diff --git a/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b889453c15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+name: Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME
+id: bcb55c13-067b-4648-98f3-627010f72520
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies the potential edition of a default Group Policy Object. A fresh installation of an Active Directory network will typically contain
+  two default group policy objects `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`. The default domain controllers policy is used to enforce and set policies to all the domain controllers within the domain environment.
+  The default domain policy is linked to all users and computers by default. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Active Directory network may modify the default group 
+  policy objects to obtain further access, deploy persistence or execute malware across a large number of hosts. Security teams should monitor the edition of the default GPOs.
+data_source:
+- Windows Security 4688
+search:
+  selection1:
+    process.file.name:
+    - mmc.exe
+    process.cmd_line|contains: gpme.msc
+  selection2:
+    process.cmd_line|contains: 31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9
+  selection3:
+    process.cmd_line|contains: 6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9
+  condition: selection1 or selection2 or selection3
+how_to_implement:  To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
+- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/weaponizing-group-policy-objects-access/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn265969(v=ws.11)
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 100
+  message: A default group policy object was opened with Group Policy Manage Editor on $dest$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1484
+  - T1484.001
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  risk_score: 50
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/default_domain_policy_modified/security-4688.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
diff --git a/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c06c90dbfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+name: Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview
+id: ec4f671e-c736-4f78-a4c0-8fe809e952e5
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell commandlet part of PowerView. This module obtains the list of all
+  active domain computers and lists the active shares on each computer. Network file shares in Active Directory environments may contain sensitive information
+  like backups, scripts, credentials, etc. Adversaries who have obtained a foothold in an AD network may leverage PowerView to identify secrets and leverage them 
+  for Privilege Escalation or Lateral Movement.
+data_source:
+- Powershell 4104
+search:
+  selection1:
+    process.cmd_line|re: 'invoke-sharefinder'
+  condition: selection1
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/blob/master/PowerView/powerview.ps1
+- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/23/sharefinder-how-threat-actors-discover-file-shares/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 60
+  message: Invoke-ShareFinder commandlet was executed on $Computer$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552
+  - T1552.006
+  observable:
+  - name: Computer
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: UserID
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - EventCode
+  - ScriptBlockText
+  - Opcode
+  - Computer
+  - UserID
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  risk_score: 48
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1135/powerview_sharefinder/windows-powershell.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d95d09f81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+name: Windows Findstr GPP Discovery
+id: 73ed0f19-080e-4917-b7c6-56e1760a50d4
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the findstr command employed to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences (GPP).
+  GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.
+  These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).
+  While Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators to create unsecure credentials, existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords are not removed from SYSVOL.
+data_source:
+- Windows Security 4688
+search:
+  selection1:
+    process.file.name:
+    - findstr.exe
+    process.cmd_line|contains: sysvol
+    process.cmd_line|contains: cpassword
+  condition: selection1 
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may leverage findstr to find passwords in GPO to validate exposure. Filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
+- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288 
+- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 70
+  message: Findstr was executed to discover GPP credentials on $dest$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552
+  - T1552.006
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - process_name
+  - _time
+  - dest_device_id
+  - dest_user_id
+  - process
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/findstr_gpp_discovery/windows-4688.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00830803d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+name: Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery
+id: fdef746e-71fb-41ce-8ab2-b4a5a6b50ca2
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell commandlet employed to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences (GPP).
+  GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.
+  These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).
+  While Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators to create unsecure credentials, existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords are not removed from SYSVOL.
+data_source:
+- Powershell 4104
+search:
+  selection1:
+    process.cmd_line|re: 'get-gpppassword'
+  condition: selection1
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
+- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288 
+- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 70
+  message: Commandlets leveraged to discover GPP credentials were executed on $Computer$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552
+  - T1552.006
+  observable:
+  - name: Computer
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: UserID
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - EventCode
+  - ScriptBlockText
+  - Opcode
+  - Computer
+  - UserID
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/powershell_gpp_discovery/win-powershell.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93e9ac8b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev_ssa/endpoint/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+name: Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration
+id: 2b301d6c-0527-4dbd-8d2d-5345bc4be0cf
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution of the PowerView powershell commandlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`. This commandlets
+  are used to enumerate Access Control List permissions given to Active Directory objects. In an active directory environment, an object is an entity that represents an available resource within 
+  the organizations network, such as domain controllers, users, groups, computers, shares, etc.  Maintaining Active Directory permissions is complicated and hard to manage, especially in complex 
+  and large environments with multiple domains. Weak permissions may allow adversaries and red teamers to escalate their privileges in Active Directory. PowerView is a common tool leveraged
+  by attackers to identify and exploit configuration weaknesses.
+data_source:
+- Powershell 4104
+search:
+  selection1:
+    process.cmd_line|re: 'get-objectacl'
+  selection2:
+    process.cmd_line|re: 'get-domainobjectacl'
+  condition: selection1 or selection2
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
+- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/enumerating-access-controls-in-active-directory-c06e2efa8b89
+- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces
+- https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainObjectAcl/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 40
+  message: PowerView AD acccess control list enumeration detected on $Computer$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.002
+  - T1069
+  observable:
+  - name: Computer
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - EventCode
+  - ScriptBlockText
+  - Opcode
+  - Computer
+  - UserID
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Exploitation
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/powerview_acl_enumeration/windows-powershell.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+    update_timestamp: true
diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5e83f1ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+name: Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME
+id: bcb55c13-067b-4648-98f3-627010f72520
+version: 1
+description: The following analytic identifies the potential edition of a default
+  Group Policy Object. A fresh installation of an Active Directory network will typically
+  contain two default group policy objects `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and
+  `Default Domain Policy`. The default domain controllers policy is used to enforce
+  and set policies to all the domain controllers within the domain environment. The
+  default domain policy is linked to all users and computers by default. An adversary
+  who has obtained privileged access to an Active Directory network may modify the
+  default group policy objects to obtain further access, deploy persistence or execute
+  malware across a large number of hosts. Security teams should monitor the edition
+  of the default GPOs.
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval process_pid=ucast(map_get(process,"pid"),
+  "string", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string",
+  null) | eval process_file_name=ucast(map_get(process_file,"name"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"), "string", null) | eval
+  actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"),
+  "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user_name=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process=ucast(map_get(actor,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_pid=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"pid"), "string",
+  null) | eval actor_process_file=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_file_path=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"path"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process_file_name=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
+  null) | where (process_file_name="mmc.exe" AND like(process_cmd_line, "%gpme.msc%"))
+  OR like(process_cmd_line, "%31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9%") OR like(process_cmd_line,
+  "%6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9%") 
+  | eval body=create_map(
+    "devices", [
+        create_map(
+            "hostname", device_hostname, "type_id", 0, "uuid", ucast(map_get(device,"uuid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "time", timestamp,
+    "evidence", create_map("process.pid", process_pid, "process.file.path", process_file_path, "process.file.name", process_file_name, "process.cmd_line", process_cmd_line, "actor.user.name", actor_user_name, "actor.process.pid", actor_process_pid, "actor.process.file.path", actor_process_file_path, "actor.process.file.name", actor_process_file_name, "device.hostname", device_hostname),
+    "message", concat("Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME has been triggered on ", device_hostname, " by ", actor_user_name, "."),
+    "users", [
+        create_map(
+            "name", actor_user_name, "uid", ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "activity_id", 1,
+    "category_uid", 2,
+    "class_uid", 102001,
+    "risk_level_id", 2,
+    "risk_score", 50,
+    "severity_id", 0,
+    "rule", create_map("name", "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", "uid", "bcb55c13-067b-4648-98f3-627010f72520", "type", "Streaming"),
+    "metadata", create_map("customer_uid", ucast(map_get(metadata,"customer_uid"), "string", null), "product", create_map("name", "Behavior Analytics", "vendor_name", "Splunk"), "version", "1.0.0-rc.2", "logged_time", time()),
+    "type_uid", 10200101,
+    "start_time", timestamp,
+    "end_time", timestamp
+  )
+  | into write_ba_finding_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be
+  legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
+- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/weaponizing-group-policy-objects-access/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn265969(v=ws.11)
+tags:
+  required_fields:
+  - process.pid
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.file.name
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.name
+  - actor.process.pid
+  - actor.process.file.path
+  - actor.process.file.name
+  - device.hostname
+  risk_score: 50
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  risk_severity: medium
+  research_site_url: https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/bcb55c13-067b-4648-98f3-627010f72520/
+  event_schema: ocsf
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: process.pid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.file.name
+    cim: process_name
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.name
+    cim: user
+  - ocsf: actor.process.pid
+    cim: parent_process_id
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.path
+    cim: parent_process_path
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.name
+    cim: parent_process_name
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  annotations:
+    analytic_story:
+    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+    cis20:
+    - CIS 10
+    kill_chain_phases:
+    - Exploitation
+    mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1484
+    - T1484.001
+    nist:
+    - DE.CM
+test:
+  name: Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - name: Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME
+    attack_data:
+    - file_name: security-4688.log
+      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/default_domain_policy_modified/security-4688.log
+      source: XmlWinEventLog
+runtime: SPL-DSP
diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7210a61325
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+name: Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview
+id: ec4f671e-c736-4f78-a4c0-8fe809e952e5
+version: 1
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell
+  commandlet part of PowerView. This module obtains the list of all active domain
+  computers and lists the active shares on each computer. Network file shares in Active
+  Directory environments may contain sensitive information like backups, scripts,
+  credentials, etc. Adversaries who have obtained a foothold in an AD network may
+  leverage PowerView to identify secrets and leverage them for Privilege Escalation
+  or Lateral Movement.
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"),
+  "string", null) | eval process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_uid=ucast(map_get(process,"uid"), "string", null) | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"), "map<string, any>", null) |
+  eval actor_user_uid=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line,
+  /(?i)invoke-sharefinder/)=true 
+  | eval body=create_map(
+    "devices", [
+        create_map(
+            "hostname", device_hostname, "type_id", 0, "uuid", ucast(map_get(device,"uuid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "time", timestamp,
+    "evidence", create_map("device.hostname", device_hostname, "process.file.path", process_file_path, "process.uid", process_uid, "process.cmd_line", process_cmd_line, "actor.user.uid", actor_user_uid),
+    "message", concat("Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview has been triggered on ", device_hostname, " by ", "Unknown", "."),
+    "users", [
+        create_map(
+            "name", "Unknown", "uid", ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "activity_id", 1,
+    "category_uid", 2,
+    "class_uid", 102001,
+    "risk_level_id", 2,
+    "risk_score", 48,
+    "severity_id", 0,
+    "rule", create_map("name", "Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview", "uid", "ec4f671e-c736-4f78-a4c0-8fe809e952e5", "type", "Streaming"),
+    "metadata", create_map("customer_uid", ucast(map_get(metadata,"customer_uid"), "string", null), "product", create_map("name", "Behavior Analytics", "vendor_name", "Splunk"), "version", "1.0.0-rc.2", "logged_time", time()),
+    "type_uid", 10200101,
+    "start_time", timestamp,
+    "end_time", timestamp
+  )
+  | into write_ba_finding_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/blob/master/PowerView/powerview.ps1
+- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/23/sharefinder-how-threat-actors-discover-file-shares/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
+tags:
+  required_fields:
+  - device.hostname
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.uid
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.uid
+  risk_score: 48
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  risk_severity: low
+  research_site_url: https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/ec4f671e-c736-4f78-a4c0-8fe809e952e5/
+  event_schema: ocsf
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.uid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.uid
+    cim: user_id
+  annotations:
+    analytic_story:
+    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+    cis20:
+    - CIS 10
+    kill_chain_phases:
+    - Exploitation
+    mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1552
+    - T1552.006
+    nist:
+    - DE.CM
+test:
+  name: Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - name: Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview
+    attack_data:
+    - file_name: windows-powershell.log
+      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1135/powerview_sharefinder/windows-powershell.log
+      source: XmlWinEventLog
+runtime: SPL-DSP
diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0c8df7164
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+name: Windows Findstr GPP Discovery
+id: 73ed0f19-080e-4917-b7c6-56e1760a50d4
+version: 1
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the findstr command employed
+  to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools
+  that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These
+  policies allow administrators to set local accounts. These group policies are stored
+  in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL
+  share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public). While
+  Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators to create unsecure credentials,
+  existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords are not removed from SYSVOL.
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval process_pid=ucast(map_get(process,"pid"),
+  "string", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string",
+  null) | eval process_file_name=ucast(map_get(process_file,"name"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"), "string", null) | eval
+  actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"),
+  "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user_name=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process=ucast(map_get(actor,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_pid=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"pid"), "string",
+  null) | eval actor_process_file=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_file_path=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"path"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process_file_name=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
+  null) | where process_file_name="findstr.exe" AND like(process_cmd_line, "%cpassword%")
+  
+  | eval body=create_map(
+    "devices", [
+        create_map(
+            "hostname", device_hostname, "type_id", 0, "uuid", ucast(map_get(device,"uuid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "time", timestamp,
+    "evidence", create_map("process.pid", process_pid, "process.file.path", process_file_path, "process.file.name", process_file_name, "process.cmd_line", process_cmd_line, "actor.user.name", actor_user_name, "actor.process.pid", actor_process_pid, "actor.process.file.path", actor_process_file_path, "actor.process.file.name", actor_process_file_name, "device.hostname", device_hostname),
+    "message", concat("Windows Findstr GPP Discovery has been triggered on ", device_hostname, " by ", actor_user_name, "."),
+    "users", [
+        create_map(
+            "name", actor_user_name, "uid", ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "activity_id", 1,
+    "category_uid", 2,
+    "class_uid", 102001,
+    "risk_level_id", 2,
+    "risk_score", 56,
+    "severity_id", 0,
+    "rule", create_map("name", "Windows Findstr GPP Discovery", "uid", "73ed0f19-080e-4917-b7c6-56e1760a50d4", "type", "Streaming"),
+    "metadata", create_map("customer_uid", ucast(map_get(metadata,"customer_uid"), "string", null), "product", create_map("name", "Behavior Analytics", "vendor_name", "Splunk"), "version", "1.0.0-rc.2", "logged_time", time()),
+    "type_uid", 10200101,
+    "start_time", timestamp,
+    "end_time", timestamp
+  )
+  | into write_ba_finding_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may leverage findstr to find passwords in GPO
+  to validate exposure. Filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
+- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
+tags:
+  required_fields:
+  - process.pid
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.file.name
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.name
+  - actor.process.pid
+  - actor.process.file.path
+  - actor.process.file.name
+  - device.hostname
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  risk_severity: medium
+  research_site_url: https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/73ed0f19-080e-4917-b7c6-56e1760a50d4/
+  event_schema: ocsf
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: process.pid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.file.name
+    cim: process_name
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.name
+    cim: user
+  - ocsf: actor.process.pid
+    cim: parent_process_id
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.path
+    cim: parent_process_path
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.name
+    cim: parent_process_name
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  annotations:
+    analytic_story:
+    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+    cis20:
+    - CIS 10
+    kill_chain_phases:
+    - Exploitation
+    mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1552
+    - T1552.006
+    nist:
+    - DE.CM
+test:
+  name: Windows Findstr GPP Discovery Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - name: Windows Findstr GPP Discovery
+    attack_data:
+    - file_name: windows-4688.log
+      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/findstr_gpp_discovery/windows-4688.log
+      source: XmlWinEventLog
+runtime: SPL-DSP
diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..71ca37b2d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+name: Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery
+id: fdef746e-71fb-41ce-8ab2-b4a5a6b50ca2
+version: 1
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell
+  commandlet employed to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences
+  (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded
+  credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts. These group
+  policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain
+  user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that
+  has been made public). While Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators
+  to create unsecure credentials, existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords
+  are not removed from SYSVOL.
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"),
+  "string", null) | eval process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_uid=ucast(map_get(process,"uid"), "string", null) | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"), "map<string, any>", null) |
+  eval actor_user_uid=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line,
+  /(?i)get-gpppassword/)=true 
+  | eval body=create_map(
+    "devices", [
+        create_map(
+            "hostname", device_hostname, "type_id", 0, "uuid", ucast(map_get(device,"uuid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "time", timestamp,
+    "evidence", create_map("device.hostname", device_hostname, "process.file.path", process_file_path, "process.uid", process_uid, "process.cmd_line", process_cmd_line, "actor.user.uid", actor_user_uid),
+    "message", concat("Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery has been triggered on ", device_hostname, " by ", "Unknown", "."),
+    "users", [
+        create_map(
+            "name", "Unknown", "uid", ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "activity_id", 1,
+    "category_uid", 2,
+    "class_uid", 102001,
+    "risk_level_id", 2,
+    "risk_score", 56,
+    "severity_id", 0,
+    "rule", create_map("name", "Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery", "uid", "fdef746e-71fb-41ce-8ab2-b4a5a6b50ca2", "type", "Streaming"),
+    "metadata", create_map("customer_uid", ucast(map_get(metadata,"customer_uid"), "string", null), "product", create_map("name", "Behavior Analytics", "vendor_name", "Splunk"), "version", "1.0.0-rc.2", "logged_time", time()),
+    "type_uid", 10200101,
+    "start_time", timestamp,
+    "end_time", timestamp
+  )
+  | into write_ba_finding_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
+- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
+tags:
+  required_fields:
+  - device.hostname
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.uid
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.uid
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  risk_severity: medium
+  research_site_url: https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/fdef746e-71fb-41ce-8ab2-b4a5a6b50ca2/
+  event_schema: ocsf
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.uid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.uid
+    cim: user_id
+  annotations:
+    analytic_story:
+    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+    cis20:
+    - CIS 10
+    kill_chain_phases:
+    - Exploitation
+    mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1552
+    - T1552.006
+    nist:
+    - DE.CM
+test:
+  name: Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - name: Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery
+    attack_data:
+    - file_name: win-powershell.log
+      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/powershell_gpp_discovery/win-powershell.log
+      source: XmlWinEventLog
+runtime: SPL-DSP
diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..14986a2e6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+name: Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration
+id: 2b301d6c-0527-4dbd-8d2d-5345bc4be0cf
+version: 1
+description: The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution
+  of the PowerView powershell commandlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`.
+  This commandlets are used to enumerate Access Control List permissions given to
+  Active Directory objects. In an active directory environment, an object is an entity
+  that represents an available resource within the organizations network, such as
+  domain controllers, users, groups, computers, shares, etc.  Maintaining Active Directory
+  permissions is complicated and hard to manage, especially in complex and large environments
+  with multiple domains. Weak permissions may allow adversaries and red teamers to
+  escalate their privileges in Active Directory. PowerView is a common tool leveraged
+  by attackers to identify and exploit configuration weaknesses.
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"),
+  "string", null) | eval process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_uid=ucast(map_get(process,"uid"), "string", null) | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"), "map<string, any>", null) |
+  eval actor_user_uid=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line,
+  /(?i)get-objectacl/)=true OR match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)get-domainobjectacl/)=true
+  
+  | eval body=create_map(
+    "devices", [
+        create_map(
+            "hostname", device_hostname, "type_id", 0, "uuid", ucast(map_get(device,"uuid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "time", timestamp,
+    "evidence", create_map("device.hostname", device_hostname, "process.file.path", process_file_path, "process.uid", process_uid, "process.cmd_line", process_cmd_line, "actor.user.uid", actor_user_uid),
+    "message", concat("Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration has been triggered on ", device_hostname, " by ", "Unknown", "."),
+    "users", [
+        create_map(
+            "name", "Unknown", "uid", ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null)
+        )
+    ],
+    "activity_id", 1,
+    "category_uid", 2,
+    "class_uid", 102001,
+    "risk_level_id", 1,
+    "risk_score", 20,
+    "severity_id", 0,
+    "rule", create_map("name", "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "uid", "2b301d6c-0527-4dbd-8d2d-5345bc4be0cf", "type", "Streaming"),
+    "metadata", create_map("customer_uid", ucast(map_get(metadata,"customer_uid"), "string", null), "product", create_map("name", "Behavior Analytics", "vendor_name", "Splunk"), "version", "1.0.0-rc.2", "logged_time", time()),
+    "type_uid", 10200101,
+    "start_time", timestamp,
+    "end_time", timestamp
+  )
+  | into write_ba_finding_events();'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes,
+  filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
+- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/enumerating-access-controls-in-active-directory-c06e2efa8b89
+- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces
+- https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainObjectAcl/
+tags:
+  required_fields:
+  - device.hostname
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.uid
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.uid
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  risk_severity: low
+  research_site_url: https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/2b301d6c-0527-4dbd-8d2d-5345bc4be0cf/
+  event_schema: ocsf
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.uid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.uid
+    cim: user_id
+  annotations:
+    analytic_story:
+    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+    cis20:
+    - CIS 10
+    kill_chain_phases:
+    - Exploitation
+    - Delivery
+    - Installation
+    mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1078.002
+    - T1069
+    nist:
+    - DE.CM
+test:
+  name: Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration Unit Test
+  tests:
+  - name: Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration
+    attack_data:
+    - file_name: windows-powershell.log
+      data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/powerview_acl_enumeration/windows-powershell.log
+      source: XmlWinEventLog
+runtime: SPL-DSP
diff --git a/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..97b6acf6b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+name: Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME
+id: bcb55c13-067b-4648-98f3-627010f72520
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+type: TTP
+status: production
+description: The following analytic identifies the potential edition of a default
+  Group Policy Object. A fresh installation of an Active Directory network will typically
+  contain two default group policy objects `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and
+  `Default Domain Policy`. The default domain controllers policy is used to enforce
+  and set policies to all the domain controllers within the domain environment. The
+  default domain policy is linked to all users and computers by default. An adversary
+  who has obtained privileged access to an Active Directory network may modify the
+  default group policy objects to obtain further access, deploy persistence or execute
+  malware across a large number of hosts. Security teams should monitor the edition
+  of the default GPOs.
+data_source:
+- Windows Security 4688
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval process_pid=ucast(map_get(process,"pid"),
+  "string", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string",
+  null) | eval process_file_name=ucast(map_get(process_file,"name"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"), "string", null) | eval
+  actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"),
+  "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user_name=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process=ucast(map_get(actor,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_pid=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"pid"), "string",
+  null) | eval actor_process_file=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_file_path=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"path"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process_file_name=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
+  null) | where (process_file_name="mmc.exe" AND like(process_cmd_line, "%gpme.msc%"))
+  OR like(process_cmd_line, "%31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9%") OR like(process_cmd_line,
+  "%6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9%") --finding_report--'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be
+  legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
+- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/weaponizing-group-policy-objects-access/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
+- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn265969(v=ws.11)
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 100
+  message: A default group policy object was opened with Group Policy Manage Editor
+    on $dest$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1484
+  - T1484.001
+  observable:
+  - name: process.pid
+    type: Other
+  - name: process.file.path
+    type: File
+  - name: process.file.name
+    type: File
+  - name: process.cmd_line
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.user.name
+    type: User Name
+  - name: actor.process.pid
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.process.file.path
+    type: File Name
+  - name: actor.process.file.name
+    type: File Name
+  - name: device.hostname
+    type: Hostname
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - process.pid
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.file.name
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.name
+  - actor.process.pid
+  - actor.process.file.path
+  - actor.process.file.name
+  - device.hostname
+  risk_score: 50
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: process.pid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.file.name
+    cim: process_name
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.name
+    cim: user
+  - ocsf: actor.process.pid
+    cim: parent_process_id
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.path
+    cim: parent_process_path
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.name
+    cim: parent_process_name
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/default_domain_policy_modified/security-4688.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
diff --git a/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9fc3a90784
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+name: Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview
+id: ec4f671e-c736-4f78-a4c0-8fe809e952e5
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+type: TTP
+status: production
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell
+  commandlet part of PowerView. This module obtains the list of all active domain
+  computers and lists the active shares on each computer. Network file shares in Active
+  Directory environments may contain sensitive information like backups, scripts,
+  credentials, etc. Adversaries who have obtained a foothold in an AD network may
+  leverage PowerView to identify secrets and leverage them for Privilege Escalation
+  or Lateral Movement.
+data_source:
+- Powershell 4104
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"),
+  "string", null) | eval process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_uid=ucast(map_get(process,"uid"), "string", null) | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"), "map<string, any>", null) |
+  eval actor_user_uid=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line,
+  /(?i)invoke-sharefinder/)=true --finding_report--'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+references:
+- https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/blob/master/PowerView/powerview.ps1
+- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/23/sharefinder-how-threat-actors-discover-file-shares/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 60
+  message: Invoke-ShareFinder commandlet was executed on $Computer$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552
+  - T1552.006
+  observable:
+  - name: device.hostname
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: process.file.path
+    type: File
+  - name: process.uid
+    type: Other
+  - name: process.cmd_line
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.user.uid
+    type: Other
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - device.hostname
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.uid
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.uid
+  risk_score: 48
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.uid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.uid
+    cim: user_id
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1135/powerview_sharefinder/windows-powershell.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
diff --git a/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a807b25d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_findstr_gpp_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+name: Windows Findstr GPP Discovery
+id: 73ed0f19-080e-4917-b7c6-56e1760a50d4
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+type: TTP
+status: production
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the findstr command employed
+  to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools
+  that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These
+  policies allow administrators to set local accounts. These group policies are stored
+  in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL
+  share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public). While
+  Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators to create unsecure credentials,
+  existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords are not removed from SYSVOL.
+data_source:
+- Windows Security 4688
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval process_pid=ucast(map_get(process,"pid"),
+  "string", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string",
+  null) | eval process_file_name=ucast(map_get(process_file,"name"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"), "string", null) | eval
+  actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"),
+  "map<string, any>", null) | eval actor_user_name=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process=ucast(map_get(actor,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_pid=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"pid"), "string",
+  null) | eval actor_process_file=ucast(map_get(actor_process,"file"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval actor_process_file_path=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"path"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor_process_file_name=ucast(map_get(actor_process_file,"name"),
+  "string", null) | eval device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"), "string",
+  null) | where process_file_name="findstr.exe" AND like(process_cmd_line, "%cpassword%")
+  --finding_report--'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
+  Sysmon TA.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may leverage findstr to find passwords in GPO
+  to validate exposure. Filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
+- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 70
+  message: Findstr was executed to discover GPP credentials on $dest$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552
+  - T1552.006
+  observable:
+  - name: process.pid
+    type: Other
+  - name: process.file.path
+    type: File
+  - name: process.file.name
+    type: File
+  - name: process.cmd_line
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.user.name
+    type: User Name
+  - name: actor.process.pid
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.process.file.path
+    type: File Name
+  - name: actor.process.file.name
+    type: File Name
+  - name: device.hostname
+    type: Hostname
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - process.pid
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.file.name
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.name
+  - actor.process.pid
+  - actor.process.file.path
+  - actor.process.file.name
+  - device.hostname
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: process.pid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.file.name
+    cim: process_name
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.name
+    cim: user
+  - ocsf: actor.process.pid
+    cim: parent_process_id
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.path
+    cim: parent_process_path
+  - ocsf: actor.process.file.name
+    cim: parent_process_name
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/findstr_gpp_discovery/windows-4688.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
diff --git a/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7c904bfeaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+name: Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery
+id: fdef746e-71fb-41ce-8ab2-b4a5a6b50ca2
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+type: TTP
+status: production
+description: The following analytic identifies the use of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell
+  commandlet employed to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences
+  (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded
+  credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts. These group
+  policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain
+  user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that
+  has been made public). While Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators
+  to create unsecure credentials, existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords
+  are not removed from SYSVOL.
+data_source:
+- Powershell 4104
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"),
+  "string", null) | eval process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_uid=ucast(map_get(process,"uid"), "string", null) | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"), "map<string, any>", null) |
+  eval actor_user_uid=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line,
+  /(?i)get-gpppassword/)=true --finding_report--'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Unknown
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
+- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
+- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 70
+  message: Commandlets leveraged to discover GPP credentials were executed on $Computer$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1552
+  - T1552.006
+  observable:
+  - name: device.hostname
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: process.file.path
+    type: File
+  - name: process.uid
+    type: Other
+  - name: process.cmd_line
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.user.uid
+    type: Other
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - device.hostname
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.uid
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.uid
+  risk_score: 56
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.uid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.uid
+    cim: user_id
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/powershell_gpp_discovery/win-powershell.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
diff --git a/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..746b0f137e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssa_detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+name: Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration
+id: 2b301d6c-0527-4dbd-8d2d-5345bc4be0cf
+version: 1
+date: '2023-05-02'
+author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
+type: TTP
+status: production
+description: The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution
+  of the PowerView powershell commandlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`.
+  This commandlets are used to enumerate Access Control List permissions given to
+  Active Directory objects. In an active directory environment, an object is an entity
+  that represents an available resource within the organizations network, such as
+  domain controllers, users, groups, computers, shares, etc.  Maintaining Active Directory
+  permissions is complicated and hard to manage, especially in complex and large environments
+  with multiple domains. Weak permissions may allow adversaries and red teamers to
+  escalate their privileges in Active Directory. PowerView is a common tool leveraged
+  by attackers to identify and exploit configuration weaknesses.
+data_source:
+- Powershell 4104
+search: ' | from read_ba_enriched_events() | eval timestamp = ucast(map_get(input_event,"time"),"long",
+  null) | eval metadata = ucast(map_get(input_event, "metadata"),"map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval metadata_uid = ucast(map_get(metadata, "uid"),"string", null) | eval
+  device=ucast(map_get(input_event,"device"), "map<string, any>", null) | eval device_hostname=ucast(map_get(device,"hostname"),
+  "string", null) | eval process=ucast(map_get(input_event,"process"), "map<string,
+  any>", null) | eval process_file=ucast(map_get(process,"file"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval process_file_path=ucast(map_get(process_file,"path"), "string", null)
+  | eval process_uid=ucast(map_get(process,"uid"), "string", null) | eval process_cmd_line=ucast(map_get(process,"cmd_line"),
+  "string", null) | eval actor=ucast(map_get(input_event,"actor"), "map<string, any>",
+  null) | eval actor_user=ucast(map_get(actor,"user"), "map<string, any>", null) |
+  eval actor_user_uid=ucast(map_get(actor_user,"uid"), "string", null) | where match_regex(process_cmd_line,
+  /(?i)get-objectacl/)=true OR match_regex(process_cmd_line, /(?i)get-domainobjectacl/)=true
+  --finding_report--'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes,
+  filter as needed.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
+- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/enumerating-access-controls-in-active-directory-c06e2efa8b89
+- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces
+- https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainObjectAcl/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  confidence: 50
+  impact: 40
+  message: PowerView AD acccess control list enumeration detected on $Computer$
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1078.002
+  - T1069
+  observable:
+  - name: device.hostname
+    type: Hostname
+  - name: process.file.path
+    type: File
+  - name: process.uid
+    type: Other
+  - name: process.cmd_line
+    type: Other
+  - name: actor.user.uid
+    type: Other
+  product:
+  - Splunk Behavioral Analytics
+  required_fields:
+  - device.hostname
+  - process.file.path
+  - process.uid
+  - process.cmd_line
+  - actor.user.uid
+  risk_score: 20
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  mappings:
+  - ocsf: device.hostname
+    cim: dest
+  - ocsf: process.file.path
+    cim: process_path
+  - ocsf: process.uid
+    cim: process_id
+  - ocsf: process.cmd_line
+    cim: process
+  - ocsf: actor.user.uid
+    cim: user_id
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/powerview_acl_enumeration/windows-powershell.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog