

YOU CAN'T FIX IT IF YOU CAN'T FIND IT

10 Techniques to Becoming the Ultimate Cyber Hunter

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WHAT IS CYBER HUNTING?

- The Art of Looking for Trouble (in network data)
- 2. Human brain is still the best pattern matching tool out there
- 3. Cyber hunters combine knowledge of a specific network and knowledge of cyber threats to go exploring through data



"Like any hunt, can be targeted or opportunistic"



"WHY CYBER-HUNT?"

- 1. Automated tools are best-suited to finding pre-defined patterns
 - · Zero-day exploits, by definition, aren't pre-defined
- 2. Anomaly detection works best at large scales or on small well-defined systems
- 3. Danger signs are often only visible in retrospect, when:
 - breach is identified
 - vulnerability finally disclosed
 - new information provides context
- 4. Your employer has invested a lot of time and money making YOU an expert on your network
 - · Cyber hunting is the single most effective way of directly applying that knowledge for a security benefit





Data Sources for Cyber Hunting

WHY CYBER-HUNT?





FULL FIDELITY DATA

- 1. What is full-fidelity?
- 2. Why is it important?
 - ☐ The most important clues are often the smallest: DNS queries, unsuccessful SSH attempts, single SYN packets sent to non-responding ports
 - "Aggregation" and "sampling" are euphemisms for "we delete data"





WHY NOT FULL PACKET CAPTURE?


- 1. Packet capture is valuable as an investigation proceeds, but doesn't work for cyber hunting: too information-rich, too hard to see the forest for the trees
- 2. Lends itself poorly to visualization and pivoting
- 3. Scales very poorly
- 4. Increased use of SSL and tunneling greatly reduce its benefit





WHY NETFLOW?

- 1. NetFlow and related technologies scale much more easily than packet capture
- 2. Unsampled data sources still commonly available from most vendors
- 3. Can be visualized and searched in real time without lengthy or expensive processing







WHY PERFORMANCE MATTERS

- 1. Often the number one budgetary intangible: analysts know they need performance, but often struggle to articulate why
- 2. Cyber hunters require responsive systems not just a "nice to have"
- 3. Hard to quantify "train of thought" but vital to pursuing a consistent hunt and maintaining a mental narrative of the items identified so far
- 4. Studies have shown that response time has a massive impact on operator responsiveness (think "first person shooter" video games as an extreme example, where network lag strongly affects performance)





TERMINOLOGY USED IN THIS LAB

"flow" – the record of a transfer of data from one host to another over a computer network

"session" – the record of at least one flow of data and optionally the return flow, defined by the host IPs, host ports, protocol, and exporting device

"partition" – a collection of session records defined by selected exporting devices, segregated for separate analysis to maintain differences between physically- and logically-distinct networks

"traffic group" – sometimes also called "host groups" or "managed objects"; groups of logically-organized IP addresses or CIDR blocks; e.g. "All Internal IPs", "All my Web Servers", "Accounting Department Desktops"

"alert" – a single tracked event, which may evolve over time, identified automatically





TOOL USED IN THIS LAB

- 1. FlowTraq Flex
 - · free tool for small offices
- 2. Open source substitutes include the popular SiLK package from CERT, and YAF





Lab Overview

SECTION 1





SECTION I OBJECTIVES

- Interpret and quickly navigate full-fidelity flow data
- 2. Find positive indicators of compromise such as outbound ddos attacks, cryptocurrency mining (bitcoin and monero)
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- 4. Effectively use data and threat feeds to identify overall patterns and abnormalities quickly



SECTION 2 OBJECTIVES

- Identify common pivot techniques used by cyber-hunters when identifying the scope and severity of security incidents
- 2. Identify 'needle in a hackstack' search techniques and iterative drill-down methods
- 3. Identify important pre-incident context
- 4. Locate patterns post-incident





SECTION 3 OBJECTIVES

- Follow the hackers' trail and identify compromised systems through multiple hops
- 2. Map the full extent of the compromise, and learn why shutting the bad guys out might not be the best first step







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