

Table 4.1: Approximate complexity to find a ϵ/n -bit near collision by generic random search[26]

Hill Climbing starts with a random candidate, and then choosing a random successor that has a better fit to the solution. In practice for message M and chaining value CV

$$HW(h(M, CV) \oplus h(M, CV + \delta)) = n/2,$$

can be considered secure, where δ is n -bit vector with small Hamming weight. However, if the diffusion for the hash function h is not proper, then we obtain a lower Hamming weight. In such situation a correlation between two chaining values differing in small weight δ can obtain near collisions, with hill climbing algorithm.

Here, the aim of hill climbing algorithm will be to minimize the function

$$f_{M_1, M_2}(x) = HW(h(M_1, x) \oplus h(M_2, x))$$

where $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, where M_1 and M_2 are message blocks. CV is chosen as any random chaining value. Then the set of k -bit neighbours for the CV, will be

$$S_{CV}^k = \{x \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid HW(CV \oplus x) \leq k\}$$

where

$$size\ of\ S_{CV}^k = \sum_{i=0}^k \binom{n}{i}.$$

The k-opt condition can be defined as

$$f_{M_1, M_2}(CV) = \min_{x \in S_{CV}^k} f_{M_1, M_2}(x)$$

We can now describe algorithm 5.1, that is used in hill climbing algorithm to find the nearest match.

Algorithm 4.1 Hill Climbing algorithm (M_1, M_2, k) [26]

```

1: Randomly select CV
2:  $f_{best} = f_{M_1, M_2}(CV)$ 
3:
4: while (CV is not k-opt) do
5:   CV = x such that  $x \in S_{CV}^k$  with  $f(x) < f(best)$ 
6:    $f_{best} = f_{M_1, M_2}(CV)$ 
7:
8: end while
9: return (CV,  $f_{best}$ )
```

Given two message M_1 and M_2 , and a randomly chosen chaining value CV, the $f_{M_1, M_2}(CV)$ is obtained. The set S_{CV}^k is searched for a better fit CV, and if found is updated. And the search is repeated again in the k-bit neighbourhood of new CV.

There are two ways of choosing the next best CV, one by choosing the first chaining value that has a lower f value, the greedy way. And another by choosing the best chaining value amongst S_{CV}^k , which is steepest ascent. The algorithm terminates once we get k-opt chaining value.

Algorithm 4.2 Simulated Annealing Algorithm for obtaining near collisions

```

1: function SIMULATED-ANNEALING( $M_1, M_2, CV, \text{schedule}$ )
2:    $\text{current} \leftarrow CV$ 
3:   for  $t = 1$  to  $\infty$  do
4:      $T \leftarrow \text{schedule}(t)$ 
5:     if  $T = 0$  then
6:       return  $\text{current}$ 
7:     end if
8:      $\text{next} \leftarrow$  a randomly selected successor from set  $S_{\text{current}}^k$ 
9:      $\Delta E \leftarrow f_{M_1, M_2}(\text{current}) - f_{M_1, M_2}(\text{next})$ 
10:    if  $\Delta E > 0$  then
11:       $\text{current} \leftarrow \text{next}$ 
12:    else
13:       $\text{current} \leftarrow \text{next}$ , with probability  $e^{\Delta E/T}$ 
14:    end if
15:  end for
16: end function

```

4.3 Tabu Search, Simulated Annealing and Random search

4.3.1 Simulated Annealing

The problem with hill climbing, is that it can get locked in the local maxima, and fail to get the global maxima. This is due to hill climbing not taking a downhill or a step with lower value. However, if hill climbing is tweaked to combine with random walk, then the problem of local maxima can be avoided. Simulated annealing picks a random successor, and accepts it if the value is higher than previous. However, if the successor has a lower value, then it is accepted with a probability less than 1. The probability has an exponential decrease proportional to the decreased value of the move, and the temperature. Thus at higher temperature or at the initial stages, a downhill successor is more likely to be accepted, than in the later stages [19].

4.3.2 Tabu Search

Tabu search implements the neighbourhood search for the solutions, until the termination condition. The algorithm uses a fixed amount of memory, to keep note of states, visited

Algorithm 4.3 Tabu Search for obtaining near collisions [8]

```

1: function TABU-SEARCH( $TabuList_{size}, M_1, M_2, CV$ )
2:    $S_{best} \leftarrow CV$ 
3:    $TabuList \leftarrow \text{null}$ 
4:   while  $S_{best}$  not k-opt do
5:      $CandidateList \leftarrow \text{null}$ 
6:      $S_{neighbourhood} \leftarrow S_{S_{best}}^k$ 
7:     for  $S_{candidate} \in S_{best_{neighbourhood}}$  do
8:       if ( $\neg \text{ContainsAnyFeatures}(S_{candidate}, TabuList)$ ) then
9:          $CandidateList \leftarrow S_{candidate}$ 
10:      end if
11:    end for
12:     $S_{candidate} \leftarrow \text{LocateBestCandidate}(CandidateList)$ 
13:    if  $\text{Cost}(S_{candidate}) \leq \text{Cost}(S_{best})$  then
14:       $S_{best} \leftarrow S_{candidate}$ 
15:       $TabuList \leftarrow \text{featureDifferences}(S_{candidate}, S_{best})$ 
16:      while  $TabuList > TabuList_{size}$  do
17:         $\text{DeleteFeature}(TabuList)$ 
18:      end while
19:    end if
20:  end while
21:  return  $S_{best}$ 
22: end function

```

some fixed amount of time in past. The idea behind keeping the state, is to restrict the search, to states that have not been visited previously. The algorithm can be tweaked, to accept moves in tabu list through aspiration criteria, or inferior moves just to explore new possible states. Tabu search has been applied to mostly combinatorial optimization problems[11, 18].

Algorithm 4.4 Random selection from k-bit neighbourhood of CV

```

1: function RANDOM-SELECTION( $M_1, M_2, CV, \text{number\_of\_trials}$ )
2:    $\text{current} \leftarrow CV$ 
3:    $\text{trial} \leftarrow 0$ 
4:   while  $\text{trial} < \text{number\_of\_trials}$  do
5:      $\text{next} \leftarrow$  randomly selected candidate from  $S_{\text{current}}^k$ 
6:     if  $f_{M_1, M_2}(\text{next}) - f_{M_1, M_2}(\text{current})$  then
7:        $\text{current} \leftarrow \text{next}$ 
8:     end if
9:   end while
10:  return  $\text{current}$ 
11: end function

```

4.4 Hypothesis

HYPOTHESIS

- Reduced state Keccak, has better resistance to near collisions than BLAKE and Grøstl. For the attack algorithms hill climbing, simulated annealing, tabu search and random selection.
- Simulated annealing and tabu search, are better at finding near collisions compared to hill climbing and random selection.

As per the press release from NIST, one of the reasons for choosing Keccak, was that it had a large security margin. All the five finalists from SHA-3 competition were found to be secure and have good security margins. However there has not been much study, on the comparative security margins for the candidate's reduced versions. Hill climbing has been shown as good generic greedy algorithm to find near collisions for reduced versions of some SHA-3 candidates. A generic algorithm does not exploit the inner permutations or construction, of a hash function. Rather takes a good guess approach, to what the solution can be depending on the fitness of the candidate solution. Thus making it an ideal tool to test on any hash function, irrespective of its design. In addition to hill climbing, it would also be interesting to observe the success other variations of generic algorithms like Tabu

search, or Simulated Annealing will be able to get, and compare those results against a random search. In theory for an ideal hashing function the performance of the generic algorithm will be equivalent to the random search algorithm on an average.

Comparative studies on SHA-3 candidates have been using the statistical test suites provided by NIST to check any deficiencies [9] [13]. Other than particular attacks like zero-sum property has been tested on Keccak and Blue Midnight Wish [1].

Chapter 5

Research Approach and Methodology

5.1 Experiment Structure

To prove or disprove the hypothesis, numbers will have to be collected on each of the SHA-3 finalist hashing algorithm, being subjected to each of the collision finding algorithm.

5.1.1 Input

The string "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog", was chosen as the root seed message. This seed string contains all letters from English alphabet, and is neither too small or large. Pairs were made from this seed string, by toggling a bit, from the ASCII/UTF-8 bit representation of this string. The toggling of the bits are divided into 3 parts - starting, middle, and end. In starting part the most significant bits of the string are toggled, while in the end part the least significant bits are toggled. In the middle part, the bits toggled equally from the most significant and least significant side of the bit that is in middle of the string. For example let bit representation of a string be 0110001000011000, then in starting section there will be strings generated of kind 1110001000011000, 0010001000011000, 0100001000011000 and so on. Only 1 bit from the seed string is toggled, starting from the first bit, then the second bit. This process is repeated till the number of bits asked to be toggled. In this case of experiment we updated 20 bits from the seed string, thus generating 20 strings from seed string each having a bit difference from the seed.

The generated strings are paired up with the seed string and are written to a file. Each file has a pair of strings written to it, separated by newline. The text files holding these

pairs are named the number, derived from the order in which the bit was updated for the generated string. For example the input file 1.txt will have the entry of seed string and the generated string that has the first bit toggled. Following are the contents of the file 1.txt in our case.

```
54686520717569636b2062726f776e20666f78206a756d7073206f76657220746865206c617a7920646f67
d4686520717569636b2062726f776e20666f78206a756d7073206f76657220746865206c617a7920646f67
```

Notice that the first line is the hexadecimal representation of the seed string "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog", and the second line has the first bit toggled, from the seed string. In similar way rest of the 20 files are created and named for the bits updated from the most significant bit onwards. These files are then stored in the folder "Start", which in turn is stored in the folder called "Input" that holds all the input strings.

In the middle section, depending on the number of pairs you want to generate will the bits be toggled. So in case of two bits being toggled, you will get two strings like 0110001100011000, and 0110001010011000. The bits are flipped in the same way for the end section, with strings generated 0110001000011001, 0110001000011010 and so on.

5.1.2 Output

5.1.3 Rational for the experiment structure and parameters

5.1.4 Collection of result data

5.2 Implementation

5.2.1 Input Creation

5.2.2 Hash function implementation

5.2.3 Experiment with different collision methods

5.2.4 Testing the implemented code

Chapter 6

Observations

For the time being, here is my hypothesis, or the premise of my question. Keccak has been selected over BLAKE and Groestl for what? Is there is a basis that Keccak's property is still comparatively immune to zero sum distinguisher compared to BLAKE and Groestl in the reduced versions. This is what, I would like to find out and examine.

Chapter 7

Evaluation and expected outcomes

The experiment with each of the pair, will be run for approximately 2^{10} times or rather 1024 times. The following are the parameters on which I propose to evaluate the algorithms.

1. How much time for each of the respective message digest size, did it take for the hill climbing algorithm to find a collision.
2. How much is the hamming distance on an average for the chaining value that is manipulated by hill climbing for each of the algorithms.
3. Till how many rounds, is the hill climbing algorithm a feasible option to find near collisions, for each of the algorithms.
4. Is the weight of the hamming distance between message pair co-related to the amount of work hill climbing algorithm does to find a collision.
5. Does the hamming weight distance between message pair, vary for each of the hashing algorithm with respect to amount of work on average required by hill climbing algorithm. This will be an indication, on how much diffusion each of the reduced versions of the algorithm are able to obtain.
6. On an average what was the hamming distance of the chaining value obtained from a successful experiment from the individual message. This will help in understanding if, chaining values and message are closely related in reduced rounds.

The above list is tentative, and by no means exhaustive. If during the course of experiment, more interesting figures come in front, then they will be added.

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