Driving Secure Development Using a Threat Model

LESS WORK, MORE BENEFIT

2011-10-07



What is a Threat Model?

SECURITY CARTOGRAPHY


- A threat model is a model of:
 - Actions an attacker could [try to] take, using this system
 - System defenses against these threats





Threat Modeling in the SDL

HISTORICALLY



Threat Modeling in the SDL

HISTORICAL OUTCOMES

Very little changes

Worst Case

- Author has spent more time thinking about security
- Nobody reads it but the authors & reviewers
- Soon, it is out of date

Best Case

- Designers mitigate design flaws they noticed
- Someone updates it as the design changes
- Developers & QA read it



Model-Driven Development

DESIRED OUTCOMES

- Security activities pruned by what is actually needed
- System models contain exactly enough security to meet security objectives
- Development decisions based on accurate security information
- Threat model updated whenever system model is updated



Model-Driven Development

STRATEGY

- Start at requirements time
- Integrate as much as possible with existing system models
- Update continuously
- Consult the model when making decisions
 - Which design option
 - What activities to do (e.g. pen testing)
 - Specifics within activities (e.g. which test cases)



System Analysis

Inside a Threat Model


ANATOMY

- Purpose of system
- High-level security goals
 - In-scope attackers
- Deployment environment
- System architecture
 - Static view
 - Dynamic view
 - Security attributes & technology

- High-level threats
- Lower-level attacks
- Relationships between threats and attacks
- Impacts
- Feasibility of attacks
- Mitigations


Security Analysis

Creation/Update Timing





Pruning Model Creation





Pruning Analysis Activities

BY SECURITY OBJECTIVES

- Many uses of risk assessment can be replaced by agreeing on security objectives up front
- In each following phase, investigate only topics noted from the preceding phase
- Would it help an attacker break the security objectives?
 - If not, it doesn't matter, don't investigate



Making Decisions

BY THREAT MODEL

- Identify a project decision that should be affected by security
 - E.g. Whether application is ready to launch
- Identify information that should inform that decision
 - E.g. Does the expense reports application meet its security objectives?
- Extract that information from the model
 - E.g. Examine threats that are still feasible for unbroken chains from attacker starting privileges to prohibited threats



Choosing Designs

BY THREAT MODEL

- Security objectives should be met
- Defenses should be protecting against threats
- Apply design patterns appropriately to respond to threats (e.g. input trust boundary, centralized input validation library)
- Best design has either fewer or easier threats to defend against



Security Tests

BY THREAT MODEL

- Confirm protections are in place
- Confirm responsibilities are met
- Try to perform all the relevant threats identified in the threat model
 - Start with those that are more beneficial to the attacker



Thanks

- Eleanor Saitta
- OWASP
- Bsides!

