Table 1: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIARIFG	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	(4) C12_	(5) D (5)	(6) DQ	(-) E	(8) E. E.	(9) R	(10) R.
$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{VAIUADLES} \\ \mathbf{T} = 1 \text{ neutral video} \end{array}$	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	-0 035	0.000	PO 0-	0.040*	-0.03	****	-0 051	***920	-0.040
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.020)	(0.048)
T = 2, TE	0.062***	0.003	0.031*	0.017	0.030	-0.048	0.115***	0.034	0.074***	0.009
E G	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.047)
$T=3,\mathrm{TR}$	0.088***	0.012	0.048***	0.005	0.042**	-0.049	0.096***	0.022	0.165***	0.070
Helped to a stranger	(0.016) $0.016$	(0.038) -0.053*	-0.003	(0.040) $-0.035$	(0.020) $0.019$	(0.030) -0.052	(0.021) $0.014$	(0.031) -0.076*	0.035*	(0.049) $-0.049$
	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.038)
$1.T\#c.$ ayuda_extraño		0.110***		0.058		0.076		0.164***		0.142***
		(0.041)		(0.042)		(0.053)		(0.055)		(0.053)
$2.T\#c.$ ayuda_extraño		0.071*		0.015		0.095*		0.097*		0.077
		(0.041)		(0.042)		(0.053)		(0.055)		(0.053)
$3.T\#c.$ ayuda_extraño		0.091**		0.051		0.109**		0.089		0.114**
		(0.042)		(0.043)		(0.054)		(0.056)		(0.054)
4b.T#co.ayuda_extraño		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
i		(0.000)	-	(0.000)	-	(0.000)	-	(0.000)	-	(0.000)
Constant	$0.411^{***}$	0.469***	0.428***	0.454***	0.509***	0.568***	0.357***	0.432***	0.351***	0.422***
	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Observations	3,319	3,319	829	829	830	830	830	830	830	830
R-squared	0.040	0.049	0.011	0.014	0.008	0.013	0.039	0.049	0.078	0.087
Number of ID	830	830	829	829	830	830	830	830	830	830
			Standard *** p<0.0	errors in	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.1	1				

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 2: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_ DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_ DG	(5) D DG	(6) D_ DG	(7) E DG	(8) E_ DG	(9) R DG	(10) R <sub>-</sub> DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055***	0.058	0.022	0.067	0.040*	0.067	0.083***	0.044	0.075***	0.056
T=2, TE	$(0.016) \\ 0.062***$	$(0.055) \\ 0.038$	$(0.016) \\ 0.031*$	$(0.057) \\ 0.021$	(0.021) $0.029$	(0.071) $-0.005$	(0.021) $0.115***$	$(0.074) \\ 0.068$	(0.020) $0.073***$	(0.071) $0.068$
$\Gamma=3,\mathrm{TR}$	(0.016) $0.090***$	(0.054) $0.120**$	(0.017) $0.049***$	$(0.056) \\ 0.079$	(0.021) $0.044**$	(0.070) $0.047$	(0.022) $0.099***$	(0.073) $0.146**$	(0.021) $0.168***$	(0.070) $0.210***$
Helped another person	(0.016) $0.045**$	$(0.050) \\ 0.051$	(0.016) $0.008$	(0.052) $0.027$	(0.020) $0.040$	(0.065) $0.039$	(0.021) $0.067***$	(0.067) $0.063$	(0.020) $0.066***$	(0.064) $0.075$
1.T#c.ayuda_persona	(0.019)	(0.040) $-0.004$	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.053) $-0.030$	(0.026)	$(0.054) \\ 0.042$	(0.025)	(0.052) $0.022$
oncomon opinio off L G		(0.057)		(0.059)		(0.074)		(0.077)		(0.074)
Z. I #C.ayuda_persona		0.027 $(0.057)$		(0.059)		(0.074)		(0.033)		(0.073)
3.T#c.ayuda_persona		-0.035 $(0.052)$		-0.033 $(0.054)$		-0.004 $(0.068)$		-0.054 $(0.071)$		-0.048 $(0.068)$
4b.T#co.ayuda_persona		0.000)		0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.383*** $(0.021)$	0.378***	0.418*** (0.021)	0.400***	0.488***	0.489***	0.308***	0.311*** $(0.052)$	0.320*** (0.027)	(0.050)
Observations	3,319	3,319	829	829	830	830	830	830	830	830
R-squared Number of ID	$0.045 \\ 830$	0.046 $830$	$0.011 \\ 829$	$0.013 \\ 829$	0.009	0.010 $830$	0.046 830	$0.050 \\ 830$	0.082 830	0.083 $830$
			Standarc *** p<0.0	l errors in j 11, ** p<0	Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	. 1				

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 3: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	(4) C12_	(5) D	(6) D	(7) E	(8) E	(9) R	$(10)$ $R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.054***	***8200	0.021	0.050	0.039*	0.042	0.083***	0.115***	0.075***	0.106***
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.039)
T = 2, TE	0.061***	0.105***	0.031*	0.068**	0.028	0.037	0.113***	0.186***	0.071***	0.130***
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.041)
T = 3, $TR$	0.087	0.149***	0.049***	0.127***	0.041**	0.110***	***960.0	0.123***	0.165***	0.239***
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.039)
Congressmen keep what they promise?	-0.008	0.013	-0.000	0.023*	-0.010	0.003	-0.017**	0.003	-0.004	0.022
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.015)
1.T#c.comun_congresistas		-0.015		-0.019		-0.002		-0.021		-0.020
		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.021)		(0.022)		(0.021)
2.T#c.comun_congresistas		-0.029*		-0.024		-0.006		-0.047**		-0.038*
		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)
3.T#c.comun_congresistas		-0.040**		-0.050***		-0.044**		-0.018		-0.048**
		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.022)
$4b.T\#co.comun\_congresistas$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.437***	0.406***	0.425***	0.389***	0.540***	0.520***	0.395***	0.364***	0.387***	0.347***
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.028)
Observations	3,303	3,303	825	825	826	826	826	826	826	826
R-squared	0.040	0.048	0.011	0.022	0.008	0.015	0.044	0.048	0.073	0.080
Number of ID	826	826	825	825	826	826	826	826	826	826
		Stan *** p	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.	in parentheses ><0.05, * p<0.1	$\begin{array}{c} \text{sses} \\ < 0.1 \end{array}$					

 $\overline{Fuente}$ : (Invamer, 2022)

Table 4: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
VARIABLES	All_Actors DG	$rac{ m All\_Actors\_}{ m DG}$	C12 DG	C12_ DG	D DC	D. DG	E DC	E. DG	$_{ m BG}$	R. DG
T=1 neutral video	*** ***	0.015	0.000	0.00	0.038*	-0.018	***6800	0.048	*****	0.010
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.021)	(0.048)
T=2, TE	0.060**	0.015	0.031*	-0.015	0.027	-0.043	0.113***	$0.096^{*}$	0.071***	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.017)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.022)	(0.051)	(0.021)	(0.049)
T=3, TR	***980.0	0.043	0.047***	-0.011	0.040*	-0.003	0.095***	0.061	0.163***	0.122**
	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.047)
Public employee solve problem?	0.002	-0.010	0.005	-0.005	0.000	-0.016	-0.002	-0.010	0.005	-0.010
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.012)
1.T#c.comun_empleado_publico		0.015		0.000		0.023		0.014		0.026
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
2.T#c.comun_empleado_publico		0.018		0.019		0.029		0.007		0.020
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)
3.T#c.comun_empleado_publico		0.018		0.024*		0.017		0.014		0.017
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)
4b.T#co.comun_empleado_publico		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.420***	0.450***	0.413***	0.437***	0.525***	0.564***	0.374***	0.394***	0.369***	0.406***
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Observations	3,307	3,307	826	826	827	827	827	827	827	827
R-squared	0.037	0.040	0.011	0.017	0.000	0.009	0.038	0.039	0.073	0.075
Number of ID	827	827	826	826	827	827	827	827	827	827
		St	Standard errors in parentheses	rs in paren	theses					
		<del>*</del> <del>*</del> *	*** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0.1$	' p<0.05, *	p < 0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 5: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	$(4) $ $C12_{-}$	(5) D	(6) D_	(7)	(8) E E	(9) R	(10) R_
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055	0.060	0.021	0.011	0.040*	0.077	0.083***	0.027	0.076***	0.121**
Ę .	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.016)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.061)	(0.021)	(0.063)	(0.020)	(0.060)
$\Gamma = 2, TE$	$0.062^{***}$ $(0.016)$	$0.076 \\ (0.047)$	$0.031^{*}$ $(0.017)$	0.054 $(0.049)$	0.030 $(0.021)$	0.045 $(0.061)$	$0.115^{***}$ $(0.022)$	$0.127^{**}$ $(0.063)$	$0.074^{***}$ $(0.021)$	0.076 (0.060)
T=3, $TR$	0.087***	0.147***	0.047***	$0.094^{*}$	0.041**	0.121**	0.096**	0.102	0.166***	0.268***
	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.016)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.061)	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.020)	(0.061)
Public schools offer quality education?	0.007	0.013	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.012	0.011*	0.008	0.018***	0.029**
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.012)
$1.T\#c.comun_escuela$		-0.001		0.003		-0.011		0.017		-0.014
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$2.T\#c.comun_escuela$		-0.004		-0.007		-0.004		-0.004		-0.000
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$3.T\#c.comun_escuela$		-0.018		-0.014		-0.024		-0.002		-0.031*
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.017)
4b.T#co.comun_escuela		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.400***	0.381***	0.431***	0.417***	0.517***	0.485***	0.332***	0.342***	0.320***	0.283***
	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.042)
Observations	3,307	3,307	826	826	827	827	827	827	827	827
R-squared	0.041	0.043	0.011	0.013	0.006	0.009	0.042	0.043	0.082	0.087
Number of ID	827	827	826	826	827	827	827	827	827	827
		Star *** I	Standard errors in parentheses $^{**}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.1	in parenth	heses p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 6: Dictator Game with interactions

	$(1)$ All_Actors	$(2)$ All_Actors_	$(3) \\ \text{C12}$	$(4) \\ \text{C12}_{-}$	(5) D	(6) D	(7) E	(8) E_	(9) $R$	$(10) \\ R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG		DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DC
T = 1, neutral video	0.054***	0.018	0.021	-0.064	0.041**	0.001		0.061	0.074***	0.076
	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.054)		(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.054)
T=2, $TE$	0.061***	-0.006	0.030*	-0.015	0.031	-0.041		0.043	0.070***	-0.008
	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.059)	(0.021)	(0.057)
T=3, $TR$	0.089***	**260.0	0.049***	0.038	0.046**	0.034		0.111**	0.165***	0.209***
	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.053)		(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.053)
Armed Forces to contribute to public safety?	0.000	-0.007	0.001	-0.010	0.002	-0.007		-0.013	0.005	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.012)		(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.012)
1.T#c.comun_fuerzas_armadas		0.012		0.028**		0.013		0.007		-0.000
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)
$2.T\#c.comun$ -fuerzas_armadas		0.022		0.015		0.023		0.023		0.025
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$3.T\#c.comun\_fuerzas\_armadas$		-0.003		0.004		0.004		-0.005		-0.014
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)
4b.T#co.comun_fuerzas_armadas		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.424***	0.446***	0.421***	0.456***	0.514***	0.543***		0.409***	0.367***	0.372***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.037)
Observations	3,291	3,291	822	822	823	823	823	823	823	823
R-squared	0.039	0.044	0.011	0.018	0.008	0.010	0.039	0.042	0.075	0.081
Number of ID	823	823	822	822	823	823	823	823	823	823
		Standar *** p<0	Standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0.1$	parentheses. 05, * p<0.	s -1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 7: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	(4) C12_	(5) D	(6) D_	(7) E	(8) E	(9) R	$(10)$ $R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055***	0.082**	0.022	0.038	0.040*	0.049	0.083***	0.105*	0.075***	0.134**
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.054)	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.020)	(0.054)
T=2, TE	0.061***	0.122***	0.031*	0.051	0.029	0.063	0.114**	0.209***	0.071***	0.162***
	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.021)	(0.057)
T=3, $TR$	0.087***	0.172***	0.048***	0.105**	0.041**	0.127**	0.095***	0.198***	0.164***	0.258***
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.020)	(0.055)
Public hospitals offer quality services?	0.010**	0.023**	0.003	0.011	0.009	0.019	0.008	0.025**	0.018***	0.037***
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.012)
$1.T\#c.comun_{-}hospital$		-0.009		-0.005		-0.003		-0.007		-0.019
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
2.T#c.comun_hospital		-0.020		-0.007		-0.011		-0.032*		-0.031*
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.018)
$3.T\#c.comun_{-}hospital$		-0.029**		-0.020		-0.029*		-0.035*		-0.032*
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
4b.T#co.comun_hospital		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.397***	0.356***	0.415***	0.392***	0.498***	0.467***	0.346***	0.294***	0.328***	0.270***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.038)
Observations	3,307	3,307	826	826	827	827	827	827	827	827
R-squared	0.041	0.048	0.011	0.014	0.008	0.013	0.039	0.046	0.081	0.086
Number of ID	827	827	826	826	827	827	827	827	827	827
		Star *** I	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.1	in parenth $<0.05, * p$	eses <0.1					

 $\overline{Fuente}$ : (Invamer, 2022)

Table 8: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All Actors	(2) All Actors	(3) C12	$(4) $ $C12_{-}$	(5) D	(6) D_D	(7) E	(8) E.E.	(9)	$(10)$ $R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055***	0.052	0.022	-0.013	0.040*	0.012	0.083***	0.111**		**260.0
T = 2. TE	(0.016) $0.063***$	(0.037) $0.118***$	(0.016) $0.032*$	(0.039) $0.036$	(0.021) $0.030$	(0.049) $0.055$	(0.021) $0.116***$	(0.050) 0.216***	(0.020) $0.074***$	(0.048) $0.163***$
	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.051)	(0.022)	(0.052)		(0.050)
T=3, TR	0.087*** $(0.016)$	$0.124^{***}$ $(0.036)$	0.048*** $(0.016)$	0.067* (0.037)	0.042** $(0.021)$	0.070 $(0.047)$	0.095*** $(0.021)$	0.123** $(0.049)$	$0.164^{***}$ $(0.020)$	0.235** $(0.047)$
Judges to make fair decisions?	0.009	0.017*	0.006	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.011	0.025*	0.015**	0.033***
1.T#c.comun_jueces	(0.005)	$(0.010) \\ 0.002$	(0.000)	$(0.010) \\ 0.015$	(0.007)	$(0.013) \\ 0.012$	(0.007)	(0.013) $-0.012$	(0.007)	(0.013) $-0.009$
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.019)
$2.T\#c.comun\_jueces$		-0.025		-0.002		-0.011		-0.045**		-0.040*
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.020)
3.T#c.comun_jueces		-0.016		-0.008		-0.012		-0.012		-0.030*
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.018)
4b.T#co.comun_jueces		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
Constant	******	(0.000)	0.41.0	(0.000)	7.7.7.4 ***	(0.000)	*******	(0.000)	***9/60	(0.000)
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Observations	3,303	3,303	825	825	826	826	826	826	826	826
R-squared	0.041	0.045	0.012	0.015	0.007	0.009	0.041	0.046	0.078	0.083
Number of ID	826	826	825	825	826	826	826	826	826	826
		*	Standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0.1$	rors in pare ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 9: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_ DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_ DG	(5) D DG	(6) D DG	(7) DG	(8) E_ DG	(9) R DG	(10) R. DG
T = 1 neutral video	***************************************	0.039	0.021	900-0-	0.040*	0.035	***680	0.017	***220	0.107**
	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.020)	(0.050)
T = 2, TE	0.061	0.037	0.031*	0.021	0.029	0.014	0.113***	0.071	0.072***	0.038
	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.050)
T=3, TR	0.087	0.132***	0.047**	0.073*	0.041**	0.105**	0.095***	0.122**	0.166***	0.226***
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.020)	(0.048)
Police prevent crime?	0.003	0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	0.008	-0.007	-0.013	0.016***	0.021**
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.011)
$1.T\#c.comun_policia$		0.006		0.010		0.002		0.023		-0.011
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)
$2.T\#c.comun_policia$		0.009		0.003		0.005		0.015		0.012
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)
$3.T\#c.comun_policia$		-0.016		-0.009		-0.023		-0.010		-0.022
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.015)
4b.T#co.comun_policia		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.416***	0.414***	0.430***	0.431***	0.512***	0.500***	0.389***	0.406***	0.335***	0.320***
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.034)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.044	0.011	0.013	0.007	0.011	0.040	0.045	0.081	0.087
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standarc *** p<0.0	l errors in 01, ** p<0	Standard errors in parentheses $***$ p<0.01, $**$ p<0.05, $*$ p<0.1	1				

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 10: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	(4) C12_	(5) D	(6) D_	(4)	(8) E_	(9) R	(10) R_
VARIABLES		DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055***	0.065**	0.021	0.050	0.042**	0.047	0.080***	0.096**	0.076***	0.065*
E E	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.040)
$\Gamma = 2, 1E$	$0.059^{***}$	$0.069^{**}$ $(0.031)$	$0.032^{*}$ $(0.017)$	0.029 $(0.032)$	0.028 $(0.021)$	(0.030)	$0.109^{***}$ $(0.022)$	0.126*** $(0.042)$	$0.068^{\mp \mp \mp}$ $(0.021)$	$0.091^{**}$ $(0.040)$
T=3, $TR$	0.088***	0.103***	0.049***	0.049	0.044**	0.066*	0.095***	0.105**	0.166***	0.192***
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.039)
Politicians think of the interests of people like you?	0.002	0.007	0.009	0.012	0.006	0.010	-0.008	-0.003	0.002	0.007
1 T. H. comin rolition	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)
		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.021)		(0.022)		(0.021)
2.T#c.comun_politicos		-0.006		0.003		-0.001		-0.011		-0.015
		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.021)
$3.T\#c.comun_politicos$		-0.009		0.000		-0.013		-0.006		-0.016
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.020)
4b.T#co.comun_politicos		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
-	÷	(0.000)	÷	(0.000)	÷	(0.000)	÷	(0.000)	÷ ÷ 1	(0.000)
Constant	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Observations	3,279	3,279	819	819	820	820	820	820	820	820
R-squared	0.038	0.039	0.014	0.016	0.008	0.008	0.038	0.039	0.075	0.077
Number of ID	820	820	819	819	820	820	820	820	820	820
		Standard e: *** p<0.01,	Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.0	entheses, $^*$ p<0.1						

 $\overline{F}uente$ : (Invamer, 2022)

Table 11: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_ DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_ DG	(5) D DG	(6) D DG	(7) DG	(8) E_ DG	(9) R DG	(10) R <sub>-</sub> DG
T = 1. neutral video	0.054**	0.043**	0.021	0.017	0.039*	0.029	0.082***	0.071***	0.074***	0.055**
T — 3 TE	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.022)
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)
T=3, TR	0.087***	0.073***	0.048**	0.046**	0.042**	0.021	0.095***	0.084**	0.164***	0.143**
Volunteered time in the last month?	$(0.016) \\ 0.018$	(0.017) $-0.032$	$(0.016) \\ 0.005$	(0.018) $-0.009$	$(0.020) \\ 0.008$	(0.022) -0.059	$(0.021) \\ 0.022$	(0.023) $-0.024$	$(0.020) \\ 0.036*$	(0.022) $-0.045$
	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.039)
$1.T\#c.tiempo\_voluntario$		0.066		0.025		0.067		0.066		0.112**
9 T 1/2 + 2 mm : 1 - 1/2 to 1		(0.042)		(0.044)		(0.054)		(0.057)		(0.054)
$2.1 \pm 0.010$		(0.044)		(0.046)		(0.057)		(0.060)		(0.057)
$3.T\#c.tiempo\_voluntario$		0.081*		0.013		0.120*		0.070		0.130**
		(0.042)		(0.044)		(0.055)		(0.057)		(0.054)
$4 \mathrm{b.T} \# \mathrm{co.tiempo\_voluntario}$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
Constant	0.422***	(0.000)	0.424***	(0.000) $0.426***$	0.523***	(0.000) $0.534***$	0.365***	0.373***	0.375***	0.387**
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	3,319	3,319	829	829	830	830	830	830	830	830
R-squared	0.040	0.045	0.011	0.011	0.007	0.012	0.040	0.042	0.078	0.085
Number of ID	830	830	829	829	830	830	830	830	830	830
		Sta ***	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.1	s in parent] p<0.05, * ]	heses $p < 0.1$					

 $\overline{Fuente}$ : (Invamer, 2022)

Table 12: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
	$All\_Actors$	$All_Actors_{\widetilde{a}}$	C12	C12_	Оζ	_ D_	田 (	丏	곱 ;	R .
VARIABLES	DC	DC	DC	DC	DC	DC	DC	DC	DC	DC
T = 1, neutral video	0.054***	0.066	0.022	0.034	0.040*	0.000	0.083***	0.142**	0.075***	*060.0
	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.021)	(0.055)	(0.020)	(0.053)
T = 2, TE	0.061***	0.066	0.031*	0.013	0.029	0.037	0.114***	0.115**	0.072***	0.100*
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.017)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.055)	(0.022)	(0.057)	(0.021)	(0.055)
T = 3, $TR$	0.086***	0.087	0.047***	0.038	0.040**	0.022	0.094***	0.144**	0.164***	0.146***
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.020)	(0.055)
Trust in Police	0.010**	0.011	0.008	0.007	0.009	0.004	0.016**	0.026**	0.006	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.012)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-1-n}$		-0.004		-0.005		0.014		-0.021		-0.005
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-1.n}$		-0.002		0.007		-0.003		-0.000		-0.010
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-1.n}$		-0.000		0.003		0.007		-0.017		0.006
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_1_n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.397***	0.393***	0.403***	0.406***	0.500***	0.513***	0.323***	0.295***	0.364***	0.357***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.038)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.042	0.042	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.010	0.045	0.048	0.074	0.075
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard errors in parentheses	rors in par	entheses					
		*	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.	** p<0.05	* $p < 0.1$					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 13: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	$(4) \\ \text{C12}_{\_}$	(5) D	(6) D	(7) E	(8) E	$\begin{pmatrix} 9 \\ R \end{pmatrix}$	$(10)$ $R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055	0.064**	0.021	*090.0	0.040*	0.036	0.083***	0.100**	0.075***	0.061
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.040)
T=2, $TE$	0.061***	0.074**	0.031*	0.054*	0.029	0.024	0.114**	0.130***	0.072***	0.090**
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.041)
$\mathrm{T}=3,\mathrm{TR}$	0.087***	$0.103^{***}$	0.048***	0.072**	0.041**	090.0	0.095***	0.103**	$0.164^{***}$	0.182***
Trust in Mayoralty	(0.016) $-0.001$	$(0.030) \\ 0.004$	(0.016) $0.001$	$(0.031) \\ 0.011$	$(0.021) \\ 0.002$	(0.039) $0.003$	(0.021) $-0.000$	$(0.041) \\ 0.005$	(0.020) $-0.006$	(0.039) $-0.003$
,	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(900.0)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-2.n}$		-0.004		-0.018		0.002		-0.008		0.006
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{2.n}$		-0.006		-0.011		0.002		-0.008		-0.008
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{2.n}$		-0.008		-0.011		-0.009		-0.003		-0.009
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_2.n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.426***	0.417***	0.422***	0.401***	0.521***	0.518***	0.369***	0.359***	0.392***	0.387***
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.027)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.038	0.011	0.013	0.006	0.007	0.038	0.039	0.074	0.075
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard e	Standard errors in parentheses	entheses					
		*	** p<0.01,	*** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0.1$	, * p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 14: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
VARIABLES	$rac{ m All\_Actors}{ m DG}$	All_Actors_ DG	C12 DG	C12_ DG	D DC	D. DG	DG DG	E- DG	$_{ m DG}$	$ m R_{-}$
T = 1 neutral video	0.055**	0.083**	0.091	**6200	0.040*	0.110**	***6800	0.063	***9200	0.081*
	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.046)	(0.020)	(0.044)
T=2, TE	0.061***	0.080**	0.031*	0.074**	0.029	0.079*	0.114**	0.079*	0.071***	0.087*
	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.045)
T=3, TR	0.087***	0.112***	0.047***	0.087**	0.041**	0.106**	0.095***	0.062	0.165***	0.192***
	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.046)	(0.020)	(0.044)
Trust in Armed Forces	-0.002	0.005	0.001	0.014*	-0.004	0.014	0.002	-0.006	-0.009	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.010)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_3\_n$		-0.011		-0.022*		-0.027*		0.008		-0.002
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_3\_n$		-0.008		-0.017		-0.020		0.014		-0.006
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_3\_n$		-0.010		-0.015		-0.025*		0.013		-0.011
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_3.n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.430***	0.413***	0.422***	0.389***	0.534***	0.489***	0.362***	0.383***	0.403***	0.391***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.039	0.011	0.015	0.007	0.012	0.038	0.039	0.076	0.076
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard errors in parentheses	rors in par	entheses					
		*	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.	** p<0.05	* p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 15: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIARIES	All_Actors	All_Actors_	C12	$\stackrel{ ext{C12}}{ ext{C12}}$	) D Z	D D	E E	E C	) R C	R.
-	5 % 6 %	** *** ***	50	50	50	,	5 %	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	* C	5 %
1 = 1, lieutral video	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.021)	(0.058)
T=2, TE	0.060**	0.095*	0.030*	0.043	0.028	0.085	0.113***	$0.116^{*}$	0.070***	0.136**
	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.017)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.022)	(0.062)	(0.021)	(0.060)
T = 3, $TR$	0.087***	0.131***	0.047***	0.077	0.041**	0.086	0.095***	0.136**	0.164***	0.224***
	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.061)	(0.021)	(0.063)	(0.020)	(0.061)
Trust in Colombian migration	-0.005	0.007	-0.004	0.005	-0.003	0.013	-0.006	0.003	-0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.013)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_4\_n$		-0.025*		-0.022		-0.031*		-0.019		-0.026
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_4.n$		-0.011		-0.004		-0.018		-0.001		-0.021
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.018)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_4_n$		-0.014		-0.009		-0.014		-0.013		-0.019
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.018)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_4.n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.441***	0.401***	0.439***	0.410***	0.534***	0.483***	0.387***	$0.361^{***}$	0.405***	0.352***
	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.043)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.039	0.043	0.011	0.015	0.007	0.010	0.039	0.041	0.074	0.077
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
		*	$^{**}$ p<0.01,	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.1	$^* \text{ p} < 0.1$					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 16: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(-)	(8)	(6)	(10)
	$All\_Actors$	All_Actors_	C12	$C12_{-}$	Ω	D_	闰	可	$\mathbb{R}$	$\mathbb{R}^{-}$
VARIABLES	DC	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
	;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;	: !	6	(		1	1000	; () ()		1
T = 1, neutral video	0.055***	0.147*	0.022	0.053	0.040*	0.112	0.083***	0.200*	0.076***	0.218**
	(0.016)	(0.085)	(0.016)	(0.088)	(0.021)	(0.111)	(0.021)	(0.115)	(0.020)	(0.110)
T=2, TE	0.062***	0.088	0.032*	0.015	0.029	0.017	0.114***	0.132	0.073***	0.181*
	(0.016)	(0.083)	(0.017)	(0.087)	(0.021)	(0.109)	(0.022)	(0.113)	(0.021)	(0.108)
T = 3, $TR$	0.088**	0.170**	0.049***	0.102	0.042**	0.022	***960.0	0.232**	0.166***	0.319***
	(0.016)	(0.080)	(0.016)	(0.083)	(0.021)	(0.105)	(0.021)	(0.109)	(0.020)	(0.104)
Trust in JEP	0.011	0.026	0.011	0.017	0.008	0.010	0.006	0.027	0.019*	0.050**
	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.023)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_5_n$		-0.028		-0.009		-0.022		-0.036		-0.043
		(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.033)		(0.034)		(0.033)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_5_n$		-0.007		900.0		0.004		-0.005		-0.033
		(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.033)		(0.034)		(0.032)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_5_n$		-0.025		-0.017		0.006		-0.042		-0.047
		(0.024)		(0.025)		(0.032)		(0.033)		(0.031)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_{-5.n}$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.388***	0.337***	0.388**	0.370***	0.497***	0.490***	0.348***	0.279***	0.317***	0.216***
	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.032)	(0.061)	(0.041)	(0.077)	(0.042)	(0.080)	(0.040)	(0.077)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.040	0.042	0.012	0.013	0.007	0.008	0.038	0.041	0.076	0.079
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard errors in parentheses	rors in par	entheses					
		*	*** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0$ .	$^{**}$ p<0.05	* p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 17: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_ DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_ DG	(5) D DG	(6) D DG	(7) E	(8) E_ DG	(9) R DG	(10) R_ DG
T = 1. neutral video	0.054**	0.154**	0.000	0.072	0.040*	0.086	***************************************	***666 0	***220	***6660
	(0.016)	(0.062)	(0.016)	(0.064)	(0.021)	(0.081)	(0.021)	(0.084)	(0.021)	(0.080)
$\Gamma=2, { m TE}$	0.061*** $(0.016)$	$0.130** \\ (0.061)$	0.031* $(0.017)$	0.102 $(0.063)$	0.028 $(0.021)$	0.088 $(0.079)$	0.113*** $(0.022)$	0.177** $(0.082)$	0.072*** $(0.021)$	$0.152* \\ (0.079)$
T=3, $TR$	***980.0	0.108*	0.048***	0.015	0.040*	0.016	0.094***	0.189**	0.164**	0.208***
Trust in Comunication media	(0.016) $-0.002$	$(0.059) \\ 0.012$	$(0.016) \\ 0.003$	$(0.062) \\ 0.009$	(0.021) $-0.005$	$(0.077) \\ 0.001$	(0.021) $-0.008$	$(0.080) \\ 0.015$	$(0.020) \\ 0.003$	$(0.077) \\ 0.023$
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.016)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_6\_n$		-0.030*		-0.015		-0.014		-0.042*		-0.047**
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_6.n$		(0.018) -0.021		(0.019) $-0.022$		(0.023) $-0.018$		(0.024) $-0.019$		(0.023) -0.024
· ·		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.023)		(0.024)		(0.023)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_6_n$		-0.006		0.010		0.008		-0.028		-0.013
E		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.023)		(0.024)		(0.023)
4b.1 #co.1rustinstitVEC_6.n		0.000)		0.000)		0.000		0.000)		0.000
Constant	0.430***	0.384***	0.415***	0.394***	0.541***	0.521***	0.394***	0.319***	0.372***	0.302***
	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.057)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.042	0.011	0.015	0.007	0.009	0.039	0.043	0.073	0.078
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
		<del>x</del>	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.	rors in par ** p<0.05,	$^*$ p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 18: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
	$ m All\_Actors$	$All_Actors$	C12	$C12_{-}$	Ω	D_	闰	띡	ଯ	$R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DC	DC	DC	DC	DG	DG	DG	DC	DC	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.054***	**0200	0.020	0.064*	0.038*	0.066	0.084***	0.090**	0.074***	0.059
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.041)
T = 2, TE	0.060***	0.082**	0.030*	0.064*	0.027	0.058	0.114***	0.123***	0.071***	0.080*
	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.044)
T=3, $TR$	0.087***	0.087***	0.047***	0.040	0.041**	0.058	0.096***	0.080*	0.164***	0.170***
	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.020)	(0.043)
Trust in Public Schools	-0.002	0.002	-0.004	0.003	-0.005	0.002	0.003	0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.010)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_7\_n$		-0.007		-0.019		-0.012		-0.003		0.007
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_7\_n$		-0.009		-0.014		-0.013		-0.004		-0.004
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_7_n$		-0.000		0.003		-0.007		0.000		-0.002
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_7_n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.429***	0.420***	0.435***	0.417***	0.537***	0.518***	0.361***	0.361***	0.384***	0.385***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.039	0.011	0.017	0.007	0.008	0.038	0.039	0.073	0.073
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard errors in parentheses	rors in par	entheses					
		*	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.	** p<0.05	* p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 19: Dictator Game with interactions

			,						,	
	$\begin{array}{c} (1) \\ \text{All Actors} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (2) \\ A & A \\ \end{array}$	(3) (12)	(4) (13)	<u>(v)</u>	(9) (-	<u>(</u> -	® ±	(6) B	(10)B
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DC	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T - 1 " marten landon	~ ** **	0.107	6600	7700	*0700	0 178	*******	0.198	********	0.166
I — I, incurial video	(0.016)	(0.094)	(0.016)	(0.08)	(0.021)	(0.122)	(0.021)	(0.127)	(0.021)	(0.122)
T=2, TE	0.062***	0.012	0.031*	0.026	0.029	-0.047	0.115***	0.014	0.073***	0.050
	(0.016)	(0.090)	(0.017)	(0.093)	(0.021)	(0.116)	(0.022)	(0.121)	(0.021)	(0.116)
T=3, $TR$	0.087***	-0.001	0.048**	-0.015	0.041**	-0.132	0.096***	-0.027	0.165***	0.162
	(0.016)	(0.092)	(0.016)	(0.096)	(0.021)	(0.120)	(0.021)	(0.124)	(0.020)	(0.119)
Trust in Health sector	0.006	-0.001	0.003	-0.007	-0.001	-0.010	0.008	-0.006	0.012	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.024)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_8_n$		-0.017		0.021		-0.043		-0.014		-0.028
		(0.029)		(0.030)		(0.037)		(0.039)		(0.037)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_8\_n$		0.015		0.001		0.024		0.031		0.007
		(0.027)		(0.029)		(0.036)		(0.037)		(0.036)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_8_n$		0.027		0.019		0.054		0.038		0.001
		(0.028)		(0.029)		(0.036)		(0.038)		(0.036)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_8.n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.407***	0.429***	0.416***	0.447***	0.526***	0.557***	0.344***	0.390***	0.342***	0.329***
	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.065)	(0.045)	(0.081)	(0.047)	(0.085)	(0.045)	(0.081)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.041	0.011	0.012	0.006	0.014	0.039	0.041	0.074	0.075
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard errors in parentheses	rors in par	entheses					
		*	*** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0$ .	$^{**}$ p<0.05	* p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 20: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
	All_Actors	$All\_Actors\_$	C12	$C12_{-}$	О	D	田	回	R	R-
VARIABLES	DC	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T=1 neutral video	***	0200	0.00	-0.036	*0000	-0 005	***************************************	0.166**	*****	
	(0.016)	(0.055)	(0.016)	(0.057)	(0.021)	(0.072)	(0.021)	(0.075)	(0.020)	(0.072)
$\Gamma=2, \mathrm{TE}$	0.061***	$\stackrel{'}{0.062}$	0.031*	0.026	0.029	0.027	0.115***	0.111	0.072***	0.085
	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.017)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.069)	(0.022)	(0.072)	(0.021)	(0.069)
T=3, $TR$	0.087	0.096*	0.048**	0.015	0.041**	0.065	0.095	0.165**	0.164**	0.142**
	(0.016)	(0.055)	(0.016)	(0.057)	(0.021)	(0.071)	(0.021)	(0.074)	(0.020)	(0.071)
Trust in Public employees	0.005	0.007	-0.001	-0.008	-0.001	-0.003	0.012	0.023	0.011	0.017
	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.015)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-9-n}$		-0.005		0.018		0.014		-0.027		-0.026
		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.022)		(0.023)		(0.022)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_9_n$		-0.000		0.001		0.001		0.002		-0.004
		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.021)		(0.022)		(0.021)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-9.n}$		-0.003		0.010		-0.008		-0.022		0.007
		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.022)		(0.023)		(0.022)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_{-9.n}$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.409***	0.403***	0.427***	0.449***	0.528***	0.533***	0.333***	0.298**	0.346***	0.329***
	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.048)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.039	0.039	0.011	0.012	0.006	0.007	0.041	0.043	0.075	0.078
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard errors in parentheses	rors in par	entheses					
		*	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.	$^{**}$ p<0.05	* p<0.1					

 $\overline{Fuente}$ : (Invamer, 2022)

Table 21: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1) All_Actors	(2) All_Actors_	(3) C12	(4) C12_	(5) D	(6) D_	(1) E	(8) E.	(9) R	$\begin{pmatrix} 10 \\ R \end{pmatrix}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DC	DC	DG	DG	DC	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.054***	-0.026	0.021	-0.062	0.041**	-0.082	0.082***	0.017	0.075***	0.026
	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.016)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.069)	(0.021)	(0.072)	(0.021)	(0.069)
$\Gamma=2, \mathrm{TE}$	$0.061^{***}$ (0.016)	$0.028 \\ (0.052)$	0.031* $(0.017)$	0.014 $(0.054)$	0.028 $(0.021)$	-0.043 (0.068)	$0.114^{***}$ $(0.022)$	0.094 $(0.071)$	$0.071^{***}$ $(0.021)$	0.046 $(0.068)$
T=3, TR	0.087***	0.019	0.048***	-0.023	0.040*	-0.092	***960.0	0.095	0.164***	0.099
	(0.016)	(0.050)	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.065)	(0.021)	(0.068)	(0.020)	(0.065)
Trust in Congress	-0.000	-0.015	0.002	-0.012	-0.009	-0.035**	0.006	-0.001	0.000	-0.011
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.014)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_10\_n$		0.025		0.026		0.038*		0.020		0.015
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.020)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_10_n$		0.010		0.005		0.022		900.0		0.008
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_10_n$		0.021		0.022		0.042**		0.000		0.021
		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.020)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC\_10\_n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
}	1000	(0.000)	1000	(0.000)	1	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.426***	$0.471^{***}$	$0.419^{***}$	$0.462^{***}$	0.551***	$0.634^{***}$	$0.351^{***}$	0.371***	0.380***	0.415***
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.027)	(0.048)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.038	0.041	0.011	0.015	0.008	0.015	0.039	0.040	0.073	0.074
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
		*	Standard errors in parentheses $***$ p<0.01, $**$ p<0.05, $*$ p<0.1	rors in pare ** p<0.05,	* p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 22: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
	All_Actors	All_Actors_	C12	$C12_{-}$	О	D	田	田	R	$R_{-}$
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055***	0.044	0.022	0.018	0.040*	-0.010	0.083***	0.095*	0.075***	0.075
	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.046)
T=2, TE	0.061***	0.057	0.031*	0.041	0.029	0.005	0.114***	0.127**	0.071***	0.056
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.022)	(0.050)	(0.021)	(0.048)
T = 3, $TR$	0.087***	0.095***	0.048***	0.057	0.041**	0.042	0.095***	0.123**	0.164***	0.161***
	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.047)
Trust in Judicial system	-0.005	-0.006	-0.004	-0.003	-0.006	-0.013	0.001	0.005	-0.010*	-0.012
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.011)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_11\_n$		0.004		0.001		0.019		-0.005		0.000
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)
$2.\mathrm{T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_11\_n}$		0.001		-0.004		0.000		-0.005		0.006
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_11\_n$		-0.003		-0.003		-0.000		-0.010		0.001
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.016)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_11_n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.438***	0.439***	0.437***	0.433***	0.540***	0.559***	0.367***	0.354***	0.407***	0.411***
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.039	0.040	0.012	0.012	0.008	0.010	0.038	0.039	0.076	0.076
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
		*	Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.		entheses * p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 23: Dictator Game with interactions

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_ DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_ DG	(5) D DG	(6) D DG	(4) DG	(8) E_ DG	(9) R DG	(10) R_ DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.054***	**960.0	0.021	0.058	0.040*	0.065	0.082***	0.122**	0.075***	0.138**
T=2, TE	(0.016) $0.061***$	(0.043) $0.107**$	(0.016) $0.031*$	(0.045) $0.095**$	(0.021) $0.029$	(0.057) $0.046$	(0.021) $0.114***$	(0.058) $0.148**$	(0.021) $0.071***$	(0.056) $0.140**$
T=3, TR	$(0.016) \\ 0.087*** \\ 0.016)$	(0.044) $0.181***$	$(0.017) \\ 0.048** \\ (0.016)$	(0.046) $0.112**$	(0.021) $0.041**$	$(0.057) \\ 0.075 \\ 0.076$	$(0.022) \\ 0.096** $	$(0.059) \\ 0.247*** \\ 0.050$	$(0.021) \\ 0.164** \\ (0.050)$	$(0.057) \ 0.292*** \ (0.055)$
Trust in Private companys	$\begin{pmatrix} 0.010 \\ 0.003 \\ 0.005 \end{pmatrix}$	$0.018^{*}$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0.010 \\ 0.004 \\ 0.005 \end{pmatrix}$	0.044 $0.018*$ $0.010$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0.021 \\ 0.001 \\ 0.006 \end{pmatrix}$	0.036 $0.007$ $0.012$	0.021 $0.006$	0.025**	0.020 $0.001$ $0.006$	$0.022* \\ 0.022* \\ 0.012)$
1.T#c.TrustinstitVEC.12.n		(0.003) $(0.014)$		-0.012		-0.008		-0.013		-0.021
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_12.n$		(0.015) $(0.013)$		-0.021		(0.018)		(0.013) $(0.013)$		(0.017) $(0.017)$
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_12.n$		-0.031**		-0.021		-0.011		-0.050***		-0.042**
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC\_12\_n$		0.000		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.415*** $(0.018)$	0.370*** $(0.030)$	0.411*** (0.019)	0.371*** $(0.031)$	0.522*** $(0.024)$	0.503*** $(0.039)$	0.349*** (0.024)	0.292*** $(0.041)$	0.378***	0.313*** $(0.039)$
Observations R-squared	$3,311 \\ 0.038 \\ 8.28$	3,311 $0.045$	827 0.012	827 0.015	828 0.006	828	828 0.039	828 0.050	828 0.073	828 0.080
Manager of the			Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.1	rors in par ** p<0.05	entheses * p<0.1		040			

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 24: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)
	$\overline{\mathrm{All}}$ Actors	$All_Actors$	C12	$C12_{-}$	<u> </u>	D_	<u>)</u> E1	) H	R	_ R
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.055	0.082**	0.022	0.025	0.040**	0.055	0.084***	0.153***	0.075	0.100*
	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.052)
T=2, $TE$	0.060***	0.006	0.031*	-0.000	0.028	-0.003	0.112***	0.060	0.071***	-0.030
	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.054)
T = 3, $TR$	0.087***	0.075*	0.048***	0.030	0.041**	0.014	0.096***	0.126**	0.164***	0.134***
	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.052)
Trust in Politicians	-0.018***	-0.021**	-0.008	-0.012	-0.019***	-0.023*	-0.041***	-0.036***	-0.004	-0.012
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.012)
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_{-13.n}$		-0.010		-0.001		-0.005		-0.025		-0.009
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$2.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_13.n$		0.020		0.011		0.012		0.019		0.038**
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.018)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC_13.n$		0.004		0.007		0.010		-0.011		0.011
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.017)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_{13.n}$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.474***	0.482***	0.448***	0.458***	0.576***	0.586***	0.480***	0.466***	0.390***	0.414***
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.054	0.059	0.014	0.015	0.017	0.019	0.083	0.090	0.073	0.081
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
			Standard e	Standard errors in parentheses	rentheses					
			*** p<0.01	*** $p<0.01$ , ** $p<0.05$ , * $p<0.1$	i, * p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)

Table 25: Dictator Game with interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(-)	(8) F	(6)	(10)
VARIABLES	DG	DG	DG	DG	DC	DG	DG	DG	DG	DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.052***	0.118**	0.019	0.081	0.037*	0.138**	***080.0	0.145**	0.074***	0.111
	(0.016)	(0.054)	(0.016)	(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.070)	(0.021)	(0.073)	(0.021)	(0.070)
$\mathrm{T}=2,\mathrm{TE}$	$0.061^{***}$	0.063	0.031*	0.035	0.029	-0.039	$0.114^{***}$	0.116*	0.071***	$0.140^{**}$
T = 3, $TR$	0.087***	(0.032) $0.119**$	0.047***	(0.034) $0.052$	0.041**	(0.068) $0.011$	(0.022) $0.095***$	(0.070) $0.189***$	(0.021) $0.164***$	(0.000) $0.227***$
:	(0.016)	(0.051)	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.066)	(0.021)	(0.069)	(0.020)	(0.066)
Trust in National Goverment	$0.013^{**}$ $(0.006)$	0.021** $(0.010)$	0.013** $(0.006)$	$0.018^{*}$ $(0.011)$	$0.017^{**}$ $(0.007)$	0.016 $(0.014)$	$0.018^{**}$ $(0.007)$	0.030** $(0.014)$	0.005 $(0.007)$	0.018 $(0.014)$
$1.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_14\_n$		-0.020		-0.019		-0.030		-0.020		-0.012
3 T # 2 Thurstingtingt 11 2		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.020)
2.1 #C.11 useimsele v EC-14-11		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.020)
$3.T\#c.TrustinstitVEC\_14\_n$		-0.010		-0.002		0.009		-0.029		-0.020
		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)
$4b.T\#co.TrustinstitVEC_14_n$		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000
Constant	0.382***	$(0.000) \ 0.359***$	0.382***	(0.000) $0.367***$	0.471***	(0.000) $0.473***$	0.312***	(0.000) $0.273***$	0.363***	(0.000) $0.322***$
	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.046)
Observations	3,311	3,311	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
R-squared	0.044	0.047	0.017	0.019	0.013	0.020	0.045	0.048	0.073	0.075
Number of ID	828	828	827	827	828	828	828	828	828	828
		₩.	Standard errors in parentheses $^{***}$ p<0.01, $^{**}$ p<0.05, $^{*}$ p<0.	rors in pare ** p<0.05,	entheses $^*$ p<0.1					

Fuente: (Invamer, 2022)