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PHIL 451
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Reading Reflection 3

Considering Kripke and Loar;

Kripke states that pain and CFF are both rigid designators; they only refer to one exact thing. Because it is possible that pain \neq CFF, aka, they have a contingent relationship, then pain is not identical with CFF.

Kripke and Loar agree that pain is a rigid designator. I think that Loar's argument about phenomenal concepts is an interesting way of approaching Kripke; by framing in terms of phenomenal concept, Loar is able to introduce some obscurity in a way that benefits his argument. As described, his argument acknowledges the explanatory gap while taking control of the wheel.

How would Kripke approach the labeling of phenomenal concepts as direct and recognitional? Pain can only be thought about in terms of its phenomenal experience. Its phenomenal experience is dependent on CFF. But isn't dependent synonymous with contingent?

If pain as a phenomenal experience is necessarily dependent on CFF, then I think it starts to pose greater challenges to Kripke. I can see how the definition direct recognitional could also be interpreted as being more akin to necessary rather than contingent; it is direct, it can only refer to that thing, and it is recognitional, where it is specific to an instance of conscious experience and is "irreducibly Gestalt." But this still hinges on believing that that conscious experience [of pain] could only arise from CFF. So we are basically returning back to square one. Is pain *always* CFF?

I haven't read it yet, but I took a peek at Goff's criticism of Loar, and I can agree with the points of weakness he's identified. In particular, earlier where I mentioned that Loar introduced obscurity to his own benefit, Goff does not let this slide. However, I can see how a stronger argument for physicalism is still explicitly permissive of the explanatory gap or of other areas of ambiguity. But I think if Kripke were addressing Loar's argument, he could defend anti-physicalism in the same way he initially argued it, in that Loar doesn't particularly pin down pain as being necessarily equal to CFF.

I'm trying to follow if the stronger parts of Loar's argument pose an actual challenge to Kripke, following Kripke's premises.

P1. It is conceivable that pain is not identical with CFF.

Loan says that if phenomenal concepts are direct recognitional concepts, there are no a priori inferential links between them and the theoretical concept. But, pain = CFF is true as an identity statement. Does this mean he disagrees with premise one? By the necessity of identity, pain = CFF is not true if it is not necessarily true, or if it is conceivably false. If there are no a priori inferential links between pain as a phenomenal concept and CFF, does that permit that it pain = CFF could conceivably be false?