

# A Guarantee of Stability for Any Parliamentary Composition: The Constructive Weighted Crutch Option

## Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference 2025

Stéphane Rouillon, B.Eng., M.Sc.A., Ph.D.  
Concordia University  
stephane.rouillon@sympatico.ca  
514-914-8002


Keywords: Parliamentary Stability, Fragmented Representation, Non-Confidence, Constructive Vote, Crutch Option, Legislative Weight, Mandate Length.

Brief overview: Whatever the level of fragmentation, the group that can rally the most elected members of parliament, from a single political party or any regrouped coalition, obtains a quasi-majoritarian voting power in parliament for a reduced mandate length.

# Summary

1. Motivation
2. Instability : a generic problem within contemporary parliaments
3. Classification of the distribution of the results
4. A stabilization mechanism: the weighted crutch option
5. Estimated stability of potentially unstable governments
6. Conclusion / simulation

# Motivation




# Instability: a Generic Problem within Contemporary Parliaments

Country or Region	Election date	Time without new government (months)	Mandate length (months)
Ireland	2016 February 26th	3	45
Northern Ireland	2017 March 2nd	19	43
The Netherlands	2017 March 15th	7	41
The Netherlands	2021 March 17th	9	39
Belgium	2010 June 13th	18	30
Belgium	2019 May 26th	16	32
Israel	2019 April 9th	5	-
Israel	2019 September 17th	6	-
Israel	2020 March 2nd	2	10
Israel	2021 March 23rd	3	19

# Other Governments with Potential Instability Problems


Country or Region	Election date	Time without new government (months)	Mandate length (months)
Bulgaria	2021 April 4th	3	-
Bulgaria	2021 July 11th	4	-
Bulgaria	2021 November 14th	1	7
Bulgaria	2022 October 2nd	6	-
Bulgaria	2023 April 2nd	2	10
Bulgaria	2024 June 9th	5	-
Bulgaria	2024 October 27th	2	at least 2
Tunisia	2014 October 26th	3	56
Tunisia	2019 October 6th	5	18
Tunisia	2023 January 29th	at least 26	-

# Five Different Types of Scenario



# Multiple Two-Party Potential Associations with Winner



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# An Almost-Majority Bonus: the Weighted Crutch Option

- Prevents governments from falling and allows them to move on
- Provides the winning party with a voting power equal to the opposition
- Legislative weight = opposition members / winners
- Transforms scenarios 1) and 2) into scenario 4)
- Power invariant:

Winners vote x Mandate Length



- Respects the coalition “principle”
- Compatible with the actual dynamics (transfers, departures, by-election and new governments)



# Estimated Stability of Potentially Unstable Governments

Probability of winning a confidence vote according to our probabilistic model:

Country or Region	Election date	Represented political parties or entities	Time without new government (months)	Mandate length (months)	Estimated stability	Stability with weighted crutch option	Reduced mandate length (months)
Ireland	2016 February 26th	31	3	45	40%	95%	22
Northern Ireland	2017 March 2nd	9	19	43	40%	92%	22
The Netherlands	2017 March 15th	13	7	41	16%	100%	14
The Netherlands	2021 March 17th	17	9	39	16%	100%	14
Belgium	2010 June 13th	12	18	30	15%	99%	11
Belgium	2019 May 26th	12	16	32	10%	100%	10
Israel	2019 April 9th	11	5	-	40%	100%	20
Israel	2019 September 17th	9	6	-	40%	98%	18
Israel	2020 March 2nd	8	2	10	40%	97%	21
Israel	2021 March 23rd	13	3	19	16%	100%	16

# Estimated Stability of Potentially Unstable Governments

Probability of winning a confidence vote according to our probabilistic model:

Country or Region	Election date	Represented political parties or entities	Time without new government (months)	Mandate length (months)	Estimated stability	Stability with weighted crutch option	Reduced mandate length (months)
Bulgaria	2021 April 4th	6	3	-	40%	92%	22
Bulgaria	2021 July 11th	6	4	-	40%	92%	18
Bulgaria	2021 November 14th	7	1	7	40%	95%	19
Bulgaria	2022 October 2nd	7	6	-	37%	95%	19
Bulgaria	2023 April 2nd	6	2	10	40%	92%	19
Bulgaria	2024 June 9th	7	5	-	37%	95%	19
Bulgaria	2024 October 27th	8	2	at least 2	37%	97%	19
Tunisia	2014 October 26th	18	3	56	49%	100%	32
Tunisia	2019 October 6th	30	5	18	26%	100%	15
Tunisia	2023 January 29th	9 - 45	at least 26 ???	???	10%	100%	18

# Simulations

## Determine Government

Political Party	Seats	AC	BEF
A	24	24	
B	18		18
C	15	15	
D	13		
E	12		12
F	10		10
G	8		

## Pass Legislation

Political Party	Seats	For	Against
A	24		
B	27		
C	15		
D	13		
E	18		
F	15		
G	8		

# Conclusion

- Instability is a generic problem within modern parliaments
- Multiple potential two-party associations with a main party to form a very stable government
- The weighted crutch option ensures such a situation in worst cases
- The mandate length gets reduced in proportion of the winning party's popularity
- It is compatible with actual British parliamentary dynamics and the coalition “principle”
- Combined with pure proportional representation, the weighted crutch option guarantees very stable governments as more opposition parties can help pass a legislation
- A new government can even take over after a by-election to complete the current – reduced – mandate