Singapore Institute of Technology
Bachelor of Information and Communications Technology (Honours)

Team Project Report - Additional Security Features

Module Code: ICT2203

Module Title: Network Security

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Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)

A SIEM will complement the team's efforts to monitor logs from a central location and track any potential security incidents. Early detection of attacks is crucial to mitigate the resulting impact, and the SIEM allows us to easily review and correlate events and logs from different sources to form an incident timeline. The team has implemented **Splunk** as the SIEM solution, as well as the network's Syslog server and NetFlow collector.



The filter sourcetype="tacacs_log" will show us information about the authentication phase of network devices configured to use AAA (All network devices use AAA in our setup).



The filter sourcetype="tacacs_acct" will show details about commands executed by a user when they are connected to network devices configured to use AAA (All network devices use AAA in our setup).



The filter sourcetype="cisco_syslog" will display all syslog messages from all Cisco network devices, which includes all successful and failed login attempts made on the different network devices. This can be used to keep track of all login attempts, even if the AAA server is unavailable, as well as any system messages generated by the network device (E.g. When a switch port or uplink is down on a network device).

In addition to security monitoring, this can also be used to enable the team to respond to and troubleshoot potential network issues by analysing the syslog messages.



The filter sourcetype="cisco:asa" will show syslog messages from the Cisco ASA firewall, including any established connections as well as denied traffic based on configured Access Control Lists (ACLs). This information can be used to alert us to any abnormal traffic that is denied by the firewall.



The filter sourcetype="netflow" shows the NetFlow information from our Edge Router, which can be analysed to provide useful insight into the traffic between the WAN and our network.

Honeypot

The team has implemented a honeypot as a way to distract and monitor potential adversaries. This will allow the team to gain more information on them which will aid us in documenting and tracking any adversary's Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). The team has implemented **OWASP Honeypot** running FTP (21/TCP) and SSH (22/TCP). The honeypot services are configured to be exposed on the same domain and public IPv4 address of our web service externally.





The above screen capture shows the Log Explorer of OWASP Honeypot with the 'ssh/strong_password' module log information. This module will log all SSH attempts by an adversary and allows us to see the IP address of the adversary. This information can then be used to generate an IP blocklist on the edge router or firewall to deny further attacks from that particular adversary.

Load-Balanced Web Service Stack with Application-Layer Defences

The team has implemented load balancing to efficiently distribute HTTP traffic across multiple web servers. As a critical service that is exposed to the WAN, it is important that high availability is ensured so that legitimate users can access it, while malicious users are denied from causing havoc.



The software used for the Load Balancer in our setup, **HAProxy**, is built to handle high volumes of concurrent connections without using much system resources. Behind the Load Balancer, a few Web Servers running **Nginx** will be running to serve web content to the end-users, each capable of handling thousands of HTTP requests due to its asynchronous event-driven architecture. The number of backend Web Servers can be scaled up or down depending on the traffic volume, and with Load Balancer configured to distribute the incoming traffic to these multiple web servers, efficiency can be maximised while mitigating the impacts of fluctuations in HTTP traffic. The team has configured 5 web servers running backend for the project setup.

HTTP error rates per client is monitored since a high volume of HTTP errors within a few seconds may signify a HTTP scan or attack. Connections per client within a time frame (Measured in HTTP requests per second) is also tracked on the Load Balancer and backend Web Servers, dropping requests if a client exceeds the rate limit, mitigating Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. A HTTP client timeout is also set on both the Load Balancer and backend Web Servers to protect against Slowloris-type of attacks.

Such incidents will be logged and further HTTP requests from the offending client is blocked by the Load Balancer for a few minutes. HTTP traffic logs are also configured and sent to Splunk via Syslog for centralised monitoring.

Public-Facing Web Service with Security Monitoring

As part of the project requirements, a public corporate website has been set up and served by the load-balanced Web Service stack in the network to the WAN. This website can be accessed via the domain "www.sea4eggs.sitict.net" or via the public IP address of the web service. The screen capture below shows the landing page of the website.



As part of the team's efforts to monitor and to distract potential adversaries, the structure of the website has been set up to mimic the WordPress content management system, to confuse adversaries performing reconnaissance on the Web Service, as seen in the below screen capture.



The web pages are static and contain no server-side code, even though the file extensions end with ".php".



A fake “WordPress Admin” login page is also set up to lure potential adversaries and detect their presence. As it is a fake static login page with no server-side code or processing logic, it has minimal to no impact on the web server. A “HTTP 401 Unauthorized” error is always returned by the Web Service if a user tries to login.

This error is logged and sent to Splunk via Syslog, allowing the team to monitor for potential adversary activity and also capture their IP address, as seen in the below screen capture.