# Detecting Block Opher Encryption for Defense against Orypto Ransomware on Low-end Internet of Things

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
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### Crypto Ransomware

A crypto ransomware encrypts files of victims using block cipher encryption.



1) The hacker requests a ransom for encrypted files from the victim.

- 2) The victim pays the ransom and receives a secret key.
- 3) The victim recovers the encrypted file using a secret key.
- The ransomware virus has became a massive threat of people with digital devices.
  - $\rightarrow$  It is necessary to defend against ransomware.



# Previous Works

| Features | Grobert et al. (2011) | Lestringant et al. (2015) | Kiraz et al. (2017) | This work (2020) |
|----------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Target   | Block & PKC           | Block Cipher              | PKC                 | Block cipher     |
| Analysis | Dynamic               | Static                    | Dynamic             | Static           |
| Method   | Heuristics            | Data graph flow           | System monitor      | Deep learning    |
| Machine  | Desktop               | Desktop                   | Desktop             | Microcontroller  |



### Proposed Method




#### 1. Crypto ransomware

Cryptographic process



- Binary file
- Instruction, Opcode






#### 3. Deep learning based detection of block cipher encryption

- Learning the encryption pattern through images
- Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)


#### 4. Low-end 8-bit AVR microcontrollers

- 8-bit AVR ATmega128
- Lightweight block cipher library and general firmware
- GNU AVR-GCC compiler





### Proposed Method



# Convert instruction and opcode into image









Image from binary




## Deep learning





## Training phase

- Repeat convolution and max pooling operation
  - convolution : feature extraction
  - max pooling : feature enhancement
  - ➤ Learning the operation types and patterns of the encryption process




Feature extraction and enhancement



### Ransomware detection phase

- Detecting block cipher encryption for defense against crypto ransomware
  - 1. algorithm: AES, PRESENT ··· HIGHT, LEA, general firmware
  - 2. architecture : SPN, ARX, general firmware
  - > Classified as the label with the highest probability





### Model and Hyper parameters

- Inception-v3 (pretrained weights) + 3 fully connected layers
  - → To adjust the classication problem
- Categorical crossentropy and Softmax
  - → Multi-class classification
- Set the optimal hyper parameter through grid search.

**Table 2.** Deep learning training hyperparameters.

| Hyperparameters  | Descriptions             | Hyperparameters                  | Descriptions  |
|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| pretrained model | Inception-v3             | epochs                           | 20            |
| loss function    | categorical crossentropy | steps per epoch                  | 10            |
| optimizer        | RMSprop(lr=0.001)        | batch size                       | 5             |
| active function  | ReLu, Softmax            | train, validation and test ratio | 0.7, 0.2, 0.1 |

### Dataset

#### Block cipher

Cryptographic modules written in C language among implementations of FELICS (Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic System)

#### General firmware

From AVR packages

#### On 8-bit AVR ATmega128

#### Unbalanced dataset

macro and micro average

**Table 3.** Dataset (block ciphers and general firmware).

| Architecture | Descriptions of programs               |
|--------------|--|
| SPN          | AES, RECTANGLE, PRESENT, PRIDE, PRINCE |
| ARX          | HIGHT, LEA, RC5, SIMON, SPECK, SPARX   |
| General      | Bluetooth, GPS, WiFi, RFID, XBee, etc. |


<sup>\*</sup>FELICS: Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic System



### **Dataset**


• SPN has a more complicated structure than ARX.

 Images differ depending on the type or pattern of instructions used.



### Instruction-based vs Opcode-based

The opcode is same, but the operand is slightly different.



<sup>\*</sup>instruction (operand + opcode)



### Instruction-based vs Opcode-based

#### Opcode-based

#### Stable performance for untrained data

- $\rightarrow$  The standard deviation for micro and macro is 0.12.
- → The standard deviation of the metrics for each experiment is also less opcode based.

**Table 4.** Validation and test on instruction and opcode.

|             |           |       | Valid     | lation |       |       |           | Т     | est       |       |        |       |  |  |  |  |
|-------------|-----------|-------|-----------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|--------|-------|--|--|--|--|
| Target      | F-measure |       | precision |        | rec   | call  | F-measure |       | precision |       | recall |       |  |  |  |  |
|             | micro     | macro | micro     | macro  | micro | macro | micro     | macro | micro     | macro | micro  | macro |  |  |  |  |
| Instruction | 0.91      | 0.84  | 0.91      | 0.87   | 0.91  | 0.95  | 0.80      | 0.60  | 0.80      | 0.60  | 0.80   | 0.60  |  |  |  |  |
| Opcode      | 0.96      | 0.93  | 0.96      | 0.92   | 0.96  | 0.94  | 0.77      | 0.58  | 0.77      | 0.59  | 0.77   | 0.60  |  |  |  |  |

<sup>\*</sup>F-measure: a harmonic mean of precision and recall



<sup>\*</sup>micro: considering the number of data belonging to each class (for each data)

<sup>\*</sup>macro: considering all classes with the same weight (for label)

# GCC optimization option (CO, O1, CO2)

- The extracted opcode is slightly different depending on the optimization option.
- **O**: Best performance for validation dataset, but not best for test dataset
- **0** : Stable and best generalization performance for test dataset (untrained data)

**Table 5.** Validation and test on GCC optimization options.

|     |                     |       | valid | ation  |       |           |       | $\mathrm{t}\epsilon$ | est   |        |       |       |
|-----|---------------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-----------|-------|----------------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| Op. | F-measure precision |       | ision | recall |       | F-measure |       | precision            |       | recall |       |       |
|     | micro               | macro | micro | macro  | micro | macro     | micro | macro                | micro | macro  | micro | macro |
| 00  | 0.96                | 0.93  | 0.96  | 0.92   | 0.96  | 0.94      | 0.77  | 0.58                 | 0.77  | 0.59   | 0.77  | 0.60  |
| 01  | 0.90                | 0.81  | 0.90  | 0.80   | 0.90  | 0.85      | 0.85  | 0.79                 | 0.85  | 0.82   | 0.85  | 0.81  |
| 02  | 0.92                | 0.89  | 0.92  | 0.90   | 0.92  | 0.9       | 0.81  | 0.67                 | 0.81  | 0.69   | 0.81  | 0.68  |

## Frequently used instructions for each architecture

#### • SPN

S-box operation  $\rightarrow$  the pattern of LD – XOR – ST, memory access (LD, ST)

#### • ARX

Addition, Rotation, and eXclusive-or (arithmetic and logical operations) → ADD, XOR, SUB

#### General

interrupt function, I/O register, branch statements → RJMP, BNE, CP

**Table 6.** Frequently used instructions for each architecture.

| Architecture |    | Ordered by frequency in program |     |     |     |     |     |      |  |  |  |  |
|--------------|----|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|--|--|--|--|
|              | 1  | 2                               | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   | 8    |  |  |  |  |
| SPN          | LD | ST                              | MOV | XOR | ADD | SUB | AND | SWAP |  |  |  |  |
| ARX          | LD | ADD                             | XOR | MOV | ST  | SUB | ROR | RJMP |  |  |  |  |
| General      | LD | RJMP                            | BNE | CP  | OUT | NOP | MOV | SEI  |  |  |  |  |

### SPNvs ARX vs General

- Cryptographic algorithms of the same architecture have similar patterns.
  - → incorrect classification between algorithms with the same architecture
- Classification for each architecture (SPN, ARX and General firmware, not each algorithm) achieved better performance.
- It accurately predicted test data in optimization option **O**l.

**Table 7.** Validation and test depending on architectures (SPN, ARX, or general).

|     |             | validation |           |       |        |       |       |        | test  |       |        |       |  |  |
|-----|-------------|------------|-----------|-------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|--|--|
| Op. | . F-measure |            | precision |       | recall |       | F-me  | easure | prec  | ision | recall |       |  |  |
|     | micro       | macro      | micro     | macro | micro  | macro | micro | macro  | micro | macro | micro  | macro |  |  |
| 00  | 0.99        | 0.99       | 0.99      | 0.99  | 0.99   | 0.99  | 0.94  | 0.91   | 0.94  | 0.91  | 0.94   | 0.95  |  |  |
| 01  | 1.00        | 1.00       | 1.00      | 1.00  | 1.00   | 1.00  | 1.00  | 1.00   | 1.00  | 1.00  | 1.00   | 1.00  |  |  |
| 02  | 1.00        | 1.00       | 1.00      | 1.00  | 1.00   | 1.00  | 0.98  | 0.99   | 0.98  | 0.99  | 0.98   | 0.99  |  |  |

### Conclusion

#### Contribution

Deep learning based crypto ransomware detection for low-end microcontrollers

Experiments with several options for high accuracy

#### • Future work

Test and evaluate our method using the real ransomware samples.

# Q&A

