Daniel J. Sonnenstuhl

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Office Contact Information

The University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy Keller Center 1307 E 60th St Chicago, IL 60637

Education

University of Chicago, PhD. Public Policy

2020-2026 (expected)

University College London, MSc. Economics, Distinction

2017-2018

University College London, BA. Philosophy and Economics, First Class Honors

2014-2017

References

Professor James Robinson (Chair) University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy jamesrobinson@uchicago.edu Professor Gregory Lane University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy laneg@uchicago.edu

Professor Eduardo Montero University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy emontero@uchicago.edu

Research Fields

Primary: Development Economics

Secondary: Labor Economics, Experimental Economics, Political Economy

Research Experience

Pre-Doctoral Fellow, The University of Chicago, Booth School of Business Feb 2020-Sept 2020 Pre-Doctoral Fellow, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver School of Economics Oct 2018-Jan 2020

Job Market Paper

Working Without Wages: The Consequences of Widespread Pay Delays (with Dauda Musa)

We show that firms in low-income countries frequently withhold employee wages and study how workers respond to this widespread practice. Using original survey data from Lagos, Nigeria, we document that 30 percent of workers across firms of all sizes report delayed or unpaid salaries. To examine how workers respond to wage withholding, we implement a field experiment guided by a theoretical framework that illustrates the trade-offs they face. At the intensive margin, delaying wages increases employees' initial effort, without affecting absenteeism or total hours worked. At the extensive margin, wage uncertainty induces worker selection: credibly signaling salary reliability increases job take-up by 25% Although this effect is driven by individuals who had initially expressed no interest in wage employment, it does not attract more productive workers. Combining intensive- and extensive margin estimates suggests that, in our setting, firms incur minimal productivity losses — about 0.2% — from engaging in wage withholding. This gives firms little incentive to refrain from the practice, despite workers valuing reliable pay highly — at over 30% of the monthly minimum wage.

Publications

A Denial a Day Keeps the Doctor Away (with Abe Dunn, Joshua D. Gottlieb, Adam Shapiro and Pietro Tebaldi) The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 139(1): 187–233, February 2024.

Who bears the consequences of administrative problems in health care? We use data on repeated interactions between a large sample of U.S. physicians and many different insurers to document the complexity of health care billing, and estimate its economic costs for doctors and consequences for patients. Observing the back-and-forth sequences of claim denials and resubmissions for past visits, we can estimate physicians' costs of haggling with insurers to collect payments. Combining these costs with the revenue never collected, we estimate that physicians lose 18% of Medicaid revenue to billing problems, compared with 4.7% for Medicare and 2.4% for commercial insurers. Identifying off of physician movers and practices that span state boundaries, we find that physicians respond to billing problems by refusing to accept Medicaid patients in states with more severe billing hurdles. These hurdles are quantitatively just as important as payment rates for explaining variation in physicians' willingness to treat Medicaid patients. We conclude that administrative frictions have first-order costs for doctors, patients, and equality of access to health care. We quantify the potential economic gains — in terms of reduced public spending or increased access to physicians — if these frictions could be reduced and find them to be sizable.

Working Papers

The Causes and Implications of the Pentecostal Movement: Evidence from Nigeria

The global spread of Pentecostalism represents an unprecedented instance of religious dynamism. This paper estimates the causal effects of joining a modern Pentecostal church in Nigeria on individuals' behavior, perceptions, social identity, and well-being. I collect original data and leverage a partnership with one of Nigeria's largest Pentecostal denominations, Living Faith Church. This partnership allows me to exploit quasi-random variation in the denomination's proselytization activities. Constructing an appropriate control group, I instrument for church membership using exposure to the proselytization team. Joining the church increases religious participation but reduces individuals' perceived locus of control, with no detectable effects on income or mental health. Finally, combining survey data with administrative records on service attendance after proselytization, I exploit quasi-random variation in sermon topics to identify the messages that attract new members. Sermons emphasizing divine intervention and health are particularly effective in drawing individuals to the church.

Works in Progress

The Economics of Wage Withholding: Evidence from Nigerian Firms (with Dauda Musa)

Megachurches and Religious Messaging in Nigeria (with Olaitan Ogunnote)

Pentecostalism and Social Cooperation: The Big Gods Hypothesis in Action (with Olaitan Ogunnote)

Research Grants and Awards (Total funding received as PI or co-PI: ~\$240,000)

| Becker Friedman Institute, Data Aquisition Grant (\$18,100) | 2025 |
|---|------|
| Development Economics Center at the University of Chicago, Research Grant (\$30,000) | 2025 |
| The Pearson Institute, Small Research Grant, with Dauda Musa (\$5,000) | 2025 |
| The Weiss Fund, Research Grant (\$50,000) | 2024 |
| Structural Transformation and Economic Growth (STEG), PhD Student Research Grant (£15,000) | 2024 |
| Development Economics Center at the University of Chicago, Research Grant (\$25,000) | 2024 |
| Development Economics Center at the University of Chicago, Pilot Grant (\$10,000) | 2024 |
| The Weiss Fund, Pilot Grant (\$11,500) | 2024 |
| The Weiss Fund, Pilot Grant, with Olaitan Ogunnote (\$15,000) | 2024 |
| The Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA), Seed Grant, with Olaitan Ogunnote (\$10,639) | 2024 |
| PEDL, Seed Grant, with Nofiu Adebisi and George Agyeah (£5,000) | 2023 |
| The Pearson Institute, Small Research Grant (\$10,000) | 2023 |
| Becker Friedman Institute Political Economics Initiative, Small Research Grant (\$5,000) | 2023 |
| Development Economics Center at the University of Chicago, Pilot Grant (\$10,000) | 2023 |
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| Development Economics Center at the University of Chicago, Exploratory Grant (\$5,000) | 2023 |
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| The Weiss Fund, Exploratory Grant (\$3,500) | 2023 |
| Development Economics Center at the University of Chicago, Exploratory Grant (\$5,000) | 2022 |

Fellowships and Awards

| Harris Graduate Student Fellowship | 2020-2026 |
|------------------------------------|-----------|
| Erste Bank Group Scholarship | 2015 |

Teaching Experience

| Senior Thesis: Public Policy (undergraduate) | Preceptor | $Fall\ 2025	ext{-}Winter\ 2026$ |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Senior Thesis: Public Policy (undergraduate) | Preceptor | $Fall\ 2024	ext{-}Spring\ 2025$ |
| Economics, Politics and African Societies (PhD) | TA for Prof. James Robinson | $Spring \ 2024$ |
| Power and Development (master) | TA for Prof. Raúl Sánchez de la Sierr | ra Spring 2024 |
| Senior Thesis: Public Policy (undergraduate) | Preceptor | $Fall\ 2023\text{-}Winter\ 2024$ |
| Principles of Microeconomics II (master) | TA for Profs. Sonin & Kumar | $Winter\ 2023$ |
| Statistics for Data Analysis I (master) | TA for Profs. Frank & Moskowitz | $Fall\ 2022$ |
| Senior Thesis: Public Policy (undergraduate) | Preceptor | $Fall\ 2022\text{-}Spring\ 2023$ |
| Principles of Microeconomics II (master) | TA for Profs. Kumar & Lo | Winter~2022 |
| Statistics for Data Analysis I (master) | TA for Profs. Frank & Moskowitz | Fall 2021 |
| Senior Thesis: Public Policy (undergraduate) | Preceptor | $Fall\ 2021\text{-}Spring\ 2022$ |

Seminars and Conferences

| Seminars | | Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (Berlin), STEG Early Career Workshop Covenant University |
|-------------|----------------|---|
| Conferences | $2025 \\ 2024$ | CSAE, DevPEC, EEA Meeting, Advances with Field Experiments Conference ASREC, SIOE, RES PhD Conference |

Other

Citizenship: German

Programming Skills: Stata, Julia, Python, R

Languages: German (native), English (full professional proficiency)