

Problem Description

Human Computable Passwords - design and analysis.

Managing passwords is a significant problem for most people in the modern world. This project will be based around the paper "Human Computable Passwords" by Blocki et al. [BBD14], proposing a method for humans to be able to re-compute passwords from public and reliable storage. Passwords are calculated using a memorized mapping from objects, typically letters or pictures, to digits; the characters of the passwords are then calculated in the users head, using a human computable function.

The main objectives of the project can be summarized as the following:

- Understand and compare the "Human Computable Passwords" scheme with other related password management schemes.
- Design and implement a password management scheme applying the ideas of the scheme.
- Analyze if the construction could be utilized to provide secure password management in practical situations.
- Validate if the scheme is feasible to use, comparing the user efforts required to the security rewards.

[1] J. Blocki, M. Blum, and A. Datta, "Human Computable Passwords," CoRR, vol. abs/1404.0, 2014.

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Abstract

Preface

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Passwords has come to be the one go to authentication method used by nearly all Internet sites and services. Guidelines and policies instructing the users on how their passwords should be, and how they should be maintained. The problem with most of these recommendations, are that they expect too much of the user. The password should be long and complicated, changed every month and not reused on more than one account. These are all commonly seen as recommendations are requirements given by sites on the Internet, and it is clear that no user will ever be able to fulfill them without using some kind of scheme or by adapting their passwords to circumvent them. Passwords reuse or password schemes improvised by the user will lead to a major loss in security, which of course is the opposite of the intentions when requiring passwords to be long and complex.

It does not seem that passwords as authentication mechanism are falling in popularity, this together with the obvious limitations of the human memory, means that there is a need for strong ways of managing passwords.

1.1 Motivation

Blocki et al. [Blo14, BBD14] has proposed a scheme allowing human users to calculate passwords based on publicly available challenges and a secret mapping stored in their own memory. This allows the user to protect all online accounts using long passwords while only remembering one set of mappings. The proposed scheme relies on generating random challenges for each account, which then have to be visible to the user when logging in to the desired account. Blocki propose ideas on how to make it easy for the user to both memorize the mappings and do the calculations efficiently. Mnemonic techniques to ease the memorization process and a special layout making the calculations more intuitive.

The usability of a password management scheme is key for it to even be considered by most users. If the requirements for it to function is too high compared to the

security rewards, not user will bother learning it. For the human computable password scheme proposed by Blocki, the usability is mostly related to the time spend calculating the password and in addition to the initial cost of memorizing a set of mappings.

This project wants to investigate how this human computable passwords scheme can be used by real users. Since the scheme is quite complex, it can be useful to have an application taking care of all the required overhead, such as generation and management of challenges. Such an application will be designed and implemented, with a goal of making it so that a user, without to much introduction, can use it to manage passwords. The application will be presented and the usability rewards discussed.

Even if the application makes the scheme easy and feasible to use, it might still be that the scheme is too demanding in regards to time spend calculating. This will be the be second part of this project, to investigate how efficient human users actually can calculate password. An experiment asking the participants to actually calculate password based on randomly generated challenges, will be design. The experiment will then record statistics regarding calculation time and failure rate of the trials. The study will be structured as an exploratory experiment, trying to find interesting and possibly important characteristics in the usage statistics recorded through the experiment.

1.2 Scope and Objectives

The project will first present human computable passwords as constructed by Blocki [BBD14], while also describing other related background material. The objectives of the project can be summarized as the following:

- Study the scheme with a special focus on the usability parameters, discussing how the different components of the scheme affect the usability.
- Design, implement and demonstrate a prototype application realizing the password management scheme as an actual application.
- Discuss if the usability is improved through the chosen design.
- Design, implement and conduct an experiment investigating the limitations imposed by calculation time and failure rates of an average user.
- Conclude with a hypothesis about the practical limitations or advantages of the password management scheme.

The experiment will not be a formal scientific research, trying to verify a hypothesis stated in advance, but it will rather collect data thought to be of interest. Afterwards the data will be presented and analyzed, no concrete answer will be given, but initial trends and characteristics will be discussed.

Limitations. It is worth noting that the usability of the scheme is directly based on two things, the calculation time(including the failure rate) and the effort spent memorizing and rehearsing the secret mapping. The experiment which is part of this project will only investigate the calculation times and failure rates. The efforts related to the secret mapping will be discussed in the background and where it is important, but memorizing a secret mapping will not be part of the experiment trials. The reasoning for this decision is that it would be much harder to find participants willing to memorize a set of mappings without somehow compensating them for the efforts.

1.3 Outline

Chapter 2 will present relevant background material, mostly related to password or password management schemes. Other methods for storing passwords will be presented, showing the difference between password management software actually storing passwords, and password management schemes which usually only helps the user remember them. Finally the usability model proposed by Blocki [Blo14] will be described.

Chapter 3 describes human computable passwords as described by Blocki [BBD14], including definitions and human computable functions. Next, some new security features will be presented, showing an interesting relationship between the security parameters of the scheme, allowing a user to adjust the scheme to his needs. A walk-through of the scheme showing how to set it up and how to calculate passwords will be given in section 3.2.

The author notes that the chapter is partially reference work presenting the scheme of Blocki, but also new thoughts and descriptions (subsection 3.1.4, section 3.3) highlighting important features of the scheme.

Chapter 4 presents the human computable password management Chrome extension. First, the architecture and components of Chrome extensions are described, including security features important to the design. Next, the extensions design and implementation is presented, including the building stones used to realize it. A short introduction to each of the components will be given, before the actual implementation is described, with additional explanation of the code given in the

appendix. Finally, a demonstration of the application is given, trying to illustrate how it would be used in practice.

Chapter 5 will describe the second part of this project, namely the usability experiment. The experiment will be conducted through a separate application which will be shown, in addition to the experiment setup. This will include important choices and assumptions made trying to mimic the actual user experience when calculating passwords.

Chapter 6 contains concluding remarks summarizing the findings and experiences made throughout the project. Suggestions on further work is also given in this final chapter.

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Passwords

Passwords are the common way of authenticating users upon access to sites on the Internet. The idea is that only the user and the target service know the password, and the user has to provide the correct password before access is granted. Passwords are a much discussed theme and claiming that passwords are usually not used in the correct manner is not an overreaction. The main problem seems to be that good passwords and the human memory does not go well together. For passwords to be sufficient as authentication each user has to be forced into using long complex password, or even use one generated for them, with the problem being that it is easily forgotten. Furthermore, if a user was able to memorize *one* "good" password, he will probably use this for all of his accounts, so that if one of the services is compromised and user information leaked, all his accounts may be compromised. With all of this in mind it is easy to say that everybody should use complex, unique passwords for each account, but in practice this is not feasible. Florêncio and Herley [LHP14] conducted a large scale study of passwords habits in 2007, revealing that a user on average has 25 different accounts protected by passwords. On average these sites are protected by about 7 distinct password, where 5 of them are rapidly re-used.

Password authentication requires the authenticating server to store something related to the password, if this is stolen the password will in most cases be compromised as well, even if the server did not store the clear text password. Attackers will, in most cases, be able to retrieve the password eventually. After obtaining the username and password for one service the attacker would try this user data on other services and compromise these as well.

If a user was to have different passwords for each site, these might still easily be compromised. Ives et al. [IWS04] discuss this "domino effect", where intrusion to one domain can compromise several others, if users have re-used passwords. A normal user will typically try to log in by trial-and-error [ABK13], if the first password does

not work, the user will try with another of his passwords. This way passwords might be lost through phishing attacks where a user is tricked into trying to log in to a fake site. It is thus clear that some kind of system is needed to allow a human user to manage strong passwords. The best case would be if each user, for each of his 25 accounts had a unique password of satisfying strength, this is of course not possible.

2.1.1 Password strength

How to measure the strength of passwords is a well known and discussed problem, but the naive approach says that password strength is related to how strong a password is against brute force attacks [DMR09]. Length and complexity are the most thought of parameters to measure such strength. A perfect password would thus be one as long as allowed by the system consisting of random characters from all possible characters, this one would also be changed frequently. All these characteristics challenge how the human brain works. In addition to the objective strength of the password, techniques making it harder for a computer to repeatedly try different passwords may be applied. Such techniques include CAPTACHAS [vABL04] which are puzzles supposed to require a human to be able to solve, thus making brute force using a computer harder. Or techniques making it easier for the user to remember multiple strong passwords.

Yan et al. [YBAG00] investigate the trade-off between security of passwords versus memorability allowing humans to remember them. An important regarding this trade-off is that most sites applying advice and policies on how to create strong passwords, do not take into account if the recommended passwords are hard or easy to remember. There is no point in having a strong password if the user is going to forget it. Yan et al. suggest that passwords should appear random but be constructed using a mnemonic structure such as passphrases. The idea here is to generate a random looking password by memorizing a familiar sentence and using the first letters of each word as the password.

Florêncio et al. [FHC07] investigate another matter; do strong passwords accomplish anything? The point is that no matter how long and complex password users chose they are still subject to the most dangerous and common threats (phishing, keylogging or access attacks), as discussed in the previous section. The reason for enforcing strong passwords seems to be to protect against bulk guessing attacks, against other attacks, typically offline attacks, shorter passwords is usually sufficient.

Some services may require their users to include characters from different groups, such as digits, symbols and upper case letters, and possibly a minimum length. Table 2.1 illustrates the effects of password length and character set. The values represent the possible values a key might have given the length and character set. E.g. using only digits and length 4 gives 10^4 possible combinations. The bigger the key space is the harder it is to perform a brute force attack. Note that the key space increase

		Password length			
Character set		4	8	12	16
	10	10^4	10^8	10^{12}	10^{16}
	26	$5 \cdot 10^5$	$2 \cdot 10^{11}$	10^{17}	$4 \cdot 10^{22}$
	36	$2 \cdot 10^6$	$3 \cdot 10^{12}$	$5 \cdot 10^{18}$	$8 \cdot 10^{24}$
	62	10^7	$2 \cdot 10^{14}$	$3 \cdot 10^{21}$	$5 \cdot 10^{28}$
	95	$8 \cdot 10^7$	$7 \cdot 10^{15}$	$5 \cdot 10^{23}$	$4 \cdot 10^{31}$

Figure 2.1: [SS09] Table showing the possible keyspace of passwords, given length and character set.

more rapidly with increased password length, than by increasing complexity of the characters used. If the character set is increased from 10 to 95 the key space increase 800 times given length of 4 characters, while increasing the length from 4 to 16 increase the key space one billion times with a character set of 10. Even if both character set and password length contribute to the strength of a password, length is the dominant factor.

Password strength meters are a common way used by many sites on the Internet to aid their users when selecting passwords. Common meters use colored progression bars together with a word or short comment stating if the entered password is evaluated as "bad", "poor" or "strong". Ur et al. [UKK⁺12] found that password meters actually lead users into choosing longer and stronger passwords, but they also argue that enforcing such policies might frustrate users and possibly lead them into writing passwords down, use weak password management schemes or re-use the same password across many sites. The most common requirements used by passwords meters of known web services can be summarized as the following [dM14]:

- Length and character selection are part of most password meters. It is normal to disallow passwords shorter, and sometimes longer, than a given range, which may vary. A variation of different characters can be required, namely different kinds of symbols or capital letters. Spaces may be allowed in between other characters, at the start or end of the password, or not at all. Some sites checks for sequences of the same character as well.
- Personal information. Information registered by the user are evaluated by some meters, typically name, email and date of birth are checked against in original and transformed forms. This means that a password like "4nD3r?1991" ("anders1991" transformed) which look strong, will be evaluated as weak.
- Dictionary checks. Make sure that the password does not include any dictionary words by matching it with a dictionary of common words.

The conclusion on what "good" passwords are, is not clear, but the one thing agreed upon seems to be that re-use of passwords are the biggest threat. It is a fact that the human brain is not capable of remembering different passwords for each account on the Internet, thus the need for an aiding application such as the one discussed in this project.

2.1.2 Password Storage

hashing, salt etc..

Internet services using password as authentication method typically have to store information about their users, associating a user and a password. How this information is kept secure can not be controlled by the user, but it important for passwords to work. Especially since many users tend to re-use their passwords on several account [IWS04], thus if one account is compromised, many others might also be lost. It is a fact that these kinds of breaches do happen from time to time, and attackers might even post the credentials online¹ If the service stores the passwords in plain text, leakage might directly lose passwords if the database gets lost.

Most online accounts try to make it harder for attackers to compromise the accounts of their users. The most used technique are hashing of the passwords before storing them, making it hard for an attacker to recover the actual passwords even if the database is broken. Hashing means applying a one-way function on the plain text password, producing a fixed length hash value which is stored instead of the plain text. When a user wants to log in the password is sent to the server where it is hashed again using the same one-way function and then compared to the stored hash value. If the database where these hashes are stored is compromised, making the hashes available to the attacker, he can no longer directly use the data to steal account. The attacker would have to first perform an offline attack, cracking[subsection 2.1.3] the hashes to recover the plain text passwords, which requires a lot of effort and time to carry out.

The problem with only hashing the passwords is that the hash of a given password will be the same every time, making it possible to recognize known password hashes through the use of big table containing the hashes of known passwords. This way a hash might get cracked quite easily, see subsection 2.1.3 for details on such attacks. To circumvent this problem a service might add a random *salt* to the password before hashing it. This way the hash of a user's password will be unique even for users with the same password. A salt is a randomly generated nonce, which is concatenated with the password before hashing, and then stored alongside the hash value in the

¹Hackers post millions of stolen Gmail passwords - <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-hackers-steal-5-million-gmail-passwords/>

user database. To authenticate a user the server concatenates the entered password with the salt from

Example 2.1.

Let the following be the records of a user database, and H a cryptographically strong hash function.

Username	Hash	Salt
Bob	3aaF4A4PxZ	wRaE3Z9oa6
...

To authenticate, Bob would enter his password, $pwd = \text{letnolin}$, which is sent to the server. The server then concatenate pwd with the salt from Bob's entry in the database, and then apply the hash function to the result. If this is the same as the stored hash, Bob is authenticated.

If $H(\text{letnolinwRaE3Z9oa6}) = 3aaF4A4PxZ \rightarrow \text{Bob authenticated.}$

The hash function can be made even stronger by using a keyed hash function [BSNP96] or simply encrypting the hashes, requiring a shared secret key between the user and the server.

2.1.3 Attacks

Passwords are often the only barrier stopping adversaries from directly accessing the accounts of a user. The combination of user name and password are the easiest point of entry to access, and thus the first logical point of attack. There are several methods used to attack password authentication, trying to retrieve passwords. The most important attacks [SS09, FHC07], will be discussed in the following section.

Capturing of passwords directly from the server responsible for the authentication involves the attack acquiring password data through breaking into the data storage, eavesdropping on communication channels or through monitoring the user by other means. The first, most basic threat is to simply steal the stored password from an insecure server, this would require a weak configured server storing the passwords in plain text. This is mitigated by storing only cryptographic hashes of passwords, which allows the server to authenticate users while preventing attackers from determining the actual passwords without *cracking* the hashes, as described in subsection 2.1.2.

Cracking requires the attacker to go through several steps. First acquiring the hash of a user account or a whole file of hashes for a site. Next, one would try to find a sequence of strings yielding the same hash as the actual password. How hard

it is to crack a hash depends on the strength of the password and can be mitigated by choosing strong passwords and changing these frequently. *Rainbow tables* [Bro11] are a technique employed by attackers to speed up this process. Rainbow tables are precomputed table of hashes, allows the attacker to compute a set of hashes once and use these values several times, thus providing a space-time trade-off. This involves using more space, since all the computed hash values would have to be stored somewhere, but allowing a much shorter computation time to brute-force a hash. The technique stores chains of hashes as shown in figure 2.2, storing only the first and last value of the chain. The attacker then searches for a given hash in the set of end points, if no match is found the hash function is applied and a new search conducted. This process continues, until a match is found, the plain text is then computed from the start value of the chain, applying the hash function the same amount of times it took to find a match in the chain.




Figure 2.2: Rainbow table

2.2 Password Management

As seen in the previous sections passwords introduce a dilemma as passwords are supposed to be hard to "guess" and thus hard to remember. The naive solution to this problem is to either use one password for many accounts or to write down passwords, even though most users understand that this solution is bad, users will still do it if the password policy required is too complex. To make the process of managing passwords easier several techniques and tools have been suggested. The main techniques used to help manage passwords online are [GF06]:

2.2.1 Password management schemes

Password creation and memorization techniques assists the user in remembering passwords, trying to circumvent the limitations of the human memory ?? . Blocki et al. [BBD13] consider 4 different examples of password managements schemes to illustrate how users might chose their passwords.

- **Reuse Weak.** When a user selects a random phrase or word w and reuse this as the password $p_i = w$ for all accounts. While maybe not very strong, this is the most simple example of a password management scheme.
- **Reuse Strong.** Same as reuse weak but the user chose four random words w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4 and reuse the concatenation of these as the password $p_i = w_1w_2w_3w_4$ for all his accounts.
- **Lifehacker.** User choses three random words w_1, w_2, w_3 as a base password $b = w_1w_2w_3$ as well as a derivation rule d used to derive unique data from the site names for each password ². Example of a derivation rule could be the first and last three letters of the service name. The password for account A_i would then be $p_i = bd(A_i)$ with $d(A_i)$ being the string derived from the site name. In practice a password generated using the method might look like "facthreerandomwordsook".
- **Strong Random and Independent.** User choses new words $w_1^i, w_2^i, w_3^i, w_4^i$ for each account to be used as passwords $p_i = w_1^iw_2^iw_3^iw_4^i$.

It is clear that the three former schemes are much easier to use than the last one. Most user would prefer the first ones because they does not require much if any rehearsal while the one strong scheme would require too much effort in terms of rehearsing and memorization. This trade-off between usability and security is the main problem when designing password management schemes. For a scheme to be popular it cannot require too much extra rehearsal, while a secure scheme most of the time will require some.

2.2.2 Password manager software.

Applications meant to keep passwords safe for the user. These applications can either be stand alone programs or, more common, browser extensions such as LastPass ³. LastPass provides an user interface to generate and store passwords for online services, as well as form fillers to enter them when logging in. The passwords are

²How to Update Your Insecure Passwords and Make Them Easy to Use.<http://lifehacker.com/5631203/how-to-update-your-insecure-passwords-and-make-them-easy-to-use>

³LastPass <https://lastpass.com/>

encrypted using a master password protecting the user credentials against both server leakage and insiders accessing the data. Such systems usually provides a lot of extra features such as automatically changing of passwords and syncing between devices.

Built-in browser password managers. Most modern browsers provide "remember password" functions. These functions act similar to software like LastPass, by storing the users passwords in some fashion, then reproduce it when login in.

These kinds of systems and applications requires the user to trust that the implemented systems are secure enough to prevent adversaries, both insiders and outsiders, stealing credentials stored by the services. Software aiding the user by storing passwords often also provide autofill-functions, automatically filling in the username and password of the associated site. Silver et al. [SJB⁺14] propose attacks exploiting these autofill functions to extract passwords from the password manager, the most basic example attack is shown in 2.2. Despite of the obvious weaknesses in many password managers, they still argue that password managers can strengthen credential security if implemented correctly.

Example 2.2.

Consider a user connecting to a open wifi at a coffee bar or another public place. It is not unusual to present the user with a "landing page" asking for approval of some usage agreement. The rouge wifi provider could include multiple iframes⁴ pointing to the login pages of common sites the user probably have stored credentials for. See Figure 2.3. By injecting javascript in the iframes the attacker can extract all the usernames and passwords autofilled by the password manager. Note that the iframes displayed in the figure are not visible to the user, to him it looks like a standard landing/welcome page. Silver et al. [SJB⁺14] claim that six out of ten password managers were vulnerable to this simple attack.

Even if the password manager is secure against autofill-attacks, or if it does not include the feature, the manager might still be at risk. If the account storing all the usernames and passwords of a user where to be compromised, all the sites would be compromised, so it is important that the password manager is even more secure than the sites themselves. Zhao et al. [ZYS13] identified several vulnerabilities in the LastPass implementation, even though no known breaches has been reported. They investigate different types of attacks, including attacks on local decrypted credentials; request monitoring attacks which tries to intercept request between the password manager and related cloud-storage; as well as brute-force attacks trying to crack the master password. The conclusion is that password managers are double-edged swords, in theory they help make password authentication stronger, but if

⁴http://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_iframe.asp




Figure 2.3: Rouge wifi landing page containing iframes with common sites, used to steal password form a autofilling password manager.

implemented slightly wrong may be a major vulnerability. Storing all the passwords at one place makes a obvious point of attack for adversaries since breaking the managers most of the time would break all accounts stored within.

2.3 Usability Model

This section presents the usability model defined by Blocki et al. [BBD13], which predicts the effort required of a user to keep a set of secrets memorized without forgetting it. It will be presented in the context of password management schemes, in particular the human computable password management scheme relied on in this project. The model will later be used to analyze the usability of the scheme and related applications.

2.3.1 Definitions

A password management scheme generates and keeps track of passwords $p_1, \dots, p_m \in P$ for all $m \in A$ accounts of a user. P is all possible passwords. Let (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) represent an association between an object (e.g. letter or picture) and a related mapping (typically a digit between 1 and 10). A user have to rehearse the association (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) to avoid forgetting it. Next two schedules are defined defining how often a user has to rehearse to not forget a association, and how often he visits an account.

Definition 2.1.

[BBD14] A rehearsal schedule for an object-mapping association (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) is a series of points in time $t_0^{\hat{c}} < t_1^{\hat{c}} < \dots$. A rehearsal requirement for each $i \geq 0$ says that the object-mapping association pair must be rehearsed at least once in the time interval $[t_i^{\hat{c}}, t_i^{\hat{c}} + 1) = \{x \in \mathbb{R} | t_i^{\hat{c}} \leq x < t_{i+1}^{\hat{c}}\}$.

A rehearsal schedule as defined in definition 2.1 is said to be sufficient if a user can keep an association in his memory without forgetting it by following the schedule.

Visitation schedule [BBD14] is a series of numbers $\tau_0^i < \tau_1^i < \dots$ representing the points in time when a user visits account A_i . This schedule cannot be known exactly so it is modeled using a random process with a parameter λ_i based on the average time between visits to account A_i - $E[\tau_{j+1}^i - \tau_j^i]$.

A rehearsal requirement can also be satisfied naturally if a user visits an account using the object \hat{c} during the interval $[t_i^{\hat{c}}, t_i^{\hat{c}} + 1)$, as defined in definition 2.2,

Definition 2.2.

A rehearsal requirement $[t_i^{\hat{c}}, t_i^{\hat{c}} + 1)$ is naturally satisfied by a visitation schedule $\tau_0^i < \tau_1^i < \dots$ if for any $j \in [m]$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}$ so that $\hat{c} \in c_j$ and $\tau_k^j i \in [t_i^{\hat{c}}, t_i^{\hat{c}} + 1)$. Let

$$ER_{t, \hat{c}} = |\{i | t_{i+1}^{\hat{c}} \leq t \wedge \forall j, k. (\hat{c} \notin c_j \wedge \tau_k^j \notin [t_i^{\hat{c}}, t_i^{\hat{c}} + 1))\}|$$

denote how many extra rehearsals required, that are *not* satisfied by the visitation schedule, during time interval $[0, t]$

2.3.2 Model

The core of the model is that usability depends on rehearsal required to remember all passwords, relative to the visitation schedule of the specific user. How hard it is for any given user to remember a relation between object may vary from person to person depending on mnemonic technique and genetic conditions. This is adjusted for in the model by the constant s representing the combined strength of mnemonic technique and the memory of a user. Next, consider two different rehearsal requirements specifying what is needed to maintain a memory.

Requirement 2.1.

Constant Rehearsal Assumption (CR)[BBD13]. The rehearsal schedule given by $R(\hat{c}, i) = is$ is sufficient to maintain the association (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) in memory.

Requirement 2.2.

Expanding Rehearsal Assumption (ER)[BBD13]. The rehearsal schedule given by $R(\hat{c}, i) = 2^{is}$ is sufficient to maintain the association (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) in memory.

Visitation schedule	1	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{7}$	$\frac{1}{31}$	$\frac{1}{365}$
Very Active	10	10	10	10	35
Typical	5	10	10	10	40
Occasional	2	10	20	20	23
Infrequent	0	2	5	10	58

Table 2.1: Visitation schedules.

The difference between these two assumptions about human memory is that CR assumes that the user have to keep rehearsing every s days for as long as he wants to make sure to not forget anything. This might be too pessimistic since it is reasonable to assume that it gets easier to rehearse for each rehearsal. This is what ER assumes, if a relation has been rehearsed i times it does not have to be rehearsed again in 2^{is} days. ER is the most intuitive assumption to make and is back up by experiments on how the human brain forgets over time [Squ89?].

Visitation Schedule

Every user will eventually have a unique visitation schedule which will vary greatly from user to user. The model uses a Poisson process to model the visitations schedule for a given site A_i , with parameter λ_i . The average time between visits, $\frac{1}{\lambda_i}$, is assumed to be known for each visitation schedule. A site visited every day would yield $\lambda_i = 1$ day, and $\lambda_i = \frac{1}{365}$ days for a site visited annually.

Next, the model use four different types of users which may have accounts of 5 different account types based on visitation frequency. The users can be: very active, typical, occasional or infrequent, while an account can be visited daily, every three days, every week, every month or annually. Table 2.1 defines how many of each type the users have respectively. In example, an active user is said to have 10 accounts he visits daily and 35 he visits annually.

Extra rehearsals

If an object-mapping association (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) is not rehearsed through normal usage within the interval $[t_i^{\hat{c}}, t_{i+1}^{\hat{c}})$ the user would have to rehearse the association to prevent forgetting it. $ER_{t, \hat{c}}$ in definition 2.2 gives the number of extra rehearsals of (\hat{c}, \hat{a}) in a given time interval. From this it can be seen that $ER_t = \sum_{\hat{c}} ER_{t, \hat{c}}$ gives the number of rehearsals, in addition to natural rehearsal, needed to maintain all objects in a set of associations. In the context of a password management scheme it is clear smaller values for $E[ER_t]$ yield less effort required by the user.

Blocki et al.[BBD13] proves that, given a sufficient rehearsal schedule and a specific visitation schedule, ER_t , total number of extra rehearsals needed to keep all object-mappings in memory, can be predicted through Theorem 2.1.

Theorem 2.1. [BBD13] Let $i_{\hat{c}}^* = (\operatorname{argmax}_x t_x^{\hat{c}} < t) - 1$, then

$$E[ER_t] = \sum_{\hat{c} \in C} \sum_{i=0}^{i_{\hat{c}}^*} \exp\left(-\left(\sum_{j:\hat{c} \in C_j} \lambda_j\right)(t_{t+1}^{\hat{c}} - t_i^{\hat{c}})\right)$$

Lemma 1. [BBD13] The probability that \hat{c} is not rehearsed naturally during the interval $[a, b]$ is $\exp(-\lambda_{\hat{c}}(b - a))$, given $S_{\hat{c}} = \{i | \hat{c} \in c_i\}$ and $\lambda_{\hat{c}} = \sum_{i \in S_{\hat{c}}} \lambda_i$

Chapter 3

Human Computable Passwords

The previous chapter concludes that managing passwords for online accounts has become a major issue for the modern Internet user. It seems to be impossible to remember and maintain enough strong passwords to keep all accounts secured. The scheme presented in this chapter is designed to help the user maintain and remember multiple strong passwords, while also protecting these after multiple passwords breaches. Human computable passwords take advantage of the human brain allowing users to calculate passwords from public challenges, using their own mind to do so.

The Human Computable Password management scheme is proposed by Blocki et al. [BBD14]. In addition to the scheme itself, the proposal introduces security and usability notions used to analyze the proposed scheme. This chapter will describe the scheme as well as associated security and usability concerns. The first section consists of definitions and notations as used by Blocki [BBD14] to describe the scheme. Next, human computable functions are introduced as this is the main component used in the password management scheme. How these functions can be used to generate and memorize unique passwords in practical cases will be presented. Finally, usability concerns related to the discussed password management scheme will be reviewed.

3.1 Password Management Scheme

The main idea of the Human Computable Password management scheme is to have a set of challenges stored in persistent memory, typically on a computer or even a piece of paper. The user then use a mapping and a function to calculate the response to each challenge, which eventually gives the password. It is worth noting that this is different from other "traditional" passwords managers, in that the passwords are not stored, only challenges "helping" the user remember the passwords. To create a new password, random challenges is generated, the user then computes the password from these using a memorized secret mapping. To reproduce the password later, the same challenges is displayed to the user, which then can calculate the same password.

This procedure is explained further in section 3.2, and in algorithms 3.3 and 3.2.

3.1.1 Definitions and Notation

Memory types considered are either *persistent* or *associative* memory [Bad97]. This project follow the settings of Blocki et al. [BBD13, BBD14] where persistent memory are equal to writing something down or somehow storing it reliably, but not securely. When talking about persistent memory, it can be assumed that this is publicly available, or at least that an adversary has undisclosed access to the data. This should be emphasized since this is a strength to the scheme, nothing needs to be kept secret after establishing the needed prerequisites.

Associative memory is the memory of each of the users, namely their human memory. This memory is different from the persistent memory in that it is totally private but needs to be rehearsed to not lose data. In a password management scheme rehearsing should optimally be part of the natural activity of a user. The best case would be if a user could rehearse and keep all his passwords in associative memory by simply logging in to his accounts as normal. This is a central challenge for all password schemes [BBD13].

The password management scheme uses a random mapping between a set of objects to single digits which has to be memorized by the user. This mapping is denoted as $\sigma : [n] \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_d$. If $X_k \subseteq [n]^k$ is the space of ordered clauses of k variables, let $C \sim X_k$ be a clause chosen at random from X_k . C is now a set of k objects (e.g. $(2, 4, 7, 8)$). Now $\sigma(C) \in \mathbb{Z}_d^k$ is the mapped variables corresponding to challenge C . C can consist of any type of object, such as pictures letters or digits, with the mapping σ always being to digits.

Example 3.1.

If $\sigma(x) = x + 1 \bmod 10$ and $C = (10, 25, 36)$ then $\sigma(C) = (1, 6, 7)$.

On of these challenges, C , will be referred to as a *single digit challenge*, which will consist of k ordered object chosen at random. The function $f : \mathbb{Z}_d^k \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_d$ is a human computable function as discussed in the next section. The user responds to a challenge C by computing $f(\sigma(C))$. A complete password challenge, $\vec{C} = (C_1, \dots, C_t) \in (X_k)^t$, will consist of t separate, single digit challenges. The response to \vec{C} , namely $f(\sigma(\vec{C}))$, is the complete password.

The password management scheme works by generating one challenge, \vec{C} , for each of a user's accounts A_1, \dots, A_m . The challenges $\vec{C}_1, \dots, \vec{C}_m \in (X_k)^t$ are stored in persistent memory. When a user wants to log in to a service he is shown the challenge corresponding to that account, the user then calculate the responses to all the single digit challenges, which will produce the password.

3.1.2 Human Computable Functions

At the core of the scheme is a human computable function f and the memorized mapping σ . The scheme require the composite function of these two $f \circ \sigma$ to be *human computable*, which simply means that the function should be easily computable in the head of the user. To fulfill this requirement the function can't involve many operations, since the complexity and thus computation time would be too high. As shown by Miller [Mil56], a human can only store 7 ± 2 pieces of information at a given time, on the other hand humans are quite good at simple operations such as addition modulo 10. In example "1+6+5+3+8+9+3+1+4+6+7+7+6 mod 10" would be easy for most humans to compute by simply doing one operation at a time, updating the answer after each. With this approach only one piece of information would be stored in memory of the user at any time. The problem with such an expression is the amount of terms.

The requirements needed for a function to be human computable can thus be summarized as the following, and formalized in Requirement 3.1:

- Can only involve "simple" operations, mainly addition and recalling from long-term memory.
- Limited amount of terms.
- Limited amount of operations.

Remark 3.1.

All operations used in the human computable functions discussed in this project are modulo 10, this is the most natural for most humans.

Requirement 3.1.

Function f is said to be \hat{t} -human computable if a human can compute it in his head in \hat{t} seconds.

Blocki et al. [BBD14] believe that a function f is human-computable if it can be computed using a fast streaming algorithm, meaning that the input is presented as a sequence of objects that only can be evaluated once. The algorithm would have to be simple since humans are not good at storing intermediate values [Mil56]. Typical operations fast enough for the human to compute in his head is addition modulo 10 which is natural for most humans to do quickly, and recalling a mapped value $\sigma(i)$ from memory.

Definition 3.1.

A function f is (P, \tilde{t}, \hat{m}) -computable if there is a space \tilde{m} streaming algorithm computing f using \tilde{t} operations from P .

Remark 3.2.

Space \tilde{m} means that the algorithm requires no more than \tilde{m} memory slots during calculation. Slots are typically used for storing values and executing primitive operations such as addition [AMS99].

As for the primitive operations in P , the following are considered:

- Add takes two digits x_1 and x_2 , and returns the sum $x_1 + x_2 \bmod 10$.
- Recall returns the secret value $\sigma(i)$ corresponding to an input index i . The mapping σ is memorized by the user, allowing the recall operation to be done quickly in the users head.
- TableLookup involves looking up the x 'th value from a table of 10 indices.

Example 3.2.

The function $f \circ \sigma(i_1, \dots, i_5) = \sigma(i_1) + \dots + \sigma(i_5)$ is $(P, 9, 3)$ -computable, since it requires 9 operations from P , 5 recall operations and 4 add operations. $\tilde{m} = 3$ since a sequence of additions $i_1 + \dots + i_n$, requires one slot for storing the sum, one slot for storing the next value in the sequence and one slot to execute the addition.

Blocki et al. [BBD14] conjecture that a user H will be able to calculate a $(P, \tilde{t}, 3)$ -computable function in $\hat{t} = \gamma_H \tilde{t}$ seconds. Blocki believes that users with moderate mathematical background should be able to achieve results yielding $\gamma_H \leq 1$ This conjecture will be part of the experiment presented later in this project.

Conjecture 3.1. [BBD14] *For each user H there is a small constant $\gamma_H > 0$ such that any $(P, \tilde{t}, 3)$ -computable function f will be \hat{t} -human computable with $\hat{t} = \gamma_H \tilde{t}$.*

3.1.3 Secure Human Computable Functions

Blocki et al. [BBD14] suggest a family of human computable functions defined as follows.

$$f_{k_1, k_2}(x_0, \dots, x_{9+k_1+k_2}) = x_j + \sum_{i=10+k_1}^{9+k_1+k_2} x_i \bmod 10,$$

$$\text{with } j = \sum_{i=10}^{9+k_1} x_i \bmod 10 \quad \text{and} \quad k_1 > 0, k_2 > 0$$

Definition 3.2.

$$f(x_0, x_2, \dots, x_{13}) = (x_{((x_{11}+x_{10}) \bmod 10)} + x_{12} + x_{13}) \bmod 10$$

Definition 3.3.

$$f \circ \sigma(x_0, x_2, \dots, x_{13}) = (\sigma(x_{(\sigma(x_{11})+\sigma(x_{10}) \bmod 10)}) + \sigma(x_{12}) + \sigma(x_{13})) \bmod 10$$

This project will use one of these functions, with $k_1 = k_2 = 2$. From now on this will be the function referred to as f , the function is defined in definition 3.2. For an in depth analysis of the function see "Usable Human Authentication: A Quantitative Treatment" [Blo14]. Blocki argues that an adversary would have to see $\tilde{\Omega}(n^{1.5})$ challenge-response pairs to be able to start recovering the secret mapping σ . A realistic mapping σ would probably consist of no more than 100 object to digit mappings. A secret mapping consisting of $n = 100$ mappings would require an attacker to steal 1000 challenge-response pairs (100 accounts given password length of 10) to recover the secret mapping. In practice this might be the tricky part of the scheme, memorizing a mapping of 100 object-digit mappings might be possible, but probably too hard for a "normal" user to bother doing. It might be more reasonable to use a smaller set of mappings which will lower the security of the scheme, while making it more accessible for novice users.

An example mapping which could be feasible in practice is characters to single digits, with characters from the alphabet and digits between 1 and 10. This mapping would yield $n = 26$ which would require an attacker to recover significantly less challenge-response pairs. With $n = 26$ the amount is down to 133 compared to the 1000 with $n = 100$. Still, this would require to fully compromise 13 or more accounts with password lengths of 10 characters.

In addition to f , a mapping function σ is used. Definition 3.3 defines the composite function of f and σ which is used later in the actual password scheme. The response to a challenge \vec{C} is calculated using this function $f \circ \sigma$. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the system looks at a high level, random challenges are stored persistently in a database and a secret mapping is stored in the associative memory of the user. A challenge is then converted into a password by applying the mapping and a human computable function.

3.1.4 System parameters

The previous section has described how the password management scheme works. The most important characteristic that should be emphasized is that there is two possible sources of information leakage in the password management scheme, namely the database used to store the challenges and the different site's password storage. The latter is e.g. the database of facebook.com which usually will consist of salted hashes of the users passwords. The challenges are, as mentioned, stored in persistent memory, which is assumed to be available to an adversary, so leaking the challenge alone is not necessarily a problem. If password hashes are leaked from online services the password to that exact service might be lost, but the scheme still ensures that no other passwords can be reduced from the compromised password. An adversary attacking the scheme would try to recover the secret mapping σ since this would




Figure 3.1: The database contains challenges indexed by domain name, which is fetched and displayed to the user. The user can then calculate the response to this challenge by using the secret mapping σ which is only stored in the mind of the user.

allow him to compute all the passwords of a user using that mapping. Such an attack, if possible, would require a set amount of challenge-response pairs.

There are some interesting trade-offs related to the parameters of the human computable passwords scheme. A bigger set of mappings makes it increasingly hard to recover the secret mapping, but it becomes harder to memorize and rehearse it. It is reasonable to say that complexity of a mapping grows linearly with the number of mappings n , and the resistance versus attackers grows polynomially, thus much quicker than the complexity, see Figure 3.2. In other words, for each mapping added to σ , n is increased with one and the security multiplied 1.5 times. The trade-off which would have to be evaluated for each user is then, how much effort is the

$f(x_0, \dots, x_{13})$	A human computable function used in the password management scheme investigated in this project. Defined in 3.2
$\sigma(x)$	Random mapping to be memorized by the user. It takes in an object of some sort and returns a digit between 0 and d , d can be assumed to always be 10.
C	A single digits challenge, this is a challenge consisting of 13 randomly chosen ordered objects. A single digits challenge in this project is a list of 13 random letters (e.g. ("B", "E", ...)). One of these will be used to compute <i>one</i> character of a user's password.
\vec{C}	A password challenge, consisting of t single digit challenges. A password challenge yields a complete password after calculating the response to all single digits challenges contained in it.

Table 3.1: Summary of notation.

user willing to put into memorizing the mappings, versus how secure he wants it to be. This should be evaluated in regards to how "important" the passwords and the accompanying accounts are, and how many accounts the user plans on having. It is not worth memorizing a large set of mappings only to store a few passwords, since there would not be enough mappings to "lose" for an adversary to recover even a small mapping set.

Another relation is between password length and number of accounts which would have to be stolen. Assume that a set of mappings with $n = 26$ is used, the number of accounts needed to start recovering the mapping is then a function of the password length as seen in Figure 3.3. If the passwords are very long only a few logins would have to be stolen to recover σ . This is important to take note of since one of the main strengths of the password scheme is that even if one account is compromised all the others are still secure since each site has a different, "unrelated" password. If the revelation of only a few accounts could compromise the secret mapping, all the passwords of the user might easily be lost.

A user requiring very secure passwords might generate very long passwords of 20+ characters for each of his accounts. If, by chance, the number of mappings was smaller than suggested, all these "strong" passwords might be lost if only a few of them was to be compromised through a password breach. Users are not advised to use shorter passwords, longer passwords are always better and the possibility of a

password being cracked drastically decreases with the length of the password. The point is that the secret mapping needs to be long enough to support the length and number of passwords a user wants to generate using the scheme.

The number of accounts needed to recover the mapping can be used as a practical way of describing the security of the scheme, 3.1 defines this parameter as an inequality reliant on the password lengths x and the number of mappings n . Figure 3.4 illustrates the relationship between password lengths and number of mappings needed to achieve different levels of security. How high the parameter \hat{a} depends on how long and how many passwords the user intends to use.

Observation 3.1.

The security of human computable function including a mapping function, $f \circ \sigma$, as defined in 3.3 and subsection 3.1.2, can be described through the expected number of accounts \hat{a} which needs to be compromised to start recover the secret mapping σ , given passwords of length x and n mappings in σ . \hat{a} is then $\hat{a} < \frac{n^{1.5}}{x}$.

Example 3.3.

A user plans on having passwords of length 20 for all of his many important accounts, and wants these to be securely stored even if it requires him to use more time on rehearsal. In this case, assume that the user wants his accounts be secure even if 100 accounts are leaked. Using 3.1 with $x = 20$ and $\hat{a} = 100$, gives $100 < \frac{y^{1.5}}{20} \implies y > 159$. This means that the user would have to memorize at least 159 unique random mappings to achieve the desired level of security against leakages.

If the user was to save only a few shorter passwords, for example requiring only security allowing loss of only 20 accounts before possibly revealing the mapping and passwords of length 15, he would need to memorize at least 45 mappings.

3.2 Practical Usage

This section will illustrate how a human computable password scheme works in practice, using the principles described in the previous sections. Before using the scheme a user have to go through a setup procedure involving memorization of a randomly generated mapping as well as setting up all accounts with passwords calculated from challenges. Section 3.1.4 discussed how the scheme can be tweaked to fit different needs a user may have, depending on the required level of security and the amount of accounts and passwords a user may have. A summary of the setup and authentication procedures are presented next.




Figure 3.2: Number of challenge-response pairs required to recover mapping σ as a function of the size of the mapping n .





Figure 3.3: Number of accounts needed to recover the mapping σ .

Figure 3.4: Inequality plot of 3 different values for \hat{a}

3.2.1 Setup procedure.

1. A secret mapping is the first prerequisite required before the scheme can be used. A random mapping of length n is generated from a set of objects chosen by the user, to digits in $\{0, 1, \dots, d\}$. The user will typically choose what type of objects to use, this can be an alphabet or a user chosen set of pictures. A system will then choose n of these objects and assign a random digit between 0 and d , d is normally 10. Algorithm 3.1 shows how the mapping would be generated from a set of objects by assigning random digits to each object. Remember that this function is supposed to only be stored in the memory of the user, and can thus not be evaluated anywhere else than in the mind of that user.
2. Memorization of the mapping is the next, and most costly procedure. The user basically has to learn the mappings by heart, and be comfortable he will not forget it. After memorizing, the mapping is deleted and not stored anywhere else than in the mind of the user. After finishing this step, there is no way to recover the mapping if the user forgets it. This might seem like a barrier making the scheme unusable, it will be shown later that this might not be that much of an effort after all. Active users will naturally rehearse and thus not forget their mapping as long as they keep using the scheme and regularly calculate passwords.

3. Passwords can now be generated for all the accounts of the user. Algorithm 3.2 describes the process of creating a new password for an account.
 - a) First the user chose the desired length of the password, t , to be generated.
 - b) t random challenges are generated and shown one by one to the user, which calculates the responses to these. Each of the responses are one character in the new password.
 - c) The calculated password is then sent to the server which should store the salted hash of the password. In the algorithms used here, it is assumed that the sites store the password hashes properly as described in subsection 2.1.2.
4. the same procedure (1-3) can be done for all the accounts the user wants to include in the password scheme.

Algorithm 3.1 Generate mapping σ .

Require:

- A base d .
- O_1, \dots, O_n objects, typically letters or pictures.

1: **for** $i = 1 \rightarrow n$ **do**

2: $k \sim \{0, d\}$

3: $\vec{S} \leftarrow (O_i, k)$

4: **function** $\sigma(O_x)$

5: search(O_x in \vec{S})

6: **return** (O_x, i)

7: **return** σ

3.2.2 Authentication procedure.

1. Authenticating with a site, which password was previously generated using the scheme, start of by selecting the correct site. The corresponding challenges will then be displayed starting with the first one.
2. The user calculates the response to each challenge, the same way he did when generating the password. If the calculations are done correctly, the result should be the same password.
3. After calculating the response to all t challenges, the password can be submitted to the server which checks if the hashed value is the same as the stored one. If it is, the user is authenticated.

Remark 3.3.

The notation $f(\sigma(\vec{C}))$ as used in the algorithms is equal to the composite function $f \circ \sigma(x_0, \dots, x_{13})$ as used in definition 3.3.

Algorithm 3.2 Create new challenge for account $A_j \in (A_1, \dots, A_m)$

Require:

- t desired length of password.
- σ secret mapping memorized by the user.
- f a human computable function.
- O_1, \dots, O_n objects, typically letters or pictures.

```

1: for  $i = 1 \rightarrow t$  do
2:    $k \sim [0, n]$ 
3:    $\vec{C}_i \leftarrow \{O_k\}^{14}$ 

4:  $\vec{C} \leftarrow (\vec{C}_1, \dots, \vec{C}_t)$ 
5: (User) Computes  $(p_1, \dots, p_t) = f(\sigma(\vec{C}))$ 
6: (Server) Store  $h_j = H(p_1, \dots, p_t)$ 
7:
8: return  $\vec{C}$ 

```

Algorithm 3.3 Authentication process for account $A_j \in (A_1, \dots, A_m)$

Require:

- Account $A_j \in (A_1, \dots, A_m)$
- Challenges $\vec{C} = (\vec{C}_1, \dots, \vec{C}_t)$ from account A_j .
- Hash h_j and hash function H .

```

1: for  $i = 1 \rightarrow t$  do
2:   Display  $C_i$  to the user
3:   User Compute  $p_i \leftarrow f(\sigma(C_i))$ 
4:                                      $\triangleright p_i$  is the  $i$ 'th character of the password for account  $A$ 
5:  $\vec{P} = (p_1, \dots, p_t)$ 
6: if  $h_j = H(\vec{P})$  then  $\triangleright$  (Server)
7:   Authenticated on account  $A_j$ 
8: else
9:   Authentication failed

```

3.3 Usability

Blocki et al. [BBD14] consider three usability parameters defining the usability of a human computable function. In addition to these, another influencing factor is introduced, failure rate. This section will discuss these requirements and how to influence them.

- The effort required to memorize the secret mapping.
- The extra rehearsal required of the user to not forget the secret mapping.
- How long it takes a human user to calculate the responses to a set of challenges, eventually producing the password.
- How reliably a human user can calculate password without mistakes.

All of these requirements might limit the usability of the scheme, and are thus worth discussing, but this project will focus mostly on the last requirement related to computation time. Later this computation time will be tested through implementing the scheme as a web app and having participants try it out while timing their efforts.

3.3.1 Memorizing the secret mapping.

As seen in the previous section, a user has to memorize a random mapping from object to digits before starting to use the scheme. This is most likely the biggest and most frightening barrier for any user considering to use the scheme. There are several techniques supposed to help memorizing relations easier, examples are the method of loci [Bad97] which is supposed to enhance memory by visualization. Mnemonic helpers showing objects merged together might help memorize relations as in the case of this project. Blocki et al. [BBD14] propose using mnemonic helpers if the mapping consists of letters to digits. These helpers would typically be a set of pictures showing a visual transition from a letter to a digit. This way might make it easier for the user to remember it instead of only being shown "A=1" etc. Some user might also feel that it is easier to memorize other things than letters, such as pictures. The user might even get to choose the set of pictures to be used themselves as long as the corresponding digits are chosen at random.

3.3.2 Rehearsing the secret mapping.

After memorizing the mappings, the user will have to rehearse it frequent enough to not forget it. Blocki et al. [BBD13] defines a model estimating the cost of this rehearsal, the model is described in section 2.3. Applying this model to the password management scheme gives insight to how much different types of users have to rehearse. The model predicts how long a user will remember an association between i and corresponding mapping $\sigma(i)$ without further rehearsal. If a user is about to forget a mapping according to the predictions, he should be reminded of this. Recall Theorem 2.1 and Table 2.1 from section 2.3. The formula for $E(ER_t)$ can be used to predict how many extra rehearsals different types of users will be required to do within a given period. Table 3.2 shows the expected number of extra rehearsals required by the different types of user given the length of the mapping function n ,

User	$n = 100$	$n = 50$	$n = 30$
Very Active	0.396	0.001	≈ 0
Typical	2.14	0.039	≈ 0
Occasional	2.50	0.053	≈ 0
Infrequent	70.7	22.3	6.1

Table 3.2: [BBD14] Extra rehearsals required of the user during the first year to remember σ . Calculated using definition 2.1 with $t = 365$ and visitation schedules as in Table 2.1.

during the first year. It is computed using Theorem 2.1 with $t = 365$ and visitation schedules λ_i from each user type as seen in Table 2.1. For each account A_i a set of public challenges $\vec{C}_i \in (X_{14})^{10}$ are chosen at random using algorithm 3.2. The expanding rehearsal assumption as defined in 2.2 is used, which assumes that for each rehearsal i the user does not have to rehearse again for 2^{is} units of time. The variable s represents differences between user in terms of memory strength, this experiment uses $s = 1$. The values in Table 3.2 are calculated by generating 100 samples of $\vec{C}_i \in (X_{14})^{10}$, then calculating the average expected number of extra rehearsals required by the different user types. n is the number of mappings in σ .

The results in Table 3.2 clearly demonstrates that the human computable passwords scheme does not require much rehearsal at all if used frequently. In fact, for very active, typical and occasional users, memorizing the mapping is a one time cost. After memorizing it at the beginning, using the scheme will provide enough natural rehearsal to maintain the mapping in memory. When a user computes the response to a challenge \vec{C} as described in subsection 3.2.2, he will have to recall the mapping of up to 5 $((\sigma(x_{11}), \sigma(x_{10}), \sigma(x_{12}), \sigma(x_{13}), \sigma(x_j))$, see definition 3.3) values of i for each character of the password. A password length of 10 would yield recalling, and thus rehearsing, 50 values of i . The same trade-off as discussed in subsection 3.1.4 can be observed here. The more complex the mapping is (larger values of n), the more effort is required when memorizing, but no extra rehearsals are necessary even with a larger number of mappings.

3.3.3 Computation Time and Failure Rates.

discuss how failure rates affect the usability

The final requirement which may limit the usability of the scheme is calculation time. If a user can not compute the response to a challenge correctly in a reasonably short amount of time the scheme would not be usable. How much time a user can tolerate is of course individual, but a too long computation time will directly effect

the usability. In addition to the time spent calculating, it is important that the users are able to consistently compute the correct responses. If the failure rate is too high, in respect to the password length, the scheme will not function at all. It is thus more important to have a low enough failure rate than a short calculation time.

Example 3.4.

failrueraret example

To make the computation as easy as possible the challenges would have to be presented to the user in a practical way, facilitating fast and reliable calculation. Using the human computable function from definition 3.3, a challenge $C = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{13})$ could be displayed as shown in Table 3.3.

$$f \circ \sigma(x_0, x_2, \dots, x_{13}) = \underbrace{\left(\underbrace{\sigma(x_{11}) + \sigma(x_{10}))}_{\text{Step 1, 2, \& 3}} \bmod 10 \right) + \underbrace{\sigma(x_{12}) + \sigma(x_{13}))}_{\text{Step 6 \& 7}} \bmod 10}_{\text{Step 4 \& 5}}$$

To evaluate a challenge using this function and the layout template from Table 3.3 a user goes through the following steps:

1. Recall the mapping x_{10}
2. Recall the mapping x_{11}
3. Add the values from the two previous steps $i = \sigma(x_{10}) + \sigma(x_{11})$.
4. Locate the element x_i from the table.
5. Recall the mapping $\sigma(x_i)$.
6. Recall the mapping $\sigma(x_{12})$ and add this to the previous value, $z = \sigma(x_i) + \sigma(x_{12})$.
7. Finally recall the mapping $\sigma(x_{13})$ and add it to the previous value, obtaining the final sum $y = z + \sigma(x_{13})$.
8. y is the response to the challenge C .

Each step depends on at most two earlier steps, allowing the user to do the calculation without having to store more than two values in his memory at any time. After Finishing steps 1-3 he will only keep one value in his memory, the previous intermediate results are now irrelevant and can be forgotten.

Example 3.5.

Table 3.4 shows the same layout using example objects. The example challenge is $C = \{A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N\}$. Let the mapping function σ be the

x_{10}	x_{11}	x_{12}	x_{13}
0 : x_0		5 : x_5	
1 : x_1		6 : x_6	
2 : x_2		7 : x_7	
3 : x_3		8 : x_8	
4 : x_4		9 : x_9	

Table 3.3: Layout template for displaying challenges.

position in the alphabet $\text{mod } 10$, $\sigma(A) = 1, \sigma(B) = 2, \sigma(J) = 0$ etc. The evaluation of this challenge would be the following.

1. $\sigma(K) = 1, \sigma(L) = 2$
2. $(11 + 12) \text{ mod } 10 = 3$
3. $x_3 = D$
4. $\sigma(D) = 4, \sigma(M) = 3, \sigma(N) = 4$
5. $(4 + 3 + 4) \text{ mod } 10 = \underline{\underline{1}}$

K	L	M	N
0 : A		5 : F	
1 : B		6 : G	
2 : C		7 : H	
3 : D		8 : I	
4 : E		9 : J	

Table 3.4: Layout template for displaying challenges.

This chapter has presented the ideas behind the human computable password management scheme. It has shown how the scheme works with a secret mapping memorized by the user and a human computable function, which together allows the user to compute passwords from challenges stored in persistent memory. Algorithms describing the procedures has been shown and described, as well as discussing the usability challenges of such a scheme.

Chapter 4

Application

This chapter will describe how browser extensions are built in the Google Chrome web browser, focusing on architecture and security features. Browser extensions can be utilized to build an application implementing the *human computable passwords scheme* as described in chapter 3. The scheme is different from other traditional password managers since it does not *store* the password, but the challenges *help* the user to remember strong passwords. The idea by using browser extensions to implement this is to have an extension monitor the password fields of the sites a user visits and update the challenges depending on the current state of the active site. This technique will be described and a prototype extension demonstrated.

4.1 Browser Extensions

Modern computer users shift towards doing more and more work through their web browsers. Web applications have become popular due to the ubiquity of browsers, thus allowing web apps to run anywhere. A web app can run at any platform running a web browser, allowing the application to run on multiple platforms as well as different devices. Updates can be applied quickly without having to distribute patches to a possibly huge amount of devices.

Browser extensions add additional features to the web browser allowing the user to tweak the experience of the web pages visited. Typical examples are extensions adding to, or tweaking already present features of the browser such as changing how bookmarks are managed, or adding additional features such as blocking advertisements. Lately browser extensions have been extended even further allowing standalone applications to be developed running as native applications¹. This allows developers to create desktop apps using the same technology as in web apps, mainly HTML5, Javascript and CCS.

¹A new breed of Chrome apps, <http://chrome.blogspot.no/2013/09/a-new-breed-of-chrome-apps.html> - accessed: 2015-03-02

This chapter will present Google chrome browser extensions, including architecture and security mechanisms.

4.1.1 Extension Security

Browser extensions introduce some security concerns which must not be forgotten while developing applications using this environment. Chrome extensions run in the browser with access to both the document object model (DOM) of the active page as well as the native file system and connected devices. The overall architecture of a chrome extension is summarized in Figure 4.1 and described in the chrome extensions documentation ². This section will describe the architecture considering security concerns relevant when developing chrome extensions which handle sensitive data such as passwords.




Figure 4.1: Chrome extension architecture.

Earlier extensions written for IE and Firefox ran in the same process as the browser and shared the same privileges. This made extensions an attractive entry point for attackers, since a buggy extension could leave security holes leaking sensitive

²What are extensions?, <https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/overview> - accessed 2015-03-02

information or even provide an entry point to the underlying operating system. For these browsers several frameworks for security have been proposed [LLV08, DG09], trying to mitigate vulnerabilities in browser extensions. The chrome extensions architecture is built from scratch with security in mind. Chrome uses a permission system following three principles [LZC⁺]; *least privileges*, *privilege separation* and *process isolation*.

Least privilege specifies that extensions should only have the privileges they need to perform functions, not share those of the browser. The privileges of each extension are requested in the *manifest* file ³. This json file needs to be included in all chrome extensions, and consist of all the permissions needed by the extension as well as some meta data and version information. This is done to prevent compromised extensions from exploiting other permissions than those available at runtime. An example of a manifest file can look like this:

```
{
  "name": "Example extensions",
  "description": "An example extensions to demonstrate how the
                  manifest file works.",
  "version": "1.2",
  "manifest_version": "2"
  "background_page": "main.html",
  "permissions": [
    "bookmarks",
    "storage",
    "https://*.ntnu.no"
  ]
}
```

This extension has specified access to the bookmarks API, chrome local storage and all sub domains of ntnu.no. Extensions can request different permissions in the manifest file including web site access, API access and native messaging. If an extension contains weaknesses it will not compromise any other parts of the system not covered by the specified privileges. For the least privileges approach to work properly each developer should only request the permissions needed, Barth et al. [BFSB10] examined this behavior and concluded that developers of chrome extensions usually limit the origins requested to the ones needed.

³Manifest file format, <https://developer.chrome.com/apps/manifest> - accessed 2015-03-04

Privilege separation. Chrome extensions are, as mentioned, divided into components; content scripts, extension core and native binaries. The addition of native binaries allows extensions to run arbitrary code on the host computer, thus posing a serious security threat. This project does not use this permission, this component will thus not be mentioned from now on.

Content scripts are javascript files allowing extensions to communicate with untrusted web content of the active web page. These scripts are instantiated for each visited web page and has direct access to the DOM of these, allowing both monitoring and editing of DOM elements. To be able to inject content scripts to a visited page, the origin of the site has to be added to the manifest file. Other than this permission, content script are only allowed to communicate with the extension core. It is important that the privileges of these scripts are at the minimum level since they are at high risk of being attacked by malicious web sites [BCJ⁺14], due to the direct interaction with the DOM.

The *extension core* is the application interface responsible for interaction with the user as well as long running background jobs and business logic. The core is written in HTML and javascript and is responsible for spawning popups and panels, as well as listening for browser action. The typical way to activate a extensions is by clicking an icon in the navigation bar, which then activates either a popup or a detached panel. The core is the components with the most privileges as it does not interact with any insecure content directly, only through direct messaging to a content script or using http requests if the target origin is defined in the manifest.

In addition to this the core has access to the extension APIs, these are special-purpose interfaces providing additional features such as alarms, bookmarks, cookie and file storage. The APIs are made available through the manifest file and only those specified there can be used. Figure 4.2 illustrates the interaction between the background page, content scripts, panels and active web page. The information flow starts by clicking the extension’s icon in the navigation bar which launches the background page spawning a panel in the browser. A content script is injected in the current web site (google.no in the example), the script now have access to the DOM of this site and can communicate with the background which in turn can update the panel.

Process isolation is a set of mechanisms shielding the component from each other and from the web. Usually when javascript is loaded from the web the authority of the script is limited to the origin from where the script is loaded [BFSB10]. Since the scripts used by the extensions are loaded from the file system, they do not have a origin in the same sense, and thus need to be assigned one. This is done by including a public key in the url of the extension, allowing a packaged extension to sign itself,




Figure 4.2: Chrome extensions browser action and content scripts.

freeing it from any naming authority or similar. The public key also enables usage of persistent data storage, since the origin of the extension can stay the same throughout updates and patches. This wouldn't be possible otherwise since the chrome local storage API relies on origin. Each extension will have a private/public key pair, a hash of the public key is used as id and each updated version uploaded will be signed with the private key. By doing this the id stays the same throughout versions and can be verified by when uploading and by chrome storage after releasing a new version.

The different components also run in different processes. The content scripts are injected and ran in the same process as the active web page, while the core run in its own process started when the extension is initiated. This protects against javascript injections from malicious web sites[BZW13]. Since the content script executes in the same environment as the active web page, users may visit websites hosting content meant to exploit extensions[CFW12], possibly stealing sensitive information or issue fake requests.

Finally content scripts are ran in a separate javascript environment isolating it from the possibly insecure environment of the web site. The environment of the content scripts are called isolated world, which in practice is a separate set of javascript objects reflecting the ones of the underlying DOM of the web page. This

means that the content script can read and edit the DOM of the page it is injected into, but not access variables or javascript functions present in the web page. Both the page and the content scripts sees no other javascript executing in their own isolated world, but they share the same DOM ⁴.

4.2 Human Computable Passwords Chrome Extension

Chrome extensions are very useful in that they can be run from any computer with Google Chrome installed, thus on any operating system and on any computer. An extension makes it possible to run applications while browsing the web, which in the case of a password management scheme is very useful. An application meant to help the user recall complex passwords should preferably be visible simultaneously with the password field. Popular password management software today are usually web applications, mobile applications or native desktop applications⁵, some of these might include plug-ins such as browser extensions. All of these password managers are reliably storing all the passwords as described in subsection 2.2.2, then they are either auto-filled into the login fields or through copy pasting manually, which introduce several security issues[BFSB10, BZW13, BCJ⁺14, CFW12, LZC⁺, SJB⁺14]

This section will present the design and prototype implementation of the human computable password scheme (chapter 3, [BBD14]. The design evolves around the fact that the scheme does not have to store anything securely, though it is important to make it as easy as possible for the user. The architecture will be similar to the one explained in section 4.1 using content scripts to monitor the password fields of the active browser session. The user interface will be presented through a "panel" in the browser. Panels are windows that stay in focus while interacting with other windows or applications ⁶.

4.2.1 Applications Design

The extension implementing human computable passwords [chapter 3] will be an extension helping the user with storing and managing of challenges for different accounts. The generation of secret mappings will not be part of the application, this should be done through a separate program on the user's local computer. Such a program would follow algorithm 3.1. The requirements for the extension are the following:

- Provide an user interface making it easy for the user to calculate his password.

⁴Content Scripts, https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/content_scripts - accessed: 2015-03-05

⁵Five Best Password Managers. <http://lifehacker.com/5529133/five-best-password-managers>

⁶"Panels"- The Chromium Project. <https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/extensions/proposed-changes/apis-under-development/panels>

- The application should keep track of the active site, displaying challenges for the correct site without user interaction.
- Add new sites to the system easily.
- The displayed challenge should update seamlessly while typing the password.
- The user should be able to type his password directly in the password field of the active site.

AngularJs

The front-end is built and updated using AngularJS⁷, which is an open source, client-side javascript framework. Angular is built using a variation of the model-view-controller architecture [Dea09], though the creators of angular states that angular is a model-view-whatever framework⁸, point being that what the architecture is called isn't important.

The *views* in angular is templates written entirely in HTML, making it easy to read and update. The *controller* contains all the business logic used by the view. The views and controllers are connected using a shared object called *\$scope*, variables or functions on this object is usually defined in the controller and accessed by the view by using double curly brackets in the view (e.g. `{{name}}` to access the name variable on *\$scope*). Figure 4.3 shows how scope is used to share variables between the controller and the view. See "Angular Essentials - Rodrigo Branas"[Bra14] for a step-by-step introduction to AngularJS.

The main benefits of using angular in this project is the data-binding which makes it easy to update the HTML shown to the user. The extension will take advantage of this when updating the challenges seamlessly while the user calculates his password. The content of the extension will change according to the data filled in a password field without reloading the extension.

Chrome Storage.

*Local storage*⁹ is a way for applications to store data persistently and securely in the browser of clients. It is meant as an improvement of cookies which is the usual way of storing user data across sessions. The biggest problem with cookies is that they are sent with every HTTP request and thus slow down the applications using them. Local storage allows applications to store (key, value)-pairs in the browser.

⁷AngularJS, <https://angularjs.org/>

⁸Model-View-Whatever - <https://plus.google.com/+AngularJS/posts/aZNVhj355G2>

⁹Local storage - <http://diveintohtml5.info/storage.html>




Figure 4.3: Angular data binding with controller, view and scope. Figure from AngularJs developer guide.

*Chrome storage*¹⁰ is close to the same as local storage, differences being that chrome local storage allows applications to store data in what is called "chrome.storage.sync". This specific storage saves data locally, but also syncs it with the currently active chrome account, thus allowing a user to log into his account in any chrome browser and access the same application data. Chrome storage also allows storage of objects compared to local storage which only allows storing strings. This project will use chrome storage to persistently store challenges across sessions, and also provide backup. This way each user will be able to keep challenges for all their account within the storage of their google account. This is a important feature since it allows access to the challenges from remote locations as well.

Content Scripts.

Content scripts are javascript files running in the context of the active web page, as browsed by the user. These scripts has direct access to the content of the active site and can thus monitor and attach event listeners to the content of the page. The content scripts are isolated from the extension itself as describe in subsection 4.1.1, thus protecting the extension from possibly harmful sites trying to exploit weaknesses in the content script. Because of this the content scripts has to communicate with the extension through google chrome's built-in message passing system. Chrome

¹⁰chrome.storage - <https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/storage>

message passing¹¹ allows scripts to listen for and respond to messages. One side sets up an event listener listening for messages, when a message is sent from the other side this event triggers and the message can be received and parsed.

The content scripts and the message passing system are likely points of attack for adversaries. The content script can monitor the value of the password field and thus, in theory, steal passwords if a malicious script was able to trick it into leaking them. The communication channel is not particularly prone to attacks since even if an adversary eavesdropped all data sent on it, the only information leaked would be the current length of the password. It is though important that the design is like this since the mistake of sending the whole password string, which might seem like a solution, would be potentially dangerous.

Typical usage of content scripts in this application will be to attach event listeners to the password fields of the pages visited by the user, and message the extension when the value of the password field changes. When a change happens, the content script send a message containing the current length of the typed password, so that the extension can display the correct challenge. In example if the user has entered 4 characters of his password the extension should display the 5th challenge etc. The content script also keep the extension updated on the URL of the current page, by sending a message every time a page is loaded. The extension then displays the challenges corresponding to the password of that site. If the site does not have challenges stored by the application, the user can generate new ones and store these in the system through clicking a button.

4.2.2 User interface


The user interface will be very simple, there will be two possible screens displayed to the user. Either, challenges associated to the current page will be shown, or a dialog asking the user to generate new challenges. The most important feature of the user interface is that it will automatically update depending on what site the user is currently browsing, and display the correct challenge when typing passwords. Wireframes illustrating the page schematics of the extension are shown in figures 4.4a and 4.4b.

4.2.3 Implementation

The implementation follows the design described in the previous section, this section will present how the extension are implemented and demonstrate the actual extension.

Figure 4.5 shows the complete architecture of the system. The content script attach an event listener to the password field of the active site. If the content of the

¹¹Chrome message passing - <https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/messaging>



(a) Screen seen by the user when launching the extension while visiting a page that is not stored in the system. (b) Screen seen by the user when loading a site with challenges stored in the system.

Figure 4.4: Wireframes illustrating the page schematics of the extension.

password field changes, the script sends a message using chrome message passing containing the current length of the password. The controller receives the new password length from the content script, and update the challenges displayed to the user. When the user visits a new site, the url is sent to the controller, which then updates the view with new challenges corresponding to that site.

The classes seen in figure 4.5 are all represented in the implemented version of the extension. The construction and responsibilities of the classes are summarized in the following list. The code of the implementation for each component is explained in more detail in appendix B.

- **Controller** is responsible for the business logic related to the information shown to the user in the extension. The controller first tries to load the user data stored in chrome storage, if no user has been created, typically if it is the first time the extension is loaded, a new user is created. The controller keeps track of the url of the current active page and the current length of the password field. It listens for messages from the content scripts and updates the URL and password length variables with the info received. The controller class used in the extension is described in appendix B.2.
- **ChromeStorage**¹² is a utility resource used to access chrome local storage[section 4.2.1]. This module is essentially a wrapper making it easier to retrieve data from chrome storage, while also providing useful debugging and cache management functions.

¹²angular-chrome-storage - <https://github.com/infomof/angular-chrome-storage>

- **Content script** is responsible for attaching event listeners to the password field of the currently active page.. It also listens to the onload event, sending url updates to the controller every time a new page is loaded. The content script of the extension built in this project can be seen appendix B.1.
- **main.html** is the view of the application, responsible for the user interface. The view receives updates from the controller through the `$scope` variable. When the controller updates in example the current password length, this is reflected in the view where different objects are shown. If the current url is not in the user's list of saved sites, the view will show a dialog allowing the user to add it. When adding a new site the user should update the password of that site using the extension. A snippet of the view is shown in appendix B.4.
- **App.js** is the focal point of the application, responsible for initializing the angular app and routing of views. In this project this file also includes some helper functions which can be seen in appendix B.3.

Random numbers are an important component of the application since all the security relies on the fact that the secret mapping and the challenges are chosen at random. As for this application, the only concern is the challenges, since the secret mapping would be generated using a separate program on each client's machines. Javascript provide a function called *Math.random* which is not considered cryptographically secure [SHB09] and should thus not be used. New browser now support a new method which are considered to be the best suited random source for cryptographic purposes, the method is called *window.crypto.getRandomValues()*¹³. The application uses this function as the source of randomness to generate challenges. The random number generator used can be seen in section B.3.

Mapping objects. The application as implemented and demonstrated in this chapter uses the alphabet as mapping objects. As explained in chapter 3, these objects could be anything and are fixed in this presentation for simplicity. There is a folder in the implementation where all the pictures are kept, these could easily be exchanged with other pictures to better suite the user.

Launching the application is done by clicking an icon in the browser toolbar which will launch the extension in a panel floating on top of the other browser windows and tabs. This behavior is specified in the *background page*¹⁴. The background page is the "launcher" of the extension, it waits for the user to click the extension icon, firing a browser action event. On catching this event, the script spawns a panel, with

¹³RandomSource.getRandomValues() - <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/RandomSource/getRandomValues>

¹⁴Background pages - https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/background_pages

the angular application as content. Listing 4.1 shows the background page of this extension. After spawning the panel, the background page is standby doing nothing, everything now happens through the angular application running inside the panel.

```
1 chrome.browserAction.onClicked.addListener(function() {  
2     chrome.windows.create({  
3         url: chrome.extension.getURL('main.html'),  
4         type: 'panel',  
5         focused: true,  
6         height: 520,  
7         width: 400,  
8     });  
9 });
```

Listing 4.1: Background page.

4.2.4 Demonstration

After launching the extension, as previously explained, the user is presented with the window show in figure 4.6. In this example the active site does not have a record in the user's challenge database, thus the "add new" dialog. By clicking the button, new challenges are generated and stored in the database as a new site. The site is automatically added with the current site domain as key together with randomly generated challenges. Next time the user visits the same page, challenges will appear. After adding a new site, it is the users responsibility to change the password of this site so it matches the challenges.

Figures 4.7a-d shows how a user would use the extension when logging in to a site. When launching it, the system receives the current sites domain and loads the first challenge corresponding to that site. The user then calculates the first character using the challenges displayed. When this is entered in the password field, new challenges appear until the whole password is calculated.

Data flow

Figure 4.8 illustrates the life cycle of the application. When the user visit a site, an event is triggered and caught by the content script, which in turn message the controller about the newly loaded site. The controller then try to load challenges for that site from the storage; if there is a record, the view is updated with the first challenge, if not the "add new"-dialog is loaded. Next event is triggered when the user enters a character in the password field, on receiving notice from the content script the controller updates the view with a new challenge depending on the length of the password. This will then go on until the user has entered the entire password, eventually closing the extension panel.

4.2.5 Discussion

The approach of this project when designing the human computable passwords extension was to make an clean and intuitive application making the password management scheme feasible to use. The extension does not require any user interaction, except from when adding new sites, this was done so the user could focus on doing the calculation correctly without having to keep track of the challenges. The scheme itself is also quit complicated so it is important for the user to focus on as few operations as possible. (The simplest approach would be to have a "next"-button for the user to click between every character calculated.)

The choice of a browser extension was done with the same mind set, making the application helpful and not distracting. It should be easy to start using the application, requiring as little configuration and managing as possible. The design and construction makes it so that the only real "configuration" required is the changing of passwords when adding sites, which essentially can not be circumvent. Panels is another very useful feature, since the panels floats on top of the other browser windows and keeps in focus while typing. Without panels the user would have to switch between windows when calculating a character and typing it in the password field, which would be a huge drawback both in terms of time and usability.

One apparent problem with using extensions is that they are not supported in mobile browsers, and probably will never be ¹⁵. The solution to this would be to make an additional application for mobile, and sync the data to another service available on mobile as well. This could be done quit easily since the data is stored as text, the only change needed would be to substitute the storage module with some other cloud storage service. The problem if the application was built for mobile would be the lack of space to display challenges while typing the password.

¹⁵Multidevice FAQ - <https://developer.chrome.com/multidevice/faq>

The decision to make a browser extension was made on behalf of the mentioned pros and cons, with the most important parameter being disturbance. Only extensions allow a seamless, non-interfering user interface. The other options, namely web application and mobile application, would require switching between windows or at least switching of focus, as well as requiring the user to manually chose the correct site and browse through the different challenges. This is all done automatically with the construction presented in this chapter. The main goal of the design was to include the least amount of unnecessary features, with a clean and unobstructive interface. A summary of the strengths of the chosen design is listed next.

- Easy to use, require less to no user interaction after configuration.
- Panel that stay on top while entering the password allows for quick and easy calculation without stopping to update and manage challenges.
- `Chrome.storage.sync` automatically synchronize the stored challenges to the users google account allowing persistent usage across devices and accounts.
- All data is stored as text strings, this makes it easy to integrate with other services in the future. The user could also store the challenges elsewhere if need be, e.g. as text locally or even print the challenges on paper in the extreme case.




Figure 4.5: Class diagram of the human computable passwords chrome extension.







Figure 4.6: Screen as seen by the user after launching the extensions while on a page without stored challenges. After clicking the "Add site"-button, the next view shows the generated challenges. The user should then calculate the response and change the password of the site to match it.




(a)



(b)



(c)



(d)

Figure 4.7: Challenge screens as seen by the user while entering password. The challenges update when the user enter a new character in the password field.




Figure 4.8: Sequence diagram showing the flow in the system when a page is loaded and characters typed in a password field.

Chapter 5

Usability Experiment

This chapter will present the design and execution of an experiment trying to measure the performance of the human computable password management scheme. The experiment is designed as a web application implementing the scheme, allowing participants to test how the scheme would work in practice while measuring how fast the computation is performed. The application thus acts as both a demonstration app and a tool for gathering performance data. It has four sections designed to help the participants understand the scheme and get familiar with the computation technique. First, a demonstration video is shown explaining how to compute a password from a challenge, then the user is asked to enter some demographic data. Next is the practice section, where the user is supposed to practice doing the calculation until feeling comfortable solving challenges without error. Finally is the experiment part, which is timed and correctness monitored. After finishing the calculations the user will submit the data and can chose to continue doing more experiments now, or later.

5.1 Experiment Objective.

The goal of the experiment is to measure how hard it is for a user to learn the scheme, to be specific, how fast users do the calculations. The experiment will thus measure the calculation times of different users, and also monitor their progression after several trials. Hopefully a user will be able to calculate passwords without to many mistakes. The failure rate is maybe the most important variable to measure; if a user average more than one mistake for each password calculated the scheme would not work in practice, since most passwords calculated would be wrong.

It is important to note that this project does not see the human computable password management scheme as a replacement for the widen used standard password managers. It is regarded as a solution for users interested in a secure and reliable way of keeping track of strong password, without having to trust a password management service or application. This experiment will thus test if it is even possible, for a user

willing to go through the trouble of learning a secret mapping, to use the scheme as an everyday solution.

The objectives of the experiment can be summarized as the following.

- Measure the average calculation times, both for each participants and for the whole population.
- Measure how much the users improve after several trials.
- Measure the average failure rate for each participant.

5.2 Method

The experiment does not try to test any preset hypothesis as it is not clear what to expect regarding either of the tested values. It is not known how hard it is to do the calculations, neither regarding calculation time or failure rates. The results of the experiment will not be a clear answer to any hypothesis, but rather a basis for further data collection through larger scale experiments, in example using crowd sourcing or social medias.

Exploratory data analysis (EDA) was introduced by John W. Turkey [Tuk77] which involves analysis of data without a prior hypothesis to test. The technique promotes exploration of data to possibly find characteristics not previously considered, and essentially suggesting hypotheses to be tested in later surveys or experiments. Velleman and Hoaglin [HD79] describes EDA as a contrast to the formal scientific method involving stating a hypothesis, collecting data and applying a statistical test of the hypothesis. EDA often involves making graphical representations of the data, and then try to find interesting characteristics and relations. EDA does not conclude with a hypothesis test based on the collected data, but is the first step of an iterative process trying to reveal facts.

This project does not intend to test any hypothesis, but rather gather data thought to be relevant, in this case, calculation time and failures, then display the data as graph and investigate relationships between different statistics. The findings of the experiment should be seen only as a prerequisite for later experiments, the patterns found can be used to form a more specific statistical test.

Remark 5.1.

The project will not store any personal information about the participants, and should thus not be subject to notification to the "Norwegian Social Science Data Service"¹. The experiment will only record an anonymous id plus the experiment

¹Is my research project subject to notification? - <http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/english/pvo.html>

results consisting of computation time and correctness of the calculations done. Some demographic data will also be recorded (age, area of study), but the data can not be connected to person and are thus not regarded as personal information.

After conducting the experiment, the data will be examined and significant characteristics discussed. There are some obvious parameters to explore, including means and standard deviation of the calculation times and failure rate, as well as how these change with practice.

The usability of the scheme directly rely on the calculation time and failure rate as discussed in section 3.3. This can be discussed further after obtaining some numbers giving a picture of what is normal and possible in terms of speed and reliability.

A result showing that more than 90% of all calculations are correct would be promising, since it means that more than 50% of the passwords calculated would actually be correct. If this is not the case the scheme would more often than not be useless since most users would obtain a faulty password when trying to log in. The conclusion of the experiment presented in this project, will either way have to be tested more thorough, possibly using the same experiment setup or preferably with a throughly random mapping as well.

5.3 Experiment Setup

The experiment will present and demonstrate the calculation technique to the user, which then will be given a chance to practice until fairly familiar with the mechanics. Finally the user will be asked to calculate a complete password challenge, from which the time spent on each single digit challenge will be recorded, as well as if the calculation was correct or not. The practice section will allow the user to learn through trial and error, using backspace to go back and forth between challenges while also giving feedback on the correctness. The experiment view on the other hand will not give any feedback and does not allow the user to go back after entering a character. This is done to make sure all mistakes are recorded, even if it is only a miss click.

5.3.1 Secret mapping

The biggest decision made in regards to the experiment design was how to simulate the operation "recall" i.e. recalling from memory. It would not be feasible to ask all the participants to memorize a secret mapping on beforehand as this would make it very hard to find volunteers. The chosen solution to this problem is to include a "cheat sheet" in addition to the displayed challenges, this will be a list of object to digit mappings shown separately but in the same view as the challenge.

After some testing it became apparent that there was a big difference between recalling from memory and actually "reading" from a list, which this approach eventually is. To make the operation more similar to the desired recall operation, the mapping was changed from random alphabet positions (e.g A=1, B=2, C=3). This way one does not always have to read in the table to know the mapping. Most users will be able to know instantly what the mapping for at least the first and eventually, after some practice, all the letters, much easier than with a random mapping. The is the closest way of mimicking the actual operations of the scheme without having the participants memorize an actual mapping. It is not in any way certain that this shortcut reflect the real world act of recalling from memory, but it is assumed to be "close enough" for the experiment.

Remark 5.2.

The author of this project did memorize a mapping of both 10 and later 20 mappings without significantly different calculation times compared to using the alphabet positions.

5.3.2 Participants

The participants for the experiment was chosen mostly from people known by the author, this limits the number of participants somewhat. This was done to ensure the quality of the data samples. The experiment could have been distributed through crowd sourcing services or social media, probably increasing the number of participants drastically. The problem with this approach, and the reason for not doing it, is that the experiment requires absolute concentration which can not be assured from "casual" participants accessing the experiment through a link posted on facebook. Since every participant calculates 10 singlet digit challenges for each trial of experiment, there will still be a decent amount of data samples, even with relatively few participants.

Even if the experiment might be limited by the number of participants, the results are still considered to be interesting. Since the scheme tested is not supposed to be a widely-deployed password manager, it might be sufficient if the experiment can show that some users are able achieve what is considered sufficient usability. It should also be noted that most of the participants are regarded above average in mathematics. This might be a strength or a weakness of the experiment as it does not represent a wide range of the population, but the calculation times should at least be stronger than average.

5.4 Web Application

The experiment application will be similar in design to the Chrome extension presented in chapter 4, but implemented as a web application. It is implemented

using the AngularJS framework (as described in chapter 4) and a mongoDB² database to store the results, a cookie in the user's browser is used to keep track of the user across trials.

The application will consist of four sections to flip through, with the last one being the actual experiment. First, the user will be presented with a presentation of the scheme and how to calculate passwords, this will be in the form of a presentation with instructions. The slides used to instruct the user can be seen in Appendix A. After watching the demo, the user is asked to enter some demographic data (age and occupation). Next, is a section which looks the same as the experiment, but without the actual recording of data, this is the practice section. The purpose of this section is to give the user a chance to verify that he has understood the scheme and are actually able to calculate passwords. When the user is ready to start the experiment, he can continue on to the actual experiment, which is the final view. The experiment is exactly like the practice section, without response on correctness and redo capabilities, with backspace deactivated. The first sample of the experiment will not be counted towards the results, to allow the user to get ready and start when he feels like it.

Section 3.3.3 discussed how a single digit challenge can be presented to the user in a logical way, possibly making it more efficient to calculate. The experiment use a similar layout to the one shown in Table 3.3 and also as in the Chrome extension in chapter 4. The challenges will update in the same way as in the chrome extension so the user should be able to calculate the responses continuously. The calculation time is recorded for each single digit challenge computed, together with a boolean value representing if the result was correct or not.

Figure 5.1 shows the screen after completing a trial of the experiment, next the user would push the submit button and the sample would be saved in the database together with a random identification stored in a cookie in the user's browser. The user can then redo the experiment several times keeping the same id, making it possible to track each participant's development.

As for the storage of results a noSQL database called MongoDB is used. After completing a trial of the experiment a javascript object is stored in the database, Table 5.1 shows an example of this object. Note the *hcp_id* field which is fetched from a cookie in the participants' browsers, making it persist across several trials.

The views of the web application can be seen in Appendix C or by visiting the hosted experiment site at hcp.sp1nakr.com.

²mongoDB - <https://www.mongodb.org/>

hcp_id	1b7aa17ea0
occupation	Technology student
age	27
results	[1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
calcTimes	[12.047, 7.115, 8.022, 9.283, 10.544, 8.807, 9.925, 9.78, 7.11, 8.187]

Table 5.1: Experiment object after completing a trial, as stored in the database.

5.5 Results

This section will present the results of the conducted experiment and investigate the characteristics of the data recorded. The focus will be on the calculation times and failure rate, which both are important factors in the resulting usability of the scheme, as discussed in section 3.3.

The observations made are not necessarily representative for all users, because of the relatively small number of samples (342 singlet digit challenges), but it is still interesting to investigate the consequences of the results. Even if the results show that the scheme achieves a lower level of usability than what are considered acceptable, it might still function well for some users with the right amount of practice. The limitations of the experiment will be discussed, in addition to results and the consequences of these.

5.5.1 Calculation times.

How fast a user is able to calculate the response to a single digit challenge is a concrete measure of the usability of the scheme. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of calculation times of all the experiment samples, the calculated average off all the 342 trials are 10.922 seconds. The median value is 10.104 with standard deviation of 3.64 which also can be observed in the figure.

Recall Theorem 3.1 from subsection 3.1.2. The function f [3.3] used in this project is $(P, 9, 3)$ -computable. The conjecture then defines the variable γ_H for user H as $\gamma_H = \frac{\hat{t}}{9}$.

The average γ of all the participants are $\bar{\gamma} = \frac{10.922}{9} = 1.214$. This is slightly higher than the 7.5 seconds ($\gamma_H \leq 1$) Blocki [BBD14] predict that users with moderate mathematical backgrounds should achieve. It is still not unreasonably high, and should not be a direct hindrance. Calculating a 10 character password would in example take $11 \cdot 10 = 110$ seconds, just short of 2 minutes, to calculate, 15 character would close in on 3 minutes. On average spending 2-3 minutes on calculating a password might seem like a lot, but a user concerned about the security of his

accounts, might be willing to make this trade-off. Especially if the user is worried about putting his passwords in the hands of an online service to store persistently (e.g. *lastpass.com*), might be willing to put quite some time into calculating his own passwords instead.

It is also relevant to study the evolution of each user in terms of calculation times. Figure 5.3 illustrates the average calculation time for each i th trial per user. $i = 1$ represents the average of the first calculation done by each user, $i = 2$ the second calculation etc. The figure clearly illustrates that the averages decrease with practice. This could have been expected, since the users will be more and more familiar with the calculation procedure for each trial. The consequence of this observation is that the average calculation time, and consequently γ , would be significantly lower if the participants got more practice with the scheme before their results were recorded. Each participant averaged 30 samples each, so it is not feasible to e.g. calculate the average after removing the 20 first calculations from each participant, as this would leave very few trials. The important goal of the experiment is though not to find an accurate average calculation time, but to verify that $\gamma_H \leq 1$ is reasonable for most users. It seems that the average most likely is somewhere between 9 and 11, depending on how long the users have been using the scheme, which is not severely limiting.

5.5.2 Failure rate.

Failure rate is a key characteristic of the scheme, as mentioned it is essential that a user is able to calculate passwords correctly for the scheme to function. How high the failure rate can be depends on how long passwords are used and how often a user can enter the wrong password without locking the account. A typical password-protected site will allow a minimum of three strikes before the account is locked [BS03]. It is thus important that the probability of being "locked out" is small enough for it not to happen often, how often is of course subject to discussion.

Observation 5.1.

Average failure rate for all samples recorded in the experiment was measured to be $\tilde{\lambda} = 0.0584795321637$, approximately every one out of 17 single digit challenges was calculated wrong.

This observation might not seem very unusual, but since a password consists of a sequence of calculations, it is required that the user calculate a given number of challenges consecutively without failure. It is thus more interesting to evaluate the probability of having at least one mistake in a complete password calculation sequence. It is also not unusual to enforce a password policy using a three-strike

policy which will lock the account if three consecutive mistakes are made. Next, these probabilities are presented and discussed.

The probability of having at least one mistake in a length l password given the failure rate λ is given by

$$P(\text{fail}) = 1 - (1 - \lambda)^l \quad (5.1)$$

Next, the probability of getting the account locked given a three-strike policy with the same password and failure rate is

$$P(\text{lock}) = (1 - (1 - \lambda)^l)^3 \quad (5.2)$$

Password length l	3	5	10	15
$P(\text{fail})$	0.1654	0.2601	0.4526	0.5959
$P(\text{lock})$	0.0045	0.0176	0.0927	0.2107

Table 5.2: Probability of having at least one mistake in a length l password given failure rate $\lambda = 0.0584795321637$ for each single digit challenge.

Table 5.2 shows the probabilities of calculating a password wrong once and three times in a row. If a user wants to use a password of 15 characters, which is reasonable to assume since the scheme only produce digits, he will compute a faulty password nearly 60% of the time. This limits the usability severely, since a user will more often than not, be unable to log in.

The probability of actually locking the account by miscalculating three passwords in a row, is lower but not significantly. With the same failure rate and password length, a user would break the three-strike rule approximately one out of five login attempts.

To illustrate this consequence in a extreme case, consider the *very active* user from table 2.1 in section 2.3 which visits 10 different accounts every day. Such an user would eventually lock two accounts every day with password lengths of 15 characters, which of course is not acceptable.

Blocki et al. [BBD14] suggests a tweak to the scheme with the purpose of decreasing the calculation time while still ensuring resistance against dictionary attacks. The suggestion is to memorize another mapping $w : \mathbb{Z}_{10} \rightarrow \{x\}$ with x being one of the 10000 most common English words. Then after computing $f(\sigma(C))$ the user would apply w giving the corresponding word to the digit. The point of doing this is to save time when calculating, but it also solves the problem with high failure rates. Blocki argues, it would be sufficient with 3-5 challenges. With this assumption that 3-5 calculations are enough, the scheme would function significantly better.

Using the same example with the very active user, an account would be locked every 222nd login attempt with length 3 and every 57th with length 5. This would be a huge improvement, actually making the scheme usable.

Remark 5.3.

The author remarks that the findings related to failure rates might be too harsh since the participants were asked to calculate the challenges "as fast as possible", which might be the wrong approach. In a real world scenario it would be more important to calculate correctly. Though, the results clearly show that the failure rate is a relevant attribute worth investigating closer, as it might limit the usefulness of the scheme in real usecases.

Human Computable Passwords

Experiment

1 2 3 4

DEMO PROFILE PRACTICE EXPERIMENT

A B C D E F G H I

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

I C G B

0 B 5 A

1 F 6 B

2 B 7 H

3 H 8 H

4 H 9 A

5959410601

Submit

```
{
  "data": {
    "calcTimes": [13.917, 9.323, 11.844, 8.669, 16.394, 13.117, 9.631, 12.222, 8.051, 11.399],
    "results": [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
    "hcp_id": "1b7aa17ea0"
  }
}
```

Figure 5.1: The experiment screen seen after completing an experiment sample, ready to be submitted.




Figure 5.2: Histogram showing the distribution of calculation times of all the recorded experiments. Sample size 342 single digit challenges.




Figure 5.3: Average calculation time of all participants' i 'th calculation sample, and the regression line of the averages. Sample size 342, average samples per participant 31.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

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Appendix A

Demonstration slides




Figure A.1: Demo slide 1.




Figure A.2: Demo slide 2.




Figure A.3: Demo slide 3.




Figure A.4: Demo slide 4.




Figure A.5: Demo slide 5.

The challenge will update after typing the digit, do the same for all 10 cahracters of the password. If you type the wrong character, continue with the next challenge.

Find the mapping for each of the three letters.
 O=4,
 P=5,
 V=7

Add these digits and type it in the pw field.
 $4+5+7 \bmod 10 = 6$

Figure A.6: Demo slide 6.

Appendix B

Extension class files

B.1 Content Script

```
1 window.onload = setTimeout(updateUrl(),500);
2 var passwords = getPwdInputs();
3 var pwField = passwords[0];
4
5 if(pwField){
6     pwField.addEventListener('input',
7         function (callback){
8
9             console.log("input content: " + pwField.value.length);
10            chrome.runtime.sendMessage({pwValue: pwField.value.length+1},
11                function(respons){
12                    console.log("Respons pw changed: " + respons);
13                });
14        });
15    });
16 }
17
18 function getPwdInputs() {
19     var ary = [];
20     var inputs = document.getElementsByTagName("input");
21     for (var i=0; i<inputs.length; i++) {
22         if (inputs[i].type.toLowerCase() === "password") {
23             ary.push(inputs[i]);
24         }
25     }
26     return ary;
27 }
28
29 function updateUrl(){
30     chrome.runtime.sendMessage({newUrl: window.location.hostname},
31         function(respons){
32             console.log("URL changed to: "+ window.location.hostname);
33         });
34 }
```

Listing B.1: Content script file.

The content script listens for the onload event triggered by the windows object when a new page is loaded. When receiving this event the updateUrl function(line 27) is called, which sends an update containing the *window.location.hostname* which

essentially is the hostname of the current page. Hostname is used since login forms may be located at different locations at different domains.

Next the script search the DOM for input fields of type "password" using the *getPwdInputs* function(line 16). This function iterates through all the input fields looking for password fields. If a password field is found, an event listener is attached to the field, listening for events of type "input" which are sent when the field changes¹. When the password field changes a message containing the new length of the password is sent to the controller.

B.2 Controller

```

1  angular.module('human-computable-pws.controllers', [])
2  .controller("MainController",
3      function($timeout, $scope, chromeStorage){
4          //initial values
5          $scope.user = "";
6          $scope.pw=0;
7          $scope.selectedSite=null;
8
9          //function adding new site to the user
10         $scope.newSite = function(){
11             var newSite = new Site($scope.url);
12             $scope.user.sites.push(newSite);
13             $scope.selectedSite = newSite;
14             chromeStorage.set("user", $scope.user);
15             $scope.newSiteButton = false;
16         }
17
18         //try to load the user object from storage,
19         //if no user is present, create new.
20         try{
21             chromeStorage.getOrElse("user",
22                 function(){
23                     var newUser = {
24                         name: "user",
25                         sites: [
26                             new Site("accounts.google.com"),
27                         ]
28                     };
29                     chromeStorage.set("user", newUser);
30                     return newUser;
31                 }).then(function(keyValue){
32                     $scope.user = keyValue;
33                 });
34         }
35         catch(err){
36             console.log("Not run as extension")
37         }
38
39         //receive messages sent from the content script
40         //if url or password length changes
41         var tmp;
42         function handleMessage(){
43             if(tmp.pwValue){
44                 $scope.pw = tmp.pwValue-1;

```

¹<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/EventTarget/addEventListener>


```

45         console.log("pw: %o", $scope.pw);
46         console.log("objects: %o", $scope.user)
47     }
48     if(tmp.newUrl){
49         $scope.url = tmp.newUrl;
50         var site = searchList($scope.url, $scope.user.sites);
51         if(!site){
52             $scope.newSiteButton=true;
53             $scope.selectedSite = null ;
54         }else{
55             $scope.newSiteButton=false;
56             $scope.selectedSite = site;
57         }
58     }
59 }
60 //add eventhandler listening for messages from content script
61 try{
62     chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(
63         function(message,sender){
64             tmp = message;
65             $timeout(handleMessage);
66         });
67 }
68 catch(err){
69     console.log("not extension")
70 }
71 });

```

Listing B.2: Angular controller.

The controller is responsible for all the business logic, keeping the storage updated with new users and new sites. The *newSite* method on line 10 is called when then "new site"-button is clicked by the user, it then generates a new object of type Site with the domain name as attribute. The site is then added to the user object which is stored to the database to keep the storage persistent in case of disconnection.

When the controller is loaded the first action executed is trying to load the user object from the storage (line 20), if no user object is found, the controller creates a new one. In the code presented here, a new user is initiated with a dummy site for demonstration purposes. All the storage specific methods are called from the *chromeStorage* object, which makes it easy to do operations accessing the Chrome storage. The *getOrElse* is used, which checks for a user object and creates a new if none is present.

The controller also listens for messages from the content script, this event listener can be seen at line 62. When a message is received the *handleMessage* is called to process the data, distinguishing between a changes in the URL and changes in password length. When data is received, the corresponding variable in the controller is updated. If a new site was added, the view is also updated, hiding the "new

site"-button.

B.3 App.js file

```

1  var hcp = angular.module('human-computable-pws', [
2      'human-computable-pws.controllers',
3      'ngAnimate',
4      'chromeStorage',
5      'ngRoute',
6  ]);
7
8  hcp.config([ '$compileProvider',
9      function( $compileProvider ) {
10         var currentImgSrcSanitizationWhitelist =
11             $compileProvider.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist();
12         var newImgSrcSanitizationWhiteList =
13             currentImgSrcSanitizationWhitelist.toString().slice(0,-1)
14             + '|chrome-extension:' + currentImgSrcSanitizationWhitelist.
15             toString().slice(-1);
16
17         console.log("Changing imgSrcSanitizationWhiteList from "+
18             currentImgSrcSanitizationWhitelist+" to "+
19             newImgSrcSanitizationWhiteList);
20         $compileProvider.imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist(
21             newImgSrcSanitizationWhiteList);
22     }
23 ]);
24
25 hcp.config([ '$routeProvider',
26     function($routeProvider){
27         $routeProvider.
28             when('/',{
29                 templateUrl: 'partials/content.html',
30                 controller: 'MainController'
31             }).
32             otherwise({
33                 redirectTo: '/'
34             });
35     }]);
36
37 function searchList(site, sites){
38     if(sites == undefined) return false;
39     for(var i = 0; i<sites.length; i++){
40         if(sites[i].name == site){
41             return sites[i];
42         }
43     }
44     return false;
45 }
46
47
48
49 function Site(name){
50     this.name = name;
51     this.challenges = [];
52
53     for(var j=0; j<14; j++){
54         this.challenges.push(randomChallenge());
55     }
56 }
57

```

```

58 function getRandInt(){
59     var intArr = new Uint8Array(1);
60     window.crypto.getRandomValues(intArr);
61     if(intArr[0]>=Math.floor(256/26) * 26)
62         return getRandInt();
63     return (intArr[0] % 26);
64 }
65
66 function randomChallenge(){
67     var letters = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
68     var ch = [];
69     for(var z=0; z<14; z++){
70         ch.push(letters.charAt(getRandInt()));
71     }
72     return ch;
73 }

```

Listing B.3: Angular launcher file.

The app.js file initiates the application, specifying the modules used as well as some helper functions, including get function responsible for generating the random challenges(line 66). If the application contained several pages the routing would also be done in this file.

B.4 View file (partial file)

```

1 <table
2     align="center" class="challenges"
3     ng-init="site = user.sites[user.sites.indexOf(selectedSite)]">
4     <tr>
5         <td>
6             
7             
8         </td>
9         <td>
10            
11            </td>
12            <td>
13                
14                </td>
15            <td></td>
16        </tr>
17    </table>
18    <hr class="divider" style="margin: 0;">
19    <table align="center" class="challenges">
20        <tr>
21            <td>
22                0
23            </td>
24            <td>
25                5
26            </td>
27        </tr>
28        <tr>
29            <td>
30                1
31            </td>
32            <td>
33                6

```

```

34         </td>
35     </tr>
36     <tr>
37         <td>
38             2
39         </td>
40         <td>
41             7
42         </td>
43     </tr>
44     <tr>
45         <td>
46             3
47         </td>
48         <td>
49             8
50         </td>
51     </tr>
52     <tr>
53         <td>
54             4
55         </td>
56         <td>
57             9
58         </td>
59     </tr>
60 </table>

```

Listing B.4: Angular view. Only included the table showing the challenges for readability.

The code shows in this listing is the part of the view where the challenges are presented. It is essentially a table containing a single digit challenge in each cell. Notice the double bracket notation, where each of the challenges are fetched. `{{site.challenges[pw][i]}}` refers to the `$scope.site.challenges` which contains the challenges associated with the current active page. `pw` is at any given time the length of the password field of the active web page, if `pw` changes the challenges on display will automatically change through the two-way data binding in Angular. This way, the correct challenge will always be the one seen by the user.

Appendix

Experiment application




Figure C.1: First view shown to the user, containing a demonstration video. Created using wideo.co.

Human Computable Passwords

Experiment

1 2 3 4

DEMO PROFILE PRACTICE EXPERIMENT

Occupation

Technology student ▼

Age

27 ▼

Next Section ...

```
{"data":{"calcTimes":[],"results":[]},"hcp_id":"1b7aa17ea0","occupation":"Technology student","age":27}
```

Figure C.2: Second view shown to the user, gathering some basic demographic data which might be relevant.




Figure C.3: Third view of the web application. Practice section used by the user before entering the actual experiment.

Human Computable Passwords

Experiment

1 2 3 4

DEMO PROFILE PRACTICE EXPERIMENT

A B C D E F G H I

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

I F A H

640

0 D 5 E

1 F 6 F

2 I 7 C

3 A 8 E

4 E 9 D

```
{"data":{"calcTimes":[11.656,8.906,2.803],"results":[1,1,1]},"hcp_id":"1b7aa17ea0"}
```

Figure C.4: Final view, containing the experiment form. The user will calculate the response to the challenge on display and enter the answer in the password field. When finished the results can be submitted. And eventually stored in the database.