My other computer is your computer: Having fun with malware live Ryan Nolette, Senior Threat Researcher BLACK ARM YOUR ENDPOINTS. COLUMN AIR RESEARCH

Agenda

- Who am I and what do I do?
- Samples of what I do
 - Stopping CryptoLocker
 - What is CryptoLocker?
 - Show real infection logs
 - Detecting Zeus
 - What does Zeus look like on a file system at a high level?
 - What does a detection event look like?
 - · Finding Bitcoin Mining Malware
 - What does the execution chain look like?
 - How did I find it?
 - How did I stop it?
- good resources to use for learning computer security
- websites and resources I read daily
- live demo
 - click on random malware and show how it is represented and how to block it
- questions



Who am I and what do I do?



My name is Ryan Nolette

- I am currently a Senior Threat Researcher at BIT9
- I am a RIT alum from the NSSA and ISF program
- I am a 10 year veteran of IT, Incident Response, Threat Intelligence, and Computer Forensics
- · I brought cards if you are interested in contacting me
- Bit9 blog links
 - https://blog.bit9.com/author/rnolette/

• I do:

· behavior analysis, threat intelligence, and threat detection

• What are these?

• These are common areas of computer security and areas that you will be interacting with heavily if you are graduating in the next 3-5 years



Samples of what I do

• Bit9

- Has 2 primary products that combined create a very useful tool for SecOps and SysAdmins.
 - Bit9
 - » Whitelisting
 - » Granular protection configuration
 - » Ban things from being able to execute by hash, extension, publisher, etc
 - Carbon Black
 - » Detection and visibility
 - » Ability to leverage many kinds of intelligence feeds to enhance and customize detection

My responsibilities

- · Gather threat intelligence
- · Turn what I learn into actionable information
- Create behavioral detection rules that customers can use to detect malware





CryptoLocker

CryptoLocker

- Malware that surfaced in late 2013.
- It is a form of "ransomware" currently targeted at Microsoft Windows-based computers.
- It encrypts files stored on local hard drives and any mounted network drives it can access.
- When it has finished encrypting all the files, it presents a branded prompt stating your files will be decrypted if a fee is paid.
 - Threatens that if it is not paid by deadline, CryptoLocker will delete the private key for your data and that decryption is no longer possible.









What does CryptoLocker do?

- For each file that is encrypted, a resulting registry value will be created under this key: HKCU\Software\CryptoLocker\Files
- Once the infection is active on your computer it will scan your drives (local & network) and encrypt the following types of files with a mix of RSA & AES encryption:
 - * .odt, ".ods, ".odp, ".odm, *.odc, *.odb, *.doc, *.docx, *.docm, *.wps, *.xlss, *.xlss, *.xlss, *.xlss, *.xls, *.ypt, *.ppt, *.pst, *.dwg, *.dxf, *.dxf, *.wpd, *.wpd, *.rtf, *.wb2, *.mdf, *.dbf, *.psd, *.psd, *.eps, *.ai, *.indd, *.cdr, ????????.jpe, img_ *.jpg, *.dng, *.3fr, *.arw, *.srf, *.sr2, *.bay, *.crw, *.cr2, *.dcr, *.kdc, *.erf, *.mew, *.mer, *.mrw, *.nef, *.nrw, *.orf, *.raf, *.raw, *.rwl, *.rw2, *.r3d, *.ptx, *.pet, *.srw, *.x3f, *.der, *.cer, *.crt, *.pem, *.pfx, *.p12, *.p7b, *.p7cThe







How can I detect a CryptoLocker V1.0 and V2.0 infection?

Registry evidence

- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run "CryptoLocker_<version_number>"
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce "*CryptoLocker_<version_number>"
- HKCU\Software\CryptoLocker\Files*

• Example of new key name

CryptoLocker_0388

• File Evidence

- %AppData%*.exe
 - C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\(213D7F33-4942-1C20-3D56=8-1A0831CDFFF3).exe (Vista/7/8)
 - C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\(213D7F33-4942-1C20-3D56=8-1A0B31CDFFF3).exe (XP)
- %AppData%**.exe

Known issues with traditional defenses

- Blocking all "*.exe" files in AppData via GPO can block legitimate applications from running.
- Blocking only dropped executables by name will not stop the infections, the filenames change each instance.
- Removing the executable after it has run will stop you from decrypting your data if you decide to pay.





CryptoLocker Infection Timeline

Timestamp	Priority	Туре	Subtype
Oct 30 2013 09:25:10AM	Notice	Discovery	New unapproved file to computer
Oct 30 2013 09:25:10AM	Info	Discovery	New file on network
Oct 30 2013 07:55:14AM	Notice	Policy Enforcement	Write block (registry rule)
Oct 30 2013 07:55:11AM	Info	Discovery	First execution on network
Oct 30 2013 07:55:11AM	Notice	Discovery	New unapproved file to computer
Oct 30 2013 07:55:08AM	Info	Discovery	File group created
Oct 30 2013 07:55:08AM	Notice	Discovery	New unapproved file to computer
Oct 30 2013 06:48:03AM	Warning	Computer Management	Agent health check

Timestamp	Process	File Path
Oct 30 2013 09:25:10AM	<path>\uqaqoz\vuik.exe</path>	c:\users\ <username>\appdata\local\temp\qxs1b16</username>
Oct 30 2013 09:25:10AM	<path>\uqaqoz\vuik.exe</path>	c:\users\ <username>\appdata\local\temp\qxs1b16</username>
	<path>\izosmjnypvgrzjxx.exe</path>	\registry\user\ <sid>\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run</sid>
Oct 30 2013 07:55:11AM	<path>\uqaqoz\vuik.exe</path>	c:\users\ <username>\appdata\local\temp\ujl21e4</username>
Oct 30 2013 07:55:11AM	<path>\uqaqoz\vuik.exe</path>	c:\users\ <username>\appdata\local\temp\ujl21e4</username>
Oct 30 2013 07:55:08AM	<path>\uqaqoz\vuik.exe</path>	<path>\uqaqoz</path>
Oct 30 2013 07:55:08AM	<path>\uqaqoz\vuik.exe</path>	c:\users\ <username>\appdata\local\temp\kgb6461</username>
Oct 30 2013 06:48:03 AM	N/A - agent health check event	N/A - agent health check event



CryptoLocker Infection Timeline

		malware confirmed by
Timestamp	File Hash	<u>VirusTotal</u>
Oct 30 2013 09:25:10AM	364be14fd1629644b1b7e87a8222573dfc79373ef9ea0be40c41d48b6c3faa86	zeus
Oct 30 2013 09:25:10AM	364be14fd1629644b1b7e87a8222573dfc79373ef9ea0be40c41d48b6c3faa86	zeus
Oct 30 2013 07:55:14AM		cryptolocker
Oct 30 2013 07:55:11AM	003c64fa11ea18a00c3e0bf2adf1a2b80287fb072d1f8108d1d55cbda17e60cb	cryptolocker
Oct 30 2013 07:55:11AM	003c64fa11ea18a00c3e0bf2adf1a2b80287fb072d1f8108d1d55cbda17e60cb	cryptolocker
Oct 30 2013 07:55:08AM	8b000da81d4c44c68890506f80ec9274ff35e224cbab1100547930e90178223c	unknown malware
Oct 30 2013 07:55:08AM	e9020b510466e0fc800acf3adedeaba4fd81a77e29cc63f2b7fcb08f24560e69	zeus
Oct 30 2013 06:48:03AM	N/A – agent health check event	N/A - agent health check event



What can I do about a Zeus infection?


What is Zeus?

- Zeus or Zbot is Trojan malware that runs on Windows.
- Spread mainly through drive-by downloads, exploit kits, and phishing attacks.
- First identified in ~July 2007
- In 2009 estimates of compromised computers were in the millions, ~3.6 million in the United States alone.
- In 2010, the FBI indicated a major international cybercrime network using Zeus to steal ~\$70 Million.
- As of May 2013, the source code and compiled binaries of Zeus were being hosted on GitHub.
- Zeus Trojan-controlled machines have been found in 196 countries, including isolated states such as North Korea.
- The five countries with most infected machines are Egypt, the United States, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

• What Does Zeus do?


- It is most often used to steal banking information and usernames and passwords from browsers.
- · It is also used to install the CryptoLocker ransomware.





Finding Bitcoin Mining Malware


What does the execution chain look like?




- From the Carbon Black process analysis of the file "94fe198e4614bec6233585d518adde34a01dc0a3 5c7115c79532564b9e0e4080.bin" we are able to see it spawn of the processes: Wscript.exe, Cmd.exe, Taskkill.exe, Cscript.exe, Ping.exe
- If we then drill into each of these child processes we can see that "csscript.exe" spawned 3 processes: Taskkill.exe, Shell.exe, Macromedia.exe

How did I find it?

 Right away I can see 5 matches for files in my environment that have a VirusTotal rating of 4 or more.







good resources to use for learning computer security

cuckoo

· localized detonation

virustotal

- https://www.virustotal.com/
- online scanning of files

anuhis

- https://anubis.iseclab.org/
- online detonation

Wepawet

- Http://wepawet.iseclab.org/
- · online detonation

threatexpert

- http://www.threatexpert.com/
- online detonation

security onion

- http://blog.securityonion.net/
- · free IPS and security tool suite

pfsense

- https://www.pfsense.org/
- opensource firewall

OSSIM

- http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/projects
- opesource SIEM

volatility

- · https://code.google.com/p/volatility/
- memory forensics

Splunk

- http://www.splunk.com/
- SIEM

SIFT

- http://digital-forensics.sans.org/community/downloads
- forensics VM

• remnux

- http://zeltser.com/remnux/#tools-on-remnux
- malware analysis VM

jsunpack


- http://jsunpack.jeek.org/
- javascript unpacker



websites and resources I read daily

- http://krebsonsecurity.com/
- http://www.darkreading.com/
- http://threatpost.com/en_us
- http://www.wired.com/category/threatlevel
- https://www.schneier.com/
- http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/
- http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/





Live Demo break stuff

- Goal:
 - Click on random crapware and malware then analyze it in my test environment
 - If suggests for malware are not given from the audience I will use https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/



QUESTIONS BITS + BLACK ARM YOUR ENDPOINTS.