ASCON AEAD 및 HASH 양자회로 구현

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urn3CHPcsZo





ASCON

- ASCON NIST 경량암호 표준화로 선정된 암호 제품군
 - NIST의 권장사항은 Ascon-128 또는 Ascon-128a와 결합된 Ascon-Hash.
 - 모든 체계는 128비트 보안을 제공하고 내부적으로 동일한 320비트 순열을 사용하므로 AEAD와 Hash모두 구현하기 좋음.
 - **AEAD**
 - **ASCON -128**
 - ASCON 128a
 - Hash
 - ASCON HASH
 - ASCON XOF
 - Variant
 - ASCON 80pq

ASCON parameter

ASCON AEAD

Name			Bit	size		Rou	ınds
	Algorithms	Key	Nonce	Tag	block	p^a	p^b
ASCON-128	$\mathcal{E}, D_{128,64,12,6}$	128	128	128	64	12	6
ASCON-128a	$\mathcal{E}, D_{128,128,12,8}$	128	128	128	128	12	8

ASCON HASH

Name		Bit	size	Rou	ınds
Name	Algorithms	Hash	block	p^a	p^b
ASCON-HASH	$\chi_{256,64,12}$ with $\ell = 256$	256	64	12	0

ASCON - AEAD

• Initialization, processing Associated Data, Processing Plaintext, Finalization

모든 프로세스마다 Permutation 포함.

$$\bullet \quad IV_{k,r,a,b} \leftarrow k \parallel r \parallel a \parallel b \parallel 0^{160-k} \\ = \begin{cases} 80400c0600000000 & \text{for ASCON-128} \\ 80800c0800000000 & \text{for ASCON-128a} \\ a0400c06 & \text{for ASCON-80pq} \end{cases}$$

(k = key size , r = data block , (a, b) = round number)

•
$$S \leftarrow IV_{k,r,a,b} \parallel K \parallel N$$

$$(K = \text{key }, N = \text{Nonce})$$

Initialization

$$S \leftarrow \text{IV}_{k,r,a,b} \parallel K \parallel N$$

$$S \leftarrow p^{a}(S) \oplus (0^{320-k} \parallel K)$$

Processing Associated Data

if
$$|A| > 0$$
 then
 $A_1 \dots A_s \leftarrow r$ -bit blocks of $A \|1\| 0^*$
for $i = 1, \dots, s$ do
 $S \leftarrow p^b((S_r \oplus A_i) \| S_c)$

$$S \leftarrow S \oplus (0^{319} \parallel 1)$$

Processing Plaintext

$$P_1 \dots P_t \leftarrow r$$
-bit blocks of $P \| 1 \| 0^*$
for $i = 1, \dots, t - 1$ **do**
 $S_r \leftarrow S_r \oplus P_i$
 $C_i \leftarrow S_r$
 $S \leftarrow p^b(S)$
 $S_r \leftarrow S_r \oplus P_t$

$$\tilde{C}_t \leftarrow \lfloor S_r \rfloor_{|P| \bmod r}$$
Finalization

$$S \leftarrow p^{a}(S \oplus (0^{r} \parallel K \parallel 0^{320-r-k}))$$
$$T \leftarrow \lceil S \rceil^{128} \oplus \lceil K \rceil^{128}$$
$$\mathbf{return} \ C_{1} \parallel \ldots \parallel C_{t-1} \parallel \tilde{C}_{t}, T$$

ASCON - HASH

· Initialization, Absorbing, Squeezing

모든 프로세스마다 Permutation 포함.

$$\bullet \quad IV_{k,r,a,b} \leftarrow 0^8 \parallel r \parallel a \parallel 0^8 || \ h = \begin{cases} 00400c000000000 & \text{for ASCON-XOF} \\ 00400c000000100 & \text{for ASCON-HASH} \end{cases}$$

(r = data block, a = round number, h = output length limit)

•
$$S \leftarrow p^a(IV_{k,r,a,b} \parallel 0^{256})$$

```
ee9398aadb67f03d |
8bb21831c60f1002 |
```

• $S \leftarrow b48a92db98d5da62 \mid | 43189921b8f8e3e8 \mid | 348fa5c9d525e140 \mid | |$

Initialization

Absorbing
$$M_1 \dots M_s \leftarrow M \parallel 1 \parallel 0^*$$
for $i = 1, \dots, s$ do
$$S \leftarrow p^a((S_r \oplus M_i) \parallel S_c)$$

 $S \leftarrow p^a(\text{IV}_{h.r.a} \parallel 0^c)$

Squeezing

for
$$i = 1, ..., t = \lceil \ell/r \rceil$$
 do
$$H_i \leftarrow S_r$$

$$S \leftarrow p^a(S)$$
return $|H_1||...||H_t|_{\ell}$

Permutation

ASCON의 주요 구성요소는 320bit 순열

$$P = P_L \circ P_S \circ P_C$$

320비트 S는 5개의 64비트 레지스터 워드 x_i , $S=x_0\parallel x_1\parallel x_2\parallel x_3\parallel x_4$ 로 분할 ($x_0=MSB$, $x_4=LSB$)

Addition of Constants(P_c)

 x_2 of constant C_r add. $x_2 \leftarrow x_2 \oplus C_r$


$$r = i$$
 for p_a & $r = i + a - b$ for p_b

p^{12}	p^8	p^6	Constant c_r	p^{12}	p^8	p^6	Constant c _r
0			00000000000000000000000000000000000000	6	2	0	0000000000000000000096
1			00000000000000000000000000000000000000	7	3	1	000000000000000000087
2			000000000000000000d2	8	4	2	00000000000000000078
3			000000000000000000c3	9	5	3	000000000000000000069
4	0		00000000000000000000000000000000000000	10	6	4	00000000000000000005a
5	1		0000000000000000000a5	11	7	5	0000000000000000004b

• Substitution Layer (P_S)


5비트 S-box 를 64개의 병렬로 구성하여 상태 S를 5개 레지스터의 각 비트 슬라이스로 변환

Table 5: Ascon's 5-bit S-box S as a lookup table.




$$x_0 = x_0 \oplus x_4, x_4 = x_4 \oplus x_3, x_2 = x_2 \oplus x_1,$$
 $t_0 = x_0, t_1 = x_1, t_2 = x_2, t_3 = x_3, t_4 = x_4,$
 $t_0 = \sim t_0, t_1 = \sim t_1, t_2 = \sim t_2, t_3 = \sim t_3, t_4 = \sim t_4,$
 $t_0 = t_0 \cdot x_1, t_1 = t_1 \cdot x_2, t_2 = t_2 \cdot x_3, t_3 = t_3 \cdot x_4, t_4 = t_4 \cdot x_0,$
 $x_0 = x_0 \oplus t_1, x_1 = x_1 \oplus t_2, x_2 = x_2 \oplus t_3, x_3 = x_3 \oplus t_4,$
 $x_4 = x_4 \oplus t_0, x_1 = x_1 \oplus x_0, x_0 = x_0 \oplus x_4,$
 $x_3 = x_3 \oplus x_2, x_2 = \sim x$

• Substitution Layer (P_S)



Ancilla qubit를 더 사용하여 병렬로 연산
→ Toffoli depth 와 Full depth 부분에서 최적화



```
for i in range(64):
    Toffoli_gate(eng, ancilla_x1[i], new_ancilla_x2[i], x0[i])
for i in range(64):
    Toffoli_gate(eng, ancilla_x2[i], new_ancilla_x3[i], x1[i])
for i in range(64):
    Toffoli_gate(eng, ancilla_x3[i], new_ancilla_x4[i], x2[i])
for i in range(64):
    Toffoli_gate(eng, ancilla_x0[i], new_ancilla_x1[i], x4[i])
for i in range(64):
    Toffoli_gate(eng, ancilla_x4[i], new_ancilla_x0[i], x3[i])
```

• Linear Layer (P_L)

각 64비트 레지스터 워드 x_i 내에서 선형 연산 진행 (Na \ddot{i} ve한 구현)

$$x_{0} \leftarrow x_{0} \oplus (x_{0} \gg 19) \oplus (x_{0} \gg 28)$$

$$x_{1} \leftarrow x_{1} \oplus (x_{1} \gg 61) \oplus (x_{1} \gg 39)$$

$$x_{2} \leftarrow x_{2} \oplus (x_{2} \gg 01) \oplus (x_{2} \gg 06)$$

$$x_{3} \leftarrow x_{3} \oplus (x_{3} \gg 10) \oplus (x_{3} \gg 17)$$

$$x_{4} \leftarrow x_{4} \oplus (x_{4} \gg 07) \oplus (x_{4} \gg 41)$$


```
def LinearDiffusion_Layer(eng,x0,x1,x2,x3,x4):
    new_x0 = eng.allocate_qureg(64)
    new_x1 = eng.allocate_qureg(64)
    new_x2 = eng.allocate_qureg(64)
    new_x3 = eng.allocate_qureg(64)
    new_x4 = eng.allocate_qureg(64)
```

Table 1: Comparison of quantum resources required for ASCON linear layer.

Linear layer	Source	#CNOT	#Qubit	Depth
Out-of-place	This work	960	640	3
Naïve (binary matrix)	RBC'23 [18]	960	640	26
Gauss-Jordan	RBC'23 [18]	2,413	320	358
PLU	RBC'23 [18]	2,413	320	288
Modified [19]	RBC'23 [18]	1,595	320	119

18. S.Roy, A.Baksi, and A.Chattopadhyay, "Quantum implementation of ascon linear layer," Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2023. 9


- Efficient Implementation of Lightweight Hash Functions on GPU and Quantum Computer s for IoT Applications (ASCON-HASH)
 - qubit 최적화를 위해 Linear Layer에서 사용하는 ancilla qubit를 이용한 S-box
 - Substitution Layer와 Linear Layer ancilla qubit(temp qubit) 공유




$$x_0 \leftarrow x_0 \oplus (x_0 \gg 19) \oplus (x_0 \gg 28)$$

 $x_1 \leftarrow x_1 \oplus (x_1 \gg 61) \oplus (x_1 \gg 39)$
 $x_2 \leftarrow x_2 \oplus (x_2 \gg 01) \oplus (x_2 \gg 06)$
 $x_3 \leftarrow x_3 \oplus (x_3 \gg 10) \oplus (x_3 \gg 17)$
 $x_4 \leftarrow x_4 \oplus (x_4 \gg 07) \oplus (x_4 \gg 41)$

- Efficient Implementation of Lightweight Hash Functions on GPU and Quantum Computer s for IoT Applications (ASCON-HASH)
 - qubit 최적화를 위해 Linear Layer에서 사용하는 ancilla qubit를 이용한 S-box
 - Substitution Layer와 Linear Layer ancilla qubit(temp qubit) 공유





ASCON-AEAD

• ASCON-128 양자 회로 구현

```
Initialization
    S \leftarrow \mathrm{IV}_{k,r,q,h} \parallel K \parallel N
    S \leftarrow p^a(S) \oplus (0^{320-k} \parallel K)
Processing Associated Data
   if |A| > 0 then
        A_1 \dots A_s \leftarrow r-bit blocks of A \|1\|0^*
        for i = 1, \ldots, s do
            S \leftarrow p^b((S_r \oplus A_i) \parallel S_c)
    S \leftarrow S \oplus (0^{319} \parallel 1)
Processing Plaintext
   P_1 \dots P_t \leftarrow r-bit blocks of P||1||0^*
   for i = 1, ..., t - 1 do
       S_r \leftarrow S_r \oplus P_i
       C_i \leftarrow S_r
        S \leftarrow p^b(S)
   S_r \leftarrow S_r \oplus P_t
   \tilde{C}_t \leftarrow \lfloor S_r \rfloor_{|P| \bmod r}
Finalization
   S \leftarrow p^{a}(S \oplus (0^{r} || K || 0^{320-r-k}))
   T \leftarrow \lceil S \rceil^{128} \oplus \lceil K \rceil^{128}
   return C_1 \| ... \| C_{t-1} \| \tilde{C}_t, T
```

```
S = x_0 \parallel x_1 \parallel x_2 \parallel x_3 \parallel x_4 \ (x_0 = MSB, x_4 = LSB)
```

```
def Associated(eng,pb,A,A_len,x0,x1,x2,x3,k4, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4):
   for i in range(32):
       CNOT | (A[i], x0[32+i])
   X \mid x0[31]
   Permutation_b(eng,pb,x0,x1,x2,x3,x4, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4)
   X [ x4[0]
def Plain(eng,pb,pt,pt_len,ct,x0,x1,x2,x3,x4):
   for i in range(32):
       CNOT | (pt[i], x0[32+i])
       CNOT | (x0[32+i], ct[i])
   X \mid x0[31]
def Finalization(eng,pa,x0,x1,x2,x3,x4,key, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4):
   for i in range(64):
       CNOT | (key[i + 64], x1[i])
       CNOT | (key[i], x2[i])
   Permutation_a(eng, pa, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4)
   for i in range(64):
        CNOT | (key[i + 64], x3[i])
        CNOT | (key[i], x4[i])
```

a hash function of ASCON

• ASCON-HASH 양자 회로 구현

Initialization $S \leftarrow p^a(\operatorname{IV}_{h,r,a} \parallel 0^c)$ Absorbing $M_1 \dots M_S \leftarrow M \parallel 1 \parallel 0^*$ for $i=1,\dots,s$ do $S \leftarrow p^a((S_r \oplus M_i) \parallel S_c)$ Squeezing for $i=1,\dots,t=\lceil \ell/r \rceil$ do $H_i \leftarrow S_r$ $S \leftarrow p^a(S)$ return $\lfloor H_1 \parallel \dots \parallel H_t \rfloor_{\ell}$

```
S = x_0 \parallel x_1 \parallel x_2 \parallel x_3 \parallel x_4 \ (x_0 = MSB, x_4 = LSB)
```

```
# Absorbing
for number in range(l):
    if(number != l-1): # 0,1,2,3
        for i in range(64):
            CNOT | (M[len - (64*(number+1)) + i], x0[i])
        Permutation_a(eng,pa,x0,x1,x2,x3,x4, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4)
   else: #4
        left len = len-64*number
        start = 64-left_len
        for i in range(left_len):
            CNOT | (M[i], x0[i+start])
        X \mid x0[63-left_len]
Permutation_a(eng, pa, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4)
for i in range(4):
    for j in range(64):
        CNOT | (x0[j], Hash[64*i+j])
   Permutation_a(eng, pa, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, new_ancilla_x0, new_ancilla_x1, new_ancilla_x2, new_ancilla_x3, new_ancilla_x4)
if(resource_check!=1):
    print_state(eng, Hash, 64)
```

양자 자원 추정

• ASCON-128(AEAD)에 대한 양자 자원 추정

Table 2: Required quantum resources for ASCON-128 quantum circuit implementation (ours).

Cipher	#X	#CNOT	#Toffoli	Toffoli depth	#Qubit	Depth	TD-M cost
ASCON-128	21,243	69,600	9,600	30	20,064	304	601,920

*: Associated data and plaintext are both of 32-bits.

Table 3: Required decomposed quantum resources for ASCON-128 quantum circuit implementation (ours).

Cipher	#Clifford	#T	T-depth	#Qubit	Full depth	FD- M cost
ASCON-128	167,643	67,200	120	20,064	513	10,292,832

*: Associated data and plaintext are both of 32-bits.

양자 자원 추정

• ASCON-HASH에 대한 양자 자원 추정

Table 4: Required quantum resources for ASCON-HASH quantum circuit implementation.

Cipher	Source	#X	#CNOT	#Toffoli	Toffoli depth	#Qubit	Depth	TD-M cost
ASCON-HASH	[20]	97,426	159,488	55,296	864	35,392	2,487	30,578,688
ASCON-IIASII	Ours	76,691	249,344	34,560	108	70,272	1,090	7,589,376

*: Input message length is 256-bit.

Table 5: Required decomposed quantum resources for ASCON-HASH quantum circuit implementation.

Cipher	Source	#Clifford	#T	T-depth	# Qubit	Full depth	FD- M cost
ASCON-HASH	[20]	699,282	387,072	3456	35,392	8,427	298,248,384
ASCON-IIASII	Ours	602,515	241,920	432	70,272	1,845	129,651,840

*: Input message length is 256-bit.

결론

• Grover 공격 비용 추정 및 결론

Table 6: Cost of the Grover's key search for ASCON-128 (ours).

Cipher	Total gates	Total depth	Cost	#Oubit	TD-M	FD-M
Cipner	Total gates	rotar deptir	(complexity)	# Qubit	cost	$\cos t$
ASCON-128	$1.180\cdot 2^{83}$	$1.574\cdot 2^{73}$	$1.857\cdot2^{156}$	20,065	$1.799 \cdot 2^{83}$	$1.925 \cdot 2^{87}$

*: Associated data and plaintext are both of 32-bit.

Table 7: Costs of the Grover's collision search for ASCON-HASH.

Cipher	Source	Total	Total	Cost	#Oubit	TD-M	FD-M
	Source	gates	depth	(complexity)	#Qubit	cost	cost
ASCON-HASH				$1.317\cdot 2^{290}$,		
	Ours	$1.268\cdot 2^{148}$	$1.415 \cdot 2^{139}$	$1.794 \cdot 2^{287}$	70,273	$1.416\cdot 2^{151}$	$1.517\cdot 2^{155}$

*: Input message length is 256-bit.

- Level 1: To be considered secure, any attack that compromises the relevant security definition must require computational resources that are at least comparable to those required for a key search on a 128-bit key block cipher, such as AES-128 $(2^{170} \rightarrow 2^{157})$.
- Level 2: To be considered secure, any attack that compromises the relevant security definition must require computational resources that are at least comparable to those required for a collision search on a 256-bit hash function, such as SHA-256/SHA3-256.

- ASCON-128
 - NIST post-quantum security Level 1 달성

- ASCON-HASH
 - 양자 컴퓨터 상에서의 보안레벨 제공 X,
 - 클래식 컴퓨터상에서의 보안 레벨만 제공
 - SHA3-256 양자 회로를 기반으로
 1.574 · 2²⁹⁵ 로 추정
 - 현재 구현되어 있는 양자회로와 비교하면 보안레벨을 달성하지는 못했지만 AES처럼 예상비용을 잠재적으로 줄일 수 있기 때문에 변할 수 있음.

Q&A