ORACLES AND CHOICE SEQUENCES FOR TYPE-THEORETIC PRAGMATICS

CMU POP SEMINAR

Jon Sterling October 8, 2015

joint work with Darryl McAdams

INTRODUCTION

[A woman walked in.]] vartriangle (∑ $p \in Woman$) WalkedIn(p)

[[A woman walked in. She sat down]]



[A woman walked in. She sat down]
$$\nabla$$

$$(\Sigma x \in (\Sigma p \in Woman) \ WalkedIn(p)) \ SatDown(???)$$

INTRODUCING require

```
[A woman walked in. She sat down] \nabla (\Sigma x \in (\Sigma p \in Woman) \ WalkedIn(p)) \ SatDown(???)
```

INTRODUCING require

[A woman walked in. She sat down]

 $(\Sigma x \in (\Sigma p \in Woman) \ WalkedIn(p))$ require y : Woman in SatDown(y)

THE require ORACLE: STATICS

require — FORMAL RULES

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require : (0;1) (operator)
require x : A in N \neq \text{require}(A; x.N) (notation)
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require — FORMAL RULES

require: (0;1) (operator)

require
$$x : A$$
 in $N \triangleq \text{require}(A; x.N)$ (notation)

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M \in A \quad \Gamma, x : A \vdash N \in B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{require } x : A \text{ in } N \in B}$$
 (require)

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What we want:

```
(\Sigma x \in (\Sigma p \in Woman) \ WalkedIn(p)) \ \mathbf{require} \ y : Woman \ \mathbf{in} \ SatDown(y) \sim (\Sigma x \in (\Sigma p \in Woman) \ WalkedIn(p)) \ SatDown(\pi_1(x))
```

require—NAÏVE DYNAMICS

$$\underline{M \in A \quad [M/x] \ N \Downarrow N'} \\
\mathbf{require} \ x : A \ \mathbf{in} \ N \Downarrow N'$$
(??)

[The President ran a marathon]

∇

[The President ran a marathon]

▽

require x: President in $(\Sigma y \in Marathon) Ran(x; y)$

require x : *President* in $(\Sigma y \in Marathon) Ran(x; y) <math>\downarrow$

```
require x: President in (\Sigma y \in Marathon) Ran(x; y)
\downarrow \qquad \qquad (\Sigma y \in Marathon) Ran(Obama; y)
```

A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE

[The unicorn ran a marathon]

∇

A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE

[The unicorn ran a marathon]

 ∇

require x : *Unicorn* **in** $(\Sigma y \in Marathon) Ran(x; y)$

A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE

 \llbracket The unicorn ran a marathon \rrbracket \lnot require x: Unicorn in (Σy ∈ Marathon) Ran(x; y)

(not a proposition)

IS require COMPUTATIONALLY EFFECTIVE?	

1. judgments shall be local / sensitive to knowledge

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- 2. non-determinism must be eliminated

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(Thanks Stefan, Umut, Bill & Bob!)



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Corollary

The meaning of a judgment \mathscr{J} must be explained in terms of its forcing condition, $w + \mathscr{J}$, for any stage/world w.

REMARK ON DECIDABILITY

•••

2. at a point in time, the subject knows whether or not it has experienced a judgment (decidability)

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Remark

Contra Dummett, I <u>by no means</u> take the above as requiring that the following shall be true in a constructive metatheory, <u>divorced from time</u>:

$$\forall w. \forall \mathcal{J}. (w \Vdash \mathcal{J}) \lor \neg (w \Vdash \mathcal{J})$$
 (Dummett's infelicity)

The above is impossible in a Beth model.



logical consequence ⇒ semantic consequence

Brouwer?, Martin-Löf, Sundholm ⇒ Brouwer?, Heyting, Allen, Zeilberger

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proof conditions ⇒ assertion conditions

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global meaning explanation \Rightarrow local meaning explanation

Husserl, Dummett, Martin-Löf ⇒ Brouwer, Beth, Kripke, Grothendieck, Lawvere, Joyal

assertion acts (judgments) are intensional (local)

$$|_{x} \mathcal{J}(x)$$

(general judgment)

$$I_x \mathcal{J}(x)$$
 (general judgment)
 $\mathcal{J}_2 (\mathcal{J}_1)$ (hypothetical judgment)

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 $M \Downarrow N$ (evaluation)

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A type	(typehood)
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A true	(truth)

$ _{x} \mathcal{J}(x)$	(general judgment)
\mathcal{J}_2 (\mathcal{J}_1)	(hypothetical judgment)
$M \Downarrow N$	(evaluation)
A type	(typehood)
A verif	(verification)
A true	(truth)
$M = N \in A$	(membership)

$w \Vdash _{x} \mathcal{J}(x)$	(general judgment)
$w \Vdash \mathcal{J}_2 (\mathcal{J}_1)$	(hypothetical judgment)
$w \Vdash M \Downarrow N$	(evaluation)
$w \Vdash A \ type$	(typehood)
$w \Vdash A \ verif$	(verification)
$w \Vdash A \ true$	(truth)
$w\Vdash M=N\in A$	(membership)

SEMANTICS OF HIGHER-ORDER ASSERTIONS

$$w \Vdash |_{x} \mathcal{J}(x)$$

 $w \Vdash \mathcal{J}_{2} (\mathcal{J}_{1})$

(general judgment) (hypothetical judgment)

SEMANTICS OF HIGHER-ORDER ASSERTIONS

$$w \Vdash |_{x} \mathcal{J}(x) \iff \forall u \geq w. \forall x \in \mathcal{D}_{u}. \ u \Vdash \mathcal{J}(x)$$

$$w \Vdash \mathcal{J}_{2} (\mathcal{J}_{1}) \iff \forall u \geq w. \ u \Vdash \mathcal{J}_{1} \Rightarrow u \Vdash \mathcal{J}_{2}$$

SEMANTICS OF HIGHER-ORDER ASSERTIONS

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where ${\mathscr D}$ is the (pre)sheaf of constructions that have been effected so far

a statement is constructively valid if it is forced at all nodes

Intuitionism subsumes constructivism, but goes much further by allowing the observation of non-constructive objects (Fourman)

THE MEANING OF A PROPOSITION

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For a type A, implicit in the explanation of $w \Vdash A \ verif$ is a \mathbb{W} -indexed family of PERs $\mathscr{V}\llbracket A \rrbracket_w \subseteq \mathscr{D}_w \times \mathscr{D}_w$ whose members reflect the computational content (extension) of verification acts.

INTUITIONISTIC SEMANTICS OF TRUTH

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In the model, this corresponds to the inevitability of verification (i.e. a <u>bar</u>, in which verification occurs at all nodes):

 $w \Vdash A \ true \iff \exists \mathfrak{B} \ \mathbf{bars} \ w. \forall u \in \mathfrak{B}. \ u \Vdash A \ verif \quad \text{(due to Dummett)}$

MEMBERSHIP AS REFLECTION ON TRUTH

The analytic judgments of type theory are reflections on mathematical activity.

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1. Canonical membership reflects verification

$$\mathcal{V}[\![A]\!]_w(M,N) \bowtie w \Vdash A \ verif$$

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$$w \Vdash M = N \in A \bowtie w \Vdash A true$$

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- 1. Canonical membership reflects verification
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$$\land \left\{ \begin{array}{l} w \Vdash M \Downarrow M' \\ w \Vdash N \Downarrow N' \\ \mathscr{V} \llbracket A \rrbracket_{w} (M', N') \end{array} \right\} \bowtie \exists \mathfrak{B} \text{ bars } w. \forall u \in \mathfrak{B}. \ u \Vdash A \ verif$$

CHOICE SEQUENCES AND THE CREATING SUBJECT

choice sequences (streams of objects) may be propounded over time based on the previous experience of the creating subject.

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Example:

$$\alpha(i) = \begin{cases} 0 & i \Vdash A \ true \\ 1 & \neg(i \Vdash A \ true) \end{cases}$$
 (KS)

THE JUSTIFICATIONS PRESHEAF

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We now can give a precise, but non-deterministic, dynamics to **require**:

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Let \mathscr{K}_A : **FinSet**^{Wop} be the presheaf of constructions of A true effected "so far" for each canonical proposition A.

We now can give a precise, but non-deterministic, dynamics to **require**:

$$\frac{w \Vdash A \Downarrow A' \quad M \in \mathcal{X}_{A'}(w) \quad w \Vdash [M/x] N \Downarrow N'}{w \Vdash \text{require } x : A \text{ in } N \Downarrow N'}$$
 (*)

ELIMINATING NON-DETERMINISM WITH A SPREAD

We need a way to deterministically choose a representative of $\mathcal{K}_A(w)$. First, let \varkappa_A be the choice sequence of lists given by enumerating $\mathcal{K}_A(w)$ at each stage w, in order of time.

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Idea: reformulate Type Theory relative to a choice sequence of "choosers".

A spread direction \mathfrak{S} is a restriction on choice sequences which is defined by a condition on their finite approximations (prefixes, neighborhoods), subject to the following laws:

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$$|_{\vec{u},m} \mathfrak{S}(\vec{u}) \left(\mathfrak{S}(\vec{u} - m) \right)$$

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$$|_{\vec{u},m} \mathfrak{S}(\vec{u}) (\mathfrak{S}(\vec{u} \sim m))$$

3. a neighborhood may always be refined within the spread

$$|_{\vec{u}} \Im(\vec{u} - m) (\Im(\vec{u}))$$



A CONSERVATIVE EXTENSION OF TYPE THEORY

A spread direction for index-choosers:

$$\frac{\Xi(\vec{u}) \quad |_{n} \, \rho(n) < n \, (n \in \mathbb{N}^{+})}{\Xi(\vec{u} - \rho)} \qquad \text{(spread law)}$$

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Reformulate type theory relative to an arbitrary $\alpha \in \mathfrak{S}$! For instance:

$$\frac{w \Vdash M \Downarrow_{\alpha} M' \quad w \Vdash N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N' \quad \mathcal{V}[\![A]\!]_{w}^{\alpha}(M',N')}{w \Vdash M = N \in_{\alpha} A}$$

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 (spread law)

Reformulate type theory relative to an arbitrary $\alpha \in \mathfrak{S}$! For instance:

$$\frac{M \Downarrow_{\alpha} M' \quad N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N' \quad \mathcal{V} \llbracket A \rrbracket^{\alpha} \left(M', N' \right)}{M = N \in_{\alpha} A}$$

require — DYNAMICS

Deterministic choice for \varkappa_A :

$$\frac{w \Vdash A \Downarrow_{\alpha} A' \quad |\varkappa_{A'}(w)| = \ell \quad \operatorname{hd}(\alpha)(\ell) = i \quad \varkappa_{A'}(w)(i) = M}{w \Vdash \varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M}$$

require — DYNAMICS

Deterministic choice for \varkappa_A :

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Deterministic dynamics for require:

$$\frac{\varkappa_{A}\ni_{\alpha} M \quad [M/x]N \Downarrow_{\mathsf{tl}(\alpha)} N'}{\mathsf{require} \ x : A \ \mathsf{in} \ N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \qquad (\mathsf{for} \ \alpha \in \mathfrak{S})$$

VALIDITY OF THE REQUIRE RULE

Theorem

The following rule is valid in our semantics:

$$\frac{A \ true_{\alpha} \quad x: A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B}{\mathbf{require} \ x: A \ \mathbf{in} \ N \in_{\alpha} B} \ require$$

 $\frac{A \ true_{\alpha} \quad x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B}{\mathbf{require} \ x : A \ \mathbf{in} \ N \in_{\alpha} B} \ require$

$$\overline{A \ true_{\alpha}} \ \mathcal{D} \qquad \overline{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \ \mathcal{E}$$

 $\overline{\mathbf{require}\ x : A\ \mathbf{in}\ N \in_{\alpha} B} \ require$

$$\overline{A \ true_{\alpha}} \ \mathcal{D} \qquad \overline{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \ \mathcal{E}$$

 $\frac{\overline{\text{require } x : A \text{ in } N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \quad \overline{\mathscr{V}[\![B]\!]^{\alpha}(N', N')}}{\text{require } x : A \text{ in } N \in_{\alpha} B} \quad require$

$$\overline{A \; true_{\alpha}} \; \mathcal{D} \qquad \overline{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \; \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{ \underset{\alpha}{\overline{\mathbb{Z}}_{A}} \ni_{\alpha} \overset{\mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{M}} \quad \overline{[M/x]N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}}{\mathbf{require} \ x : A \ \mathbf{in} \ N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \quad \overline{\mathscr{V}[B]^{\alpha} (N', N')}}{\mathbf{require} \ x : A \ \mathbf{in} \ N \in_{\alpha} B} \ require$$

$$\overline{A \; true_{\alpha}} \; \mathcal{D} \qquad \overline{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \; \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\sqrt{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}}{\frac{\varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} \mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{m}} \underbrace{\frac{[M/x]N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}{\mathcal{V}[B]^{\alpha} (N', N')}}_{\mathbf{require} \ x : A \ \mathbf{in} \ N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \underbrace{\frac{\mathbb{E}[B]^{\alpha} (N', N')}{\mathbb{E}[B]^{\alpha} (N', N')}}_{\mathbf{require} \ \mathbf{m}} \text{ require}$$

$$\frac{1}{A \; true_{\alpha}} \; \mathcal{D} \qquad \frac{\overline{|y_{,z} \; [y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \; \left(y = z \in_{\alpha} A\right)}}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \; \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\sqrt{A \operatorname{true}_{\alpha}}}{A \operatorname{true}_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}}{\underset{\mathbf{require}}{\times} x : A \operatorname{in} N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \underbrace{\mathcal{V}[B]^{\alpha}(N', N')}_{require} x : A \operatorname{in} N \in_{\alpha} B}$$
 require

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \frac{\overline{|y_{,z}[y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A)}}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \mathcal{F}$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{[M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)}}{\mathbb{F}(M,M)} \frac{\mathcal{F}(M,M)}{M \in_{\alpha} A}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\sqrt{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}}{\frac{\varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M}{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}} \frac{[M/x]N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}{\mathcal{V}[B]^{\alpha}(N', N')}$$

$$\frac{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \in_{\alpha} B}{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \in_{\alpha} B}$$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \frac{\overline{|y_{,z} [y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A)}}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B}}{\underline{[M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)}} \mathcal{F}(M, M) \frac{\overline{x_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M}}{M \in_{\alpha} A}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\sqrt[]{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}}{\frac{\varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M}{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \ \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}} \frac{}{\mathcal{V} \llbracket B \rrbracket^{\alpha} (N', N')} \\ \frac{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \ \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \in_{\alpha} B} \text{require}$$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \frac{1}{y,z} [y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A) \mathcal{F}$$

$$x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}$$

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 $\frac{A \ true_{\alpha}}{\varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M} \frac{[M/x]N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}{[M/x]N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \frac{}{\mathscr{V}[B]^{\alpha}(N',N')} \frac{}{\text{require } x : A \text{ in } N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \text{require}$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \frac{\overline{|y_{,z}[y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A)}}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \mathcal{E}$$

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$$\frac{\overline{|M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)}}{[M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B} \mathcal{F}(M, M) \frac{\overline{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{M \in_{\alpha} A}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\sqrt{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}}{\frac{\varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M}{\text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}} \frac{[M/x]N \Downarrow_{\alpha} N'}{\mathcal{V}[B]^{\alpha}(N', N')} \text{require } x : A \ \text{in } N \in_{\alpha} B$$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \ \mathscr{D} \qquad \frac{1}{y_{,z} \ [y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A)}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \ \mathscr{E}$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{[M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)} \ \mathscr{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{\frac{\sqrt{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{\varkappa_{A} \ni_{\alpha} M}}{M \in_{\alpha} A}$$

$$\frac{\overline{[M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B}}{[M/x]N \downarrow_{\alpha} N'}$$

$$\frac{\overline{A \ true_{\alpha}}}{\mathbb{F}(M,M)} \qquad \frac{\overline{[M/x]N \downarrow_{\alpha} N'}}{\mathbb{F}[B]^{\alpha} (N',N')}$$

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$$x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B$$

$$\frac{A \ true_{\alpha}}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D}$$

$$\frac{[M/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)}{[M/x]N \notin_{\alpha} N'} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{A}{M} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \mathcal{F}(M,M)$$

$$\frac{[M/x]N \downarrow_{\alpha} N'}{[M/x]N \downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \mathcal{F}(M,M)$$

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$$\frac{1}{|M/x|N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{1}{|M/x|N \in_{\alpha} A} \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{1}{|M/x|N \downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \mathcal{F} \qquad \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{1}{|M/x|N \in_{\alpha} A} \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{1}{|M/x|N \downarrow_{\alpha} N'} \mathcal{F} \qquad \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \mathcal{F}($$

require x : A in $N \in_{\alpha} B$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \qquad \frac{1}{y_{,z} [y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A)}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \mathcal{E}$$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \qquad \frac{1}{A \ t$$

require x : A in $N \in_{\alpha} B$

$$\frac{1}{A \ true_{\alpha}} \mathcal{D} \qquad \frac{1}{|y_{,z}[y/x]N = [z/x]N \in_{\alpha} B \ (y = z \in_{\alpha} A)}{x : A \vdash_{\alpha} N \in B} \mathcal{F}$$

$$\frac{1}{|M/x|N \in_{\alpha} B \ (M \in_{\alpha} A)} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{1}{|M/x|^{2}} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{1}{|M/x|^{2}} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{1}{|M/x|^{2}} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \frac{1}{|M/x|^{2}} \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad \mathcal{F}(M,M) \qquad$$

require x : A in $N \in_{\alpha} B$



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