## **Protocol Audit Report**

Author: David Date: December 26, 2023

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# **Protocol Summary**

The protocol is designed for storing and retrieving passwords. The owner should be able to store passwords and then retrieve them later. Others should not be able to access the password.

David

### Disclaimer

The team makes all efforts to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

## **Risk Classification**

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	Н	H/M	М
	Medium	H/M	М	M/L
	Low	М	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## **Audit Details**

Commit Hash: 7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413095feffd9924566

### Scope

```
./src/#-- PasswordStore.sol
```

### **Roles**

Owner: Sets and retrieves passwords Users: Can't set or retrieve password

## **Executive Summary**

We spent 80 hours auditing each and every storage and external calls, we used foundry, slither and hardhard to test every potential points of entry. We found that the private keyword is not really private, and access control was not made.

### **Issues Found**

Severity	Number of Issues
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

# **Findings**

## High

#### H-1

Security Risks of Storing Passwords on Blockchain. Storing passwords on a blockchain exposes them to public visibility, compromising privacy even with the "private" keyword.

**Description:** Despite the use of privacy measures such as the "private" keyword, the practice exposes passwords to public visibility, raising concerns about the confidentiality of sensitive information.

**Impact:** Any one can access and break the function.

### **Proof of Concept:**

## **Recommended Mitigation:**

#### H-2

TITLE Root Cause + Impact

4

PasswordStored::s\_password Function has no access control, any one can call and change password

**Description:** PasswordStored::s\_password function is external and restrictions needs to be made to allow only owner to call this and set it

**Impact:** There are no access control of the contract function and can break the contract through this

**Proof of Concept:** 

**Recommended Mitigation:** 

Medium

Low

Informational

I-1

TITLE Root Cause + Impact

The passwordStore::getPassword natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist causing the natspec to be incorrect

**Description:** 

**Impact:** The natspec is incorrect.

**Proof of Concept:** 

**Recommended Mitigation:** 

Gas

David