

# Perfect Secrecy and One Time Pad Notes

Songyue Wang (sywang@cs.hku.hk)  
HKU-COMP3357  
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## 1 Perfect Secrecy

### 1.1 Definition of Perfect Secrecy

An encryption scheme  $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  with message space  $M$  is perfectly secret if for every probability distribution over  $M$ , every message  $m \in M$ , and every ciphertext  $c \in C$  for which  $\Pr[C = c] > 0$ :

$$\Pr[M = m | C = c] = \Pr[M = m] \quad (1)$$

For an adversary with **unlimited computational power**, the ciphertext **does not leak any** information about the underlying message.

## 2 One Time Pad

### 2.1 Definition of One Time Pad

- *Gen*: choose a uniform binary string from  $K = \{0, 1\}^l$ .
- *Enc*: given key  $k$  and message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^l$ , compute cipher text  $c := k \oplus m$ .
- *Dec*: given key  $k$  and message  $c \in \{0, 1\}^l$ , compute plaintext  $m := k \oplus c$ .

### 2.2 Proof of Perfect Secrecy for OTP

For arbitrary  $c \in C$ ,  $m' \in M$  and uniformly selected  $k \in \{0, 1\}^l$ , we compute:

$$\Pr[C = c | M = m'] = \Pr[\text{Enc}_k(m') = c] = 2^{-l} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[C = c] &= \sum_{m' \in M} \Pr[C = c | M = m'] \cdot \Pr[M = m'] \\ &= 2^{-l} \cdot \sum_{m' \in M} \Pr[M = m'] \\ &= 2^{-l} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Use Bayes' Theorem,

$$\begin{aligned}
 Pr[M = m|C = c] &= \frac{Pr[C = c|M = m] \cdot Pr[M = m]}{Pr[C = c]} \\
 &= \frac{2^{-l} \cdot Pr[M = m']}{2^{-l}} \\
 &= Pr[M = m]
 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Regardless of the cipher text, the adversary can only guess the message with **priori probabilities** (no extra information leaked).

### 2.3 Points to Note

- Reusing the same pad will be unsecure.

We have 2 messages with equal length, which are encrypted with the same pad:

$$\begin{aligned}
 m_1 \oplus k &= c_1 \\
 m_2 \oplus k &= c_2
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

The adversary can simply XOR two cipher texts:

$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = m_1 \oplus m_2 \oplus k \oplus k = m_1 \oplus m_2 \tag{6}$$

If some bits in  $m_1 \oplus m_2$  are 0, it can be concluded that the the corresponding bits in  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are the same, if  $m_1 \oplus m_2$  is an all-zero bit string, we know the same message is being sent twice.

- The OTP inherits the limitation of perfect secret encryption scheme. If the mssage space is  $M$  and key space is  $K$ , then  $|K| \geq |M|$ .

Proof:

Assume  $|K| < |M|$ , and  $M(c) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} m|m = Dec_k(c)$  for some  $k \in K$ .

As  $|M(c)| \leq |K|$ , there is some  $m' \in M$  s.t.  $m' \notin M(c)$  Therefore for these messages,

$$Pr[M = m'|C = c] = 0 \tag{7}$$

Which is not equal to **priori probabilities**.