



Security Assessment

June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2021

For: FootballStars



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### **About FootballStars**

FootballStars Fans are connecting with their heroes like never before. Sports clubs and sporting mega stars are big business. They collect billions worldwide through endorsements and TV deals. It sometimes seems like the fans are being left behind while clubs and players Cash In. the advent of FootballStars means that players and clubs can now reconnect with fans on a global scal

The FootballStars Marketplace will interconnect fans, football players and clubs from around the world, under one platform. FootballStars is a deflationary, community lead hybrid DEFI/NFT project. Aiming to be the personal connection between fans and real life football stars and clubs Having Already Garnished A Vast Array Of Contacts In The Sports Industry, FootballStars Has The Competitive Edge, To Quickly Become The Leading Sports Blockchain Platform.

Website | ■ Telegram | Twitter | Instagram

## **About Solid Group**

Solid Group is a blockchain consulting and auditing service provider, founded by 3 cybersecurity experts with a passion for thinking out of the box, learning, and sharing knowledge. Every project goes through a meticulous process and is viewed by at least two partners, thereby achieving a high level of credibility and professionalism. Our group is partnered with multiple organizations and launchpads that have a combined market cap of over 400 million USD.

<u>►Telegram | ¶Telegram discussion group | Twitter | Value | Contact for audit | Medium</u>

## **Description**

The bridge contract on ETH network.

# Files in Scope

Contract Name	Contract Address
Initial Revision	https://etherscan.io/address/0x90b0ced725077a935782e09a47807a66420 bd5c6

# **Vulnerability Summary**

•	Informational severity Issues	2	7 /
•	Low severity issues	2	
•	Medium severity issues	2	
•	High severity issues	4	



## **Privilege Functions**

- The owner can withdraw any number of tokens/eth that was sent to the contract by having a consensus among all owners.
- The owner can control the number of tokens that are received by the user on the receiving side of the bridge. Which can be different from the amount that was sent by the user on the other side.
- The bridge is managed by the team. They can close the bridge whenever they like.

## **General Warnings**

- We audit the bridge contract. The bridge management server is the one that handles the transfer between the two networks. Which was not audited by us.
   Our recommendation is to audit the code of the bridge management server since there may be found potentially high severity issues.
- FTS token was not initially audited by us, assuming the integration
- The audit covers only the on-chain **contract** on the Ethereum network. the bridge management server has not been audited by us. There is no guarantee that the bridge management server is bug-free **and can't be exploited by a malicious actor.** We did raise our concern regarding the security of the bridge management server.
- Solid Group assumes that the integration with FTS contract was tested and treats the FTS
  token contract code as Blackbox since it wasn't initially audited by Solid Group. The team
  was asked to do proper testing for the integration with FTS token contract and especially
  test the behavior in extreme cases.



Issue #1	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Volatile Code	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	recieveTokens	X Not Fixed

#### Description

recieveTokens should always work, even if it fails to send commission to one of the owners, to ensure that investors' funds are safe. If the function is critical (such as recieveTokens) always make sure its error cases are handled gracefully!

```
for (uint i = 0; i < owners.length; i++) {
    address payable owner = payable(owners[i]);
    uint256 commission = commissions[i];
    owner.transfer(commission);
}</pre>
```

#### Recommendation

Use try catch when calling transfer.

Issue #2	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Logical Issue Gas Optimization	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	recieveTokens	X Not Fixed

#### Description

amountToSent should be declared as a local variable to save on gas fees.

amountToSent = tokensRecievedButNotSent[msg.sender] - tokensSent[msg.sender];



Issue #3	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Volatile Code	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	deleteOperation	X Not Fixed

#### Description

This block of code removed allOperations[index] by setting it to the last element. Line 7 (which is commented out) simply deletes the last element which was moved down the array by lines 3 and 4, and instead, you reinsert the last element to the array on line 8

```
if (index < allOperations.length - 1) { // Not last

allOperations[index] = allOperations[allOperations.length - 1];

allOperationsIndicies[allOperations[index]] = index;

//allOperations.length-1
allOperations.push(allOperations[allOperations.length-1]);</pre>
```

#### Recommendation

Remove line 8 and uncomment line 7

Issue #4	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Volatile Code	<ul><li>High</li></ul>		X Not Fixed

#### Description

The code is vulnerable to overflow.

#### Recommendation

Consider using safemath library

Issue #5	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Volatile Code	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	transfer Ownership With How Many	X Not Fixed

#### Description

Same as Issue #3

```
1 // allOperations.length = 0;
2 allOperations.push(allOperations[0]);
```

Issue #6	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Best Practice	• Low	transfer Ownership With How Many	X Not Fixed

#### Description

It's customary to revert in case a token transfer failed, to undo any side effects.



```
transferStatus = token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
if (transferStatus == true) {
    tokensRecieved[msg.sender] += amount;
}
```

Issue #7	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Logical Issue	<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	recieveTokens	X Not Fixed

#### Description

commission can be bypassed by the user.

1 function recieveTokens(uint256[] memory commissions) public payable {

Issue #8	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Logical Issue	• Low	recieveTokens	X Not Fixed

#### Description

```
1 require(msg.value >= owners.length * 150000 * 10**9, "Not enough ETH (The amount of
```

This magic number is equal to 3.00000218e-7\$ according to the current ETH price, which is practically zero.

#### Recommendation

Consider using a sensible minimum or determining the price in a more dynamic way (e.g. specifying the required commission per holder in writeTransaction)

Issue #9	Туре	Severity	Location	Status
	Volatile Code	<ul><li>High</li></ul>	recieveTokens	X Not Fixed

#### Description

The function recieveTokens should revert if it failed to transfer the tokens to msg.sender.

```
1 token.transfer(msg.sender, amountToSent);
2 tokensSent[msg.sender] += amountToSent;
```

#### tokensSent will be updated as if the tokens were already sent

```
1 require(msg.value >= owners.length * 150000 * 10**9, "Not enough ETH (The amount of
```

This magic number is equal to 3.00000218e-7\$ according to the current ETH price, which is practically zero.

#### Recommendation

Use require.