



SOLIDProof
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Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY

Audit

**Security Assessment
18. October, 2021**

For



miniFlokiADA

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Version	Date	Description
1.0	16. October 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Layout project• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing• Summary

Network

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

Website

<https://www.miniflokiada.com/>

Telegram

<https://t.me/miniflokiada>

<https://t.me/miniflokiadaannouncement>

Twitter

<https://twitter.com/miniflokiada>

Instagram

<https://instagram.com/miniflokiada>

Description

We aim to build wealth for our community and in the same time we are also spreading love for a greater cause! We strive to be the best project that will support and contribute to several Dog Charity around the world. Join our movement and help donate to different Non-profit organization for Dogs worldwide. Our community-driven project pours 2% charity distribution and shall be utilized to fund several charity drives.

We have been prospecting several Dog Rescue Charity around the world and has been in touch to do our first charity drive. Where we are aiming to donate \$10,000 in total for the first charity, consequently every charity drive will be held monthly, at the end of each month. We donate because we truly care, and we are proud to be giving our all to the community.

We also would love to hear from our community, different charity recipient shall be chosen through polls by the community in our Telegram groups.

Project Engagement

During the 12th of October 2021, **MiniFlokiADA Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link

v1.0

[https://bscscan.com/address/
0x48CbC7f87C657fEA3B297F658a5133a5deeF9b04#code](https://bscscan.com/address/0x48CbC7f87C657fEA3B297F658a5133a5deeF9b04#code)

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as they were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

- OpenZeppelin
 - Address
 - Ownable
 - SafeMath
 - Context
 - ReentrancyGuard
 - IERC20
- Uniswap
 - UniswapV2Factory
 - UniswapV2Pair
 - UniswapV2Router01
 - UniswapV2Router02

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.


v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/miniflokiada.sol	54f881a65fc0d900f786e9469d9c79c1c54642ef


Metrics

Source Lines v1.0

source comment single block mixed
empty todo blockEmpty



Risk Level v1.0



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	2	3	7	2

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Version	Public	Payable
1.0	62	3

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	39	83	7	10	19

State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	47	24

Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experimental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembly	Has Destroyable Contracts
1.0	^0.6.0		yes	yes (2 asm blocks)	

Version	Transfers ETH	Low-Level Calls	DelegateCall	Uses Hash Functions	ECRec over	New/Create/Create2

1.0	yes						
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Scope of Work


The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Correct implementation of Token standard
2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Inheritance Graph

v1.0



Verify Claims

Correct implementation of Token standard

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	provides information about the total token supply	✓	✓	✓
BalanceOf	provides account balance of the owner's account	✓	✓	✓
Transfer	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	✓	✓	✓
TransferFrom	executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	✓	✓	✓
Approve	allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	✓	✓	✓
Allowance	returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	✓	✓	✓

Optional implementations

Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
renounceOwnership	Owner renounce ownership for more trust	✓	✓	✗

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified	File
Deployer cannot mint	✓	✓	✓	Main
Comment	Line: -			

Max / Total Supply: 1.000.000.000.000



1. approve	→
2. claimReward	→
3. decreaseAllowance	→
4. excludeAccount	→
5. includeAccount	→
6. increaseAllowance	→
7. renounceOwnership	→
8. setAntiBotEnabled	→
9. setCharityFee	→
10. setCharityWallet	→
11. setFeeActive	→
12. setLiquidityFee	→
13. setMarketingFee	→
14. setMarketingWallet	→
15. setMaxTxAmount	→
16. setMinTokensBeforeSwap	→
17. setNormalRewardFee	→
18. setPairRouterRewardToken	→
19. setRewardCycleInterval	→
20. setSwapEnabled	→
21. setTaxFee	→
22. setTaxless	→
23. setTopHolderRewardDistributor	→
24. setTopHolderRewardFee	→
25. transfer	→
26. transferFrom	→
27. transferOwnership	→

Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified
Deployer cannot lock	✓	✓	✗
Deployer cannot burn	✓	✓	✓

Comments:

v1.0

- Deployer can lock user funds
 - If
 - Sender is not taxless
 - Recipient is not taxless
 - Or amount is higher than maxTxAmount
 - One of the above conditions must be met to disable the transfer function
- Deployer can set
 - antiBotEnabled
 - If PinkAntiBot not zero address and antiBotEnabled is true
 - onPreTransferCheck will be called in PinkAntiBot
 - PinkAntiBot was not provided to check what the function does, so we recommend you to DYOR (Do your own research) before investing
 - This function could lock user funds
 - topHolderRewardDistributor contract address was not provided to check
 - Please DYOR here, what that contract does
 - That contract could lock user funds
- Deployer can set rewardCycleInterval with setRewardCycleInterval function
 - it can be set indefinitely without restrictions

1. approve	→
2. claimReward	→
3. decreaseAllowance	→
4. excludeAccount	→
5. includeAccount	→
6. increaseAllowance	→
7. renounceOwnership	→
8. setAntiBotEnabled	→
9. setCharityFee	→
10. setCharityWallet	→
11. setFeeActive	→
12. setLiquidityFee	→
13. setMarketingFee	→
14. setMarketingWallet	→
15. setMaxTxAmount	→
16. setMinTokensBeforeSwap	→
17. setNormalRewardFee	→
18. setPairRouterRewardToken	→
19. setRewardCycleInterval	→
20. setSwapEnabled	→
21. setTaxFee	→
22. setTaxless	→
23. setTopHolderRewardDistributor	→
24. setTopHolderRewardFee	→
25. transfer	→
26. transferFrom	→
27. transferOwnership	→

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Verified
Deployer cannot pause	✓	✓	✓

1. approve	→
2. claimReward	→
3. decreaseAllowance	→
4. excludeAccount	→
5. includeAccount	→
6. increaseAllowance	→
7. renounceOwnership	→
8. setAntiBotEnabled	→
9. setCharityFee	→
10. setCharityWallet	→
11. setFeeActive	→
12. setLiquidityFee	→
13. setMarketingFee	→
14. setMarketingWallet	→
15. setMaxTxAmount	→
16. setMinTokensBeforeSwap	→
17. setNormalRewardFee	→
18. setPairRouterRewardToken	→
19. setRewardCycleInterval	→
20. setSwapEnabled	→
21. setTaxFee	→
22. setTaxless	→
23. setTopHolderRewardDistributor	→
24. setTopHolderRewardFee	→
25. transfer	→
26. transferFrom	→
27. transferOwnership	→


Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	✓
Partly Verified	🚩
Unverified / Not checked	✗
Not available	-

CallGraph



Source Units in Scope

v1.0

Type	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
	contracts/miniflokiada.sol	7	7	1228	1001	626	304	613	
	Totals	7	7	1228	1001	626	304	613	

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

- no critical issues found -

High issues

- no high issues found -

Medium issues

- no medium issues found -

Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.)	-	We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities
#2	Main	A floating pragma is set		The current pragma Solidity directive is „^0.”.
#3	Main	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)	737, 1207, 1203, 1144,	Check that the address is not zero
#4	Main	State variable visibility is not set	682	It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly
#5	Main	Tautology or contradiction (tautology)	1105	Fix the incorrect comparison by changing the value type or the comparison

Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description

#1	Main	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	672, 691, 670, 671, 679, 689, 687	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change
#2	Main	Functions that are not used (dead-code)	604, 644, 630	Remove unused functions.

Only owner functions

- renounceOwnership
- transferOwnership
- excludeAccount
- includeAccount
- setPairRouterRewardToken
- setTaxless
- setSwapEnabled
- setFeeActive
- setTopHolderRewardDistributor
- setTaxFee
- setNormalRewardFee
- setTopHolderRewardFee
- setChairtyFee
- setMarketingFee
- setLiquidityFee
- setMarketingWallet
- setCharityWallet
- setMaxTxAmount
- setMinTokensBeforeSwap
- setRewardCycleInterval
- setAntiBotEnabled

Audit Comments

18. October 2021:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Deployer can lock user funds
 - If
 - Sender is not taxless
 - Recipient is not taxless
 - Or amount is higher than maxTxAmount
 - One of the above conditions must be met to disable the transfer function
- Deployer can set
 - antiBotEnabled
 - If PinkAntiBot not zero address and antiBotEnabled is true

- `onPreTransferCheck` will be called in `PinkAntiBot`
 - `PinkAntiBot` was not provided to check what the function does, so we recommend you to DYOR (Do your own research) before investing
 - This function could lock user funds
- `topHolderRewardDistributor` contract address was not provided to check
 - Please DYOR here, what that contract does
 - That contract could lock user funds
- Deployer can set `rewardCycleInterval` with `setRewardCycleInterval` function
 - it can be set indefinitely without restrictions

SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
SW C-13_6	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
SW C-13_5	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
SW C-13_4	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
SW C-13_3	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
SW C-13_2	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
SW C-13_1	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
SW C-13_0	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
SW C-12_9	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
SW C-12_8	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW C-12 7</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	<u>CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-12 5</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	<u>CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-12 4</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	<u>CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-12 3</u>	Requirement Violation	<u>CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-12 2</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	<u>CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-12 1</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	<u>CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-12 0</u>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	<u>CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-11 9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	<u>CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-11 8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	<u>CWE-665: Improper Initialization</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-11 7</u>	Signature Malleability	<u>CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</u>	PASSED

SW C-11 6	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
SW C-11 5	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
SW C-11 4	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
SW C-11 3	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
SW C-11 2	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
SW C-11 1	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
SW C-11 0	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-10 9	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
SW C-10 8	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	NOT PASSED
SW C-10 7	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
SW C-10 6	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW C-10 5</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	<u>CWE-284: Improper Access Control</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-10 4</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	<u>CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-10 3</u>	Floating Pragma	<u>CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime</u>	NOT PASSED
<u>SW C-10 2</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	<u>CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-10 1</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<u>CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation</u>	PASSED
<u>SW C-10 0</u>	Function Default Visibility	<u>CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</u>	PASSED

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