### **Proving Necessity**

Designing a Proof System for Necessary Conditions **Julian Mackay**, James Noble, Sophia Drossopolou, Susan

Eisenbach

### **Traditional Specifications**

- {P}s{Q}

- $\{P\} s \{Q\}$
- if P is true before we execute s, then Q will be true after

```
class Account
   field balance
   field password
   method transfer(pwd, to, amt)
   if this.auth(pwd)
      this.balance -= amt
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   method send(amt)
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- e.g.

- open world

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what if we wanted to specify the behaviour of arbitrary code?

 $extbf{from}\,A_1 \, extbf{next}\,A_2 \, extbf{onlyIf}\,A$   $extbf{from}\,A_1 \, extbf{to}\,A_2 \, extbf{onlyIf}\,A$   $extbf{from}\,A_1 \, extbf{to}\,A_2 \, extbf{onlyThrough}\,A$ 

### $from A_1 next A_2 only If A$

if A1 is true, and A2 is true in the next program state, then A must have originally been true too

• e.g. if a.balance = 100 and in the next visible program state a.balance < 100, then transfer have been called

### $from A_1 to A_2 only If A$

if A1 is true, and A2 is true in some future program state, then A must have originally been true too

e.g. if a.balance = 100 and in some future program state a.balance <</li>
 100, then someone must know our password

#### from $A_1$ to $A_2$ onlyThrough A

if A1 is true, and A2 is true in some future program state, then A must have been true in some intermediate state


e.g. if a.balance = 100 and in some future program state a.balance < 100, then someone have called transfer with the correct password in some intermediate program state</li>

### **Necessity Specifications - Open World**


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### Necessity Specifications - Modelling the Open World

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


 necessity specs describe the externally visible world, i.e. externally visible program states



we base our logic on top of two secondary proof systems

- assertion encapsulation: what assertions require internal library code to be invalidated
- functional specifications: proofs of traditional Hoare triples



our logic consists of 3 components:

- 1. per-call necessary preconditions
  - e.g. for a call to transfer to decrease the balance, the correct password must be given

```
from a.balance = bal && <_ calls a.transfer(pwd, _, _)>
  next a.balance < bal
  onlyIf pwd = a.password</pre>
```

we build this off traditional specifications ....

```
from a.balance = bal && <_ calls a.transfer(pwd, _, _)>
  next a.balance < bal
  onlyIf pwd = a.password

equivalent to ...

{a.balance = bal && pwd <> a.password}
  a.transfer(pwd, _, _)
{a.balance = bal}
```

our logic consists of 3 components:

- 2. per-step necessary preconditions
  - e.g. for any arbitrary execution step to decrease the balance, that step must be a call to transfer with the correct password

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from a.balance = bal
  next a.balance < bal
  onlyIf <_ calls a.transfer(pwd, _, _)> && pwd = a.password
```

we build this on top of assertion encapsulation ...

```
from a.balance = bal
  next a.balance < bal
  onlyIf <_ calls a.transfer(pwd, _, _)> && pwd = a.password
```

#### is true iff

- a : Account
- a.balance = bal is "encapsulated", i.e. requires internal computation to invalidate
- there is no other way to decrease the balance internally

our logic consists of 3 components:

- 3. emergent behaviour
  - e.g. for any execution of arbitrary length to decrease the balance, someone must first know the password

```
from a.balance = bal
  to a.balance < bal
  onlyIf exists x.[<x access a.password> && <external x>]
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- 3. emergent behaviour
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from a.balance = bal
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  onlyIf exists x.[<x access a.password> && <external x>]
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```
\frac{M \vdash \{x : C \land P_1 \land \neg P\} \text{ res} = x.m(\overline{z}) \{\neg P_2\}}{M \vdash \text{ from } P_1 \land x : C \land \langle \_\text{ calls } x.m(\overline{z}) \rangle \text{ next } P_2 \text{ onlyIf } P} \qquad \text{(If1-CLASSICAL)} \frac{M \vdash \{x : C \land \neg P\} \text{ res} = x.m(\overline{z}) \{\text{res} \neq y\}}{M \vdash \text{ from inside}(y) \land x : C \land \langle \_\text{ calls } x.m(\overline{z}) \rangle \text{ next } \neg \text{inside}(y) \text{ onlyIf } P} \qquad \text{(If1-Inside)}
```

```
 \begin{bmatrix} \text{ for all } C \in \text{dom}(M) \text{ and } m \in M(C).\text{mths,} \\ [M \vdash \text{ from } A_1 \land x : C \land \langle \_\text{calls } x.m(\overline{z}) \rangle \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A_3] \end{bmatrix} \\ \frac{M \vdash A_1 \longrightarrow \neg A_2 \qquad M \vdash A_1 \Rightarrow \textit{Enc}(A_2)}{M \vdash \text{ from } A_1 \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A_3} \\ \frac{M \vdash A_1 \longrightarrow A_1' \qquad M \vdash A_2 \longrightarrow A_2' \qquad M \vdash A_3' \longrightarrow A_3 \qquad M \vdash \text{ from } A_1' \text{ next } A_2' \text{ onlyIf } A_3'}{M \vdash \text{ from } A_1 \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A_3} \\ \frac{M \vdash \text{ from } A_1 \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A \lor A' \qquad M \vdash \text{ from } A' \text{ to } A_2 \text{ onlyThrough false}}{M \vdash \text{ from } A_1 \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A} \\ \frac{\forall y, M \vdash \text{ from } ([y/x]A_1) \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A}{M \vdash \text{ from } \exists x.[A_1] \text{ next } A_2 \text{ onlyIf } A} \\ (\text{If 1-J_1}) \\ \end{bmatrix}
```

$$\frac{M + \operatorname{from} A \operatorname{next} \neg A \operatorname{onlyIf} A'}{M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyThrough} A'} \quad (\operatorname{Changes}) \qquad \frac{M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyThrough} A_3}{M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyThrough} A} \quad (\operatorname{Trans}_1)$$

$$\frac{M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyThrough} A_3}{M + \operatorname{from} A_3 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyThrough} A} \quad (\operatorname{Trans}_2)$$

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\frac{M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyThrough} A_3 \qquad M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_3 \operatorname{onlyIf} A}{M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyIf} A} \qquad \text{(IF-Trans)}
M + \operatorname{from} x : C \operatorname{to} \neg x : C \operatorname{onlyIf} \operatorname{false} \qquad \text{(IF-Class)} \qquad M + \operatorname{from} A_1 \operatorname{to} A_2 \operatorname{onlyIf} A_1 \qquad \text{(IF-Start)}
```

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- closely related to temporal logic, so how do they compare?

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- currently assertion encapsulation is constructed from an ad-hoc system relying on a rudimentary type system, can we define a full fledged proof system for encapsulation?