Bounded Software Model Checking An Introduction to CBMC

SCC.363 Security and Risk

School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University

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Is a given Boolean formula F <u>satisfiable</u>?

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<u>Problem</u>: does there exist an assignment of truth values to the Boolean variables x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 that makes the formula *True*?

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$$\land$$
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<u>Problem</u>: does there exist an assignment of truth values to the Boolean variables x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 that makes the formula *True*?

Yes! $x_0 = False$, $x_1 = True$, $x_2 = True$, $x_3 = False$.

So F is satisfiable (otherwise unsatisfiable).



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<u>Problem</u>: does there exist an assignment of truth values to the Boolean variables x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 that makes the formula *True*?

Yes! $x_0 = False$, $x_1 = True$, $x_2 = True$, $x_3 = False$.

So F is <u>satisfiable</u> (otherwise <u>unsatisfiable</u>).


[The SAT problem was the first example of an NP-Complete problem (Cook, 1971).]



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Many problems (e.g. in circuit design) can be reduced to SAT.

[An output from a wire in a digital circuit corresponds to a Boolean formula whose variables correspond to the input wires (along the wires $1={\sf True},\,0={\sf False}$).]




$$F = (x_0 \land x_1) \lor \neg (x_1 \land x_2)$$

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
One may e.g. model a *multiplier circuit* as a Boolean formula and ask if there are inputs to the circuit that result in the number 21 (10101 in binary) along the output wires (i.e. check if 21 is *prime*).



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


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Many problems (e.g. in circuit design) can be reduced to SAT.

An output from a wire in a digital circuit corresponds to a Boolean formula whose variables correspond to the input wires (along the wires 1 = True, 0 = False).

One may e.g. model a multiplier circuit as a Boolean formula and ask if there are inputs to the circuit that result in the number 21 (10101 in binary) along the output wires (i.e. check if 21 is prime).




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


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 $F = \neg F_{15} \wedge \neg F_{14} \wedge \neg F_{13} \wedge \neg F_{12} \wedge \neg F_{11} \wedge \neg F_{10} \wedge \neg F_{9} \wedge \neg F_{8} \wedge \neg F_{7} \wedge \neg F_{6} \wedge \frac{\mathbf{F_4}}{4} \wedge \neg F_{3} \wedge \frac{\mathbf{F_2}}{5} \wedge \neg F_{11} \wedge \frac{\mathbf{F_0}}{5} \wedge \mathbf{F_{10}} \wedge \neg F_{12} \wedge \neg F_{13} \wedge \neg F_{14} \wedge \neg F_{15} \wedge \neg F_{15}$



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SAT Solvers

Boolean formula
$$F \longrightarrow {f SAT \ solver} \longrightarrow {f SAT/UNSAT}$$

Modern SAT solvers are very efficient and can solve SAT problems with <u>millions</u> of Boolean variables! Enormous progress made in the past 25 years, spurred on by the SAT competition.

http://www.satcompetition.org/

Most modern SAT solvers are based on the **DPLL** algorithm or its refinements such as **CDCL** (time complexity is exponential).

DPLL is based on *backtracking* and works on Boolean formulas in *Conjunctive Normal Form* (CNF).



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Conjunctive Normal Form

A <u>literal</u> is a Boolean variable x_i , or its negation $\neg x_i$.

A <u>clause</u> is a disjunction of literals (e.g. $x_1 \vee \neg x_3 \vee x_2$).

A Boolean formula is in *Conjunctive Normal Form* (CNF) if it is a conjunction of one or more clauses, e.g.

$$(x_1 \vee \neg x_3 \vee x_2) \wedge (\neg x_4 \vee \neg x_1 \vee x_3) \wedge (\neg x_5).$$

[Any Boolean formula ${\cal F}$ can be brought to CNF by applying some transformations:


- eliminating double negations (i.e. $\neg \neg P$ becomes P),
- De Morgan's laws (e.g. $\neg(P \land Q) = \neg P \lor \neg Q$),
- $\blacksquare \ \, \text{distributive laws (e.g. } P \lor (Q \land R) = (P \lor Q) \land (P \lor R), \ \text{etc.)]}$

An Application of SAT Solvers: Model Checking

CBMC: the **C B**ounded **M**odel **C**hecker

(https://www.cprover.org/cbmc/)

<u>Main idea</u>: Given a C program and a claim, use a SAT solver to check if there is an execution that <u>violates the claim</u>.



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CBMC: Bug [Catching [©]/ Finding [●]] with a SAT Solver

Developed by D. Kroening and others at CMU in 2003.

Given a C program, **CBMC** can automatically check simple safety claims, some of which are important to security:

- array bound checks,
- division by zero,
- arithmetic overflow,
- pointer checks (NULL pointer dereference),
- user-supplied assertions.

CBMC expects there to be a program entry point, i.e. a main().

It allows the user to make assertions using assert() and to create assumptions using __CPROVER_assume().



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Using **CBMC**

Claims made by decorating code with assumptions and assertions.

- assert(e)
 aborts execution when e is false; no-op otherwise.
 void assert(_Bool e) { if (!e) exit(); }
- __CPROVER_assume (e) "ignores" execution when e is false; no-op otherwise. Program traces are restricted to those satisfying the assumption.

To find counterexamples to claims in a program prog.c we run:

\$ cbmc --trace prog.c



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
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Demo: Let's try out CBMC to see if we can factorise integers.



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CBMC: How Does It Work?



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Control Flow Simplification

- All side effects are removed e.g. j=i++; is transformed into j=i; i=i+1;
- Control flow is made explicitcontinue and break are replaced by goto
- All loops are simplified into <u>one form</u>
 e.g. for, do, while are replaced by just while

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It is trivial to translate a program into a set of equations if each variable is only assigned once!

```
1 x = a;
2 y = x+1;
3 z = y-1;
```

This program is directly transformed into

$$x = a \wedge y = x + 1 \wedge z = y - 1$$
.

Static Single Assignment (SSA) form.

- Every variable is assigned exactly once.
- Every variable is defined before it is used.

When a variable is assigned multiple times, we use a new variable for each assignment.

```
1 x=x+y;
2 x=x*2;
3 a[i]=100;
1 x1 = x0 + y0;
2 x2 = x1*2;
3 a1[i0] = 100;
```

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```

What about conditionals?

Converting conditionals to SSA.

```
1 if(v)
2    x = y;
3 else
4    x = z;
5    w = x;
1    if(v0)
2    x0 = y0;
3    else
4    x1 = z0;
5    w1 = x?? // which x?
```

Converting conditionals to SSA.

```
1 if(v)
2   x = y;
3 else
4   x = z;
5   w = x;
1 if(v0)
2   x0 = y0;
3 else
4   x1 = z0;
5   x2 = v0 ? x0 : x1;
6   w1 = x2;
```

For each joint point add new variables with selectors.

Starting from the following C code:

```
1 int y;
2 int x;
3 x=x+y;
4 if(x!=1)
5 x=2;
6 else
7 x++;
8 assert(x<=3);</pre>
```

Simplify control flow and remove side effects

```
1 int y;
2 int x;
3 x=x+y;
4 if(x!=1)
5 x=2;
6 else
7 x=x+1;
8 assert(x<=3);</pre>
```

Convert to SSA (Static Single Assignment form)

```
1  x1 = x0+y0;
2  if(x1 != 1)
3   x2 = 2;
4  else
5   x3 = x1 + 1;
6  x4 = (x1 != 1) ? x2 : x3;
7  assert(x4<=3);</pre>
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7  assert(x4<=3);</pre>
```

Generate constraints (if SAT, then assertion is false):

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= x_0 + y_0 \wedge x_2 = 2 \wedge x_3 = x_1 + 1 \\ \wedge & ((x_1 \neq 1 \wedge x_4 = x_2) \vee (x_1 = 1 \wedge x_4 = x_3)) \quad \text{[selector]} \\ \wedge & \neg (x_4 \leq 3) \quad \text{[negated assertion]} \end{aligned}$$

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- All loops are unwound:
 - can use different unwinding bounds for different loops,
 - can check whether unwinding is <u>sufficient</u> using a special unwinding assertion.
- If a program satisfies all of its claims and all unwinding assertions, then it is correct.
- Recursive functions and backward goto are similar (use inlining).

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while loops are unwound iteratively.

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```
void f(...) {
    ... // some code
    if(cond){
        Body;
        while(cond){
            Body;
        }
}
```

Remainder;

10 }

while loops are unwound iteratively. (break/continue replaced by goto.) void f(...) { ... // some code if (cond) { Body; if (cond) { Body; while (cond) { Body; 10

11 12

13 }

Remainder;

while loops are unwound iteratively.

(break/continue replaced by goto.)

```
void f(...) {
      ... // some code
      if (cond) {
        Body;
        if (cond) {
           Body;
           if (cond) {
7
             Body;
             while (cond) {
10
                Body;
11
12
1.3
14
15
      Remainder;
16 }
```

Assertion inserted after last iteration: violated if the program runs longer than bound permits.

```
void f(...) {
      ... // some code
      if (cond) {
        Body;
        if (cond) {
          Body;
          if (cond) {
             Body;
             assert(!cond); //Unwinding assertion
10
11
12
1.3
      Remainder;
14 }
```

Assertion inserted after last iteration: violated if the program runs longer than bound permits. Positive correctness result!

```
void f(...) {
      ... // some code
      if (cond) {
        Body;
        if (cond) {
          Body;
          if (cond) {
             Body;
             assert(!cond); //Unwinding assertion
10
11
12
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14 }
```

Example: Sufficient Loop Unwinding

unwind = 3

```
void f(...) {
                                   void f(...){
2 \quad j = 1;
                                     j = 1;
3 while(j<=2){</pre>
                                3 \quad if(j \le 2) \{
   j = j + 1;
                                     j = j + 1;
                                    if(j<=2){
6
  Remainder;
                                     j = j + 1;
                                        if(j<=2){
                                         j = j + 1;
                                         assert(!(j<=2));
                                10
                                11
                                12
                                13
                                     Remainder;
                                14 }
```


Example: Insufficient Loop Unwinding

unwind = 3

```
void f(...) {
2 \quad j = 1;
3 while(j<=10){</pre>
     j = j + 1;
6
   Remainder;
```

```
void f(...){
      j = 1;
3 \quad if(j \le 10) \{
     j = j + 1;
     if(j<=10){
        j = j + 1;
        if (j <= 10) {</pre>
          j = j + 1;
          assert(!(j<=10));
10
11
12
13
      Remainder;
14 }
```

CBMC: How Does It Work?



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Bit Blasting

So far, formulas such as $x_2 = x_1 + 1 \wedge y_2 = x_2$ are *not* stated in propositional logic!

The operations are performed on bit vectors.

In order to convert these formulas into a format acceptable to a SAT solver, one needs to apply *flattening/bit blasting*.



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In order to convert these formulas into a format acceptable to a SAT solver, one needs to apply *flattening/bit blasting*.

Intuitively, we can build Boolean circuits for the bit-vector operations; these can be described by Boolean formulas.

Unfortunately with a lot more variables.

CBMC: How Does It Work?

CBMC works by transforming a C program into a set of equations.

The main steps in **CBMC** are:

- Simplify control flow
- Unwind all the loops
- Convert into Single Static Assignment (SSA)
- Convert into equations
- "Bit-blast"
- 6 Solve with a SAT solver
- Convert SAT assignment into a counterexample

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CBMC: What is the Security Angle?

Some important *automatic* checks offered by **CBMC** (see command line options with cbmc --help):

- array bound checks,
- division by zero,
- arithmetic overflow,
- pointer checks (NULL pointer dereference).

User-supplied assertions to **CBMC** offer a very flexible tool for bug-finding.



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Problems & Further Reading

See problem sheet on the course website.

Further Reading:

- CBMC tutorial: http://www.cprover.org/cprover-manual/cbmc/tutorial/
- Edmund Clarke, et al. "Behavioral consistency of C and Verilog programs using bounded model checking." Proceedings 2003. Design Automation Conference. IEEE, 2003. CMU-CS-03-126.pdf

A more modern approach (using SMT solvers in **ESBMC**):

- Lucas Cordeiro, et al. "SMT-based bounded model checking for embedded ANSI-C software." IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 38.4 (2011): 957-974. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/59348834.pdf
- ESBMC (An Efficient SMT-based Bounded Model Checker): http://esbmc.org/

SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theory) Solving:

- N. Bjørner, L. de Moura, L. Nachmanson, and C. Wintersteiger.
 "Programming Z3". https://theory.stanford.edu/ nikolaj/programmingz3.html
- Z3 SMT Solver: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/z3-3/

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