

Better living through cryptography

Secure Systems Engineering Fall 2024

 EE G7701

September 18, 2024

Tushar Jois




Recap

- Buffer overflows can be used to hijack the control flow of a program
- Either shellcode or a return-to-libc can spawn a shell afterward
- Defenses against buffer overflows exist, but have shortcomings

Lesson objectives


- Explain how symmetric encryption and digital signatures work
- Describe the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
- Compose cryptographic primitives to build secure systems




Symmetric encryption




Symmetric encryption




Symmetric encryption






$m = \text{"secret"}$



The secret we
encrypt with still goes
over the channel



$m = \text{"secret"}$

$$\text{[Red Grid]} + \text{[Yellow Grid]} = \text{[Orange Grid]}$$

$$c = \text{Encrypt}(m, \text{[Orange Grid]})$$




The secret we encrypt with still goes over the channel

$$\text{[Yellow Grid]} + \text{[Red Grid]} = \text{[Orange Grid]}$$


$$m = \text{Decrypt}(c, \text{[Orange Grid]})$$

$m \rightarrow \text{"secret"}$

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange




Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Alice and Bob agree to use $p = 23, g = 5$
- Alice chooses a secret integer $a = 4$
- Alice sends Bob $A = g^a \bmod p$
 - $A = 5^4 \bmod 23 = 4$
- Bob chooses a secret integer $b = 3$
- Bob sends Alice $B = g^b \bmod p$
 - $B = 5^3 \bmod 23 = 10$
- Alice computes $s = B^a \bmod p$
 - $s = 10^4 \bmod 23 = 18$
- Bob computes $s = A^b \bmod p$
 - $s = 4^3 \bmod 23 = 18$
- Alice and Bob now share a secret 18


Assumption: the discrete logarithm problem is hard

public channel color 



Assumption: separating paint colors is hard

Basic file encryption




Need to convert
Diffie-Hellman result r
into encryption key sk

Cryptographic
hash function


Cryptographic hash function

- **Pre-image resistance:** Given hash value h , it should be difficult to find any message m such that $h = \text{Hash}(m)$
- **Second pre-image resistance:** Given input m_1 , it should be difficult to find a different input m_2 such that $\text{Hash}(m_1) = \text{Hash}(m_2)$
- **Collision resistance:** It should be difficult to find inputs m_1, m_2 such that $\text{Hash}(m_1) = \text{Hash}(m_2)$

Ideally: the output of the cryptographic hash function **looks random**



Basic file encryption



Digital signatures

Integrity

Encryption


Confidentiality

Digital signatures

Integrity

- The party who wants to sign generates (sk, pk)
 - sk = "signing key"
 - pk = "verification key"
- The signer keeps sk secret, using it to sign messages
- The signer publishes pk
 - Anyone can use pk to validate the signature on a message
 - The only way that pk can validate a message is if sk signed it -- **unforgeability**

Digital signatures



Looking ahead

- Crypto is great, but also has a number of failure modes, as we'll see
- Exam 1 is **Oct 9** (three weeks away!)
- Yet another seminar is happening next week! (Sep 26 11am)
- **Today's activity:** Lab 4, Cryptography in Rust

Lesson objectives

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- Describe the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
- Compose cryptographic primitives to build secure systems