

So Hye Yoon

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Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544

Fields

Industrial Organization, Real Estate and Urban Economics, Digital Economics, Finance

Graduate Studies

Princeton University

Aug. 2020 – Present

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Expected Completion Date: May 2026

REFERENCES

Professor Jakub Kastl
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Tel: (609) 258-4012
jkastl@princeton.edu

Professor Sylvain Chassang
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Tel: (609) 258-4035
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Professor Alessandro Lizzeri
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Tel: (609) 258-7632
lizzeri@princeton.edu

Associate Professor Adam Kapor
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Tel: (609) 258-7354
akapor@princeton.edu

Prior Education

Yonsei University, M.A. in Economics

Sep. 2018 – Aug. 2020

Yonsei University, B.A. in Economics

Mar. 2014 – Aug. 2018

Graduated with the 2nd-highest GPA among 284 graduates
GPA (Overall): 4.26/4.30 (3.97/4.00)
GPA (Economics): 4.28/4.30 (4.00/4.00)

Publications

Tying in Two-sided Markets with Heterogeneous Advertising Revenues and Negative Pricing, *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* [\[Link\]](#)

With Jong-Hee Hahn and Sang-Hyun Kim

2023

Abstract: We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two-sided markets when below-cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying-good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real-world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.

A Simple Correction of Gini Estimates Using Tax Return Data (*Pre-doctoral publication; Korean journal: The Review of Social & Economic Studies*), [\[Link\]](#)

With Joo-Hyung Shin and Tae-Hwan Kim

2020

Abstract: The Gini coefficient is typically estimated using income data collected by surveying a group of randomly selected people. It is well known that people tend to underreport their income when asked about their income. As a result, the Gini coefficient is likely to be underestimated. This paper investigates how to correct such a prevalent underestimation problem occurring when estimating the Gini coefficient using survey data. We calculate top 1% income shares using tax return data, and use these results to correct the problem. Using our correction method, we have found the following: (i) the official Gini estimates announced by the National Statistical Office are underestimated, (ii) the degree of income inequality might have become worsened over time than described by the official Gini estimates, and (iii) the extent of underestimation is likely to be larger for South Korea than other OECD countries such as the US.

Job Market Paper

Selling Fast or Selling Junk: Is iBuying Sustainable?

2025

(Previously titled: Hassle Costs vs Winner's Curse: Is iBuying Sustainable?)

Presented at the 19th North American Meeting of the Urban Economics Association (Student Prize Session), the 1st Zurich–Oxford Doctoral Symposium on Real Estate Markets, the 2025 European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) Annual Conference, the Econometric Society 2025 World Congress, and the 2025 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association (AREUEA) National Conference

Abstract: This paper examines challenges in algorithmic intermediation and proposes a framework to mitigate adverse selection when private information about product quality is intertwined with private information about preferences. I examine these issues in the context of iBuyers—firms that offer instant home purchases using big-data-driven pricing models—and analyze why they have struggled to achieve sustainable profitability. I develop a model in which home sellers choose between selling to an iBuyer and listing on the open market based on two dimensions of private information: unobserved house quality and the hassle costs of traditional selling. Sellers may select an iBuyer either to avoid the time and effort of listing or because the iBuyer's offer exceeds their expected market price, with the latter case generating adverse selection against the iBuyer. Using detailed transaction and listing data, I estimate the joint

distribution of these factors, identified from repeated sales and seller choice following iBuyer entry. Counterfactual analyses show that a revenue-sharing contract mitigates adverse selection by improving selection incentives, while incorporating an LLM-based text score derived from unstructured listings further reduces informational frictions by providing a standardized signal of unobserved house quality. Together, these mechanisms enhance the viability of algorithmic transaction markets.

Working Paper

Positioning in Time: The Impact of Opening Days on Pricing and Market Competition 2025

Presented at the 13th European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association

Abstract: This paper examines the timing of product offerings as an additional dimension of competition, expanding the understanding of firms' positioning decisions. The analysis exploits a novel setting in the U.S. coffee shop industry during the COVID-19 pandemic, when labor shortages sharply increased operating costs and induced firms to compete on which days to open. Using mobile tracking and sales data, I estimate a structural model of demand, pricing, and operating-day choices under sticky (uniform) pricing. The results show that higher labor frictions reduce the number of operating days, and that price stickiness amplifies this effect by linking daily operations to weekly pricing incentives. Counterfactual simulations reveal that ignoring this interaction understates the welfare losses from higher operating costs, underscoring the importance of accounting for interdependent competitive dimensions—time and price—in assessing market outcomes.

Work in Progress

Two-Sided Bargaining in Regulation: Private Equity and Local Government in Permits and Rezoning 2025

This project examines how private equity (PE) firms engage in two-sided bargaining with local governments to navigate regulatory processes and shape housing supply. Using permit, lobbying, and legislative data from the United States, I study whether PE ownership facilitates faster permitting, more successful rezoning applications, and ultimately more efficient development outcomes. Preliminary evidence from Chicago shows that permits for PE-owned properties are processed more quickly, underscoring how scale, financing capacity, and lobbying strength influence bargaining dynamics in urban development.

Professional Activities

Conference & Invited Presentations

- 2025 North American Meeting of the Urban Economics Association (Student Prize Session) *Montreal, Canada*
Selling Fast or Selling Junk: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- Zurich–Oxford Doctoral Symposium on Real Estate Markets *Zurich, Switzerland*
Selling Fast or Selling Junk: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) Annual Conference *Valencia, Spain*
Hassle Costs vs Winner’s Curse: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- Econometric Society World Congress *Seoul, Korea*
Hassle Costs vs Winner’s Curse: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- Singapore Management University (SMU) *Singapore*
Selling Fast or Selling Junk: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- INSEAD *Singapore*
Selling Fast or Selling Junk: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- National University of Singapore (NUS) Business School *Singapore*
Selling Fast or Selling Junk: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association (AREUEA) National Conference *Washington, D.C., United States*
Hassle Costs vs Winner’s Curse: Is iBuying Sustainable?
- 2024 European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association *Copenhagen, Denmark*
Positioning in Time: The Impact of Opening Days on Pricing and Market Competition
- 2019 Kyoto–Yonsei Joint Workshop on Economic Theory *Seoul, Korea*
Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Advertising Revenues and Negative Pricing
- Summer Meeting of the Korean Econometric Society *Seoul, Korea*
A Simple Correction of Gini Estimates Using Tax Return Data

Academic Service

- 2025 1,000 Scientist AI Jam Session, U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories
Collaborated on evaluating advanced AI reasoning models for scientific research challenges as part of a cross-laboratory initiative.
- 2023–2024 Organizer, IO Student Workshop, Princeton University
Coordinated speakers, scheduling, and logistics for the IO Student Workshop.

Community Service

- 2023 Mentorship, Department of Economics, Princeton University
Participated as a fourth-year Ph.D. student in mentoring first-year students.
- 2023 Mentorship, Scholars Institute Fellows Program, Princeton University
Served as a graduate fellow mentoring first-generation and lower-income students.
- 2018 Tutoring Program, Yonsei University
Volunteered as a tutor in Econometrics I, helping undergraduates keep up with coursework.
- 2015 Global Seminar, Yonsei University
Organized an orientation session for incoming foreign freshmen.
- 2014 Voluntary Teacher, Songcheon Elementary School, Yonsei University
Taught English to elementary school students during a summer outreach program.

Honors, Awards, and Grants

Honors & Awards

- 2024 Graduate Student Teaching Prize, Princeton University
- 2014–2017 Highest Honors, Yonsei University
Received across five semesters: Spring 2014, Fall 2015, Fall 2016, Spring 2017, and Fall 2017.
- 2018–2019 Yonsei Outstanding Student Scholarship, Yonsei University
Awarded for academic excellence in Fall 2018, Spring 2019, and Fall 2019.
- 2019 Brain Korea 21 Plus Incentive Fellowship, Yonsei University
Awarded in recognition of research performance during Spring and Fall 2019.
- 2015 Best Award, National University Debate Contest (Heungsadan)

Grants

- 2025 Dean's Fund for Scholarly Travel, Princeton University
JRCPPF Travel Funding, Princeton University
- 2024 Dean's Fund for Scholarly Travel, Princeton University
JRCPPF Travel Funding, Princeton University
- 2023 JRCPPF Graduate Student Conference & Professional Travel Funding; George and Obie Shultz Foundation (MIT)
Funding for Publisher Multi-homing in Digital Advertising Markets: Evidence from Websites and Mobile Applications.

Teaching

Consultant, Princeton University
Economics Statistical Services

Spring 2024 – Fall 2024

Teaching Assistant, Princeton University
ECO 323 Market Failures and Policy Responses
ECO981 Junior Independent Work
FIN521/ECO466 Fixed Income, Options and Derivatives
FIN 591/ECO491 Financial Risk Management

Spring 2024, Spring 2025
Fall 2023 – Fall 2025
Spring 2023
Fall 2022

Teaching Assistant, Yonsei University
Econometrics II

Fall 2018

Research Assistant Experience

2023–2025 Research Assistant for Prof. Alessandro Lizzeri, Princeton University
2019–2020 Research Assistant, Social Science Korea (SSK) Team, Yonsei University
2018–2020 Research Assistant for Prof. Taehwan Kim, Yonsei University

Languages

English, Korean

Computer Skills

R, Python, Julia, Stata, Matlab

Last updated: November 1, 2025