

# Quantum Implementation of Encoding Algorithm for HQC

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**Introduction**


**Background**

**Proposed Method**

**Conclusion**

# Introduction

- The security of current encryption systems is being threatened by quantum algorithms.
- As a result, NIST organized the **Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization competition**.
- To establish a **quantum-resistant cryptographic system**,
  - It is essential to implement **quantum circuits to reassess the security** of cryptographic algorithms.
- In light of this, our paper focuses on **optimizing the quantum circuit implementation technique for HQC**,
  - One of the candidate algorithms in **NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Round 4**.



The screenshot shows the NIST Information Technology Laboratory Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) website. The main heading is "PQC Standardization Process: Announcing Four Candidates to be Standardized, Plus Fourth Round Candidates". Below this, the section "PQC Fourth Round Candidate Key-Establishment Mechanisms (KEMs)" states that the following candidate KEM algorithms will advance to the fourth round:

Public-Key Encryption/KEMs
BIKE
Classic McEliece
HQC
SIKE

Annotations on the table:

- A blue box highlights BIKE, Classic McEliece, and HQC, with the label "Code-based cryptographic algorithms" to the right.
- An orange box highlights SIKE, with the label "Isogeny based cryptographic algorithms" to the right.
- A red checkmark is placed next to HQC.

# Background

- **HQC(Hamming Quasi-Cyclic)**
  - **Code-based cryptography** (**Hamming codes** with randomly generated **Quasi-Cyclic codes**).
  - **Quasi-Cyclic** ensures that certain relationships cycle within the matrix, optimizing operations.
    - It is possible to know the entire matrix by **only storing the first row**, efficiently **reducing the key size**.
  - The **PKE** version of HQC consists of three main processes
    - *key generation* ( $sk = (x, y)$ ), *encryption (encoding)* ( $ct = (u, v)$ ), and *decryption (decoding)*.
  - Decoding is impossible because **the error  $e$**  added during encryption is **very large**
    - But only the user who has **the secret key** can easily decode by reducing  $e$
  - Decoding may fail with probability, but in the HQC paper, the authors demonstrate through a detailed and precise mathematical analysis that the **probability of failure is negligibly low** → **offer high security**

# Proposed Method

- In this paper, due to the imperfect implementation of  $u$  and  $v$  used as ciphertext
  - They are separately implemented and the separated resources are estimated.
    - $u \leftarrow r_1 + hr_2$
    - $v \leftarrow mG + sr_2 + e$
- HQC- 128, operations are carried out in the binary field of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{17668}}$ .
- Due to the limitations of quantum simulation, we implement the quantum circuit by **reducing**  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}(\mathbb{F}_{2^{17668}} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^{12}})$ 
  - Primitive polynomial :  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}} / (x^{11} + x^{10} + x^9 + \dots + x + 1)$  (Derived from  $(X^n - 1) / (X - 1)$ )
- In the operation  $m \cdot G$ , a shortened **Reed-Solomon** code is utilized in the binary field of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ .
  - Primitive polynomial :  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8} / (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x^1)$

# Proposed Method

- **Multiplication**

- We apply **WISA'22 [Jang et al.] multiplication**

- optimized with a **Toffoli depth of one** for any field size.

- WISA'22[Jang et al.] multiplication

- Using the **Karatsuba algorithm recursively** and allocating additional ancilla qubits.

- All the AND operations become independent and the operations of **all Toffoli gates in parallel.**

- The allocated ancilla qubits can be **reused** through **reverse operations.**

# Proposed Method

- **Addition**

- Addition is same as XOR operation in modular operations.

→ Only CNOT gate

- Using these **binary field operations**

→ We can calculate  $u \leftarrow r_1 + hr_2$ ,  $v \leftarrow mG + sr_2 + e$

Table 1: Required quantum resources for Binary Field Operations

Field	Arithmetic	Qubits	#CNOT	#Toffoli	Toffoli depth	Full depth
$\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$	Multiplication	81	164	27	1	26
$\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$	Addition	24	12	-	-	1
	Multiplication	162	495	54	1	32

Table 2: Required quantum resources for implementing  $u \leftarrow r_1 + h \cdot r_2$

Field	Operation	Qubits	#CNOT	#Toffoli	Toffoli depth	Full depth
$\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$	$u(r_1 + h \cdot r_2)$	174	507	54	1	33

# Proposed Method

- **Shortened Reed-Solomon algorithm**

- The operation  $\mathbf{m} \cdot \mathbf{G}$  involves more than simple multiplication
  - and one of the method used for this operation is **Shortened Reed-Solomon**.
  - $v \leftarrow \mathbf{mG} + sr_2 + e$
- In this algorithm, the crucial operation involves binary field operations
  - multiply the **coefficient matrix** of the publicly available **RS-S1 polynomial** by the message vector.
- The constant values used in the algorithm are denoted as

<i>constant</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>N1</i>
<i>values</i>	16	31	46



# Proposed Method

- **Shortened Reed-Solomon algorithm**
  - Using WISA'22 multiplication
    - optimized with a **Toffoli-depth of 1**
  - The function *Copy\_gate\_value* involves copying the *gate\_value*
    - 30 subsequent multiplications **in parallel**.
  - **All multiplication with a Toffoli-depth of 1 by parallelization.**
  - Because it repeated 16, Total Toffoli-depth is 16.

Table 3: Required quantum resources for Shortened Reed-Solomon quantum circuit implementation

shortened Reed-Solomon	Qubits	#CNOT	#Toffoli	Toffoli depth	Full depth
HQC-128	28,696	94,320	12,960	16	545

Algorithm 2 Quantum circuit implementation of shortened Reed-Solomon.

**Input:** 8-qubit array  $msg[K]$ ,  $RS\_POLY[G-1]$ ,  $cdw[N1]$ ,  $gate\_value$ ,  $copy[G-2]$ ,  $ancilla$  qubits array  $ac[30]$

**Output:**  $cdw$

```

1: for  $i = 0$  to  $G-1$  do
2:    $RS\_POLY[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(RS\_COEFS, RS\_POLY[i])$ 
3: end for
4: for  $i = 0$  to  $K$  do
5:    $gate\_value[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(cdw[N1-K-1], gate\_value[i])$ 
6:    $gate\_value[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(msg[K-1-i], gate\_value[i])$ 
7:   for  $j = 0$  to  $G-2$  do
8:      $copy[j] \leftarrow Copy\_gate\_value(gate\_value[i], copy[j])$ 
9:   end for
10:   $tmp[0] \leftarrow Multiplication(gate\_value[i], RS\_POLY[0], ac[0])$ 
11:  for  $j = 1$  to  $G-1$  do
12:     $tmp[j] \leftarrow Multiplication(copy[i], RS\_POLY[j], ac[j])$ 
13:  end for
14:  for  $j = N1-K-1$  to  $0$  do
15:     $cdw[j] \leftarrow CNOT8(cdw[j-1], cdw[j])$ 
16:     $cdw[j] \leftarrow CNOT8(tmp[j], cdw[j])$ 
17:  end for
18:   $cdw[0] \leftarrow CNOT8(tmp[0], cdw[0])$ 
19:  for  $j = 0$  to  $G-2$  do
20:     $copy[j] \leftarrow Copy\_gate\_value(gate\_value[i], copy[j])$ 
21:  end for
22: end for
23: for  $i = 0$  to  $K$  do
24:    $cdw[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(msg[i], cdw[i+30])$ 
25: end for
26: return  $cdw$ 

```

# Proposed Method

- **Shortened Reed-Solomon algorithm**
  - We utilize the **reverse** operation (Line 19-21 in Algorithm 2)
    - To **reuse** the qubit array ( $copy[j]$ ),
  - The reverse operation employs only **CNOT gates**
    - With **minimal impact on full depth**
  - The **CNOT gates** of reverse operation are further **parallelized**
    - **resulting in an even more smaller impact on the full depth.**

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**Input:** 8-qubit array  $msg[K]$ ,  $RS\_POLY[G-1]$ ,  $cdw[N1]$ ,  $gate\_value$ ,  $copy[G-2]$ , *ancilla* qubits array  $ac[30]$

**Output:**  $cdw$

```

1: for  $i = 0$  to  $G - 1$  do
2:    $RS\_POLY[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(RS\_COEFS, RS\_POLY[i])$ 
3: end for
4: for  $i = 0$  to  $K$  do
5:    $gate\_value[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(cdw[N1 - K - 1], gate\_value[i])$ 
6:    $gate\_value[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(msg[K - 1 - i], gate\_value[i])$ 
7:   for  $j = 0$  to  $G - 2$  do
8:      $copy[j] \leftarrow Copy\_gate\_value(gate\_value[i], copy[j])$ 
9:   end for
10:   $tmp[0] \leftarrow Multiplication(gate\_value[i], RS\_POLY[0], ac[0])$ 
11:  for  $j = 1$  to  $G - 1$  do
12:     $tmp[j] \leftarrow Multiplication(copy[i], RS\_POLY[j], ac[j])$ 
13:  end for
14:  for  $j = N1 - K - 1$  to  $0$  do
15:     $cdw[j] \leftarrow CNOT8(cdw[j - 1], cdw[j])$ 
16:     $cdw[j] \leftarrow CNOT8(tmp[j], cdw[j])$ 
17:  end for
18:   $cdw[0] \leftarrow CNOT8(tmp[0], cdw[0])$ 
19:  for  $j = 0$  to  $G - 2$  do
20:     $copy[j] \leftarrow Copy\_gate\_value(gate\_value[i], copy[j])$ 
21:  end for
22: end for
23: for  $i = 0$  to  $K$  do
24:    $cdw[i] \leftarrow CNOT8(msg[i], cdw[i + 30])$ 
25: end for
26: return  $cdw$ 

```

# Conclusion

- In this paper, we propose a quantum circuit implementation for the core operations involving **binary field arithmetic** and shortened **Reed-Solomon code** in the **encoding process** of the HQC PKE version, **a fourth-round candidate algorithm in the NIST competition**.
  - It is expected that the presented quantum circuit will contribute to **the security analysis of HQC**.
- In the future, we plan to **complete the encoding** operations by implementing other operations.
- We will also implement the **key generation** and **decoding** to complete **the entire quantum circuit of HQC**.
- We plan to adjust the range for **feasible simulations** and **expand the binary field** to maximum extent.

Q & A