

Supporting Information: Treatment Balance Tests and Robustness Checks

In Table SI1, we present treatment rates for the 38th and 39th Parliaments for government and opposition members. We show that treatment rates do not differ significantly between government and opposition members in either Parliament. Likewise, treatment rates do not differ for either government members or opposition members between Parliaments.

In Table SI2, we compare differences on a number of variables between those who were and were not treated. The lack of significant differences suggests that the lottery for the power to propose was a random draw.

In Tables SI3 and SI4, we examine whether the right to propose legislation was related to whether incumbents contested the next election (or, “reoffered”). If proposal power is related to reoffering, then another layer of potential selection effects may be present, confounding our analysis. These tables demonstrate that this is not occurring, as proposal power and place on the order of precedence are statistically unrelated to reoffering.

In Table SI5, we present average current and previous vote shares for those in treatment and control by government/opposition and then by Parliament. Treatment vote shares are for legislators who were assigned the power to propose regardless of whether they in fact proposed legislation.

Tables SI6 and SI7 present robustness checks of our main result, using a Huber regression and a non-parametric, quantile regression. Both results confirm our principal finding of a significant increase in vote share for government incumbents who have the power to propose legislation.

Table SI8 presents an alternative specification of our treatment variable. The results confirm that lower positions on the order of precedence (and thus a lower probability of vote share) are negatively related to vote share.

Table SI9 replicates the main findings of Table 1 excluding those who had the power to propose but chose not to introduce legislation. The estimated treatment effect in this specification is similar to that presented in Table 1, suggesting our results are not driven by those who did not introduce legislation.

Table S10 replicates the main findings of Table 1 excluding from control those who were not randomly granted the power to propose but did propose Senate-initiated legislation. The estimated treatment effect in this specification is similar to that presented in Table 1, suggesting our results are not driven by those who introduced Senate-initiated legislation.

Table SI1: Treatment rate by Parliament and government/opposition status

Variable	Opposition			Government			Difference
	Mean	S.E.	N	Mean	S.E.	N	<i>T, p</i>
39 th Parliament	44.52	4.13	146	40.38	6.87	52	0.51, .61
38 th Parliament	40.00	3.95	155	33.33	6.67	51	0.85, .40
Difference, 38 th v 39 th , <i>T, p</i>	0.79, .43			0.74, .46			

The final column of the table tests for differences in treatment rates between opposition and government members in each Parliament. The final row of the table tests for differences between Parliaments for opposition members and government members. The results show that treatment rates were constant between members and between Parliaments.

Table SI2: Randomization Checks

Variable	Untreated			Treated*			Difference
	Mean	S.E.	N	Mean	S.E.	N	<i>T, p</i>
Average years in parliament, all	6.86	0.34	239	7.10	0.39	165	0.47, .64
Average years in parliament, 39 th	7.49	0.53	112	7.43	0.55	86	0.08, .94
Average years in parliament, 38 th	6.330	0.45	127	6.74	0.55	79	0.63, .53
Former cabinet ministers (%), all	5.4	1.5	239	7.3	2.0	165	0.75, .45
Former cabinet ministers (%), 39 th	8.1	2.6	112	14.0	3.8	86	1.34, .18
Former cabinet ministers (%), 38 th	3.1	1.6	127	0	0	79	1.60, .11
Female (%), all	17.2	2.4	239	23.0	3.3	165	1.46, .14
Female (%), 38 th	17.0	3.6	112	25.6	4.7	86	1.48, .14
Female (%), 37 th	17.3	3.4	127	20.3	4.6	79	0.53, .60

The final column tests for the differences between untreated and treated members on a number of observable characteristics. The lack of statistically significant differences suggests that the lottery was in fact a random draw. We have also conducted non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests of difference and found no significant differences. Finally, an F-test suggests that treatment is jointly unrelated to years in parliament, status as an former minister, and gender ($F(3, 400)=0.89, p=0.45$).

Table SI3: Place in the order of precedence and incumbent reoffering

Variable	38 th parliament			39 th parliament			Combined		
	Coef.	S.E.	<i>p</i>	Coef.	S.E.	<i>p</i>	Coef.	S.E.	<i>p</i>
Place on paper	-1.22	0.74	.10	0.44	0.60	.47	-0.22	0.46	.62
Constant	2.76	0.47	.00	1.47	0.33	.00	1.98	0.27	.00
<i>N</i>	237			255			492		
Pseudo R ²	.02			.00			.00		

Logistic regression showing the relationship between place in the order of precedence and reoffering. Place in the order of precedence is $(n-1)/(N-1)$, where *n* is an individual legislator's place on the order of precedence and *N* is the total number of individuals on the order. The dependent variable reads 0 for members who choose not to contest the next election and 1 for those incumbents who did choose to contest the next election. These results show that place on the paper as measured was statistically unrelated to the decision to reoffer.

Table SI4: Proposal power (dichotomous) and incumbent reoffering

Variable	38 th parliament			39 th parliament			Combined		
	Coef.	S.E.	<i>p</i>	Coef.	S.E.	<i>p</i>	Coef.	S.E.	<i>p</i>
Proposal power	0.30	0.45	.51	-0.45	0.35	.19	-0.19	0.27	.46
Constant	1.99	0.25	.00	1.91	0.25	.00	1.95	0.18	.00
<i>N</i>	237			255			492		
Pseudo R ²	.00			.01			.00		

Logistic regression showing the relationship between the power to propose and reoffering. The power to propose is measured 0 for those whose place on the order of precedence was after that of the last member to introduce a piece of legislation for second reading, and 1 for those who were not after this individual. The dependent variable reads 0 for members who choose not to contest the next election and 1 for those incumbents who did choose to contest the next election. These results show that proposal power as measured was statistically unrelated to the decision to reoffer.

Table SI5: Descriptive Statistics, Current and Previous Vote Share

Variable	Untreated			Treated*			Difference <i>T, p</i>
	Mean	S.E.	N	Mean	S.E.	N	
Current vote, all	48.02	0.63	239	48.91	0.82	165	0.87, .39
Previous vote, all	48.61	0.60	239	49.83	0.74	165	1.30, .20
Current vote, government	47.68	1.26	65	53.20	1.71	38	2.63, .01
Previous vote, government	48.20	1.08	65	51.60	1.54	38	1.85, .07
Current vote, opposition	48.16	0.72	174	47.63	0.91	127	0.46, .65
Previous vote, opposition	48.76	0.72	174	49.31	0.84	127	0.50, .62
Current vote, government, 39 th	52.73	1.71	31	58.01	2.23	21	1.91, .06
Previous vote, government, 39 th	48.86	1.77	31	53.34	2.49	21	1.51, .14
Current vote, opposition, 39 th	44.72	0.92	81	45.31	0.95	65	0.44, .66
Previous vote, opposition, 39 th	46.95	0.92	81	47.64	0.79	65	0.56, .58
Current vote, government, 38 th	43.07	1.44	34	47.26	1.86	17	1.72, .09
Previous vote, government, 38 th	47.61	1.30	34	49.45	1.48	17	0.87, .39
Current vote, opposition, 38 th	51.14	1.00	93	50.06	1.51	62	0.62, .54
Previous vote, opposition, 38 th	50.33	1.06	93	51.06	1.48	62	0.41, 0.68

This table presents additional descriptive statistics concerning the current and previous vote shares. The treatment category includes all members who were assigned the right the propose legislation, including those who chose not to introduce legislation. Accordingly, the differences presented are intent to treat effects.

Table SI6: Huber regression robustness check

<u><i>Dependent Variable:</i></u>			
<u><i>Vote Share</i></u>			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>R.S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Government * Power to Propose</i>	3.70	1.44	.01
<i>Government Member</i>	-0.02	0.97	.99
<i>Power to Propose</i>	-0.98	0.72	.18
<i>Year = 2006</i>	0.07	0.58	.90
<i>Previous Vote</i>	0.82	0.04	.00
<i>Constant</i>	7.89	1.92	.00
<i>N</i>	404		
<i>R²</i>	.61		
<i>Root MSE</i>	6.31		

Huber regression of vote share on variables shown. All *p*-values are two-tailed. The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 2.72 percentage points (95% C.I. 0.29, 5.17). This shows that members of the government who are randomly granted the right to propose legislation on average earn 2.72 percentage points more vote share than those government members who are not.

Table SI7: Quantile regression robustness check

<u><i>Dependent Variable:</i></u>			
<u><i>Vote Share</i></u>			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Government * Power to Propose</i>	4.07	1.27	.00
<i>Government Member</i>	1.89	0.78	.02
<i>Power to Propose</i>	-0.97	0.63	.13
<i>Year = 2006</i>	-0.03	0.54	.96
<i>Previous Vote</i>	0.73	0.03	.00
<i>Constant</i>	11.89	1.46	.00
<i>N</i>	404		
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	.35		
<i>Minimum sum of deviations</i>	1986.5		

Quantile regression of vote share on variables shown. All *p*-values are two-tailed. The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 3.10 percentage points (95% C.I. 0.93, 5.27), suggesting that the median vote share among government incumbents with the power to propose is significantly larger than that of government incumbents without the power to propose.

Table SI8: Place on the order paper robustness check

<u><i>Dependent Variable:</i></u>			
<u><i>Vote Share</i></u>			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>R.S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Government * Place on Paper</i>	-5.14	2.32	.03
<i>Government Member</i>	4.03	1.31	.02
<i>Place on Paper</i>	0.76	1.17	.52
<i>Year = 2006</i>	0.11	0.58	.85
<i>Previous Vote Share</i>	0.82	0.04	.00
<i>Constant</i>	7.15	1.97	.00
<i>N</i>	404		
<i>R²</i>	0.61		
<i>Root MSE</i>	6.32		

OLS regression of vote share on variables shown. Place on paper is the place in the order of precedence is $(n-1)/(N-1)$, where n is an individual legislator's place on the order of precedence and N is the total number of individuals on the order for that year. All p -values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered on Members of Parliament. The coefficient on the interaction of Government * Place on Paper indicates that those government members at the bottom of the list receive 5.14 percentage points less vote share in the next election compared to government members at the top of the list.

Table SI9: Non-proposers excluded robustness check

<u><i>Dependent Variable:</i></u>			
<u><i>Vote Share</i></u>			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>R.S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Government * Power to Propose</i>	5.34	1.42	.00
<i>Government Member</i>	-0.02	0.98	.98
<i>Power to Propose</i>	-1.14	0.69	.10
<i>Year = 2006</i>	0.47	0.57	.42
<i>Previous Vote Share</i>	0.80	0.04	.00
<i>Constant</i>	8.74	1.93	.00
<i>N</i>	389		
<i>R²</i>	0.62		
<i>Root MSE</i>	6.12		

OLS regression of vote share on variables shown. Those with the power to propose who did not propose legislation are excluded. All *p*-values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered on Members of Parliament. The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 4.20 percentage points (95% C.I. 1.77, 6.62). This shows that members of the government who are randomly granted the right to propose legislation and did propose it on average earn 4.20 percentage points more vote share than those government members who did not receive the power to propose.

Table SI10: Senate-initiated proposers excluded robustness check

<u>Dependent Variable:</u>			
<u>Vote Share</u>			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>R.S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Government * Power to Propose</i>	3.60	1.45	.01
<i>Government Member</i>	0.09	0.98	.92
<i>Power to Propose</i>	-1.04	0.73	.15
<i>Year = 2006</i>	0.07	0.58	.91
<i>Previous Vote Share</i>	0.82	0.04	.00
<i>Constant</i>	8.10	1.93	.00
<i>N</i>	399		
<i>R²</i>	0.61		
<i>Root MSE</i>	6.30		

OLS regression of vote share on variables shown. Those who advanced above the treatment threshold through Senate-initiated legislation are excluded. All *p*-values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered on Members of Parliament. The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 2.56 percentage points (95% C.I. 0.10, 5.01). This shows that members of the government who are randomly granted the right to propose legislation and did propose it on average earn 2.56 percentage points more vote share than those government members who are not.