

BIT MUN 2014

29TH-30TH MARCH, 2014

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

"ROLE OF NATO IN AFGHANISTAN POST 2014"

Reference Guide

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to BIT MUN 2014 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. My name is *Mudit Singhvi*, and I am excited to meet you all in Jaipur! I along with *Shreya Gupta* will serve as your Executive Board members at BIT MUN 2014.

This March you will find yourself in the seat of international military power, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. You will debate one of the most pressing issues of the 21st century. The topic to be discussed is “Role of NATO in Afghanistan Post 2014”

NATO relies on a “know it by sight” litmus test for involvement, which provides a non-standard front to NATO’s allies and adversaries, and prevents coordination of response to developing or near to end crises. NATO’s role in the 21st century touches upon the topic, but asks the broader question of “What should be NATO’s job in the world of 2014?” Delegates should consider not only NATO’s intervention/non intervention aims, but also its endgame in expansion, and interactions with other international organizations. Is NATO still primarily a military alliance, or should it be viewed as a peacekeeping organization with greater might than the UN?

To familiarize with your individual country’s policy and role in NATO is very essential. As NATO is a deliberative body, there is a plethora of statements and viewpoints on its actions. Fully understand this information and weaving it into a cohesive and correct country policy is key to a realistic and successful summit.

The study guide will be a great first resource, and we highly recommend all delegates to read it cover to cover, but it is by no means all the preparation a delegate on this committee needs. We will recommend you all to visit the Official Website of NATO and all other relevant web resources, without which the simulation would not be realistic.

The topic area provides ample challenge and stimulating debate for the duration of the simulation. Having up-to-date information will benefit you as the simulation will move fast in transpired events. Please feel free to e-mail us with any questions or concerns. Or just to say hello! We hope you are excited for BITMUN 2013.

Take care and see you in March 2014!

Perspire and Inspire!

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“Afghanistan will one day stand on it’s own, but it will not be standing alone”

~A.F. Rasmussen (NATO Secretary General)

A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan will strengthen development in the region, and help progress in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and crime

Important progress has been made both in terms of security and development, but the task is not yet complete. In particular, the Afghan government needs to pursue its commitments to improve rule of law and good governance, including fighting corruption and promoting human rights.

NATO and the international community remain committed to supporting Afghanistan in the long term to secure a better future for the Afghan people.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established on April 4th, 1949 as an intergovernmental military alliance. The Alliance's creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration. Since its inception, NATO went through different stages of development, changing from a bi-polar power in the Cold War to a crisis orientated entity today. Starting with 12 member countries in 1949, it grew to an organization comprising 28 countries, with its latest members, Croatia and Albania, joining in 2009.

Like any alliance, NATO is ultimately governed by its 28 member states. However, the North Atlantic Treaty outlines how decisions are to be made within its structure. Each of the 28 members sends a delegation or mission to NATO's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; the senior permanent member of each delegation is known as the Permanent Representative. Together, the Permanent Members form the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a body which meets together at least once a week and has effective governance authority and powers of decision in NATO.

The meetings of the North Atlantic Council are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO and action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord when decisions are to be made. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the Council table, or on any of its subordinate committees, retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.

Introduction

Thousands of NATO troops have spent the past 10 years fighting for stability of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, increasing budget constraints of NATO countries struck by financial crisis together with high, long-lasting expenses of troop deployment have created political pressure to conclude the mission and invest in domestic economies instead. Starting from 1st January 2015, all combat units will be withdrawn, and the security of a country of 31 million people will be handed over to the national security forces. Still, the country is far from being stable, time is running out, and NATO needs to plan thoroughly its role in and after the transition. Some of the main questions for concern are:

- *How many assistance and advisory teams should stay deployed in Afghanistan? What role should they assume?*
- *What other measures can NATO take to support security and stability of Afghan government? What should be the form of cooperation?*

Many factors play their role that might affect decision-making in the future Afghanistan, the most notable in favour of higher involvement being the influence of Taliban and terrorism, instability of the government, economic sustainability, preparedness of Afghan National Security Forces etc. The strongest arguments against high involvement are the costs and geopolitical impact of NATO presence in the region. Moreover, other players in the region have to be taken into account, as their actions affect the situation in Afghanistan.

History and Current State of Play

Historical background

“The Graveyard of Empires” is the unofficial title of Afghanistan, as two great world powers have managed to bury their armies there. First the British Empire during three Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-43, 1878-1880 and 1919) when it was opposing the Russian empire and Iranian intrigues in Afghanistan. Second, during the last decade of the Cold War, Afghanistan was under Soviet occupation that transformed into a war between USSR troops and insurgents (most notably supported by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan). USSR could not economically and politically sustain the war and eventually withdrew from Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Soviets kept the established communist government alive until the eventual fall of USSR. With ongoing economic crisis and no Soviet support, the government could not maintain power over the fragmented state. When in 1992 Burhanuddin Rabbani replaced the communist government as the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in order to establish a democratic system, the opposition militia led by Abdul Rashid Dostum were occupying the north of Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the south was falling under the influence of Taliban linked to Al-Qaeda.

International support, especially from the U.S. and the UN, has decreased dramatically for variety of reasons. Taliban managed to capture the capital city and was de facto ruling and terrorizing most of the country until the end of the millennium. Despite their former enmity, Massoud with the help of Rabbani formed a coalition with Dostum called the *Northern*

Alliance (or the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) to maintain influence in the northern part of the country. The breaking point was September 2001 – the terrorist attack against the US that was accompanied by the assassinations of the defence minister Massoud and the president. Once it had been determined that the attacks came from abroad, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time and launched the Operation Enduring Freedom.

In the meantime, the UN Security Council agreed on the deployment of the **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)** that cooperated with Hamid Karzai's interim government on reconstruction of the country and stabilizing Kabul. Taliban had already been toppled, certain members of Al-Qaeda captured and the power of insurgents pushed on lower political level or abroad to Pakistan. However, Taliban found the environment in Pakistan more favourable and started to emerge from the south of Afghanistan in 2003. It resorted to strategically more successful asymmetric warfare, such as sabotage, raids, terrorism, provocations etc. Danger of asymmetric war lies in the knowledge of terrain and "hit and run" attacks that are undemanding in terms of training and equipment. What is more, impact is long-term, and the attacks can hardly be prevented in the mountain terrain. Training required for Taliban techniques is not only faster and easier, but also often supported by local warlords.

Over the years, the conflict has transformed into a long-term asymmetric war. Costs and length of the conflict has forced NATO to conclude active military intervention and put more emphasis on diplomatic peace efforts leading to the 2010 agreement on the transition of security responsibility to Afghan government.

Transition process or Integral

The transition itself is a process of withdrawing foreign combat forces and establishing peace secured by Afghan government. It has been officially sealed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit with signature of *the Enduring Peace Partnership*; the first tranche out of five was launched a year later in March and the last one in June 2013. When it is officially concluded by the end of 2014, Afghan National Security Forces (hereinafter referred to as ANSF) will assume full security responsibility for the country under the command of Afghan government. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, who are providing technical assistance and building the capacity of provincial governments, will have handed over their functions to the Afghan government. Further transition support takes the form of cooperation in training with thirty-seven contributing countries involved in the *NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A)*. It was established in 2009 in order to enable ANSF to take over responsibility for Afghan security by the end of 2014. Aligned body is the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), which is responsible for the operational training of ANSF units in the field through the so called Security Force Assistance Teams.

Post-ISAF Afghanistan

The main goal of ISAF has been to provide conditions for the Afghan government to be functional, stable and sustainable with the support of ANSF. After 2014 the support of NATO will be deprived of the combat troops, however, it still has to be decided how many advisory and assistance team members will arrive to replace them. NATO will need the approval of the Afghan government to confirm the number. At this point, it seems that it would be about 9,000 of U.S. troops and 6,000 of its allies (current number is around 100,000 troops). It is still necessary to perfectly clarify the scope of their power and deployment. The Enduring

Peace Partnership guarantees post-2014 cooperation of NATO countries in the areas of mentoring and financial support for institutions and high military and police levels, fight against corruption, development of civil aviation, connectivity and internet access or disaster preparedness. At the 2012 Tokyo conference, Afghan government in return made commitments to hold transparent elections in 2014, fight corruption, improve public financial management, endorse the constitution, rule of law and human rights.

The question remains, whether the government will be feasible enough to fulfil its commitments and sustainably steer the country out of humanitarian, economic and social crisis. It is necessary to realize that key pillars for reconstruction include long list of humanitarian and social tasks, such as: demining, delivery of basic foods and medicine, refugee support, medical and psychological care for those affected by the fighting, drinkable water and electricity supply or development of educational institutions. Economic and infrastructural reconstruction accompanies the social dimension by protecting the establishment of new enterprises, banks, farms and agricultural production. Last but not least, forming a functioning system of law and order, dealing with past violence, establishment of institutions and expelling corruption are long-term essential tasks for sustainable Afghanistan that have to be taken into consideration during decision-making process.

Parties and factors involved in transition

Deciding factors in transition are not limited to internal insecurity, influence is partly international. Currently, ISAF troop contributors include twenty-one partner countries, from Australia to Latin America. Key actors from the region have their political and geo-economic interests in Afghanistan. Countries are far from being the only players in the transition, however essential they might be. The Alliance works in close cooperation with various international organizations, including:

- **United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan** - political mission, helping on request of Afghan government, e.g. with organizing elections or assisting local institutions.
- **World Bank** (via Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) - financing variety of projects from rural development, public management to gender rights protection
- **European Union** - mostly using development and humanitarian assistance
- **Development and humanitarian aid** - humanitarian aid reflects emergency needs, such as food, shelter or medical appliances. Development aid focuses on long-term projects to build infrastructure, support agriculture, healthcare, education or civil society. Hundreds of organizations provide such help, more information can be found via OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Reconstruction and support for Afghanistan must take into account factors that might affect the stability of democratic government. Afghanistan is fighting a social and humanitarian crisis, the economy belongs to one of the poorest and worst performing in the world and both neighbouring and world powers are highly conscious of its strategic importance in the region, acting accordingly.

Countries with Vested Interests

Pakistan

Current relations with Pakistan have been formed by a very complex historical process involving the 1893 Durand Line separating these territories. Pakistani militants took part in

the war in Afghanistan (some 8000 troops after 1996, some of them belonging to Taliban) against the United Islamic Front and NATO forces. Alleged link between Pakistani and Afghan Taliban is accompanied by the link of Pakistani intelligence services. Pakistan is perceived as a source for terroristic ambitions in Afghanistan. At the same time it is a strategic transition point for NATO supplies, even though NATO and UN are in search for safer alternatives. Pakistani government fears the cooperation of Afghanistan with India, because the latter two would “squeeze” Pakistan in between.

India

“India and Pakistan can play a crucial role in bringing peace back in Afghanistan.” India enjoys cordial relations with Kabul, providing over USD 2 billion of development and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Most recently, Afghanistan has lobbied for military support for post-2014 as well. Pakistani generals fear being squeezed between massive Indian presence to their south and a pro-Indian regime to the north in Afghanistan. Not to forget that both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers with long-lasting disputes, mostly over Kashmir territory.

Iran

Iran’s mixed approach to Afghanistan results from cultural proximity of part of Afghans, most notably the Tajiks and the Hazaras, and geopolitical relations to Taliban and the US. Even though Iran has almost gone into war with Taliban in 2001, it is not fond of the military deployment of foreign troops that fight Taliban. Despite the cultural ties, Iran has used Afghan refugees as a negotiating leverage.

Russia

Russia is facilitating the transit of non-military equipment from Europe via Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is an active body in counter-narcotics, technician training or technical support. Russia is concerned about the stability of the region after withdrawal, especially in relation to narcotics, terrorism and Islamic radicalism. President Putin urged NATO to leave the forces beyond planned withdrawal and even considers own troops deployment at the Tajik-Afghan border. Further steps of Russia should be monitored closely; it has undisputable interest in the region, preserves former Soviet contacts and will have impact on development of the country.

Partner countries in Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan provide support to ISAF, including overflight rights, support for supply routes and the leasing of military bases to individual Allies.

Japan

Top partner as for development, peace efforts and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Japan runs programs for insurgent reintegration, finances assistance and reconstruction teams and contributes to the trust funds of the Afghan National Army, Afghan police and NATO Partnership.

Players in the region

Exercise their power using unofficial means, not refraining from supporting and gaining from arms trafficking, drug trade and the strategic location of Afghanistan.

Factors

Few lines are far from enough to grasp the complexity of relevant factors that will form NATO role in Afghanistan, and so the list below is merely indicative:

Economic costs for NATO

Deployment of soldiers and military equipment in the past is costly, as well as funding the ANSF training and support for after 2015. Withdrawal is burdening NATO budget and the faster it is, the more expensive it becomes and consequently affects domestic political will as well. “The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, taken together, will be the most expensive wars in US history totalling somewhere between USD 4 trillion and USD 6 trillion” “It is estimated that the cost of deploying one (American) soldier for one year in this war amounts to USD 1 million”

Causalities and humanitarian issue

According to a Brown University project Costs of War, at least 16,725 Afghan civilians have been killed directly and many more indirectly as a result of poor living standards, illnesses and other factors related to the war. Causalities of Afghan security forces were four times higher in 2012 than in 2007 and the desertion rate closes up to 50,000 men per year. Ammunition that has been left on the Afghan soil since Soviet occupation is being enriched by dangerous military equipment of departing NATO troops, especially mines or grenades. These are responsible for several hundred civilian deaths each year and should be addressed with logistic and financial solution during transition.

Refugees

There is an estimated number of 2.7 million of Afghans living in exile in neighbouring countries as a result of instability. International efforts have helped to repatriate some 5.7 million refugees in the past 10 years, however, the rest refuse to return because of problematic reintegration and instable situation. Many Afghans that returned home were forced to move from rural to urban areas in search of sustainable jobs and lives, thus becoming part of the estimated 450,000 internally displaced people in Afghanistan. Some seek asylum in industrialized countries, primarily in Germany and Turkey, but their placement is temporary.

Instability of Afghan Authorities

It would be more than misleading to state that Afghan official authorities are ready to sustainably govern the country and lead it out of current crisis. ANSF forces are slowly gaining experience in their role, but the process is to be finished. Their men need training to increase effectiveness and ensure the security of citizens. Taliban, insurgents, warlords, opium-related violence and foreign influence are considerable challenges to tackle. Security forces will require funding for logistical and military equipment. The manpower itself also needs reinforcement and uplift in morale and discipline. If NATO wants to stand up to its commitments, it cannot afford to leave the power solely in the hands of government and president, who depend on armed, partly trained and disputably loyal forces that might be exploited by opposition or other vested interests.

Warlords

A power structure existing along the official government and communicating together. Their power is stronger on local and regional level, where “these commanders do actually represent

the government.” It may include control over agricultural production, infrastructure and opium trade; moreover, warlords do not refrain from taking over the land or using violence, force or threats against farmers. It is not possible to simply eliminate the warlords, because many are maintaining official governmental posts, strong unofficial local power and Taliban relations at the same time. Gaining their sympathies might be a complicated task, it would weaken the government, and the loyalty of warlords is linked more to power and economic benefits than international politics. On the other hand, freezing all communication could seriously undermine other current efforts.

Ethnicity

Afghanistan is not ethnically united country; its nation is divided into Pashtun (42 %), Tajik (27 %), Hazara (9 %), Uzbek (9 %) and other ethnic groups. “Today the Tajiks make up 70 % of the officers in the Afghan army and conversely many Pashtuns support or at least feel residual sympathies for the Taliban” With relation to their significance in Afghan history and also current presence in Pakistan, the Pashtu majority is not to be overlooked.

Opium cultivation

Afghanistan is the world’s top producer of opium and its derivatives, which accounts for 82 % of world production. In regions with high concentration of drug fields, the economy is affected by production of poppy as opposed to regular crops, and in some provinces of Afghanistan the family income depends as much as 40 % on opium. Earnings from drug trade are connected to organized crime, insurgencies, corruption and Taliban.

Taliban and terrorism

The complex Taliban-terrorism relations and widespread abuse of power, drugs and corruption are helping Taliban maintain their ties in Afghan high-level structures. Moreover, western diplomats realize the need for peace-talks, so the temporarily suspended discussions between Taliban, Afghan government and partner countries have been restored in June 2013. The need to tackle terrorism has resulted in anti-Taliban Northern Alliance groups regrouping under the umbrella of the National Coalition of Afghanistan (political arm) and the National Front of Afghanistan (military arm). Terrorism is not limited to Afghanistan, so the counterterrorism operations in South Asia that are the easiest to control from allied Afghanistan with strategic position are of grave importance.

Some Conclusions and Options

The scale of currently discussed scenarios ranges from “**zero option**” to strong presence, leaving room for negotiation of the **realistic scenario** somewhere in between.

The “**zero option**” means leaving not a single NATO or any other official foreign troop in the country, not even for training. This option would provide Mr Karzai with “Afghan-led” peace talks and transformation, as he favours, and might increase his legitimacy as opposed to being a puppet under the U.S. It is also the cheapest option that would be welcomed by domestic voters of NATO members. On the other hand, the objective should be to stabilize security for the Afghani people and depriving ANSF from help might damage the morale, while encouraging the Taliban.

Strong presence option would provide NATO with information and control over unsecured areas to a certain degree. Moreover, the influence in entire region would be maintained even

from the point of view of surrounding countries. ANSF would have the possibility to receive training and strategic support and it would be easier to deliver physical help (for delivering equipment or infrastructure). On the other hand, support for NATO is not that strong in Afghanistan and Taliban might gain moral advantage over the government. It could also be considered a diplomatic signal by other countries, such as Russia, Pakistan, Iran or China, who would probably not react favourably on continuous foreign troop deployment in their area of interest.

The **realistic scenario**, nevertheless, is not likely to reach any of the above options and can be expected to follow a middle path. Main task is to decide the following:

How and to what extent the support will be provided to Afghanistan after 2014?

The transition process must take into account the capability of ANSF to handle security tasks transferred from ISAF, the security of citizens, local governance and adjustments of ISAF role regarding ANSF possibilities.

In order for the transition to be successful, ANSF need to develop effective authority that can sustain security in the long-term.

Negotiations of the Ambassadors should cover the geopolitical implications of countries in the region as well.

The task is both urgent and complicated; a true challenge for its negotiators.

A chronology of key events (Afghanistan)

1838-42 - British forces invade, install King Shah Shujah. He is assassinated in 1842. British and Indian troops are massacred during retreat from Kabul.

1878-80 - Second Anglo-Afghan War. A treaty gives Britain control of Afghan foreign affairs.

1919 - Emir Amanullah Khan declares independence from British influence.

1926-29 - Amanullah tries to introduce social reforms, which however stir civil unrest. He flees.

1933 - Zahir Shah becomes king and Afghanistan remains a monarchy for next four decades.

1953 - General Mohammed Daud becomes prime minister. Turns to Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. Introduces social reforms, such as abolition of purdah (practice of secluding women from public view).

1963 - Mohammed Daud forced to resign as prime minister.

1964 - Constitutional monarchy introduced - but leads to political polarisation and power struggles.

1973 - Mohammed Daud seizes power in a coup and declares a republic. Tries to play off USSR against Western powers.

1978 - General Daud is overthrown and killed in a pro-Soviet coup. The People's Democratic Party comes to power but is paralysed by violent infighting and faces opposition by US-backed mujahideen groups.

Soviet intervention

1979 December - Soviet Army invades and props up communist government.

1980 - Babrak Karmal installed as ruler, backed by Soviet troops. But opposition intensifies with various mujahideen groups fighting Soviet forces. US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supply money and arms to the mujahideen.

1985 - Mujahideen come together in Pakistan to form alliance against Soviet forces. Half of Afghan population now estimated to be displaced by war, with many fleeing to neighbouring Iran or Pakistan.

1986 - US begins supplying mujahideen with Stinger missiles, enabling them to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships. Babrak Karmal replaced by Najibullah as head of Soviet-backed regime.

1988 - Afghanistan, USSR, the US and Pakistan sign peace accords and Soviet Union begins pulling out troops.

Red Army quits

1989 - Last Soviet troops leave, but civil war continues as mujahideen push to overthrow Najibullah.

1992 - Najibullah's government toppled, but a devastating civil war follows.

1996 - Taliban seize control of Kabul and introduce hard-line version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic punishments, which include stoning to death and amputations.

1997 - Taliban recognised as legitimate rulers by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They now control about two-thirds of country.

1998 - US launches missile strikes at suspected bases of militant Osama bin Laden, accused of bombing US embassies in Africa.

1999 - UN imposes an air embargo and financial sanctions to force Afghanistan to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial.

2001 September - Ahmad Shah Masood, leader of the main opposition to the Taliban - the Northern Alliance - is assassinated.

US-led invasion

2001 October - US-led bombing of Afghanistan begins following the September 11 attacks on the United States. Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces enter Kabul shortly afterwards.

2001 December - Afghan groups agree deal in Bonn, Germany for interim government.

Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of an interim power-sharing government.

2002 January - Deployment of first contingent of foreign peacekeepers - the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - marking the start of a protracted fight against the Taliban.

2002 April - Former king Zahir Shah returns, but makes no claim to the throne and dies in 2007.

2002 June - Loya Jirga, or grand council, elects Hamid Karzai as interim head of state. Karzai picks members of his administration which is to serve until 2004.

2003 August - Nato takes control of security in Kabul, its first-ever operational commitment outside Europe.

Elections

2004 January - Loya Jirga adopts new constitution which provides for strong presidency.

2004 October-November - Presidential elections. Hamid Karzai is declared winner.

2005 September - Afghans vote in first parliamentary elections in more than 30 years.

2005 December - Parliament opens with warlords and strongmen in most of the seats.

2006 October - Nato assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force.

2007 August - Opium production has soared to a record high, the UN reports.

2008 June - President Karzai warns that Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails to take action against them.

2008 July - Suicide bomb attack on Indian embassy in Kabul kills more than 50.

2008 September - US President George Bush sends an extra 4,500 US troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a "quiet surge".

2009 January - US Defence Secretary Robert Gates tells Congress that Afghanistan is new US administration's "greatest test".

2009 February - Nato countries pledge to increase military and other commitments in Afghanistan after US announces dispatch of 17,000 extra troops.

New US approach

2009 March - US President Barack Obama unveils new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. An extra 4,000 US personnel will train and bolster the Afghan army and police and there will be support for civilian development.

2009 August - Presidential and provincial elections are marred by widespread Taliban attacks, patchy turnout and claims of serious fraud.

2009 October - Mr Karzai declared winner of August presidential election, after second-placed opponent Abdullah Abdullah pulls out before the second round.

2009 December - US President Obama decides to boost US troop numbers in Afghanistan by 30,000, bringing total to 100,000. He says US will begin withdrawing its forces by 2011.

An Al-Qaeda double agent kills seven CIA agents in a suicide attack on a US base in Khost.

2010 February - Nato-led forces launch major offensive, Operation Moshtarak, in bid to secure government control of southern Helmand province.

2010 July - Whistleblowing website Wikileaks publishes thousands of classified US military documents relating to Afghanistan.

General David Petraeus takes command of US, ISAF forces.

2010 August - Dutch troops quit.

Karzai says private security firms - accused of operating with impunity - must cease operations. He subsequently waters down the decree.

2010 September - Parliamentary polls marred by Taliban violence, widespread fraud and a long delay in announcing results.

2010 November - Nato - at summit in Lisbon - agrees plan to hand control of security to Afghan forces by end of 2014.

2011 January - President Karzai makes first official state visit to Russia by an Afghan leader since the end of the Soviet invasion in 1989.

2011 February - Number of civilians killed since the 2001 invasion hit record levels in 2010, Afghanistan Rights Monitor reports.

2011 April - Burning of Koran by a US pastor prompts country-wide protests in which foreign UN workers and several Afghans are killed.

Some 500 mostly Taliban prisoners break out of prison in Kandahar.

2011 July - President's half-brother and Kandahar governor Ahmad Wali Karzai is killed in Taliban campaign against prominent figures.

2011 September - Ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani - a go-between in talks with the Taliban - is assassinated.

2011 October - As relations with Pakistan worsen after a series of attacks, Afghanistan and India sign a strategic partnership to expand co-operation in security and development.

Military pact

2011 November - President Karzai wins the endorsement of tribal elders to negotiate a 10-year military partnership with the US at a loya jirga traditional assembly. The proposed pact will see US troops remain after 2014, when foreign troops are due to leave the country.

2011 December - At least 58 people are killed in twin attacks at a Shia shrine in Kabul and a Shia mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Pakistan and the Taleban boycott the scheduled Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Pakistan refuses to attend after a Nato air strike killed Pakistani soldiers on the Afghan border.

2012 January - Taliban agree to open office in Dubai as a move towards peace talks with the US and the Afghan government.

2012 February - At least 30 people are killed in protests about the burning of copies of the Koran at the US Bagram airbase. US officials believed Taliban prisoners were using the books to pass messages, and that they were extremist texts not Korans. Two soldiers are also killed in reprisal attacks.

2012 March - US Army Sgt Robert Bales is accused of killing 16 civilians in an armed rampage in the Panjwai district of Kandahar.

2012 April - Taliban announce "spring offensive" with audacious attack on the diplomatic quarter of Kabul. The government blamed the Haqqani Network. Security forces kill 38 militants.

Nato withdrawal plan

2012 May - Nato summit endorses the plan to withdraw foreign combat troops by the end of 2014.

New French President Francois Hollande says France will withdraw its combat mission by the end of 2012 - a year earlier than planned.

Arsala Rahmani of the High Peace Council is shot dead in Kabul. A former Taliban minister, he was crucial in reaching out to rebel commanders. The Taliban deny responsibility.

2012 July - Tokyo donor conference pledges \$16bn in civilian aid to Afghanistan up to 2016, with US, Japan, Germany and UK supplying bulk of funds. Afghanistan agrees to new conditions to counter corruption.

2012 August - The US military discipline six soldiers for accidentally burning copies of the Koran and other religious texts in Afghanistan. They will not face criminal prosecution. Three US Marines are also disciplined for a video in which the bodies of dead Taliban fighters were urinated on.

2012 September - US hands over Bagram high-security jail to the Afghan government, although it retains control over some foreign prisoners until March 2013.

The US also suspends training new police recruits in order to carry out checks on possible ties to Taliban following series of attacks on foreign troops by apparent police and Afghan soldiers.

2013 February - President Karzai and Pakistan's Asif Ali Zardari agree to work for an Afghan peace deal within six months after talks hosted by Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron. They back the opening of an Afghan office in Doha and urge the Taliban to do the same for talks to take place.

2013 March - Two former Kabul Bank chiefs, Sherkhan Farnood and Khalilullah Ferozi, are jailed for the multi-million dollar fraud that almost led to its collapse and that of the entire Afghan banking system in 2010.

2013 June - Afghan army takes command of all military and security operations from Nato forces.

President Karzai suspends security talks with the US after Washington announces it plans to hold direct talks with the Taliban. Afghanistan insists on conducting the talks with the Taliban in Qatar itself.

2013 November - Consultative loya jirga assembly of elders backs President Karzai's proposed security agreement to provide US military with bases in Afghanistan after Nato troops formally withdraw in 2014. Jirga, like US, backs immediate approval of the deal, whereas President Karzai seeks further US progress to deliver peace before signing.

Recent Happenings

NATO Defence Ministers and counterparts from ISAF partner nations met with Afghan Defence Minister Bismullah Khan Mohammadi on Thursday (27 February 2014), to review ISAF mission progress and to discuss NATO's relationship with Afghanistan after 2014. "We are focused on completing ISAF, but we also need certainty and predictability to launch our new mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan forces after 2014," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said after the meeting.

The ISAF mission will end on 31 December 2014. In the remaining 10 months, ISAF's work will focus on enabling the Afghan security forces to take on full security responsibility for the country and providing logistical support for the elections this year. "*The Afghan security forces are creating the conditions for secure elections. They have primary responsibility*", the Secretary General said. The ISAF mission has so far provided airlift support for transportation of election material to regional hubs and district polling locations.

Ministers also discussed the implications and risks resulting from delays in finalising required legal agreements, before Allies can establish a follow-on mission. The Resolute Support Mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces after 2014 requires a legal framework. The signature of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan (BSA) is a prerequisite for concluding a Status of Forces Agreement between NATO and Afghanistan, which is currently being negotiated. "*If the Bilateral Security Agreement is not signed, we cannot conclude the Status of Forces Agreement. And without*

the necessary legal framework, there simply cannot be a deployment after 2014. No security agreement. No troops and trainers. These are the hard facts", Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen said.

He went on to say: *"So today, we discussed the need to plan for all possible outcomes, including the possibility that we may not be able to deploy to Afghanistan after 2014, due to the persistent delays we have seen. Let me be clear, that is not the outcome we want. It is not the outcome that we think is in the interest of the Afghan people. However, this is what is at stake"*. The ministers were briefed by NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, Ambassador Maurits Jochems and by the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force General Joseph F. Dunford.

Ambassador Jan Kubiš, United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan and the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton also attended the meeting.

Appendix - 1

The North Atlantic Treaty Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. ⁽³⁾

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of

America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

Rules of Procedure of the North Atlantic Council of NATO at BIT MUN'14

Rules of Procedure of the North Atlantic Council of NATO

(Suited for simulation at BIT MUN, 2014)

1. The Board of the Council**1.1. Composition.**

The Board of the North Atlantic Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the Council) will be composed of the Chair of the Council, the Vice-Chair of NATO.

1.2. Competence of the Board.

The competence of the Board may not be questioned by the delegates at any time and for whatever reason.

1.3. Board: Authorities and Responsibilities.**1.3.1. Authority of the Chair.**

The Chair shall exercise ultimate authority over his/her Council, presiding in an equitable and objective manner. The Board also reserves the right to propose a motion at any time, which will help the work and procedures of the Council move forward and should be taken seriously into account by the Council. In case of disruptive or dilatory behaviour of any participants, the Chair reserves the right to take any appropriate action.

1.3.2. Responsibilities of the Chair.

The Chair is responsible for all procedural matters pertaining to the Council, including, but not limited to, moderating debate, determining the applicability of the rules and if necessary, clarifying on the meaning of the existing rules without needing any approval of the Council.

1.3.3. Authority of the Vice-Chair.

The Vice-Chair shall have authority over all Council support operations. The Vice-Chair shall have as primary responsibility to ensure, in co-operation with the Secretary General, that delegates are accurately representing the position of their countries with respect to

substantive issues and topics. The Vice-Chair reserves the right to take appropriate actions to ensure the proper representation of country-policies by the delegates.

1.3.4. Responsibilities of the Vice Chair.

The Vice-Chair shall also be responsible for ensuring relevancy of the content and format of the Working Papers before their submission for verification. The Vice-Chair shall also assist the Chair with all Council presiding matters.

2. Delegations

2.1. Members

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation meet within the North Atlantic Council (hereinafter referred to as the Council).

2.2. Non-Council Members

When an issue before the Council involves a state non-party to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council reserves the right to invite the delegation to be present during Council sessions in which the issue is being discussed. This Motion requires Simple Majority to pass. Subsequently the Council may dismiss non-Council Delegations as it sees fit. This motion also requires Simple Majority.

2.2.1. Debating Privileges

A non-Council member is given debating rights. This will allow the delegation to be recognized by the Chair during debate, but not to vote on draft Communiqués or amendments.

2.3. Permission to Approach the Bench.

Any delegate wishing to contact the Chair for a very delicate matter may ask for permission to approach the Bench. This is a last resort in case of *emergency*.

3. Parliamentary procedure

3.1. Roll Call.

Attendance shall be conducted by the Chair by a Roll Call at the beginning of every session. Delegates shall establish their presence in the Council by raising their placards and declaring “*Present*”.

3.2. Procedural Matters.

Procedural matters are those matters relating to the structure of the Council session. They include, but are not limited to, establishing speaking time, motions and adjournment of the council session. All delegates must vote on procedural matters by raising their placards and no delegate may abstain. Roll Call vote is not in order for procedural matters.

3.3. Substantive Matters.

Substantive matters are defined as those matters relating to the specific topic at hand. Delegates that have established their presence at the initial Role Call shall act accordingly. Roll Call vote on substantive matters is in order following voting procedure as set in section 13.1.

3.3.1. Decision Making Process

The Council of N.A.T.O. during BITMUN is composed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty working towards the unanimous adoption of Draft Communiqués.

4. Quorum

Council activities and debate shall start when at least 50% +1 of the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are present. If quorum is not met thirty (30) minutes after the scheduled start time of the Council session, the Council shall start its session with the number of delegates already present, unless otherwise instructed by BIT MUN Secretariat. Participants arriving during or after the Roll Call, are required to send a note to the Chair stating their presence in the Council. As long as participants have not informed the Chair of their arrival they will not be allowed to vote or give a speech. All participants who have not informed the Chair of their arrival until voting procedure begins are not eligible to vote. The total number of delegates will be determined by the attendance list from the most recent Council session. If quorum is in question in the first committee session, the list of delegations expected to attend will serve to determine the total number of delegates in attendance. Quorum will be assumed to be present unless specifically challenged and shown to be absent. The Chair may at any time, and especially before entering voting procedures, revisit the quorum at his/her own discretion.

4.1. Motion for the Verification of Quorum.

Delegates may move to the Verification of Quorum, where the Chair will proceed with Quorum confirmation by initiating a Roll Call. The Chair can rule the Motion dilatory without option for appeal.

5. Majority

Unless otherwise specified, no motions are debatable and all require a simple majority vote to pass.

5.1. Simple Majority.

A procedural matter requires a simple majority to pass implying that fifty percent plus one vote (50% + 1) of the Council must vote in favour of the matter to pass. If the vote is a tie, the matter will be considered to have failed.

5.2. Two-thirds (2/3) Majority.

A procedural or substantive matter requiring a two-thirds (2/3) majority to pass implies that two-thirds (2/3) of the Council must vote in favour for a matter to pass.

5.3. Unanimity

Unanimity is needed in order to reach decision and adopt a Draft Communiqué. Each member state has one vote. Abstentions are permissible and do not count against unanimity, being interpreted as an absence of the abstaining state from voting procedure.

6. Debate

6.1. Form of Debate

Unless the Chair decides otherwise, **moderated caucus** will be the form of debate during all sessions of the Council. Any delegate wishing to speak should raise his/her placard and be recognized by the Chair. General Speakers List (GSL) as formal debate procedure is implied. Special Speakers List (SSL) can also be established.

6.2. Informal Debate.

During formal debate (GSL/SSL) a motion can be made by any delegate for an Unmoderated Caucus, which constitutes informal debate. Informal debate can only occur on substantive issues and is out of order once a motion to close debate has passed. Motion to enter informal debate is in order, following the procedures outlined in sections 10.3 and 10.4.

6.3. Recognition.

A Delegate may only address the Council if he/she has received permission from the Chair.

6.4. Interruptions.

A Speaker may not be interrupted by another delegate, unless the delegate has risen to a Point of Personal Privilege. Point of Order cannot interrupt a speaker. Only once a Speaker has concluded and the floor is given back to the chair, a delegate may move to a Point of Order etc.

7. Speeches

7.1. Motion to Set Speaking Time.

A Delegate may move to set a time limit on speeches. The Chair may either rule the Motion dilatory at his/her discretion or put it to vote. A Delegate exceeding the allotted time for a speech may be called to order by the Chair.

8. Points

8.1. Point of Personal Privilege.

A Delegate may rise to a Point of Personal Privilege if a matter impairs him/her from participating fully in Council activities. The Chairpersons shall try to effectively address the source of impairment. A Point of Personal Privilege may only interrupt a speaker if the delegate speaking is inaudible. Otherwise, the delegate rising on the Point of Personal Privilege must wait till the end of the speech to raise the Point

8.2. Point of Order.

A Delegate may rise to a Point of Order if a rule of procedure is not properly observed by a Delegate or by the Board. The Chair will rule on the validity of the point. A Delegate rising to a Point of Order may not comment on the topic of discussion. A Point of Order ruled dilatory by the Chair may not be appealed. This point may interrupt a Speaker. A Point of Order may also be raised for factual inaccuracy of a speaker subject to adjudication by the Chair.

8.3. Point of Parliamentary Inquiry.

A Delegate may rise to a Point of Parliamentary Inquiry to request an explanation on the Rules of Procedure by the Chair. This point may not interrupt a Speaker.

9. Rights

9.1. Right of Reply.

A Delegate whose personal or national integrity has been impugned by another Delegate's comments may rise to a Right of Reply. Disagreement with the content of a Delegate's speech is not grounds for a Right of Reply. The Chair will recognize the Right of Reply at his/her discretion as well as decide on how to resolve the motion. This point may not interrupt a speaker but should be addressed the moment he/she will has finished his/her speech. Should the Chair rule the Right of Reply out of order, his/her decision cannot be appealed. No delegate may call for a Right of Reply on a Right of Reply.

10. Motions

10.1. Motion for the Adjournment of the Meeting.

A Delegate may move for the Adjournment of the meeting to suspend all Council activities until the next scheduled meeting time. The Chair may rule the Motion out of order without possibility of appeal or put it to vote.

10.2. Motion for the Adjournment of the Session.

A Delegate may move for the Adjournment of the Session to cease permanently all Council activities. The Chair may rule the Motion out of order without possibility of appeal or put it

to vote. In the event that the Chair approves this, there should be two (2) speakers for and two (2) speakers against and the motion will require a two-thirds (2/3) majority to pass.

10.3. Motion for an Unmoderated Caucus.

A Delegate may move for an Unmoderated Caucus, thereby suggesting a change from formal to informal debate. The Delegate who makes this motion must suggest a length for the Unmoderated Caucus. The Chair may suggest a more appropriate caucus length and put it to vote or may rule the Unmoderated Caucus out of order without possibility of appeal. Once the Motion has passed, the Delegates will carry an informal discussion on the topic specified in the Motion without leaving the conference room.

10.4. Motion to Extend the Unmoderated Caucus.

A Delegate may move to extend the Unmoderated Caucus if he/she feels that additional time would benefit the work of the Council. The Delegate who moves for an extension of Unmoderated Caucus must suggest a length for the extension, which shall not exceed the duration of the original Unmoderated Caucus. The Chair may suggest a more appropriate caucus length and put it to vote or may rule the Extension of the Unmoderated Caucus out of order without the possibility of appeal. Only two extension of the Unmoderated Caucus is allowed.

10.5. Motion to Table Debate on a Topic.

A Delegate may move to Table Debate in order to end debate on a substantive issue without voting any Draft Communiqués that may be on the floor. If the Chair rules the Motion in order, one (1) Delegate shall speak in favour and one (1) Delegate shall speak against before proceeding with a vote. A 2/3 majority is needed in order to table the debate.

10.6. Motion to Resume Debate on a Topic.

A Delegate may move to Resume Debate on a substantive issue that has been tabled (Rule 10.5). If the Chair rules the Motion in order, one (1) Delegate shall speak in favour and one (1) Delegate shall speak against before proceeding with a vote. A two-thirds (2/3) majority is needed in order to resume the debate.

10.7. Motion to Close Debate on a Draft Communiqué

A Delegate may move to Close Debate in order to end debate on a draft Communiqué, whereby the Council will enter voting procedure on all amendments on the floor. If the Chair rules the Motion in order, there will be only two (2) Delegates speaking against the Motion. A two-thirds (2/3) majority vote is required to pass the Motion to close debate.

10.8. Motion to Close Debate on the Topic Area under Discussion.

A Delegate may move to Close Debate in order to end Debate on the Topic Area under Discussion whereby the Council will enter voting procedure on all Draft Communiqués on the floor, in the order in which they were submitted. If the Chair rules the Motion in order, there will be only two (2) Delegates speaking against the Motion. A two-thirds (2/3) majority vote is required to pass the Motion to close debate.

11. Communiqués of the Council

11.1. Working Paper.

A Working Paper is an informal document used by Council Delegates to work on building a draft Communiqué. A Working Paper will be distributed at the Chair's discretion if requested by a Delegate. Delegates are strongly advised to have prepared working papers on their topics.

11.2. Communiqués of the North Atlantic Council

11.2.1. Format.

Please see sample. This is a formal document with proper perambulatory and operative clauses.

11.2.2. Sponsor.

The main writer/contributor of the draft Communiqué is recognized as the Sponsor. The Sponsor must be present for a draft Communiqué to be introduced to the floor. The Sponsor must agree to support a Communiqué, unless major changes have been introduced through the amendment process.

11.2.3. Introduction of a Draft Communiqué.

Delegates may move to introduce a Draft Communiqué once it has been approved and assigned a number by the Chair and distributed to the Council. Such an introduction shall be procedural in nature. The content of the introduction shall be limited to the reading of the draft Communiqué as a whole where upon the Sponsor of the Draft Communiqué shall be granted the floor for the allotted time limit.

Following this motion, a new debate will begin upon the introduced Draft Ministerial Declaration, according to rules in Section 7.

11.2.4. Withdrawal of a Draft Communiqué.

A draft Communiqué may be withdrawn by its sponsors at any time before voting on it. This request should be submitted in written form to the Chairperson. A draft Communiqué may not be withdrawn if any amendment to it is on the floor.

11.3. Amendments.

During Debate on a draft Communiqué, a Delegate may move to introduce an Amendment, which will add to, strike out from or modify a part of the draft Communiqué. The Amendment has to be first approved by the Chair. It is highly recommended, the Amendment to be supported at least by one co-sponsor. It is in the discretion of the Chair to define (to the House) the period of time, during which the floor will be open to Amendments.

11.3.1. Non Substantive Amendments.

Amendments correcting grammatical, spelling or formatting mistakes will be automatically adopted without vote from the Council, at the discretion of the Chair. Following the initial reading of the draft Communiqué by its sponsor, delegates are permitted to point out any such problems to the Chair.

11.3.2. Substantive Amendments.

Substantive Amendments to a Draft Communiqué require approval from the Chair to be introduced. Such Amendments will be put to a vote prior to the vote on the Draft Communiqué as a whole. Amendments to Amendments are out of order. But, Amendments to amended parts of a Draft Communiqué are in order. It is, however, in the discretion of the Chair whether or not he/she will accept a plethora of such amendments. The Chair reserves the right to assign one (1) speaker for and one (1) speaker against each Substantive Amendment. Due to the nature of the decision process in the NAC, all Amendments to a Draft Communiqué must be unanimously voted upon.

11.4. Withdrawal.

The Sponsor of a Substantive Amendment may request its withdrawal at his/her discretion, before its adoption by the Council.

12. Voting Procedure

12.1. General

The Council usually reaches decisions by allowing discussions to continue until a consensus is reached. In the event of a stalemate, the Council may make use of a *tour de table* (see rule 12.2. below).

12.1.1. Unanimity

For the decision process demanding Unanimity, refer to rule 6.3., above.

12.2. Tour de table

Tour de Table shall be conducted at the discretion of the Chair. The Chair requests each delegate to give a short summary of his/her thinking on the matter under discussion, thus ensuring that every member state is able to outline his or her position and allowing the Chair to determine whether a compromise is possible.

12.3. Procedure

When the Chair announces that the Council is entering voting procedure, no entering or exiting from the room will be permitted, unless there is an emergency or until voting procedure has come to an end. At this time, Motion for a Roll Call Vote is in order.

13. Method of Voting

Each Delegate of the Council has one vote and must demonstrate his/her voting intentions by raising his/her placard at the Chair's request unless there is a Roll Call Vote (see rule 13.1). Delegates must vote in favour, against or abstain.

13.1. Roll Call Vote.

Roll Call Vote may only be in order for substantive matters. This Motion is automatically accepted unless the Chair rules it out of order; the decision is not subject to appeal. The Roll Call starts from a delegate randomly selected by the Chair.

13.2. Passing.

During Roll Call, a Delegate may choose to pass. The Chair will place the Delegate at the bottom of the voting list. A Delegate who has passed once during a voting sequence may not pass again but must ascertain his vote.

13.3. Voting with Rights.

A Delegate may request a right of explanation after voting. Upon completion of voting, the Delegate will be permitted to explain the reasons as to why he/she has chosen to vote a certain way. The Chair may limit the speaking time at his/her discretion.

13.4. Voting on Draft Communiqués.

Draft Communiqués will be voted on, in the order that they were numbered by the Chair. The result of the voting procedure is defined by the process outlined in section 5.3. (Unanimity).

13.5. Voting on Amendments.

All Amendments shall be voted on in the order in which they were proposed before the Council closes debate on the Communiqué that they concern. If one Amendment implies the rejection of a second Amendment, the second Amendment will not be voted upon. A passed Amendment shall be automatically included in the Communiqué. Once all the Amendments relating to a Communiqué have been voted on, the Council shall vote on the Communiqué as a whole after Closure of the Debate on the Topic Area under Discussion. The result of the voting procedure is defined by the process outlined in Rules 5.3. (Unanimity)

Additional

Note – Precedence of motion and other allied clarifications shall be made at the start of committee session.

Any doubts can also be cleared by e mailing the Executive Board Members.

The Executive Board reserves the right to change any procedure mentioned above for the smooth functioning of committee proceedings. Due notice and intimation of the same shall be given to the delegates.

Communiqué Writing and Submission

Communiqués are official documents that have been passed by the NATO aiming to address a particular problem or issue. Communiqués are actions of the NAC submitted in draft form under the sponsorship of the delegations working in a council. Primarily, communiqués address an opinion to a given situation and recommended action to be taken by the NATO. NATO Communiqués are binding for the NATO member states.

Draft communiqués are communiqués as they are drafted and passed in Council Sessions that are taking place during the BIT MUN Conference. The NAC Draft Communiqués have to be adopted in absolute consensus.

It is important to acknowledge that in drafting a communiqué wording will influence its acceptance among fellow delegates. The draft communiqué should be clear and concise. Consequently, the better the substance of a draft communiqué is the higher the success of achieving consensus the council session. The main aim of communiqué writing is to put down ideas in a clear and concise manner in accordance with the provided format.

A regular NATO communiqué has the following pattern:

Draft Communiqué

1. The Heading, identifying the type of the meeting (Ministerial or Summit) in which the communiqué is introduced
2. Numbering: the sequel number of each draft communiqué, presented by the Chair along with the submission of the communiqué by the Sponsor, i.e. NAC Draft Communiqué. NAC/A/ 08-Dec-2005/ 1, which indicates the first Draft Communiqué submitted in NAC, on topic Area A, on the 8th of December 2005.

Sample of a Draft Communiqué

Draft Communiqué

Ministerial of the North Atlantic Council

held at NATO Headquarters,
Thessaloniki, April 26th 2006

1. Today the North Atlantic Council met in Defense Ministers Session, in Thessaloniki, to advance the ...
2. At our meeting today...
3. We are committed to the continuing success of the NATO-led International Security Assistance force...
4. We welcome the adoption...
5. We fully support the negotiations...
6. We strongly condemn terrorism...
7. In response to the call by the government of Pakistan...
8. NATO will continue to play an essential role in regional security and stability...
9. We express our concerns about ...
10. We express / our deep appreciation...
11. We fully agree with the statements...
12. We recognize the need/ the importance...
13. We reaffirm our determination...
14. We reiterate our commitment to the...
15. We remain committed to our transatlantic link...
16. The members of NATO, recognize that the Alliance faces a wide range of threats...

Each clause is numbered (1-...). All the clauses end with dot. Each clause may contain more than one sentence.

Amendments

After draft communiqués have been submitted to the council for discussion, draft communiqués may be modified through changes known as amendments, suggested by the delegates of the council, representing adjusted perspectives or proposals on the topic under discussion. Phrasing and purpose of the amendment should complement the draft communiqué.

There are two types of amendments as outlined in the Rules of Procedure as well:

1. *Non Substantive Amendments*, correcting grammatical, spelling or formatting mistakes will be automatically adopted without vote from the Council, at the discretion of the Chair.
2. *Substantive Amendments*, which are due to change the substantial meaning of the communiqué shall be unanimously adopted by the NAC.

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For any information/queries etc. please contact the Secretariat Staff at BIT MUN 2014