



05 PQC 최적화 I

양자 컴퓨터 개발 현황 (Google vs IBM)

2019년 구글에서 양자 컴퓨터 supremacy 달성
(난수성 문제 증명: 10,000년 vs 3분 20초)

2025년 IBM에서 약 4~5천 큐비트 양자컴퓨터 개발 계획 발표
낮은 보안 강도를 가지는 RSA/ECC의 경우 실제 해킹 가능

Article
Quantum supremacy using a programmable superconducting processor

Received 10/20/2018; 11/08/2018; 01/06/2019; 01/26/2019
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The promise of quantum computers is that certain computational tasks might be executed exponentially faster on a quantum processor than on a classical processor.¹⁰ A fundamental challenge is to design a quantum processor capable of executing quantum algorithms in an exponentially large computational space. Here we report the use of a processor with programmable superconducting qubits¹¹ to create quantum states on 51 qubits, corresponding to a computational state space of dimension 2^{51} (about 10^{15}). Measurements from repeated experiments show that the resulting probability distribution, which we verify using classical simulations of quantum circuits, obeys a distribution that about 200 seconds to sample one instance of a quantum circuit a million times over. Our benchmark is currently limited by the time taken for state transfer of the quantum supercomputer would take approximately 10,000 years. This dramatic increase in speed compared to all known classical algorithms is an experimental realization of quantum supremacy¹² for this specific computational task, heralding a much-anticipated computing paradigm.


In the early 1980s, Richard Feynman proposed that a quantum computer would be an effective tool with which to solve problems in physics and chemistry, given that it is exponentially costly to simulate large quantum systems on a classical computer. Feynman's proposal poses substantial experimental and theoretical challenges. First, can a quantum system be engineered to perform a computation in a large enough computational Hilbert space and with a low enough error rate to be useful? Second, how can we read out the result of the computation? It is hard for a classical computer but easy for a quantum computer? By applying such benchmark tasks on our superconducting qubit processor, we tackle both questions. Our experimental achievement, a milestone on the path to full-scale quantum computing.

[illegible]

The diagram illustrates the IBM Quantum Development Roadmap from 2019 to 2026+. A central vertical dashed line marks the year 2021, with a callout box stating '올해 127 큐비트 개발 예상' (Expected development of 127 qubits this year). The roadmap is organized into five horizontal tracks: Enterprise Clients, Model developers, Algorithm developers, Kernel developers, and Quantum systems. A yellow dashed box highlights the period from 2021 to 2023, with a goal statement '3년 안에 클라우드 서비스 제공 목표' (Goal to provide cloud services within 3 years) spanning from 2023 to 2026+.

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026+
Enterprise Clients	Use case exploration Problem mapping Skills building		올해 127 큐비트 개발 예상		3년 안에 클라우드 서비스 제공 목표			
Model developers					Quantum model services Natural Sciences Optimization	Finance Machine Learning		
Algorithm developers		Natural Sciences Optimization	Finance Machine Learning		Prebuilt quantum routines	Prebuilt quantum + HPC routines		
Kernel developers	Circuits		Qiskit Runtime	Dynamic circuits	Circuit libraries	Advanced control systems		
Quantum systems	Falcon 27 qubits	Hummingbird 65 qubits	Eagle 127 qubits	Osprey 433 qubits	Condor 1121 qubits	Beyond 1K - 1M+ qubits		
IBM Cloud	Circuits		Programs		Models			

현대 암호의 위기와 차세대 암호 알고리즘




Shor's Algorithm ~


양자 내성 암호!

ECDLP: $Q = aP$

보안 강도와 상관없이 취약성 존재
→ 다른 대안 암호로 교체 필요



Grover's Algorithm



보안강도가 현재의 약 절반으로 감소
→ 키 길이를 2배로 증가하여 보안성 유지

양자 내성 암호 공모전



양자 알고리즘과 양자 내성 암호

- ▶ 양자 알고리즘 → 현대 공개키 암호의 붕괴
- ▶ 새로운 공개키 암호의 필요 → 양자 내성 암호 공모전 (NIST)



양자 내성 암호 공모전



양자 내성 암호 표준화 일정

▶ 초기 계획과 달리 일정이 점차 앞당겨지고 있음

기존 일정	수정된 일정	내용
2017. 11	2017. 11	알고리즘 제안 마감
2018. 04	2018. 04	제안 알고리즘 소개
2018~2019	2018~2019	1차 평가분석 진행 (1차 후보 선정)
2019. 08	2019. 01	1차 선정 결과 발표
2020~2021	2019~2020	2차 평가분석 진행 (2차 후보 선정)
2022~	2020. 07	2차 선정 결과 발표
	2020~2022	3차 평가분석 진행(최종 후보 선정)
	2022~2024	최종 선정 결과 발표 및 표준화

양자 내성 암호 공모전 📌 Round 3 (finalist, alternate)

📌 격자 기반 암호가 가장 큰 관심을 받고 있음

▶ 현재 격자기반 암호 알고리즘이 가장 많이 후보군에 선정됨

종류	구분	Finalist	Alternate	장점	단점
격자	키교환	KYBER, NTRU, SABER	FrodoKEM, NTRU Prime	고속 구현	파라미터 설정 어려움
	서명	DILITHIUM, FALCON	-		
다변수 다항식	키교환	-	-	작은 서명, 고속 구현	큰 키 사이즈
	서명	Rainbow	GeMSS		
해시	키교환	-	-	안전성 증명 가능	큰 서명 사이즈
	서명	-	SPHINCS+		

양자 내성 암호 공모전 Round 3 (finalist, alternate)

종류	구분	Finalist	Alternate	장점	단점
아이소 지니	키교환	-	SIKE	작은 키 사이즈	느린 속도
	서명	-	-		
코드	키교환	Classic McEliece	BIKE, HQC	고속 구현	큰 키 사이즈
	서명	-	-		
영지식	키교환	-	-	number- theoretic 혹은 structured hardness에 기반하지 않음	큰 서명 사이즈
	서명	-	Picnic		

타겟 프로세서



일정한 제한을 두고 양자내성암호 벤치마크를 수행 중에 있음

What NIST wants

2 라운드 주요 관심사

- Performance (hardware+software) will play more of a role
 - More benchmarks
 - For hardware, NIST asks to focus on Cortex M4 (with all options) and Artix-7
 - [pqc-hardware-forum](#)

- Continued research and analysis on **ALL** of the 2nd round candidates

2019년, **NIST**에서는 임베디드 장비에 대한 벤치마크를 요구

- See how submissions fit into applications/protocols. Any constraints?

- STM32F4DISCOVERY
 - ARM Cortex-M4
 - 32-bit ARMv7E-M
 - 192KB RAM, 168 MHz



격자 기반 양자 내성 암호

📌 격자 기반 서명 알고리즘인 Dilithium과 Falcon 중 하나 선정 예정

NIST Status Update on the 3rd Round

Dustin Moody
NIST PQC team

NIST National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

The Signatures

- ▶ The finalists **Dilithium** and **Falcon** are both based on structured lattices
 - ▶ *NIST expects to select at most one for standardization*
- ▶ There are two multivariate schemes: the finalist **Rainbow**, and the alternate **GeMSS**
- ▶ The alternate **Picnic** is based on some symmetric primitives
- ▶ The alternate **SPHINCS+** is based on the security of hash functions

Dilithium 서명 알고리즘 (NIST 3 라운드 finalist)

- 작은 키와 서명 크기를 가지고 있음
- Polynomial ring 상에서 연산: $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^{256} + 1)$, $q = 8380417$
- NTT 연산을 통해 최적화 구현: $a \cdot b = INTT(NTT(a) \cdot NTT(b))$

알고리즘	NIST Level	Public Key [bytes]	Signature [bytes]	Rejection sampling의 예상 반복 횟수
Dilithium2	1	1,184	2,044	5.9
Dilithium3	2	1,472	2,701	6.6
Dilithium4	3	1,760	3,366	4.3

Algorithm 1 Dilithium key generation

Output: Secret key $sk = (\rho, K, tr, s_1, s_2, t_0)$
Output: Public key $pk = (\rho, t_1)$
 1: $\rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$
 2: $K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$
 3: $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow S_\eta^{k \times \ell} \times S_\eta^k$
 4: $\hat{A} \in R_q^{k \times \ell} := \text{ExpandA}(\rho)$
 5: $t := NTT^{-1}(\hat{A} \circ NTT(s_1)) + s_2$
 6: $(t_1, t_0) := \text{Power2Round}(t)$
 7: $tr \in \{0, 1\}^{384} := \mathcal{H}(\rho \| t_1)$

Algorithm 2 Dilithium signature generation


Input: Secret key $sk = (\rho, K, tr, s_1, s_2, t_0)$
Input: Message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$
Output: Signature $\sigma = (z, h, c)$
 1: $\hat{A} \in R_q^{k \times \ell} := \text{ExpandA}(\rho)$
 2: $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^{384} := \mathcal{H}(tr \| M)$
 3: $\kappa := 0; (z, h) = \perp$
 4: $\rho' \in \{0, 1\}^{384} := \mathcal{H}(K \| \mu)$
 5: $\hat{s}_1 := NTT(s_1); \hat{s}_2 := NTT(s_2); \hat{t}_0 := NTT(t_0)$
 6: **while** $(z, h) = \perp$ **do**
 7: $y \in S_{\eta, -1}^{\ell} := \text{ExpandMask}(\rho', \kappa)$
 8: $w := NTT^{-1}(\hat{A} \circ NTT(y))$
 9: $w_1 := \text{HighBits}(w)$
 10: $\hat{c} := NTT(\mathcal{H}_B(\mu \| w_1))$
 11: $z := y + NTT^{-1}(\hat{c} \circ \hat{s}_1)$
 12: $(r_1, r_0) := \text{Decompose}(w - NTT^{-1}(\hat{c} \circ \hat{s}_2))$
 13: **if** $\|z\|_\infty \geq \gamma_1 - \beta$ **or** $\|r_0\|_\infty \geq \gamma_2 - \beta$ **or** $r_1 \neq w_1$ **then**
 14: $(z, h) = \perp$
 15: **else**
 16: $h := \text{MakeHint}(-NTT^{-1}(\hat{c} \circ \hat{t}_0), w - NTT^{-1}(\hat{c} \circ \hat{s}_2) + NTT^{-1}(\hat{c} \circ \hat{t}_0))$
 17: **if** $\|NTT^{-1}(\hat{c} \circ \hat{t}_0)\|_\infty \geq \gamma_2$ **or** $\# 1$'s in $h > \omega$ **then**
 18: $(z, h) = \perp$

Algorithm 3 Dilithium verification

Input: Public key $pk = (\rho, t_1)$
Input: Message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$
Input: Signature $\sigma = (z, h, c)$
Output: Valid or Invalid
 1: $\hat{A} \in R_q^{k \times \ell} := \text{ExpandA}(\rho)$
 2: $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^{384} := \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(\rho \| t_1) \| M)$
 3: $w'_1 := \text{UseHint}(h, NTT^{-1}(\hat{A} \circ NTT(z) - NTT(c) \circ NTT(2^d \cdot t_1)))$
 4: **if** $c = \mathcal{H}_B(\mu \| w'_1)$ **and** $\|z\|_\infty < \gamma_1 - \beta$ **and** $\# 1$'s in $h \leq \omega$ **then**
 5: **return** Valid
 6: **else**
 7: **return** Invalid


ARM Cortex-M3/M4 상에서의 Constant Timing 곱셈 구현

- UMULL $RdHi, RdLo, Rm, Rs \rightarrow RdHi : RdLo := Rm * Rs$
 - unsigned 64-비트 곱셈기 명령어
 - M4에서는 single cycle
 - M3에서는 경우에 따라 다름 \rightarrow Timing Attack 가능



M3 상에서의 Constant Timing 구현

- 64-비트 곱셈기는 **variable timing**
- 대신 32-비트 곱셈기는 **constant timing**
 - Radix 2^{16} 을 이용하여 64-비트 값 표현
 - $a = 2^{16}a_1 + a_0$ 그리고 $b = 2^{16}b_1 + b_0$
($0 \leq a_0, b_0 < 2^{16}$, $-2^{15} \leq a_1, b_1 < 2^{15}$)
 - $ab = 2^{32}a_1b_1 + 2^{16}(a_0b_1 + a_1b_0) + a_0b_0$ ($-2^{31} \leq a_ib_j < 2^{31}$)



M3/M4 상에서의 Constant Timing 구현

Listing 1 CT butterfly from [GKOS18]

```
1 ; q=8380417, qinv=4236238847
2 ; Input: p0, p1, twiddle
3 ; Output: p0, p1
4 umull tmp0, tmp1, p1, twiddle
5 mul  pol1, tmp0, qinv
6 umlal tmp0, tmp1, p1, q
7 add  p1, p0, q, lsl#1
8 sub  p1, p1, tmp1
9 add  p0, p0, tmp1
```

Listing 3 GS butterfly in [GKOS18]

```
1 ; q=8380417, qinv=4236238847
2 ; Input: p0, p1, twiddle
3 ; Output: p0, p1
4 add  tmp0, p0, q, lsl#8
5 sub  tmp0, tmp0, p1
6 add  p0, p0, p1
7 umull tmp1, p1, tmp0, twiddle
8 mul  tmp0, tmp1, qinv
9 umlal tmp1, p1, tmp0, q
```

Listing 2 Our CT butterfly

```
1 ; q=8380417, qinv=4236238847
2 ; Input: p0, p1, twiddle
3 ; Output: p0, p1
4 smull tmp0, tmp1, p1, twiddle
5 mul  p1, tmp0, qinv
6 smlal tmp0, tmp1, p1, q
7 sub  p1, p0, tmp1
8 add  p0, p0, tmp1
```

Listing 4 Our GS butterfly

```
1 ; q=8380417, qinv=4236238847
2 ; Input: p0, p1, twiddle
3 ; Output: p0, p1
4 sub  tmp0, p0, p1
5 add  p0, p0, p1
6 smull tmp1, p1, tmp0, twiddle
7 mul  tmp0, tmp1, qinv
8 smlal tmp1, p1, tmp0, q
```

Listing 5 Schoolbook SMULL (SBSMULL)

```
1 ; Input: a = a0 + a1*2^16
2 ;       b = b0 + b1*2^16
3 ; Output: c = a*b = c0 + c1*2^32
4 mul  c0, a0, b0
5 mul  c1, a1, b1
6 mul  tmp, a1, b0
7 mla  tmp, a0, b1, tmp
8 adds c0, c0, tmp, lsl #16
9 adc  c1, c1, tmp, asr #16
```

Listing 6 Schoolbook SMLAL (SBSMLAL)

```
1 ; Input: a = a0 + a1*2^16
2 ;       b = b0 + b1*2^16
3 ;       c = c0 + c1*2^32
4 ; Output: c = c + a*b
5 ;       = c0 + c1*2^32
6 mul  tmp, a0, b0
7 adds c0, c0, tmp
8 mul  tmp, a1, b1
9 adc  c1, c1, tmp
10 mul tmp, a1, b0
11 mla  tmp, a0, b1, tmp
12 adds c0, c0, tmp, lsl #16
13 adc  c1, c1, tmp, asr #16
```

기존 unsigned를 signed로 변경


M3의 경우 smull/smlal이 variable timing
→ mul과 mla을 통해 constant timing으로 재 구현

- 두 polynomial (a 그리고 b) 에 대한 연산 결과 (c):
 - 1) 입력인자 (a 그리고 b) 를 N 개의 degree-0 polynomials 으로 변환 (Forward transform; NTT).
 - 2) Pointwise multiplication 을 수행
 - 3) Chinese remainder theorem을 통해 본래의 값 복구 (c) (Backward transform; INTT).

Chinese remainder theorem 예시

$$x \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$$

해답 $x = 23 + 105k$, k 는 integer



NTT 수학 (1 / 2)

- Case study (reduction polynomial을 나누기)

$$1) \quad R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^{256} + 1)$$

$$2) \quad (X^{128} - \alpha)(X^{128} + \alpha) = (X^{256} + 1)$$

$$(X^{256} + 1) = (X^{128} - \alpha)(X^{128} + \alpha)$$

$$(X^{256} + 1) = X^{256} + (-\alpha + \alpha)X^{128} - \alpha^2$$

$$1 = -\alpha^2$$

$$\alpha^2 = -1$$

$$\alpha^4 = 1, \alpha = \sqrt[4]{1}$$

(Fourth primitive root of 1)

NTT 수학 (2 / 2)

- Case study (reduction polynomial을 나누기)

$$1) \quad R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^{256} + 1)$$

$$2) \quad (X^{128} - \alpha)(X^{128} + \alpha) = (X^{256} + 1)$$

$$3) \quad (X^{128} + \alpha) = (X^{64} - \gamma)(X^{64} + \gamma)$$

$$(X^{128} + \alpha) = X^{128} + (-\gamma + \gamma)X^{64} - \gamma^2$$

$$(X^{128} - \alpha) = (X^{64} - \beta)(X^{64} + \beta)$$

$$\alpha = -\gamma^2$$

$$(X^{128} - \alpha) = X^{128} + (-\beta + \beta)X^{64} - \beta^2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma &= \sqrt{-\alpha} = \sqrt{(-1) \cdot \alpha} = \sqrt{\alpha^2 \cdot \alpha} = (\sqrt{\alpha})^3 \\ &= (\sqrt{\zeta_4})^3 = \zeta_8 \end{aligned}$$

$$-\alpha = -\beta^2$$

$$\beta = \sqrt{\alpha} = \sqrt{\zeta_4} = \zeta_8$$

ζ_k 는 k -th primitive root of 1, 혹은 수학식은 다음과 같음 ($\zeta_k = \sqrt[k]{1}$).

- Case study (reduction polynomial을 나누기)

$$1) R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^{256} + 1)$$

$$2) (X^{128} - \alpha)(X^{128} + \alpha) = (X^{256} + 1)$$

$$3) (X^{128} + \alpha) = (X^{64} - \delta)(X^{64} + \delta) \quad (X^{128} - \alpha) = (X^{64} - \beta)(X^{64} + \beta)$$

$$4) (X^{256} + 1) = (X^{64} - \zeta_8)(X^{64} + \zeta_8)(X^{64} - \zeta_8^3)(X^{64} + \zeta_8^3)$$

Degree-0 polynomials에 도달할 때까지 나누기

$$5) (X^{256} + 1) = (X - \zeta_{512})(X + \zeta_{512})(X - \zeta_{512}^{129})(X + \zeta_{512}^{129}) \cdots (X - \zeta_{512}^{127})(X + \zeta_{512}^{127})(X - \zeta_{512}^{255})(X + \zeta_{512}^{255})$$

NTT 예시 (2 / 3)

- Case study (reduction polynomial을 나누기)

$$1) \quad a \in Z_q[X]/(X^{256} + 1) \quad \quad \quad \underset{a_L}{(X^{128} - a)} \underset{a_R}{(X^{128} + a)} = (X^{256} + 1)$$

$$2) \quad a_L \in Z_q[X]/(X^{128} - a)$$

$$X^{128} = a$$

$$a_i X^i = a_i a X^{i-128}$$

$$3) \quad a_L = (a_0 + a_{128}a) + (a_1 + a_{129}a)X + (a_2 + a_{130}a)X^2 + \dots$$


유사하게 a_R 에 적용 가능~

$$4) \quad a_R = (a_0 - a_{128}a) + (a_1 - a_{129}a)X + (a_2 - a_{130}a)X^2 + \dots$$

NTT 예시 (3 / 3)


- Case study (reduction polynomial을 나누기)

- Butterfly diagram



Inverse NTT 는 NTT 연산과 유사!

Merging layers (NTT) for M3/M4



프로세서 별 constant-time 구현상세

- M4: 2 layers를 merging 함
- M3: layer들을 merging 하지 않음

Modular Operation: Barret reduction

$$\frac{1}{b} = \frac{(2^k)/b}{b \cdot (2^k)/b} = \frac{(2^k)/b}{2^k} \approx \frac{x}{2^k}$$

$$x = \lfloor 2^k / b \rfloor$$

$k = \log_2(a)$ 근사치를 이용한 modular operation

Input: Two numbers a and b , parameter k , $x = \lfloor \frac{2^k}{b} \rfloor$

Output: $a \pmod{b}$

1 $q \leftarrow (a \times x) \gg k;$

2 $r \leftarrow a - q \times b;$

3 **if** $r \geq b$ **then**

4 $r \leftarrow r - b$

5 **end**

6 **return** r

Modular Operation: Montgomery reduction

- ▶ 2의 배수의 값으로 나누어지도록 숫자를 변환하여 계산
- ▶ z 는 R^2 승수를 가지는 임의의 수를 의미
- ▶ 연산 복잡도는 n 워드 연산 시 $2n^2 + n$ 곱셈 필요

$$\tilde{x} = xR$$

$$Mont(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) = \tilde{x}\tilde{y}R^{-1} \bmod p = xyR \bmod p.$$

$$c \leftarrow \frac{z + (zp' \bmod R)p}{R}, p' = -p^{-1} \bmod R$$

만약 $c \geq p$ 라면 $c \leftarrow c - p$ 수행

z 는 곱셈 결과값, p 는 modulus 값, c 는 reduction 이후 값

Modular Operation: K -Montgomery reduction

- $q = 12289 = 3 \cdot 2^{12} + 1$, 여기서 3을 k 로 설정
- 모듈러가 $q = k \cdot 2^m + 1$ 이고 입력 인자 $0 \leq a, b \leq q$ 인 경우
- $C = a \cdot b \rightarrow 0 \leq C \leq q^2 = k^2 2^{2m} + k 2^{m+1} + 1$
- $C = C_0 + 2^m C_1$ ($0 \leq C_0 \leq 2^m$)
- $0 \leq C_1 = \frac{C - C_0}{2^m} < k^2 2^m + 2k + \frac{1}{2^m} = kq + k + \frac{1}{2^m}$
- $kC \equiv kC_0 - C_1 \pmod{q}, |kC_0 - C_1| < \left(k + \frac{1}{2^m}\right) q$

```
function K-RED( $C$ )  
   $C_0 \leftarrow C \bmod 2^m$   
   $C_1 \leftarrow C / 2^m$   
  return  $kC_0 - C_1$   
end function
```


Modular Operation: K -Montgomery reduction

- 몽고메리 reduction을 통해
격자기반 modulus에 대한
reduction 효율적으로 수행
- $\tilde{x} = x \cdot k^{-1} \bmod p, \tilde{y} = y \cdot k^{-1} \bmod p$
- $K-RED(\tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{y}) \equiv \tilde{x}\tilde{y}k \equiv xy \cdot k^{-1} \pmod{p}$

```
function K-RED( $C$ )  
   $C_0 \leftarrow C \bmod 2^m$   
   $C_1 \leftarrow C/2^m$   
  return  $kC_0 - C_1$   
end function
```