Share of audited resources involving corruption Dependent variable OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Matching (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6) (7)

-0.020

[0.010]\*\*

0.10

476

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

-0.020

[0.010]\*\*

0.08

476

Yes

No

No

No

No

Mayor in first term

Mayor characteristics

characteristics
Political and judicial

institutions Lottery intercepts

State intercepts

Observations

Municipal

 $R^2$ 

-0.019

[0.009]\*\*

0.01

476

No

No

No

No

No

TABLE 4—THE EFFECTS OF REFLECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION

-0.024

[0.011]\*\*

0.12

476

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

-0.026

[0.011]\*\*

0.14

476

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

-0.027

[0.011]\*\*

0.20

476

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.028

[0.010]\*\*

n/a

476

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Tobit

(8)

[0.012]\*\*

n/a

476

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.042