

The Taming of the Skew: Asymmetric Inflation Risk and Monetary Policy

Discussion of De Polis, Melosi and Petrella (2024)

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The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the position of the Bank of England.

Our Cast: The Taming of the *Shrew*



Petruchio ('Tamer')

Katharina ('Shrew')




Bianca ('Ideal')

Our Cast: The Taming of the *Skew*



Jay Powell and the FOMC
(‘Tamer’)



Skewed Inflation Outlook
(‘Shrew’)



Price Stability (‘Ideal’)

This Paper

- ▶ **Timely Question:** *How can we account for time-varying and asymmetric risks when π forecasting and setting monetary policy?*

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- ▶ **Key Ingredients:**
 - Reduced-form **skew- t** model for π with time-varying moments [Delle Monache et al., 2024]
 - Time-varying skew in *linear* **NK-DSGE + Optimal policy** with *quadratic* losses

This Paper

- ▶ **Timely Question:** *How can we account for time-varying and asymmetric risks when π forecasting and setting monetary policy?*
- ▶ **Key Ingredients:**
 - Reduced-form **skew- t** model for π with time-varying moments [Delle Monache et al., 2024]
 - Time-varying skew in **linear NK-DSGE + Optimal policy** with *quadratic* losses
- ▶ **Main Results:**
 - Robust empirical evidence of time-varying π skew in the US data
 - Skew- t model delivers forecasting improvements vs. UCSV model, *and* comparable to SPF
 - π -skew plays role in optimal monetary policy
 - Raises *new* questions about Fed's Flexible-Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT)
 - ? Proposes alternative Risk-Adjusted Inflation Targeting (RAIT) framework

#1. More To The Empirical Model Than Meets the Eye?

Reduced-form model for inflation π_t :

$$\pi_t \sim Skt_{\nu}(\mu_t, \sigma_t^2, \varrho_t)$$


where for each $f_{i,t}$ in $f_t = \{\mu_t, \delta_t = \log(\sigma_t), \gamma_t = \arctan(\varrho_t)\}$:

$$f_{i,t} = \underbrace{\bar{f}_{i,t}}_{\text{permanent}} + \underbrace{\tilde{f}_{i,t}}_{\text{transitory}}$$


with $\bar{f}_{i,t} = \bar{f}_{i,t-1} + a_i s_{i,t-1}$ and $\tilde{f}_{i,t} = \phi_i \tilde{f}_{i,t-1} + b_i s_{i,t-1}$, where $s_{i,t}$ is scaled score

Estimated via Bayesian methods


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
(a) Mean



(b) Volatility



(c) Skewness



(d) Expected value decomposition

Recent policy discourse around π focused on **persistence**

*“Participants generally noted their uncertainty about the **persistence** of high inflation and expressed the view that recent data had not increased their confidence that inflation was moving sustainably down to 2 percent”*

[FOMC Minutes, March 2024]

Qn: What can we learn about persistence from model’s permanent components?

#2. What Drives the Skew?

Qn: Empirical model silent about economic *drivers* of skew...

...but these presumably matter for optimal policy prescriptions?

- ▶ Authors have already explored some alternative sources of skew in NK-DSGE setup


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Alt. approach: quantile regression estimates highlight different sources of skew...



[Anesti et al., 2023]


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Alt. approach: ...with oil shocks having particular influence....



[Garofalo et al., 2023]

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
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Alt. approach: ...and monetary policy also playing a role:

(d) Quantile Response at 4-year Horizon from QR-LP



[Lloyd & Manuel, 2024]

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Suggestion: *either* investigate extensions to empirical model to say more about economic **drivers** of skew *or* explore various potential sources of skew in NK-DSGE setup

Relatedly, but for later: how do **joint** distributions of policy-relevant macro variables evolve?

#3. RAIT? ... Wait!

Policy implications explored in LQ setup:

$$y_t = \mathbb{E}_t y_{t+1} + \varsigma^{-1} \left(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} \right) \quad (\text{IS})$$

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa(y_t - y_t^*) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + \varepsilon_t \quad (\text{PC})$$

$$\hat{i}_t = \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_\pi(\hat{\pi}_t - \hat{\pi}_t^*) \quad (\text{MP})$$

MP deals with interest-rate setting given state, then CB announce time-varying inflation target $\pi_{t+1|t}^*$ in each period to:

$$\min_{\pi_{t+1|t}^*} \mathcal{L}_{t+1|t} = (\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1})^2$$

#3. RAIT? ... Wait!

Optimal policy sets $\hat{\pi}_{t+1|t}^*$ such that $\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} = 0$...

...and, if shocks ε_t have asymmetric **skew**, a wedge opens up between the **modal** and mean inflation expectation:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} = \mu_{t+1|t} + \psi_{t+1|t}$$

...so CB announces time-varying target to correct 'bias' from the **skew**...

RAIT: *adjust $\hat{\pi}_t^*$ to counteract expected direction of inflation risk*

#3. RAIT? ... Wait!

Two lessons and **questions**:

#1. **RAIT vs. FAIT**:

- Highlights *new* issues with Fed's FAIT
 - FAIT is *backward-looking* (corrects past mistakes), while RAIT is *forward-looking* (offsets predicted skew)
- ⇒ Relative to FAIT, RAIT delivers more gradual policy during post-Covid period
- **Qn:** **Can authors provide fuller comparison of macro outcomes vs. FAIT?**

#3. RAIT? ... Wait!

Two lessons and **questions**:

#2. RAIT vs. Something Simpler:

- Stripping away ability to set $\hat{\pi}^*$, targeting rules will always feature mean $\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}$, not mode $\mu_{t+1|t}$, in LQ setup
- ⇒ Optimal policy *always* accounts for skew, even with symmetric target
- In principle, simple alternative rule looks like it could generate optimal outcomes with symmetric target and skew:

$$\hat{i}_t = \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_{\pi}(\mathbb{E}_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{\pi}_t^*) \quad (\text{MP})$$

- **Qn:** Aside benefits vs. FAIT, can authors discuss other benefits of RAIT vs. other (seemingly) simpler frameworks?

In Sum

- ▶ Skews prevalent in π outlook, and matter for monetary policy
 - ▶ Skew- t model provides timely π -skew estimates, with favourable forecasting properties (comparable to SPF)
 - ▶ Convincing arguments that RAIT \succ FAIT
- ⇒ **We need more models of higher-order moments to inform policy**

My questions:

- ▶ Can empirical model features be more closely linked to recent policy debates around 'persistence'?
- ▶ Does the source of skew matter for policy? Can modelling be enriched to capture different economic drivers of skew?
- ▶ Is RAIT really preferable to symmetric inflation targeting?