#### Summary from James' visit

## A: how to reason about external calls and how to reason about protection in the open world,

Here the call of an external function. Note that I changed the notation for "y is protected from x by module M" to be

In the above,  $\mathtt{HS}_\mathtt{M}$  is the holistic specification of  $\mathtt{M}$ . And we define "y is protected from x by module  $\mathtt{M}$ " as below

$$M, \sigma \models y \nmid x \triangleq \forall n, f_1, ... f_n. [\sigma(x.f_1...f_n) = y \implies \exists k < n. \sigma(x.f_1...f_k) \in M]$$


Note that the above definition does not preclude tat the path once it went through M, can go outside again. Here it is possible that  $j>k \land \sigma(x.f_1...f_i) \notin M$ .

And we need some HL rules for the preservation of yix. For example, something like


## B: Obtaining holistic specs of more than one module

#### **Lack of monotonicity**


Here some implications which do not hold in general (btw, check in how far they would hold in the closed world)




For example:



And similarly, the following implication does not hold, eg "Accountant" gives a counter-example



However, some assertions are "stable", and then, more implications hold



#### How do we combine modules into larger ones?

When we combine modules, we should distinguish between


- 1) M1[M2] M1 encapsulates M2, and M2 is not visible outside M1
- 2) M1 | M2 M1 and M2 are not aware of each other, and are both visible to outside
- 3) M1[M2] || M2

M1 uses M2, and they are both visible to outside

4) M1[M2] || M2[M1]

M1 and M2 use each ither, and are both visible to outside

#### Three avenues to obtain holistic specs from several modules



P is dedicated, ie we have M[P]

 $Q:=P \mid M$ 

Q.tr : classical triples for Q

Q.HS: Holistic Spec Q

Black arrows:

as we did in OOPSLA'23


Blue Arrow (new)

**Combine Holistic Specs** 


Red Arrow (new)


Combine Code and HS

An Example of the "red avenue" from above. Here, printers keep authorization tokens, and only print if the call print(k) passes a k which is one of the authorization tokens. In that case the call print)k) returns true.





## An Example of the "Blue Avenue" from above






# Here its application





**Example: Printer, Printer Multiplexer and Bank** 



### Things that I have not yet fully "deciphered"

I think that G stands for obeys, P for pays, but B?

