



Singapore Institute of Technology
Bachelor of Information and Communications Technology
(Honours)

Team Project Report - Additional Security Features

Module Code: ICT2203

Module Title: Network Security

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Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)

A SIEM will complement the team's efforts to monitor logs from a central location and track any potential security incidents. Early detection of attacks is crucial to mitigate the resulting impact, and the SIEM allows us to easily review and correlate events and logs from different sources to form an incident timeline. The team has implemented **Splunk** as the SIEM solution, as well as the network's Syslog server and NetFlow collector.

The screenshot shows a Splunk search interface with the following details:



- Search bar: index="sea4eggs" sourcetype="tacacs_log"
- Event count: 2,365 events (from 19/11/2020 07:00:00.000 to 20/11/2020 17:54:01.000) with No Event Sampling.
- Events (2,365) tab selected, showing a list of authentication events.
- Fields sidebar:
 - Selected Fields: # host 1, # source 1, # sourcetype 1.
 - Interesting Fields: # date_hour 7, # date_miday 1, # date_minute 59, # date_month 1, # date_second 60, # date_wday 1, # date_year 1, # date_zone 1, # index 1, # linecount 1, # punct 22, # splunk_server 1, # timeendpos 1.
- Event list:
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:28.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:28 2020 [14527]: connect from 172.16.0.1 [172.16.0.1] host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:28.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:28 2020 [14526]: authorization query for 'network_manager' tty388 from 172.16.0.1 accepted host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:28.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:28 2020 [14526]: connect from 172.16.0.1 [172.16.0.1] host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:25.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:25 2020 [14524]: enable query for 'network_manager' tty388 from 172.16.0.1 accepted host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:21.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:21 2020 [14525]: connect from 172.16.0.1 [172.16.0.1] host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:21.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:21 2020 [14524]: connect from 172.16.0.1 [172.16.0.1] host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:19.000: Fri Nov 20 09:52:19 2020 [14523]: login success: user=network_manager device=172.16.0.1 ip=172.16.0.1 port=tty388 client=172.16.68.8 host = kali | source = /var/log/tac.log | sourcetype = tacacs_log

The filter **sourcetype="tacacs_log"** will show us information about the authentication phase of network devices configured to use AAA (All network devices use AAA in our setup).

The screenshot shows a Splunk search interface with the following details:

- Search bar: index="sea4eggs" sourcetype="tacacs_acct"
- Event count: 1,527 events (from 19/11/2020 07:00:00.000 to 20/11/2020 07:53:02.000) with No Event Sampling.
- Events (1,527) tab selected, showing a list of command executions.
- Fields sidebar:
 - Selected Fields: # host 1, # source 1, # sourcetype 1.
 - Interesting Fields: # cmd 90, # date_hour 7, # date_miday 1, # date_minute 57, # date_month 1, # date_second 60, # date_wday 1, # date_year 1, # date_zone 1, # index 1, # linecount 1.
- Event list:
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:28.000: Nov 20 09:52:28 172.16.0.1 network_manager tty388 172.16.68.8 stop task_id=182 timezone=SGT service=shell start_time=1605865949 priv-lvl=15 cmd=show running-config host = kali | source = /var/log/tac_plus.acct | sourcetype = tacacs_acct
 - 20/11/2020 17:52:21.000: Nov 20 09:52:21 172.16.0.1 network_manager tty388 172.16.68.8 stop task_id=181 timezone=SGT service=shell start_time=1605865941 priv-lvl=0 cmd=enable <cr> host = kali | source = /var/log/tac_plus.acct | sourcetype = tacacs_acct
 - 20/11/2020 17:51:17.000: Nov 20 09:51:17 172.16.68.3 network_manager tty1 172.16.68.8 stop task_id=442 timezone=SGT service=shell start_time=1605865877 priv-lvl=0 cmd=exit <cr> host = kali | source = /var/log/tac_plus.acct | sourcetype = tacacs_acct
 - 20/11/2020 17:51:14.000: Nov 20 09:51:14 172.16.68.3 network_manager tty1 172.16.68.8 stop task_id=441 timezone=SGT service=shell start_time=1605865875 priv-lvl=15 cmd=write <cr> host = kali | source = /var/log/tac_plus.acct | sourcetype = tacacs_acct
 - 20/11/2020 17:50:45.000: Nov 20 09:50:45 172.16.68.3 network_manager tty1 172.16.68.8 stop task_id=440 timezone=SGT service=shell start_time=1605865846 priv-lvl=0 cmd=enable <cr> host = kali | source = /var/log/tac_plus.acct | sourcetype = tacacs_acct
 - 20/11/2020 17:50:03.000: Nov 20 09:50:03 172.16.68.5 network_manager tty2 172.16.68.8 stop task_id=4116 timezone=UTC service=shell start_time=1605865803 priv-lvl=0 cmd=exit <cr> host = kali | source = /var/log/tac_plus.acct | sourcetype = tacacs_acct

The filter **sourcetype="tacacs_acct"** will show details about commands executed by a user when they are connected to network devices configured to use AAA (All network devices use AAA in our setup).



The filter `sourcetype="cisco_syslog"` will display all syslog messages from all Cisco network devices, which includes all successful and failed login attempts made on the different network devices. This can be used to keep track of all login attempts, even if the AAA server is unavailable, as well as any system messages generated by the network device (E.g. When a switch port or uplink is down on a network device).

In addition to security monitoring, this can also be used to enable the team to respond to and troubleshoot potential network issues by analysing the syslog messages.




The filter `sourcetype="cisco:asa"` will show syslog messages from the Cisco ASA firewall, including any established connections as well as denied traffic based on configured Access Control Lists (ACLs). This information can be used to alert us to any abnormal traffic that is denied by the firewall.

The filter `sourcetype="netflow"` shows the NetFlow information from our Edge Router, which can be analysed to provide useful insight into the traffic between the WAN and our network.

Honeypot

The team has implemented a honeypot as a way to distract and monitor potential adversaries. This will allow the team to gain more information on them which will aid us in documenting and tracking any adversary's Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). The team has implemented **OWASP Honeypot** running FTP (21/TCP) and SSH (22/TCP). The honeypot services are configured to be exposed on the same domain and public IPv4 address of our web service externally.




The screenshot shows the 'Sea4Eggs' log explorer interface. At the top, there are buttons for 'DASHBOARD' and 'LOG EXPLORER'. Below these are search and filter fields: 'Event Type: Credential Events', 'Module Name: All Modules', 'Start Date: 20 / 11 / 2020', 'End Date: 21 / 11 / 2020', and a 'SEARCH' button. A 'Rows per page:' dropdown is set to 500, and a 'Search filter...' input field is present. The main area displays a table of log entries:

Country	Date	IP	Machine Name	Module Name	Password	Username
SG	2020-11-20 09:41:11	129.126.164.22	stockholm_server_1	ssh/strong_password	root	
SG	2020-11-20 09:41:11	129.126.164.22	stockholm_server_1	ssh/strong_password	froot	root
SG	2020-11-20 09:41:11	129.126.164.22	stockholm_server_1	ssh/strong_password	Cisco	root
SG	2020-11-20 09:41:11	129.126.164.22	stockholm_server_1	ssh/strong_password	NeXT	root
SG	2020-11-20 09:41:11	129.126.164.22	stockholm_server_1	ssh/strong_password	QNX	root

The above screen capture shows the Log Explorer of OWASP Honeypot with the 'ssh/strong_password' module log information. This module will log all SSH attempts by an adversary and allows us to see the IP address of the adversary. This information can then be used to generate an IP blocklist on the edge router or firewall to deny further attacks from that particular adversary.

Load-Balanced Web Service Stack with Application-Layer Defences

The team has implemented load balancing to efficiently distribute HTTP traffic across multiple web servers. As a critical service that is exposed to the WAN, it is important that high availability is ensured so that legitimate users can access it, while malicious users are denied from causing havoc.




The software used for the Load Balancer in our setup, **HAProxy**, is built to handle high volumes of concurrent connections without using much system resources. Behind the Load Balancer, a few Web Servers running **Nginx** will be running to serve web content to the end-users, each capable of handling thousands of HTTP requests due to its asynchronous event-driven architecture. The number of backend Web Servers can be scaled up or down depending on the traffic volume, and with Load Balancer configured to distribute the incoming traffic to these multiple web servers, efficiency can be maximised while mitigating the impacts of fluctuations in HTTP traffic. The team has configured 5 web servers running backend for the project setup.

HTTP error rates per client is monitored since a high volume of HTTP errors within a few seconds may signify a HTTP scan or attack. Connections per client within a time frame (Measured in HTTP requests per second) is also tracked on the Load Balancer and backend Web Servers, dropping requests if a client exceeds the rate limit, mitigating Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. A HTTP client timeout is also set on both the Load Balancer and backend Web Servers to protect against Slowloris-type of attacks.


Such incidents will be logged and further HTTP requests from the offending client is blocked by the Load Balancer for a few minutes. HTTP traffic logs are also configured and sent to Splunk via Syslog for centralised monitoring.

Public-Facing Web Service with Security Monitoring


As part of the project requirements, a public corporate website has been set up and served by the load-balanced Web Service stack in the network to the WAN. This website can be accessed via the domain "www.sea4eggs.sitict.net" or via the public IP address of the web service. The screen capture below shows the landing page of the website.



As part of the team's efforts to monitor and to distract potential adversaries, the structure of the website has been set up to mimic the WordPress content management system, to confuse adversaries performing reconnaissance on the Web Service, as seen in the below screen capture.



The web pages are static and contain no server-side code, even though the file extensions end with ".php".



A fake “WordPress Admin” login page is also set up to lure potential adversaries and detect their presence. As it is a fake static login page with no server-side code or processing logic, it has minimal to no impact on the web server. A “HTTP 401 Unauthorized” error is always returned by the Web Service if a user tries to login.

This error is logged and sent to Splunk via Syslog, allowing the team to monitor for potential adversary activity and also capture their IP address, as seen in the below screen capture.

Time	Event
Nov 20 17:14:55 172.16.81.2 Nov 20 17:15:29 ba2b4271aa2f[493473]; 129.126.164.22 ~ ~ [20/Nov/2020:09:15:29 +0000] "POST /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1" 401 8840 "http://129.126.164.18/wp-login.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4288.66 Safari/537.36 Edg/87.0.664.41"	20/11/2020 17:15:29.000