

Differential Phase Shift Protocol

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Why this one?

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Differential Phase Shift Quantum Key Distribution

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Some numbers from experimental papers

A mode-locked Ti:sapphire laser (Coherent Mira 900) produces pulses at $\lambda_p = 710 \text{ nm}$ with 150 fs pulse width and 76 MHz repetition rate.
 $1.3 \times 10^{-8} \text{ s}$ 2.3 fs

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The superposition of discrete times is made by a bulk Michelson interferometer with a path-length difference of **1.2 ns**.

The phase is tuned by **varying the temperature** of the interferometer.

PHYSICAL REVIEW A **66**, 062308 (2002)

Time-bin entangled qubits for quantum communication created by femtosecond pulses

I. Marcikic,¹ H. de Riedmatten,¹ W. Tittel,^{1,2} V. Scarani,¹ H. Zbinden,¹ and N. Gisin¹

¹Group of Applied Physics-Optique, University of Geneva, CH-1211, Geneva 4, Switzerland

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(Received 10 June 2002; published 10 December 2002)

We create pairs of nondegenerate time-bin entangled photons at telecom wavelengths with ultrashort pump pulses. Entanglement is shown by performing Bell kind tests of the Franson type with visibilities of up to 91%. As time-bin entanglement can easily be protected from decoherence as encountered in optical fibers, this experiment opens the road for complex quantum communication protocols over long distances. We also investigate the creation of more than one photon pair in a laser pulse and present a simple tool to quantify the probability of such events to happen.

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ADVANTAGES W.R.T. Polarisation: Polarisation changes in fiber. Phase does not change.

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
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
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Precursor: Schematic for experimental implementation
Time encoding based BB 84 protocol




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


$$|f_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left(|t_0\rangle + |t_1\rangle \right) \quad \begin{matrix} 0 & 0 \\ \hline \text{Pulse in left half} & \text{Pulse in right half} \end{matrix}$$

$$|f_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left(|t_0\rangle - |t_1\rangle \right) \quad \begin{matrix} 0 & \pi \\ \hline \text{Pulse in left half} & \text{Pulse in right half} \end{matrix}$$




$$|f_d\rangle = \sum_{d=0}^{D-1} \omega^{dn} |t_n\rangle$$




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
$|f_0\rangle$




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DPS

Introduction

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- **A photon split into three pulses is sent from Alice to Bob, in which the phases of two sequential probability amplitudes are randomly modulated.**
- **Bob extracts the bit information by measuring the differential phase.**
- **Suitable for fiber transmission systems, while offering a key creation efficiency higher than conventional fiber-based BB84.**


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

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Setup of the proposed QKD system



Single
photon
source

Setup of the proposed QKD system





BS: beam splitter
SW: switch

The time delays between paths a and b and between paths b and c are equally T .


$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \left(|1\rangle_A |0\rangle_B |0\rangle_C \pm |0\rangle_A |1\rangle_B |0\rangle_C \pm |0\rangle_A |0\rangle_B |1\rangle_C \right)$$

The splitting ratios of the beam splitters are such that the probabilities for a photon to pass through each route are equal.


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


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


-  :Beam Splitter
-  :Phase modulator


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
Setup of the proposed QKD system:
Possibilities




(i) a + short path.




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
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
Setup of the proposed QKD system: Possibilities



- (i) a + short path.
- (ii) a + long path, b + short path.




Setup of the proposed QKD system: Possibilities




- (i) a + short path.
- (ii) a + long path, b + short path.
- (iii) b + long path, c + short path.


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
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Setup of the proposed QKD system: Possibilities



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- (iii) b + long path, c + short path.
- (iv) c + long path.



But, KGR?????

Claimed KGR



time instance of the photon detection/ **NOT WHICH DETECTOR!!!**



II/III

**Time+which
detector recorded.**

KGR



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From this information and her modulation data, Alice knows which detector clicked in Bob's site.

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**Time+which
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(1) From this information and her modulation data, Alice knows which detector clicked in Bob's site.

(2) Alice and Bob have an identical bit string, provided that the DET1 click represents "0" and the DET2 click represents "1." In the above protocol, Bob only tells the time-instance to Alice, and the bit information is not leaked to the public.

Resilience to eavesdropping

Beam splitting attack

Eve taps one photon out of multiple photons in a coherent pulse, and then obtains bit information by measuring the photon after Alice and Bob exchange supplementary information through a public channel.

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In conventional BB84, Eve can measure bit information perfectly from a tapped photon. In the present scheme, on the other hand, Eve cannot do so because she cannot measure one of the two phase differences with 100% probability.

Thus, the present scheme **may be more robust against the beam splitting attack for weak coherent light.**

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an intercept/resend attack using the same receiver setup as Bob.

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- **Eve detects a photon at four possible time instances as Bob does.**
- **obtains partial information when a photon is counted at (ii) or (iii), while she gets no information when it is counted at (i) or (iv).**

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- obtains partial information when a photon is counted at (ii) or (iii), while she gets no information when it is counted at (i) or (iv).
- From the measurement at (ii) or (iii), Eve knows one of the two phase-differences.
- If Eve sends a photon split into two pulses having the measured phase difference, she changes the counting rate at each time instance in Bob.

When Eve measures the phase difference between the first two pulses and resends a fake photon accordingly, Bob counts the photon at time-instances (i), (ii), or (iii).

The probability ratio of the click at (i), (ii), and (iii) is 1:2:1. When Eve measures the phase difference between the second and two pulses, Bob's detectors can click at time-instances (ii), (iii), and (iv) with a probability ratio of 1:2:1. Thus, the overall ratio of the clicks at (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) becomes 1:3:3:1. On the other hand, the counting ratio for a photon split into three pulses is 1:2:2:1. Therefore, this cheating is revealed by

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Sources/ References

1. Inoue, Kyo, Edo Waks, and Yoshihisa Yamamoto. *Physical review letters* 89.3 (2002): 037902.
2. Djordjevic, Ivan B. *Physical-layer security and quantum key distribution*. Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2019.

We have to put the things a little loosely before you because we are still searching for the comparison data for different hardware implementation.