Implementing Navigation Message Authentication on SBAS

SPENCER PAUL'S REU

Stanford University GPS Lab 6/1/21


Background Information

SBAS, CRYPTOGRAPHY




Satellite-based Augmentation System (SBAS)

- SBAS uses a collection of listening stations at **known** position to provide corrections
- ➤ Provides augmentation information for corrections of satellite position errors, clock/time errors and errors induced by delay of the signal while crossing the ionosphere.
- increases the accuracy with position errors below 1 meter



What is Spoofing?


- malicious actors want to trick (spoof) GNSS users by manipulating their location
- Areas this could potentially occur -- smartphone to produce false Uber charges, mislead a passenger jet or autonomous vehicle




Authentication is used to prevent spoofing

- Authentication is the process of determining if a claim is true
 - > i.e gmail authenticates you are yourself when you log into your email
 - ➤ Stanford makes you scan an ID card to prove your identity when entering buildings
- This is distinct from encryption which encodes information that is not comprehensible without a specific key to decode it
- My work focused on implementing navigation message authentication (NMA) on SBAS to hinder spoofing


Asymmetric v Symmetric Encryption





Hash Functions

- Deterministic each input has the same output every time
- One Way it is very hard to determine input from hash
- Collision Free no two inputs will have the same hash sum



Our Scheme


TESLA-ECDSA

Tesla-ECDSA Scheme

- TESLA must be used in tandem with ECDSA
 - > TESLA authenticates the SBAS messages, and ECDSA authenticates SBAS's TESLA use as periodic maintenance.
 - ➤ We modify the SBAS message schedule by appending an extra message after every 5 messages that is used for authentication
- Requirements for design
 - > [Jason help]


TESLA Portion of Scheme

- Very simple only requires one cryptographic hash function (h(point))
- Works by generating a chain of hashes p1 = h (p2), p2 = h(p3), p3 = h(p4)
 - \rightarrow p4 \rightarrow p3 \rightarrow p2 \rightarrow p1



ECDSA

- ECDSA stands for Elliptic Curve Digital Signing algorithm and is used to create a digital signature of data
- Used to verify the first hash point that is released
- This is also asymmetric and relies of the use of curves and mathematical equations to generate a public key that can verify a signature.



Zooming in on the actual messages

- MT50 message containing authentication data
- HMAC message authentication code for each message
 - \triangleright key = xor(hp97, time)
 - HMAC6 = h(message, key)
- ➤ 6-11 second delay before we can authenticate messages


	SBAS Message 6
	SBAS Message 7
	SBAS Message 8
	SBAS Message 9
	SBAS Message 10
MT50	HMAC6 HMAC7 HMAC8 HMAC9 HMAC10 Hash Point 98
	SBAS Message 11
	SBAS Message 12
	SBAS Message 13
	SBAS Message 14
	SBAS Message 15
MT50	HMAC11 HMAC12 HMAC13 HMAC14 HMAC15 Hash Point 97
	SBAS Message 16
	SBAS Message 17
	SBAS Message 18
	SBAS Message 19
	SBAS Message 20
MT50	HMAC16HMAC17HMAC18HMAC19HMAC20Hash Point 96

Implementing the Scheme

Programing authentication into MAAST

- MAAST is a simulation on MATLAB of SBAS
- We implemented a full-stack SBAS simulation of our design into MAAST
- MAAST provides Monte-Carlo simulation results to evaluate how our design performs under message loss over the WAAS coverage area
- Our KPIs: time to first authenticated fix, time to authentication per message, and robustness to message loss

Class diagram of what I was coding this quarter



Edge cases in simulation added a lot of complexity

```
methods (Test)
   function test_key_chain_construction(testCase)
   function test_M50_creation(testCase)
   function test_next_keychain(testCase)
   function test_sender_and_reciever(testCase)
   function test manipulated message(testCase)
   function test manipulated mt50(testCase)
   function test missing mt50(testCase)
   function test_swapped_mt50(testCase)
   function test swapped messages(testCase)
   function test_sender_and_reciever_keychain_rotation(testCase)
   function test missing message(testCase)
   function test_many_rotations(testCase)
   function test_long_string_missed_messages(testCase)
   function test constructor args(testCase)
   function test 1 arg constructor(testCase)
```

Adding missed message functionality

```
function verify_missed_mt50_hp(obj)
    largest verified key = max(cell2mat(keys(obj.mt50 table))):
   for i = 1:length(obj.missing mt50)
       if isKev(obj.mt50 table, obj.missing mt50(i) - 1) && ...
                largest_verified_key > obj.missing_mt50{i}
           count = largest_verified_key;
           new hash = obi.mt50 table(largest verified kev):
           new_hash = new_hash{1}.hash_point;
           while count ~= obj.missing_mt50{i}
               new hash = obj.kev chain function(new hash):
               count = count - 1;
           if obj.missing_mt50{i} - 1 ~= 0
               mt50 = obj.mt50_table(obj.missing_mt50{i} - 1);
               m = mt50{1};
               t = mt50{2}:
               obj.verify_hmac_block(m, new_hash, t);
   obj.missing_mt50 = {};
```

Hash path rotation

```
function buffer_message_for_authentication(obj, message, time)
message = DataConversions.binary_string_to_uint8(message);
% keeping track of curret hmac index and total messages
obj.message_count = obj.message_count + 1;
obj.hmac_num = obj.hmac_num + 1;
% once we reach end of key chain - rotate the hash path
if obj.key_chain_length - obj.current_block <= 0
% store last element of key chain for next mt50
obj.stored_block(6) = obj.key_chain{1};
obj.rotate_hash_path();
obj.current_block = 1;
end</pre>
```

Coding Practices




Unit Testing

- Unit Testing was critical to prevent nasty bugs in the future when we integrated code into MAAST
- Every line of code had to be unit tested to pass our build check
- We had ~1500 lines of code dedicated to unit testing ~1500 lines of actual code


File	Coverage	Lines	Branches		Missing
All files	1%	1%	NaN%	×	
Authenticator	100%	100%	NaN%	V	
AuthenticatorECDSA	100%	100%	NaN%	\checkmark	
HashingWrappers	100%	100%	NaN%	\checkmark	
assert_matlab_checkcode	0%	0%	NaN%	×	4-30
execute_matlab_tests_into_xml	0%	0%	NaN%	×	13-32
TestAuthenticatorECDSA	100%	100%	NaN%	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
TestHashingWrappers	100%	100%	NaN%	V	

Minimum allowed coverage is 199%



Using GitHub for organized version control

- Helped Jason and myself collaborate effectively throughout the quarter
- Allowed us to keep a linear version history
- Prevents merge conflicts and allowed us to see exactly where our code diverged



Other Coding Checks

- Mandatory code review for PR approval
- Style Checks using Miss Hit

