**CS Final Exam (IS310)**

**\*\*\* Format**

1. **Comprehension Questions**
2. Explain 6 conceptual frameworks based on characteristics, objectives, and applications: New Left, Liberal Democratic Model, Society First Perspective, Embedded Advocacy Model (Cambodia & Vietnam case), Social Movement Model (Myanmar case), and State Corporatist Model (China case)

***Example:*** Give particular cases and ask to use those concepts to apply.

**Or** Explain particular frameworks by raising cases as examples.

1. Explain functions and roles of CS in Political Change.
2. Identify two groups of CS in any countries, that pose challenge to political power despite authoritarian rule. Give examples with 5 cases.
3. **Critical Thinking Question**
4. Give solution to CS current situation in which there is a tension between government and CS to reduce the conflict and promote cooperation. Raise conceptual frameworks to support your arguments.
5. Weak CS leads to undemocratic state. Do you agree with this statement? Please support your stance.

**\*\*\* Review**

1. **CQ**
2. **6 conceptual frame works:**
3. ***New Left (Neo-Gramscian)***

New left is rooted in the Gramscian formulation of civil society, which focuses on how civil society tries to influence policy and politics by forming public will and counternarratives. The main theme is to encourage political participation and community action to fulfil state’s citizenship. For new left, state is the hegemony trying to establish hegemonic society endlessly because its hegemonic project never come to an end; for example, state controls all social institutions. State represents the powerful class, for example bourgeois class. Civil society is the site for struggle and negotiation of the absolute power of state because state directly and indirectly control social institutions. Civil society can be considered as alternative version of democracy because civil society tries to influence state policy and politics in liberal-democratic state because civil society is an independent sphere. Also, it can be viewed as a site for struggle and construction of a counternarrative for an alternative version of democracy that will cater to the needs of the excluded class. In order to form public will against state’s dominant ideology, civil society performs several roles such as safeguarding state’s behavior and nations interest as a whole and expressing political view by actively participating in politics and mobilizing working class to do protest to influence government policies and actions.

**Case:** Cambodia

The sub-national state (as a part of the overall weak state) is experiencing difficulty responding to citizens’ demands; hence, broadly speaking, it welcomes partnering from civil society. Even so, the authorities are cautious on many fronts and have been exercising various means to contain civil society activities. Two actions are examples confirming this observation: the state’s intention to control VDC development, and the state putting forward different requirements to delay the implementation of civil society activities. First, VDCs was set in the early 1990s was to ensure that prioritisation of needs in planning started at the lowest level. Proposed action plans were submitted to the communes, and then UN agencies and NGOs could allocate resources for activities identified by VDCs. Up to early 2010, local citizens were democratically elected as VDC member. Things have changed; on 22 December 2010, the ministries of Interior and Rural Development issued a joint directive, stipulating: VDCs are under the structure and authority of individual commune/sangkat councils … and the structure of VDCs shall be composed of the village chief, deputy village chief, and village assistant … Depending on each locality’s needs and the requests of the village chief, commune/sangkat councils may appoint villagers to serve as members of VDC.). Lately, since the directive has taken effect, civil society staff complain that they can no longer work with the VDCs they used to cooperate with because VDCs have become politicised. It is clear that sub-national government, under the direction of the central government, aims to limit the empowerment objectives of civil society, which are perceived to ignite people’s understanding of their roles as rights holders. Further, the fact that VDCs have been integrated into the state system allows the state to have counter-forces against the activities promoted by civil society groups. The second issue involves the sub-national government’s caution and interference in the work of civil society. Various informants found the local authorities unwelcoming when they started new projects and activities involving a number of people. District authorities sometimes require groups to seek their permission and invite their attendance and even their personnel to speak. We were undertaking an environment project. Before we could mobilise people to attend our training and dissemination, the authorities required us to get their permission, demanded they be present and sent a resource person from the Provincial Department of Land and Urban Planning. They used the pretext that we did not have a resource person who could explain and respond to the people. They were clearly suspicious of us and expected to limit our scope of training.

Despite growing intervention by the state, a fascinating development observed in fieldwork is that a large number of NGOs and CBOs have demonstrated strategies and abilities to stay engaged with the state yet retain their positions. Gramsci was right when he pointed out that the hegemonic project of the state is never complete, but counter-hegemonic forces usually struggle against it. One provincial NGO released statement equating the authorities with a tiger means his organisation has not given in but has productively engaged with them, slowly building trust, letting them understand what they intend to accomplish, and being flexible. He further explained a recent approach: Just lately the authorities have been more cautious and have restricted the space for us to carry out our advocacy work, but we must be flexible. The best way forward now is, when we can’t explicitly work on sensitive areas such as legal rights, we must insert advocacy aspects of hot issues into rural livelihood projects or components.

1. ***Liberal Democratic Model (Neo-Tocquevillian)***

Liberal democratic model relates to generation of social capital and democracy by creating social capital embedded with democratic culture through participation in associations. In return, it leads to democratic change because a strong civil society is a prerequisite for effective democracy. While state is the representatives of citizens in the condition that state can become despotic to use power to control people, civil society is the site for development of democratic culture and democratization of authoritarian state. Democratic culture refers to situation in which people can exercise rights in respect of others with high-level of tolerance, so citizens are well aware of their rights and obligations. To build democratic culture, civil society pushes for socialization by promoting democratic culture through education, media, civil society members, individuals.

**Case:** Human rights activism operates based on principles of socialization toward new political norms or priorities. Human rights activism is not just about policy advocacy but aims to change Malaysians’ expectations of the state and the state’s definition of democracy. In other words: the human rights movement seeks to influence the state by advancing a normative shift. The Malaysian government—particularly Mahathir, prime minister from 1981 to 2003—consistently argues that universal standards of human rights are not suitable for Malaysia. An NGO-produced human rights report explains: “This argument prioritises economic development over civil and political rights”. The report goes on to assert, however, that the government routinely violates the collective rights of indigenous peoples to their land, culture, and identity; the right of Malaysian society to clean air and water; and the right of urban settlers to housing. Thus the report advocates a rethinking of how human rights are treated in Malaysia and, moreover, how they should be regarded. Malaysian activists have codified this normative challenge to the regime in the “Malaysian Charter on Human Rights,” developed through the 1990s out of consultations among fifty NGOs. The charter does present specific policy demands—such as ratifying and implementing a range of UN covenants and conventions, recasting economic development to guarantee environmental rights, and satisfying the right of all to food, shelter, and other basic needs. It is difficult to measure the extent of political change brought about by this long-term discursive campaign. At least a significant proportion of the voting public has come to debate whether the limitations placed on such freedoms are necessary or just. Mahathir himself insisted in a December 1998 speech indicating acknowledgment that his regime’s legitimacy was being judged, not just in terms of his own choosing, but also on the basis of human rights standards enumerated by nonstate voices. In meeting this challenge—explaining how his government did in fact meet the new standard—Mahathir signified, however grudgingly, a shift in the discursive terrain in favor of counterhegemonic human rights language and norms. The state may yet refuse to yield ground, in policy terms, to bring laws and institutions in line with its rhetoric. In that case, though, it risks alienating voters who apply human rights standards in evaluating regime performance. Hence while some of Malaysia’s most egregious human rights violations have yet to be corrected—such targets of human rights activism as the continuing use of detention without trial and tight restrictions on speech and assembly—greater progress seems to have been made at the discursive level. Ultimately, this normative shift could lead to concrete political change.

1. ***Society First Perspective***

Society-first perspective centers around vision of democracy with multiple sites, of which civil society is an important arena of governance. A democratic state consists of various actors; however, civil society is an independent one. It suggests a more complex connection between civil society and democracy. In addition to the function of civil society in affecting democratic institutions and governance at the level of the state, it draws attention to democratic governance in other sites and the decentralization of power, resources, and authority to local and nonstate institutions in order to promote self-governance and liberate society from domination by the political center. The main idea was to liberate society from the all-pervasive totalitarian ideology of the party-state, recover social autonomy, expand civil liberties and human rights, and create democratic space outside the party-state. While states are the centralized the political system with communist residual in which states declare themselves as the liberal-democratic states; however, communism is still dominant, civil society is the site for distinctive governance. It is an independent institution with self-regulation, self-governance, self-management, and self-organization. To push for democratic change, civil society urges for decentralization of state power, decision making, function, and financial management and state reforms by influencing legal system and political system to change but not overthrow.

1. ***Embedded Advocacy Model (Cambodia & Vietnam case)***

Embeddedness is a central concept in social theory, describing relations between the state, economy and society. In a narrower sense, embeddedness refers to mutually co-opted relations between an individual, organisation, or network and elites, and is closely linked conceptually with guanxi, vertical social capital, and corporatism. Embedded advocacy is based on reciprocal relationships with authorities. A network member who is a current or former state employee may use this position to collect information or influence others. Embeddedness carries positive connotations of state-society synergy, but it also suggests a lack of objectivity and independence because civil society network partly depends on government official to get data and institutionalize policy process in advocacy. In Vietnam, all social organisations need permission from some level of authority, which in turn can exercise oversight and control over the organisation. Yet the same relationship can also form an entry point for advocacy, as networks leverage access and connections with other parts of the state.

To be effective advocates, writes Bratton, organisations need to “identify openings in the administrative system” and “cultivate non-adversarial working relationships with the politically powerful by prioritising ways to agree and communicate with government rather than compromising activists’ independence because state connections are desirable and necessary for achieving grassroots impact and policy objectives, making activists more effective communicators and advocates, as well as shielding them from potential criticism or reprisals. For example, Vietnamese activist notices improved state responsiveness to advocacy efforts as long as you put in the correct language, pick the right issue and send the letter at the right time, you can get a response. It’s possible to know where the line is if you keep contact with people in high positions by sharing drafts of a letter first and listening to allies’ advice on when it’s “safe” to send.

Effective embedded advocacy requires having something to say that elites will listen to and take seriously: not only arguments, but also “scientific” evidence (V45). Actions can speak louder than words. “We don’t push [authorities] and tell them what to do; we do our own thing, and if it’s good they’ll take it on. We can afford to make mistakes, but the government thinks they can’t”. However, evidence can be hard to obtain if state or corporate actors restrict access; control of information can then be used as an excuse to deny activists standing to comment on policy issues. If networks cannot provide evidence on their own, one alternative is to circulate information on a related subject written by others. According to one research institute expert, the most successful advocacy is carried out by “famous scholars” – individuals who are well-connected, rather than NGOs who often are not.

1. ***Social Movement Model (Myanmar case)***

Social Movement Model is useful in explaining the emergence of social movements—especially in questioning how such movements spread, even though the legal space for independent civil society organizations remains closed. Three leading scholars of social movements, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow, have proposed an approach—an interactive and dynamic framework for analyzing mobilization—that can help us understand how political activists might overcome their organizational deficits and launch nationwide political protests by considering three things: how broad processes of change affect the socio-political environment, how activists perceive and construct opportunity and threat, and how activists appropriate social and organizational bases. According to this framework, broad social and political change in a country brings about changes in the social, political, and economic environments, which in turn create opportunities for activists to engage in collective action. It means that whether activists will engage in collective action depends on the reality of the opportunity, the threat of forceful retaliation from the regime, and how the activists and the general populace perceive the opportunities and threat.

As this framework suggests, activists must therefore convince others that the movement is worth joining. And this, in turn, can be done by constructing an injustice frame (underscoring “the seriousness and injustice of a social condition” or redefining “as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable”), an identity frame (defining a common identity of the movement in order to “define enemies by real or imagined attributes and evil”), and an agency frame (creating “consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective actions”). This process, often referred to as collective action framing, involves “interactive reconstruction of disputes” among activists, their opponents, the state, and the media (McAdam et al. 2001: 48). So long as the movement continues, therefore, activists and their opponents try to frame and reframe identities, rituals, demands, and goals.

The framework also notes that in order to carry out the framing and actual mobilization, activists need resources and structure. These resources include money, labor, time, expertise, and access to media. The mobilization structure usually includes both formal organizations and informal social networks. In the face of organizational shortcomings, activists might appropriate existing networks, organizations, and collective identities and turn them into “vehicles of mobilization” (McAdam et al. 2001: 44–45; Boudreau 2001). Although informal networks can serve as a “common source of recruitment into social movements,” they are not sufficiently organized to engage in “sustained challenges against powerful opponents”.

When a movement’s activities are launched, organizers must “invent, adapt, and combine various forms of tactics to urge inactive participants to be highly participative as possible. In so doing, activists should employ tactics within their current repertoire (such as forms of contention), create new ones, or adopt innovative actions—especially means that are banned by the regime in question. This innovative framework outlined here draws attention to the movement precisely because of its potential, through informal networks, to undertake a full-fledged social movement and allows one to see the complexity in the process of mobilizing a social movement. We shall see how political activists in Burma tried to mobilize social movements through their informal networks.

In the case of Burma, 8888 uprising could provide a good example to understand Social Movement Model. Due to strong power and brutal crackdown from Ne Win government, any anti-government movement were cracked down. However, economic crisis, demonetarization policy, and inefficient banking system during 1980s gave opportunity to informal study groups to stand up because the grievance of people toward the incapability of government. For example, Burmese Communist Party-Affiliated student study groups in Rangoon and Mandalay distributed a series of pamphlets urging college students in Rangoon to rise up against the government; however, they are unwilling to do so fearing the high cost. Following by the minor-off campus brawl responded by violence and detention from local authority, and foreign news about authoritarian leader and foreign donors for anti-government movement, those student groups were able to launch mass rallies and demanded for resignation of Ne Win in 1988. As a result, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was installed as interim government waiting for election.

1. ***State Corporatist Model***

State corporatism, in contrast, is a descriptive model of state-society relations in nations where the state plays a central role in controlling the growth and development of societal actors. As Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan point out, corporatism is made up of a collection of “institutional mechanisms” and as such can be deployed by many different types of regimes The state-corporatist framework also looks for the rise of interest associations at the societal level. The rise of associations is seen not as an indication of receding state power, however, but as an evolution away from direct state control to indirect state coordination. Variants on the state-corporatist models, usually emerging due to problems in the application of corporatism to the Chinese case, have recently become more central to the discussions by Philip Huang, Kenneth Foster, Margaret Pearson, and many others.

The central focus is the existence of a realm between society and the state that is constituted by both but subsumed by neither. These variants or form of state corporatism are also rooted in China’s history, drawing from the guilds of the late Qing era and the effects of socialist organization and ideology on current developments. The corporatist paradigm and its China-specific applications set their sights, not only on the formation of associations, but on the role of the state in initiating, running, and controlling these groups, not necessarily through repression or violence but through mutual penetration, converging interests, and co-optation. Under state corporatism, associational life is strictly controlled by the state.

Characteristics of state-led formation include a pre-emption of issues, co-optation of leaders, institutionalization of access, state planning and resource allocation, development of quasi-state agencies, a political culture stressing formalism, consensus, and continuous bargaining, and the periodic but systematic use of physical repression. All of these characteristics fit, to varying degrees, the current relationship between the Chinese state and social organizations. (Unger and Chan 1995: 37). Chinese government employs state-corporatist structures to reign in and control society does little to help us understand future political change. There are three types of civil society in China: associations created from scratch by the Chinese state, associations spun off from the bureaucracy, and independent associations and it seems that this last category remains the smallest in number.

One of the key contributions of this volume is to show that civil society’s relationship to democratization is highly contingent. Unfortunately, even the more sophisticated frameworks presented in this volume have limited usefulness for our understanding of civil society in China. Chinese civil society can only come up short if this is the major focus of comparison. Moreover, a linear focus on movement away from the state (from no autonomy to more autonomy) will only capture one angle of China’s associational life, and arguably not the most important aspect. One of the key arguments presented here is that state-civil society interaction is important because it is changing the nature of the Chinese state. This transformative effect of civil society is, however, a result of the close interdependence and mutual penetration of the state and social groups. My emphasis here echoes Suzaina Kadir, it is more important to study “the process of interaction and how it defines, bounds, or transforms the two sides,” rather than measuring the degree of societal autonomy from the state.

1. **Functions and roles of CS in Political Change.**

Civil society is a space, an arena of governance, and organizations populating this space can be a force for affecting institutions and governance in political society, the state, and the market; civil society is not monolithic; there is no necessary connection between civil society and democracy; certain civil society organizations have greater democratic effect than others, while some may have an antidemocratic effect; the democratic effect and role of a country’s civil society organizations depend on its specific domestic and international circumstances; successful democratic transition and consolidation require civil and political societies to have strong democratic forces; these forces are more consequential when they complement one another and act in mutually supporting ways; and the role and influence of civil society actors must be examined in conjunction with other actors in both the domestic (political society, the market, the state) and the international arenas.

1. ***System legitimacy and change***

The specific functions and roles of civil society organizations will vary with the legitimacy of the nation-state and political system, the type of political system, and the stage of political development. First, if the nation-state and political system are widely acknowledged as legitimate, most civil society organizations are likely to emphasize reform, accountability, representation, and subsidiarity. In a nation-state that is contested or where a political system lacks legitimacy, it is highly probable that disengagement, resistance, construction of counternarratives, formation of clandestine organizations, and mobilization of domestic and international support will feature prominently. Second, in a system in the midst of transition, the role of civil society can be expected to change as well. For example, in an entrenched communist or authoritarian system, civil society groups may seek to carve out public space in certain domains. In the subsequent transition phase, civil society groups may become involved in drafting a new constitution, in strengthening and monitoring political society and the state, in institutionalizing civil society, and in fostering public participation in politics and policymaking. In the consolidation phase, civil society groups may seek to expand the space for civil society and correct the deficiencies of the new democracy (including greater transparency and accountability)—all with the goal of making democracy the only game in town.

The effectiveness of these civil society roles hinges on prodemocracy groups acquiring and retaining a favorable balance of power in the different phases. This may at times be difficult to accomplish. The point is simply this: the process of political change often is not linear, and the composition and role of civil society groups in this process are bound to alter as circumstances change.

1. ***Autonomy and Institutionalization of the Public Sphere***

The role of civil society in political change must also be examined in terms of the arenas of political discourse and governance, which includes civil society itself. Civil society is a distinct and crucial sphere of democratic governance. First, it is about the expansion of space of the public realm cultivating and sheltering the political autonomy because it relates to decentralization of power, authority, and resources to local levels and nonstate institutions such that social, cultural, and some political interaction are regulated by associations free of state intervention. Also, Citizens acquire the right to self-determination and governance in matters of immediate relevance and civil society also provides the space and means for articulating and aggregating public interests, forming public opinion, developing agendas outside the state and the market, and creating the means to influence them. In return, public autonomy facilitates collective judgment and decision making to support self-governance by citizens and influence political society, the state, and the market.

Second, the change involves the transformation of civil society from a group of social movements to a set of institutions. Institutionalization of civil society involves a guarantee of fundamental rights that presupposes a constitution, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary; a politically accessible media that is independent of state and market; decentralization of power, authority, and resources to local governments and nonstate institutions; acceptance of domestic and international NGOs as legitimate actors; and financially secure associations. In other words, civil society becomes a legally protected realm distinct from the state and political society.

Third, the change relates to the development of the communicative mode of rational action. In this mode, agreements are arrived at through rational discourse and interpersonal interaction, not through power, money, or violence. Actors with divergent interests coordinate their interaction by negotiating definitions of the situation and remedies through discourse and reinterpretation of norms.

1. ***Change in Political Society and the State***

At the level of political society, the concern is with structures and rules for interest aggregation and representation, competition for state power, and the power and responsiveness of legislatures to demands from civil and political society. Civil society can assist the development of political parties and a party system, the institution of an electoral system, public participation in elections, monitoring of elections and legitimating outcomes, and the constitution and functioning of the legislature. In addition to developing political society and monitoring its activities, civil society organizations may build links to political parties and legislators in order to channel and realize the interests of their specific groups and bolster democratic elements in civil society.

Turning to the state, the concern is with change in the basis of political community, type of political system, and specific policies of domination and governance. Such changes may be determined by a number of sites, including the ideational foundation of the nation-state, the structure of the state (unitary or federal state; creation of autonomous regions; presidential, semipresidential, or parliamentary systems), change within a political system (political liberalization in an authoritarian system, for example, or change in the base of the vanguard party in a communist state), change in the political system itself (from authoritarianism or a communist party system to democracy, or vice versa), change in existing government, redefinition of the state’s relationship with economic society, political society, and civil society, and change in state institutions and policies in specific areas of governance. In a system that is recognized as legitimate, civil society groups may play a variety of roles in shaping the course of such changes: setting norms, representing interests, promoting transparency and democratic accountability, and contributing to policymaking. In a system that is contested and widely regarded as illegitimate, in contrast, resistance, change, and transformation may inform the role of prodemocracy groups.

1. ***Socialization Function***

Civil society organizations perform a socialization function that applies across the board by encompassing roles that relate to citizens’ skills and communication of information—critical elements in the development of an individual’s capacity for autonomous judgment and participation in the democratic process—as well as those that relate to the virtues of trust, reciprocity, and recognition, which can serve as a foundation for the robustness of the public sphere and democratic institutions of a community. As identified by Larry Diamond (1999), those roles are stimulating political skills and participation, education for democracy, development of crosscutting identities, and dissemination of information to empower citizens, as well as others that relate to the creation of civic virtues.

The role of civil society in political change may be investigated in several ways such as investigating political change in the direction of open, accountable, and participatory politics and the importance of conceptualizing civil society both as an arena of governance and as a force for bringing about change in political society and the state. Those functions and roles are illustrative, however, not exhaustive. They will vary with the type and legitimacy of political system and stage of system change.

1. **Two cases of civil society that poses challenge to government.**
2. **Land conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s in Indonesia**

The key civil society groups are Organizations of subordinate social groups like workers and farmers, local NGOs, Corporatist or semicorporatist bodies, and student groups. The New Order regime took extraordinary measures to repress, control, and proscribe independent organization and mobilization among subordinate classes. One aim of these policies was to facilitate capitalist development, upon which the regime relied in large part for its legitimacy. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, lower-class protest began to have a significant impact on national politics. This protest was to a large extent fostered by the very pattern of capitalist development promoted by the state. One sign was an unprecedented wave of strikes from 1990 on by workers in the new industrial estates that had sprung up around the big cities following a government shift toward export-oriented industrialization policies in the 1980s (Hadiz 1997). Prior to this, protests by farmers and other members of rural communities had attained considerable coverage in the national press. The most celebrated of these cases occurred in Kedung Ombo, Central Java, when the government attempted to relocate approximately thirty thousand people to make way for a massive reservoir being built with funds from the World Bank and other sources. Residents complained they were being offered inadequate compensation and claimed that the military was using violence, intimidation, and deception to force them to leave (Stanley 1994). Many of them refused to comply. Local NGOs and student activists became involved. The International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI), the major umbrella group for Indonesian NGOs and their foreign counterparts, also campaigned internationally on the issue, provoking President Suharto’s ire. Students accompanied residents to the national capital, Jakarta, where they held rowdy demonstrations. Although the dam was filled with water in early 1989, many residents still refused to accept the government’s miserly offers of compensation or relocation. The case dragged on for years. There were court challenges, frequent articles in the national press, even plays.

Civil society campaigning, like that around land disputes, did not mount an immediate threat to the New Order state. But it did have a significant political impact. The unjust terms of land acquisition, as well as the brutal techniques used by the military to suppress those who resisted, generated much discussion in the media, academia, and other public forums. Campaigning thus added to the mounting burden faced by the regime of maintaining its aura of legitimacy. The cumulative effect of such activity, from the early 1990s onward, shifted the ground of public discourse under the feet of the regime and greatly undermined its legitimacy. It was here that civil society made its central contribution to the transition to democratic government: it eroded the ideological foundations of authoritarian rule. In the end, Suharto regime collapsed in 1998 followed by a series of political reform toward establishing a more secure legal framework for civil society.

1. **8888 Uprising**

In the case of Burma, 8888 uprising could provide a good example to understand Social Movement Model. Due to strong power and brutal crackdown from Ne Win government, any anti-government movement were cracked down. However, economic crisis, demonetarization policy, and inefficient banking system during 1980s gave opportunity to informal study groups to stand up because the grievance of people toward the incapability of government. For example, Burmese Communist Party-Affiliated student study groups in Rangoon and Mandalay distributed a series of pamphlets urging college students in Rangoon to rise up against the government; however, they are unwilling to do so fearing the high cost. Following by the minor-off campus brawl responded by violence and detention from local authority, and foreign news about authoritarian leader and foreign donors for anti-government movement, those student groups were able to launch mass rallies, however, governments always cracked down brutally. Later one, government seemed to back down and stop cracking down. Successfully, they were able to get Ne Win resign in 1988. As a result, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was installed as interim government waiting for election.