

## Shor\_Preskill simple proof of security of BB84 protocol

*Based on*

***Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol***

Peter Shor and John Preskill

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A detour to CSS  
(Calderbank-Shor-  
Steane) Codes as it  
will be used as a tool.



- *Uhlmann's Theorem:*

$$F(\rho, \sigma) = \max_{\psi, \phi} F(\psi, \phi), \quad (24)$$

where  $\psi$  and  $\phi$  are purifications (using the same ancillary system) of  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  respectively.

*Proof.* Denote the system of  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  as  $A$  and the ancillary system as  $E$ . Consider the maximally entangled state  $|\Phi^+\rangle = \sum_j |jj\rangle$ , an explicit purification of  $\rho$  or  $\sigma$  is  $|\psi\rangle_{AE} = \sqrt{\rho_A} \otimes \mathbb{I}_E |\Phi^+\rangle_{AE}$  or  $|\phi\rangle_{AE} = \sqrt{\sigma_A} \otimes \mathbb{I}_E |\Phi^+\rangle_{AE}$ . Then an arbitrary purification of  $\rho$  or  $\sigma$  is  $U_E |\psi\rangle_{AE}$  or  $V_E |\phi\rangle_{AE}$ . Now we have

$$\begin{aligned} F(\psi, \phi) &= | \langle \phi_{AE} | V_E U_E | \psi_{AE} \rangle |, \\ &= | \langle \Phi^+ |_{AE} \sqrt{\sigma_A} V_E U_E | \sqrt{\rho_A} | \Phi^+ \rangle_{AE} |, \\ &= | \text{Tr}[\sqrt{\sigma_A} \sqrt{\rho_A} \cdot V_E U_E] |. \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

Here the last line uses the identity  $\text{Tr}[A^\dagger B] = \langle \Phi^+ | A \otimes B | \Phi^+ \rangle$ . Using the variational form of the trace norm, we have

$$\max_{\psi, \phi} F(\psi, \phi) = \max_{U_E V_E} | \text{Tr}[\sqrt{\sigma_A} \sqrt{\rho_A} \cdot V_E U_E] | = | \text{Tr}[|\sqrt{\sigma_A} \sqrt{\rho_A}|] | = F(\rho, \sigma). \quad (26)$$

□

### 3 Relation between trace distance and fidelity

**Pure states** For two pure states  $\psi$  and  $\phi$ , trace distance and fidelity are actually equivalent

$$D(\psi, \phi) = \sqrt{1 - F(\phi, \psi)^2}. \quad (30)$$

6

**General case** In general, we have

$$1 - F(\rho, \sigma) \leq D(\rho, \sigma) \leq \sqrt{1 - F(\rho, \sigma)^2}. \quad (31)$$

The first inequality could be proven by using the reduction to classical trace distance and fidelity and their relation as we proved in Eq. (17). For the second inequality, we consider the purification of  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$ , i.e.,  $\psi$  and  $\phi$ , that achieves the fidelity according to Uhlmann's theorem. Then we have

$$D(\rho, \sigma) \leq D(\psi, \phi) = \sqrt{1 - F(\phi, \psi)^2} = \sqrt{1 - F(\rho, \sigma)^2}. \quad (32)$$



CSS Code [n, k] code

??

Generator matrix  $G$ : maps messages to their equivalents in code spaces.

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$(n-k) \times n$  Matrix with entries in  $\{0,1\}$

$(n-k)$  Linearly independent vectors orthogonal to the columns of  $G$ .

$$H = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$



$$\text{error } e \implies y' \rightarrow y + e$$

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Different error syndromes

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Makes it possible to read off the error from syndromes.

$d(x, y) \rightarrow$  Hamming distance



**The number of positions in which the two bit strings differ**

# How many errors can such a code correct?

$$d(C) = \min_{x,y \in C, x \neq y} d(x, y)$$

$C \rightarrow$  An  $[n, k, d]$  code

Number of  
physical bits

Number of  
logical bits

Distance



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A code with distance  $(2t + 1)$  for some integer ' $t$ ' can be used to correct upto ' $t$ ' errors, simply by decoding the corrupted message ' $y$ ' as the unique codeword  $y$  that satisfies

$$d(y, y') \leq t.$$

$C : [n, k]$  Code with generator matrix  $G$  and parity check matrix  $H$ .

$C^\perp$  : Codeword orthogonal to each codeword in  $C$

$H^T$  : Generator matrix of the dual.

$G^T$  : Parity check matrix of the dual.



Example: A [3, 1, 1] code




Diagram illustrating the encoding process for a [3, 1, 1] code. A green vector  $G$  is shown with a red arrow pointing to the first row of the generator matrix  $\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$ . A green message  $x$  is shown with a red arrow pointing to the value  $(0)$ . A red arrow points from  $(0)$  to the resulting codeword  $y = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} (0) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$




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$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} (1) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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**1st bit  
corrupted**

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**No error**



$$H = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Flip on the first qubit.



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Flip on the second bit.

$$H = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

NO Error.

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Flip on the first bit.

Flip on the third bit.

$$\underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}}_H \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}}_H \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Flip on the second bit.



## Quantum error correction

An  $[n, k_1]$  code  $C_1$     An  $[n, k_2]$  code  $C_2$      $C_2 \subset C_1$  ??

$C_1$  and  $C_2^\perp$  Both can correct upto  $t$  errors.  
?

For any codeword  $x \in C_1$ , we define the quantum state,

$$|x + C_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|C_2|}} \sum_{y \in C_2} |x + y\rangle$$

$|C_2|$  : Cardinality of  $C_2$

**Crucial point:** Bit flip and phase flip errors are corrected independent of each other.

Bit flip

$$|x\rangle \rightarrow |x + e_{\text{bit}}\rangle$$

Phase flip

$$|x\rangle \rightarrow (-1)^{x \cdot e_{\text{phase}}} |x\rangle$$



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**Observation:** Bit flip error  $\xrightarrow{\text{Hadamard}}$  Phase flip error

$$|x'\rangle \rightarrow |x' + e_{\text{phase}}\rangle$$

$$|x + e_2\rangle \rightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{k+1}}} \sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{(x+y) \cdot e_{\text{phase}}} |x + y + e_{\text{bit}}\rangle$$

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**Computation of the syndrome:** Apply the parity check matrix  $H_1$  of the code  $C_1$  and store the result in the Ancilla state:

$$|x + y + e_{\text{bit}}\rangle \rightarrow |x + y + e_{\text{bit}}\rangle |H_1(x + y + e_{\text{bit}})\rangle = |x + y + e_{\text{bit}}\rangle |H_1 e_{\text{bit}}\rangle$$



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**Detection of error:** Measure the Ancilla state, discard it and apply NOT gate on the qubits where a bit flip has occurred.

This removes all the bit flip errors and the resulting state is:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{k_2}}} \sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{(x+y) \cdot e_{\text{phase}}} |x + y\rangle$$



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**A property**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(I)} \quad & \text{If } z' \in C^\perp, \sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{y \cdot z'} = |C_2|, \\ \text{(II)} \quad & \text{if } z' \notin C^\perp, \sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{y \cdot z'} = 0. \end{aligned}$$

So,

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n-k_2}}} \sum_{z' \in C_2^\perp} (-1)^{x \cdot z'} |z' + e_{\text{phase}}\rangle$$



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**A property**

- (I) If  $z' \in C^\perp$ ,  $\sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{y \cdot z'} = |C_2|$ ,
- (II) (II) if  $z' \notin C^\perp$ ,  $\sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{y \cdot z'} = 0$ .

For this reason,  
 $C^\perp$  is needed.

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If  $z' \in C^\perp$ , then  $\sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{y \cdot z'} = |C_2|$ , while if  $z' \notin C^\perp$ ,  $\sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{y \cdot z'} = 0$ . So,

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n-k_2}}} \sum_{z' \in C_2^\perp} (-1)^{x \cdot z'} |z' + e_{\text{phase}}\rangle$$

Exactly the same form as that of a bit-flip error described the vector  $e_{\text{phase}}$ .



### Example

$$|0\rangle_L \equiv \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle + |111\rangle) (|000\rangle + |111\rangle) (|000\rangle + |111\rangle)$$

$$|1\rangle_L \equiv \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle - |111\rangle) (|000\rangle - |111\rangle) (|000\rangle - |111\rangle)$$

Can correct arbitrary errors on a single qubit.

$$|0\rangle_{L_2} \equiv \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \left( |0\rangle_{L_1} + |1\rangle_{L_1} \right)^{\otimes 3}; \quad |1\rangle_{L_2} \equiv \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} \left( |0\rangle_{L_1} - |1\rangle_{L_1} \right)^{\otimes 3}$$

$$|0\rangle_{L_1} \equiv |000\rangle; \quad |1\rangle_{L_1} \equiv |111\rangle.$$

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
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
## Entanglement-based version of BB84 protocol




Alice and Bob distribute a sequence of  $m$  of these states, i.e.,

$$|\Phi^+\rangle_{AB}^{\otimes m} = |\Phi^+\rangle_{AB} \otimes |\Phi^+\rangle_{AB} \otimes \cdots \otimes |\Phi^+\rangle_{AB}$$

In practice, they will share a mixed state  $\rho$ .









$\{b\}$     0    1    1    0    1




$\{b\}$  0 1 1 0... 1






$H$  : Hadamard transformation






0

1







0...

1



Position of check bits





## Entanglement-based version of BB84 protocol

1. Alice creates  $2n$  qubit pairs in the state  $|\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes 2n}$  with  $|\Phi^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ .

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2. She randomly selects  $n$  of these qubits that will later be used to estimate the errors in the qubit pairs.
3. Selects **a random classical bit** string  $b = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{2n})$  of length  $2n$ . When  $b_i = 1$ , she applies a Hadamard transform to her half of the corresponding qubit pair.

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9. They measure the state  $|\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m}$  in the computational basis to obtain the shred secret key.

## Lemma

Let  $\epsilon \geq 0$  and  $\rho_{AB}$  be a bipartite quantum system such that

$$F\left(\rho_{AB}, |\phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m}\right) \geq 1 - \epsilon^2.$$

Then the two  $n$ –bit strings resulting from local measurements of  $\rho_{AB}$  in the computational basis are  $\epsilon$ –secure keys (with respect to an adversary who controls a purifying system of  $\rho_{AB}$ .)



# Uhlmann theorem

## Relation between trace distance and fidelity



### Lemma

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### Purifying system

$$|\psi_{ABE}\rangle \text{ Such that } \rho_{AB} = \text{Tr}_E(|\psi_{ABE}\rangle\langle\psi_{ABE}|) \\ \rho_E = \text{Tr}_{AB}(|\psi_{ABE}\rangle\langle\psi_{ABE}|)$$

Criterion for a protocol to be secure:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left\| \rho_{ABE} - \rho_{UU} \otimes \rho_E \right\|_1 \leq \epsilon,$$

$$\rho_{UU} = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{S}} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} |u\rangle\langle u| \otimes |u\rangle\langle u|$$

$$F\left(\rho_{ABE}, |\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m} \otimes \sigma_E\right) = F\left(\rho_{AB}, |\phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m}\right)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} \left\| \rho_{ABE} - |\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m} \otimes \sigma_E \right\|_1 &\leq \sqrt{1 - F\left(\rho_{ABE}, |\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m} \otimes \sigma_E\right)} \\ &= \sqrt{1 - F\left(\rho_{AB}, |\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m}\right)} \\ &\leq \sqrt{1 - (1 - \epsilon^2)} = \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

Relation between trace distance and fidelity



Quantum measurements do allow an interpretation in terms of classical probability theory if the observables that are considered refer to only one basis.

$$|\Phi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle), \quad |\Psi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle)$$

In the protocol, the three errors are generated by  $\sigma_x$ ,  $\sigma_y$ ,  $\sigma_z$ .

Nothing (1)

$$|\Phi^+\rangle \rightarrow |\Phi^+\rangle$$

Bit flip ( $\sigma_x$ )

$$|\Phi^+\rangle \rightarrow |\Psi^+\rangle$$

Phase flip ( $\sigma_z$ )

$$|\Phi^+\rangle \rightarrow |\Phi^-\rangle$$

Bit+phase ( $\sigma_y$ )

$$|\Phi^+\rangle \rightarrow |\Psi^-\rangle$$

## Detectors of errors: POVM

Detector of bit-flip

$$\Pi_{bf} = |\Psi^+\rangle\langle\Psi^+| + |\Psi^-\rangle\langle\Psi^-|$$

Detector of phase-error

$$\Pi_{pe} = |\Phi^-\rangle\langle\Phi^-| + |\Psi^-\rangle\langle\Psi^-|$$

$$\Pi_{bf} = \frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{1} \otimes \mathbf{1} - \sigma_z \otimes \sigma_z)$$

$$\Pi_{pe} = \frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{1} \otimes \mathbf{1} - \sigma_x \otimes \sigma_x)$$



## Reduction to the prepare-and-measure version

The measurement of  $n$  check pairs in step 8 is simply used to estimate the error rate. Instead of using entangled states, Alice can equivalently prepare and send  $n$  single qubit states to Bob. This changes sets 1, 2 and 8 of the protocol to:

## Entanglement-based version of BB84 protocol

1. Alice creates  $n$  random check bits and  $n$  qubit pairs in the state  $|\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes n}$ . She encodes  $n$  qubits as  $|0\rangle$  or  $|1\rangle$  according to the check bits.
2. She randomly chooses  $n$  out of  $2n$  positions to put in the check qubits. In the remaining positions, she puts in one half of each state  $|\Phi^+\rangle$ .
3. Alice selects a random classical bit string  $b = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{2n})$  of length  $2n$ . When  $b_i = 1$ , she applies a Hadamard transform to her half of the corresponding qubit pair.
4. She sends the other half of all qubit pairs to Bob.
5. Alice announces the string  $b$  and the positions of the check qubits.
6. Bob applies a Hadamard transformation to those qubits for which  $b_i = 1$ .
7. Alice and Bob measure the check qubits in the computational basis  $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$  to estimate the error rate. If more than  $t$  errors occur, they abort the protocol.
8. Bob measures the  $n$  check qubits in the  $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$  basis and publicly shares the result with Alice. If more than  $t$  bits disagree, they abort the protocol.
9. They measure the state  $|\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes m}$  in the computational basis to obtain the shared secret key.



How to remove the remaining  $n$  entangled pairs?

Two classical linear error correction codes  $C_1$  (encoding  $k_1$  bits into  $n$  bits) and  $C_2$  (encoding  $k_2$  bits into  $n$  bits), a  $[n, m]$  CSS code of  $C_1$  over  $C_2$  encodes  $m = k_1 - k_2$  qubits into  $n$  qubits and corrects upto  $t$  errors.

**Position of bit-flip error:** parity check matrix  $H_1$  of the classical code  $C_1$

**Information about the phase-error:** parity check matrix  $H_2^\perp$  of the classical dual code  $C_2^\perp$

A codeword in this code is always of the form

$$|x_k + C_2\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|C_2|}} \sum_{y \in C_2} |x_k + y\rangle,$$

$x_k$ : a representative of one of the  $2^m$  cosets of  $C_2$  in  $C_1$ .

$x_k$  : a vector  $x$  indexed by a string  $k$  .

$$|x_k, v, w\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|C_2|}} \sum_{y \in C_2} (-1)^{v \cdot y} |x_k + y + w\rangle$$



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These states form an orthonormal basis of a  $2^n$  dimensional Hilbert space.

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We show that there are  $2^{k_1-k_2}$  distinct values of  $x_k$ ,  $2^{n-k_1}$  distinct values of  $w$  and  $2^{k_2}$  distinct values of  $v$  .



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I. If  $x_k - x'_k \in C_2$ , then  $|x_k + C_2\rangle = |x'_k + C_2\rangle$ , which implies that the state  $|x_k + C_2\rangle$  only depends on the coset  $C_1/C_2$  in which  $x_k$  is contained. Since there are  $2^m$  such cosets, there are  $2^m$  distinct values of  $x_k$  .



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2. Suppose that  $|x_k, v, w\rangle = |x_k, v', w\rangle$ . This implies that  $v \cdot y = v' \cdot y$  for all  $y \in C_2$ , and therefore  $(v - v') \cdot y = 0$  for all  $y \in C_2$ . This means that  $v - v' \in K$ , where  $K$  is the row space of the parity check matrix  $H_2$  of  $C_2$ . The rows of  $H_2$  span the space of all the vectors that are orthogonal to the codewords  $y$  of  $C_2$ .



Therefore, the requirement for two states  $|x_k, v, w\rangle$  and  $|x_k, v', w\rangle$  to be distinct states is  $v - v' \notin K$ , which directly implies  $v + K \neq v' + K$  (which is a property of cosets). Since  $H_2$  has  $n - k_2$  linearly independent rows,  $v$  has  $2^{n-(n-k_2)} = 2^{k_2}$  distinct values.

III. With a similar argument as in I, the values of  $w$  depend on the coset of  $C_1$  in a  $2^n$  dimensional Hilbert space in which  $w$  is contained, which implies that there are  $2^{n-k_1}$  distinct values of  $w$ .

## Orthonormality of the states

If  $x_k$  and  $x'_k$  belong to different cosets of  $C_1/C_2$ , then there are no codewords  $y, y' \in C_2$  such that  $x_k + y = x'_k + y'$ . Hence, the states are orthonormal. A similar argument can be given in the current situation.

Consider the cosets of  $C_2 \in F_2^n$  (the set of all  $n$ -bit strings. For two distinct states  $|x_k, v, w\rangle$  and  $|x'_k, v', w'\rangle$ ,  $x_k + w$  and  $x'_k + w$  belong to different cosets of  $F_2^n/C_2$ , and therefore, there are no  $y, y' \in C_2$  such that  $x_k + w + y = x'_k + w' + y'$ ; hence the two states are orthonormal.)