

Behavior Synthesis for an ATLAS Humanoid Robot from High-level User Specifications

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LIST OF TODOs, FIXES, OPEN ISSUES

Title of my TODO example (hyperlink)	1
Consider mutex for grounding conflicts in this paper?	1
Activation–Outcomes or just Completion–Failure ?	1
Fix Action Outcome Constraints Formula (4a) . .	2
Procedure for recursively adding preconditions . .	2
How to write control mode Mutex formula	2
Make SM outcomes persistent	3
Differentiate between control modes and memory	3
Strict liveness requirement (goal) ordering	3

Abstract—In this paper we ...

Body of my TODO example

I. INTRODUCTION

Contributions (brain dump):

- Partial to full specification
 - Most intuitive from the users point-of-view
 - Limited message size over bad comms (send partial specification → compile and synthesize onboard)
- Multi-paradigm specification (objectives and initial conditions from user, topology/modes, preconditions, task)

Also consider mutex for grounding conflicts?

- Generalization of activation–completion paradigm [1]
- Integration with FlexBE and ROS
- Experimental validation on ATLAS

II. PRELIMINARIES

A. ATLAS Humanoid Robot

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B. Team ViGIR's Approach to High-level Control

...

C. Linear Temporal Logic and Reactive LTL Synthesis

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III. PROBLEM STATEMENT

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IV. LTL SPECIFICATION COMPILATION

A. Multi-Paradigm Specification

...

B. Discrete Abstraction & Proposition Grounding

Write LTL formulas in terms of any possible outcome, $o \in \text{Out}(a)$, or only of completion and failure, $\{c, f\}$?

This work was supported by
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$$\mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{M} \quad (1a)$$

$$\mathcal{X}' = \mathcal{X} \cup \bigcup_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \bigcup_{o \in \text{Out}(a)} \pi_a^o \cup \bigcup_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \bigcup_{o \in \text{Out}(m)} \pi_m^o \quad (1b)$$

C. LTL Specification for ATLAS

1) *Generic Formulas*: The system safety requirements (2) dictate that an activation proposition should turn `False` once an outcome has been returned.

$$\bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(a)} \Box (\pi_a \wedge \bigcirc \pi_a^o \Rightarrow \bigcirc \neg \pi_a) \quad (2)$$

The environment safety assumptions (3) dictate that the outcomes of an action are mutually exclusive. For example, an action cannot both succeed and fail.

$$\bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(a)} \Box (\bigcirc \pi_a^o \Rightarrow \bigwedge_{o' \neq o} \bigcirc \neg \pi_a^{o'}) \quad (3)$$

2) *Action-specific Formulas*: The environment safety assumptions (4) govern the value of outcomes in the next time step. Specifically, formula (4a) says that if an outcome has been returned, and the corresponding action is re-activated, then any outcome can become `True`. Formula (4b) dictates that, if an outcome is `False` and the corresponding action is not activated, then that outcome should remain `False`. This pair of formulas is a generalization of the “fast-slow” formulas (3) and (4) in [1].

Formula (4a) is outdated. It doesn't account for the activation–deactivation paradigm!

$$\Box (\bigvee \pi_a^o \wedge \pi_a \Rightarrow \bigvee \bigcirc \pi_a^o) \quad (4a)$$

$$\bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(a)} \Box (\neg \pi_a^o \wedge \neg \pi_a \Rightarrow \bigcirc \neg \pi_a^o) \quad (4b)$$

The environment safety assumptions (5) dictate that the value of an outcome should not change if the corresponding action has not been activated again. In other words, the outcome persists.

$$\bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(a)} \Box (\pi_a^o \wedge \neg \pi_a \Rightarrow \bigcirc \pi_a^o) \quad (5)$$

The environment liveness assumption (6c) is a fairness condition. It states that, (always) eventually, either the activation of an action will return an outcome, (6a), or that the robot will “change its mind”, (6b). Formula (6a) is a generalization of $\varphi_a^{\text{completion}}$ in [1], whereas formula (6b) is exactly the same as $\varphi_a^{\text{change}}$ in [1], since it consists of activation propositions only.

$$\varphi_a^{\text{return}} = (\pi_a \wedge \bigvee \bigcirc \pi_a^o) \vee (\neg \pi_a \wedge \bigwedge \bigcirc \neg \pi_a^o) \quad (6a)$$

$$\varphi_a^{\text{change}} = (\pi_a \wedge \bigcirc \neg \pi_a) \vee (\neg \pi_a \wedge \bigcirc \pi_a) \quad (6b)$$

$$\Box \Diamond (\varphi_a^{\text{return}} \vee \varphi_a^{\text{change}}) \quad (6c)$$

The system safety requirement (7) demonstrates how a formula encoding the preconditions of an action, $\text{Pre}(a)$, looks like in the activation–outcomes paradigm.

Demonstrate how, given partial specification, we can bring in only those actions and modes that are necessary.

$$\Box (\bigvee_{p \in \text{Pre}(a)} \neg \pi_p^c \Rightarrow \neg \pi_a) \quad (7)$$

where the superscript $c \in \text{Out}(p)$ stands for “completion”.

3) *Control Mode Formulas*: The system safety requirements (8) encode a topological transition relation, such the BDI control mode transition system.

$$\bigwedge_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \Box (\bigcirc \pi_m^c \Rightarrow \bigvee_{m' \in \text{Adj}(m)} \bigcirc \varphi_{m'} \vee \bigcirc \varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{none}}) \quad (8)$$

where $\varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{none}} = \bigwedge_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \neg \pi_m$ being `True` stands for not activating any control mode transitions.

The environment safety assumptions (9) enforce mutual exclusion between the BDI control modes.

This formula requires the \bigcirc operators to synthesize properly (slugs), but intuitively, they shouldn't be there.

$$\bigwedge_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \Box (\bigcirc \pi_m^c \Leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{m' \neq m} \bigcirc \neg \pi_{m'}^c) \quad (9)$$

The environment safety assumptions (10) govern how the active control mode can change in a single time step in response to the activation of a control mode transition.

$$\bigwedge_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \bigwedge_{m' \in \text{Adj}(m)} \Box (\pi_m^c \wedge \varphi_{m'} \Rightarrow (\bigcirc \pi_m^c \vee \bigvee_{o \in \text{Out}(m')} \bigcirc \pi_{m'}^o)) \quad (10)$$

The environment safety assumptions (11) constrain the outcomes control mode transitions.

$$\bigwedge_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(m)} \Box (\neg \pi_m^o \wedge \neg \pi_m \Rightarrow \bigcirc \neg \pi_m^o) \quad (11)$$

The environment safety assumptions (12) dictate that the value of the outcomes of control mode transitions must not change if no transition is being activated, i.e., they must persist.

$$\bigwedge_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(m)} \Box (\pi_m^o \wedge \varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{none}} \Rightarrow \bigcirc \pi_m^o) \quad (12)$$

The environment liveness assumption (13c) is the equivalent of the fairness condition (6c) for control mode propositions.

$$\varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{return}} = \bigvee_{m \in \mathcal{M}} (\varphi_m \wedge \bigvee_{o \in \text{Out}(m)} \bigcirc \pi_m^o) \quad (13a)$$

$$\varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{change}} = \bigvee_{m \in \mathcal{M}} (\varphi_m \wedge \bigcirc \neg \varphi_m) \quad (13b)$$

$$\Box \Diamond (\varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{return}} \vee \varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{change}} \vee \varphi_{\mathcal{M}}^{\text{none}}) \quad (13c)$$

4) *Initial Conditions:* For each action, a , and control mode, m , in the initial conditions, \mathcal{I} , the completion proposition should be `True` in the environment initial conditions (14). All other outcome propositions corresponding to those actions and control modes, as well as all outcome propositions corresponding to any other actions and control modes, should be `False`.

$$\varphi_i^e = \bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \left(\pi_i^c \bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(i) \setminus \{c\}} \neg \pi_i^o \right) \wedge \bigwedge_{j \notin \mathcal{I}} \bigwedge_{o \in \text{Out}(j)} \neg \pi_j^o \quad (14)$$

Activation propositions are `False` regardless of whether that action or control mode is in the initial conditions or not (15). The reason being that, intuitively, if we want something to be an initial condition, then we shouldn't have the resulting controller re-activate it at the beginning of execution.

$$\varphi_i^s = \bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \neg \pi_i \wedge \bigwedge_{j \notin \mathcal{I}} \neg \pi_j \quad (15)$$

5) *Success and Failure:* The system initial condition (16), safety requirements (17), and liveness requirement (18) are used to reason about the satisfaction of the system's goals, \mathcal{G} , in a finite run (as opposed to infinite execution, which is what LTL is defined over). The proposition $\pi_{finished} \in \text{Out}(SM)$ in formula (17d) is one of those “special” propositions.

Technically, all π_o , $\forall o \in \text{Out}(SM)$ should also be persistent, like memory props (17b).

I've been using m to stand both for control modes $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and for memory propositions m_g . Fix.

$$\bigwedge_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \neg m_g \quad (16)$$

$$\bigwedge_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \square \left(\bigcirc \pi_g^c \Rightarrow \bigcirc m_g \right) \quad (17a)$$

$$\bigwedge_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \square \left(m_g \Rightarrow \bigcirc m_g \right) \quad (17b)$$

$$\bigwedge_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \square \left(\neg m_g \wedge \bigcirc \neg \pi_g^c \Rightarrow \bigcirc \neg m_g \right) \quad (17c)$$

$$\square \left(\pi_{finished} \Leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{g \in \mathcal{G}} m_g \right) \quad (17d)$$

$$\square \diamond \bigvee_{o \in \text{Out}(SM)} \pi_o \quad (18)$$

Come up with alternative formulation of (17) that enforces strict ordering on the liveness requirements. It will be optional from the user's point-of-view.

D. Other subsection

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V. ROS IMPLEMENTATION

VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank all other members of Team ViGIR and particularly Alberto Romay and Stefan Kohlbrecher.

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- [1] V. Raman, N. Piterman, and H. Kress-Gazit, “Provably Correct Continuous Control for High-Level Robot Behaviors with Actions of Arbitrary Execution Durations,” in *IEEE Int'l. Conf. on Robotics and Automation*, 2013.