

DISCUSSION OF HOUSING FINANCE, BOOM-BUST EPISODES, AND MACROECONOMIC FRAGILITY BY GARRIGA AND HEDLUND

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Any views expressed are my own and not those of the Bank of Canada.

This paper

Builds an incomplete markets model with housing and mortgages

Shows that lax credit drives a housing boom

- house price rises 45% at a peak

Shows that mortgage features affect house prices, foreclosures, and consumption

- FRM vs ARM
- Refinancing cost
- Loan duration

Studies the effects of LTV and PTI regulations


Is this paper really about macroeconomic fragility?

The Great Recession made the term '**macroprudential**' popular as we saw a build-up of financial imbalances in the housing sector lead to severe macroeconomic consequences

- increases in mortgage defaults froze interbank lending and credit to consumers and businesses
- led to a large rise in unemployment and fall in output
- the model does not have elements that can generate these dynamics

Is this paper really about macroeconomic fragility?

Unemployment should not be a shock, but it should be a measure of the macro outcome



Source: Census, HUD, BLS


Credit condition and house prices

Effect of credit boom on house prices depends on the rental market setup

- literature's findings range from
 - credit having no effect (Kaplan et al. (2020))
 - credit explaining most of the cycle (Favilukis et al. (2017))
 - partial effect (explaining 32% to 53% of the boom, Greenwald and Guren (2024))
- Greenwald and Guren (2024) argues that these differences come from the rental market setup
- Strong assumptions on the rental market
 - rental price: $\frac{1}{A_a}$
 - quantity limit: $\bar{a} < \underline{h}$

What determines the effects of LTV and PTI regulations?

- **Greenwald (2018)** argues that a cap on PTI, not LTV is more effective for limiting boom-bust
- PTI tightening tends to restrict buying large/expensive houses, while LTV affects all sizes
- It would be useful to characterize conditions under which each policy is in/effective



How do we leverage the endogenous liquidity of the housing market?

During the bust, illiquidity in the housing market amplifies the fall in house prices

- e.g. subsidizing housing transactions when the market is illiquid
- compare it with other costly policies such as the mortgage rate reduction in Garriga and Hedlund (2020)

Takeaways

- Tell us more about how mortgage design affects foreclosure during a housing bust, and how malfunction in the financial sector affects employment and output
- Robust check on how house prices respond to credit conditions
- Tell us under which condition LTV and PTI can be effective
- Suggest policies that can improve housing market liquidity during a bust

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