Overcoming empathy failures to improve prosociality

Experimental evidence from Colombia

Angela Fonseca Galvis[1] Santiago Alonso[1] Sandra Polanía-Reyes[2]
Andrés Casas[1] Emile Bruneau[3]

[1]Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, [2]Universidad de Navarra, [3]University of Pennsylvania

Fedesarrollo

April 14, 2023

Prosocial behavior as a *desired* effect

1. Theory shows it as key for political and economic development
   - reduces social inefficiency in the presence of incomplete contracts, Arrow 1971, Becker 1976, Akerlof 1984
   - solves collective action problems, Ostrom 1990
   - determines integration policies' success 3ie 2009, J-PAL 2013

Prosocial behavior as a *desired* effect

1. Theory shows it as key for political and economic development
   - reduces social inefficiency in the presence of incomplete contracts, Arrow 1971, Becker 1976, Akerlof 1984
   - solves collective action problems, Ostrom 1990
   - determines integration policies' success 3ie 2009, J-PAL 2013
2. Practice finds it highly valuable
   - determines economic behavior
   - improves efficiency, Heckman 2004, Miguel et al. 2012

Prosocial behavior as a *desired* effect

1. Theory shows it as key for political and economic development
   - reduces social inefficiency in the presence of incomplete contracts, Arrow 1971, Becker 1976, Akerlof 1984
   - solves collective action problems, Ostrom 1990
   - determines integration policies' success 3ie 2009, J-PAL 2013
2. Practice finds it highly valuable
   - determines economic behavior
   - improves efficiency, Heckman 2004, Miguel et al. 2012
3. Empathy among citizens is a prime mechanism Borman et al 2001, Jolliffle & Farrington 2004, Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018

Example: Intra-group conflict and media interventions

- Communities in Colombia face an inflow of *non-desirable* individuals
  - Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) ex-combatants
  - Venezuelan migrants - V Migrants Gallump 2019

Example: Intra-group conflict and media interventions

- Communities in Colombia face an inflow of *non-desirable* individuals
  - Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) ex-combatants
  - Venezuelan migrants - V Migrants Gallump 2019

- There is descriptive experimental evidence
  - social psychology measures **alone** with ex combatants, ethnic groups in Europe Bruneau et al 2015, 2017 and migrants in US Moore-Berg et al 2021
  - Prosociality **alone** towards migrants in Europe
  - Prosociality within groups, exFarc, in Afghanistan Condra & Linardi 2019

Example: Intra-group conflict and media interventions

- Communities in Colombia face an inflow of *non-desirable* individuals
  - Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) ex-combatants
  - Venezuelan migrants - V Migrants Gallump 2019

- There is descriptive experimental evidence
  - social psychology measures **alone** with ex combatants, ethnic groups in Europe Bruneau et al 2015, 2017 and migrants in US Moore-Berg et al 2021
  - Prosociality **alone** towards migrants in Europe
  - Prosociality within groups, exFarc, in Afghanistan Condra & Linardi 2019

- Little is known in the about how to promote pro-sociality towards these groups.
  - Info and prosociality towards refugees in Germany Grimalda et al 2018, in Uruguay Gandelman & Lamé 2021
  - Info/labels/forcing interaction and empathy in Israel and Palestina
  - Media/Edutainment interventions towards exFarc Bruneau et al 2022, migrants Rodriguez Chatruc & Rozo 2021

From Political Economy

- What determines preferences for redistribution?

From Political Economy

- What determines preferences for redistribution?
  - Income maximization

From Political Economy

- What determines preferences for redistribution?
  - Income maximization
    - ★ Position on the income distribution Meltzer & Richard 1981

From Political Economy

- What determines preferences for redistribution?
  - Income maximization
    - ★ Position on the income distribution Meltzer & Richard 1981
    - ★ Perceptions about own position on income distribution Cruces et al 2013

From Political Economy

- What determines preferences for redistribution?
  - Income maximization
    - ★ Position on the income distribution Meltzer & Richard 1981
    - ★ Perceptions about own position on income distribution Cruces et al 2013
  - Social insurance
    - ★ Risk aversion Gärtner et al
  - Social preferences
    - ★ Ideology Fehr et al 2020, Alesina La Ferrara 2018
    - ★ Presence of migrants, diversity Alesina et al 2020

From Political Economy

- What determines preferences for redistribution?
  - Income maximization
    - ★ Position on the income distribution Meltzer & Richard 1981
    - ★ Perceptions about own position on income distribution Cruces et al 2013
  - Social insurance
    - ★ Risk aversion Gärtner et al
  - Social preferences
    - ★ Ideology Fehr et al 2020, Alesina La Ferrara 2018
    - ★ Presence of migrants, diversity Alesina et al 2020
- Why is it important?
  - Influences the support for redistributive policies and support for specific groups

A multidisciplinary approach to human capital investments

- **Our mechanism**: A Social psychologically informed media intervention - tailor-made design Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018, Bruneau et al. 2022

A multidisciplinary approach to human capital investments

- **Our mechanism**: A Social psychologically informed media intervention - tailor-made design Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018, Bruneau et al. 2022
- Aiming to improve empathy *(social psychology & neuroscience)* towards Venezuelan migrants and exFarc via information and learning

A multidisciplinary approach to human capital investments

- **Our mechanism**: A Social psychologically informed media intervention - tailor-made design Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018, Bruneau et al. 2022
- Aiming to improve empathy *(social psychology & neuroscience)* towards Venezuelan migrants and exFarc via information and learning
- A 5-minute media intervention from interviews conducted with ...
  - exFarc in a Colombian demobilization camp and non-FARC Colombians in neighbouring communities Bruneau et al. 2022
  - Venezuelan migrants in a slum Bogota and Colombians

A multidisciplinary approach to human capital investments

- **Our mechanism**: A Social psychologically informed media intervention - tailor-made design Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018, Bruneau et al. 2022
- Aiming to improve empathy *(social psychology & neuroscience)* towards Venezuelan migrants and exFarc via information and learning
- A 5-minute media intervention from interviews conducted with ...
  - exFarc in a Colombian demobilization camp and non-FARC Colombians in neighbouring communities Bruneau et al. 2022
  - Venezuelan migrants in a slum Bogota and Colombians
- on prosociality *(economics)* and social biases *(cognitive science)*
  - lab-in-the-field economic experiment
  - underlying cognitive processing behind pro-social judgements with movement tracking Song & Nakayama 2009, Freeman et al 2011: velocity, curvature, postitions, changes of mind...

Research significance

Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide UNHCR, 2022

Research significance

Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide UNHCR, 2022

A median Colombian vs. a Venezuelan migrant, an exFarc from a representative sample of **839 participants** in the main Colombian regions

Research significance

Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide UNHCR, 2022

A median Colombian vs. a Venezuelan migrant, an exFarc from a representative sample of **839 participants** in the main Colombian regions

1. Using Internally Displaced People (IDP) and low income Colombians as comparison groups

Research significance

Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide UNHCR, 2022

A median Colombian vs. a Venezuelan migrant, an exFarc from a representative sample of **839 participants** in the main Colombian regions

1. Using Internally Displaced People (IDP) and low income Colombians as comparison groups
2. Measure empathy AND prosociality (i.e. Altruism, Trust and preferences for redistribution)

Research significance

Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide UNHCR, 2022

A median Colombian vs. a Venezuelan migrant, an exFarc from a representative sample of **839 participants** in the main Colombian regions

1. Using Internally Displaced People (IDP) and low income Colombians as comparison groups
2. Measure empathy AND prosociality (i.e. Altruism, Trust and preferences for redistribution)
3. Effect of a Social psychologically informed media intervention on BOTH empathy and prosociality + social biases

Research significance

Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide UNHCR, 2022
A median Colombian vs. a Venezuelan migrant, an exFarc from a representative sample of **839 participants** in the main Colombian regions

1. Using Internally Displaced People (IDP) and low income Colombians as comparison groups
2. Measure empathy AND prosociality (i.e. Altruism, Trust and preferences for redistribution)
3. Effect of a Social psychologically informed media intervention on BOTH empathy and prosociality + social biases
4. Panel connected to the WVS 2018, 2020, 2021 with COVID perceptions.
5. Public policy implications: what determines support for policies that redistribute in favor of migrants and exFarc?

The lab: Activities and decisions

- One token is US$2

The lab: Activities and decisions

- One token is US$2
- Four Activities
  1. Dictator Game (DG): 5 tokens, 2 players
  2. Trust Game (TG): 3 tokens, 2 players
  3. Income Distribution Game Grimalda et al 2018, Almas et al 2020 with lottery (IDG-luck): 5 tokens, 3 players
  4. Income Distribution Game with salary (IDG-merit): 5 tokens, 3 players

The lab: Activities and decisions

- One token is US$2
- Four Activities
  1. Dictator Game (DG): 5 tokens, 2 players
  2. Trust Game (TG): 3 tokens, 2 players
  3. Income Distribution Game Grimalda et al 2018, Almas et al 2020 with lottery (IDG-luck): 5 tokens, 3 players
  4. Income Distribution Game with salary (IDG-merit): 5 tokens, 3 players
- Players will only know identity of other player in terms of three characteristics Cárdenas et al 2008, Glaeser et al 2000

Number of decisions in DG or TG

Player 1	*Player 2 (randomly assigned)*	*Decisions*
Any citizen from the sample of participants	low SES ($\leq$3) $\leq$ Incomplete Secondary education None, IDP, ExFarc OR VenMigrant	4

The lab: the income distribution game: 3 players

- P2 and P3 accepted to participate in the study and received a show up fee.

The lab: the income distribution game: 3 players

- P2 and P3 accepted to participate in the study and received a show up fee.
  - **Activity 3 - with luck** P2 and P3 are hired to perform a task. Both receive the same payment. One player is randomly chosen to receive 5 extra tokens (for simplicity it will be always P2)

The lab: the income distribution game: 3 players

- P2 and P3 accepted to participate in the study and received a show up fee.
  - **Activity 3 - with luck** P2 and P3 are hired to perform a task. Both receive the same payment. One player is randomly chosen to receive 5 extra tokens (for simplicity it will be always P2)
  - **Activity 4- with merit** Only P2 is hired to perform a task and received a 5-token payment. P3 did not have the opportunity to perform and did not received any extra payment.

The lab: the income distribution game: 3 players

- P2 and P3 accepted to participate in the study and received a show up fee.
  - **Activity 3 - with luck** P2 and P3 are hired to perform a task. Both receive the same payment. One player is randomly chosen to receive 5 extra tokens (for simplicity it will be always P2)
  - **Activity 4- with merit** Only P2 is hired to perform a task and received a 5-token payment. P3 did not have the opportunity to perform and did not received any extra payment.
- P1 receives 5 tokens and her re-allocation decision ranges from 0 to 5 tokens

The lab: the income distribution game: 3 players

- P2 and P3 accepted to participate in the study and received a show up fee.
  - **Activity 3 - with luck** P2 and P3 are hired to perform a task. Both receive the same payment. One player is randomly chosen to receive 5 extra tokens (for simplicity it will be always P2)
  - **Activity 4- with merit** Only P2 is hired to perform a task and received a 5-token payment. P3 did not have the opportunity to perform and did not received any extra payment.
- P1 receives 5 tokens and her re-allocation decision ranges from 0 to 5 tokens
- P2 and P3 know each other's three characteristics
- P1 knows P2 and P3's characteristics

The lab: the income distribution game: 3 players

- P2 and P3 accepted to participate in the study and received a show up fee.
  - **Activity 3 - with luck** P2 and P3 are hired to perform a task. Both receive the same payment. One player is randomly chosen to receive 5 extra tokens (for simplicity it will be always P2)
  - **Activity 4- with merit** Only P2 is hired to perform a task and received a 5-token payment. P3 did not have the opportunity to perform and did not received any extra payment.
- P1 receives 5 tokens and her re-allocation decision ranges from 0 to 5 tokens
- P2 and P3 know each other's three characteristics
- P1 knows P2 and P3's characteristics
  - **Activity 3** 7 decisions
  - **Activity 4** 4 decisions:

1. None-None
2. None-IDP
3. None-ExFarc
4. None-Migrant

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.
- **Phase 2. P1 Sample**: online panel
- Qualtrics software

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.
- **Phase 2. P1 Sample**: online panel
- Qualtrics software
- P1 is randomly assigned to one treatment group

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.
- **Phase 2. P1 Sample**: online panel
- Qualtrics software
- P1 is randomly assigned to one treatment group
- 70 minutes duration average

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.
- **Phase 2. P1 Sample**: online panel
- Qualtrics software
- P1 is randomly assigned to one treatment group
- 70 minutes duration average
- Two activity quizzes before each set of decisions

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.
- **Phase 2. P1 Sample**: online panel
- Qualtrics software
- P1 is randomly assigned to one treatment group
- 70 minutes duration average
- Two activity quizzes before each set of decisions
- **Payment**: 1 activity and 1 decision is randomly chosen for payment + show-fee + incentivized expectations: US$20 average

Treatments

- **No video**
- **Control video**: exposure to a 5 min video on the coffee region in Colombia Bruneau et al 2022
- **Video TE**: exposure to a 5 min video that presents ex-combatants as similar as the median colombian Bruneau et al 2022
- **Video TM**: participants will be exposed to 5 min video that presents migrants as similar as the median colombian reproducing the same psychological barriers structure in Bruneau et al 2022

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions
- Collective blame

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions
- Collective blame
- Direct empathy (family related situations)
- Threat

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions
- Collective blame
- Direct empathy (family related situations)
- Threat
- Hypothetical hiring

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions
- Collective blame
- Direct empathy (family related situations)
- Threat
- Hypothetical hiring
- Malleability

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions
- Collective blame
- Direct empathy (family related situations)
- Threat
- Hypothetical hiring
- Malleability
- Quantity and quality of interactions Ben/Ner et al 2015
- Exposure to violence

Outcomes: measuring prosociality

- (incentivized) empirical expectations on altruism, trust and redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- (incentivized) altruism, trust, trustworthiness, redistribution due to lottery and opportunity

Outcomes: measuring prosociality

- (incentivized) empirical expectations on altruism, trust and redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- (incentivized) altruism, trust, trustworthiness, redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- WVS trust, stereotypes, social capital

Outcomes: measuring prosociality

- (incentivized) empirical expectations on altruism, trust and redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- (incentivized) altruism, trust, trustworthiness, redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- WVS trust, stereotypes, social capital
- BRIQ Institute's reciprocity, altruism measures and empirical expectations

Outcomes: measuring prosociality

- (incentivized) empirical expectations on altruism, trust and redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- (incentivized) altruism, trust, trustworthiness, redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- WVS trust, stereotypes, social capital
- BRIQ Institute's reciprocity, altruism measures and empirical expectations
- Support for integration policies

Main Hypotheses

- H1: Citizens are less prosocial when interacting with a migrant or an ex-combatant
- H2: Exposure to the intervention improves citizens' empathy and prosociality

Preliminary Findings

- Across all actors TE and TM increased transfers in DG and TG, increased reallocation to Migrants and ExFarc in IDG-luck and higher for transfers to Migrants (ExFarc) under the TM (TE) treatment

Preliminary Findings

- Across all actors TE and TM increased transfers in DG and TG, increased reallocation to Migrants and ExFarc in IDG-luck and higher for transfers to Migrants (ExFarc) under the TM (TE) treatment
- TM improved trust towards all actors in TG

Preliminary Findings

- Across all actors TE and TM increased transfers in DG and TG, increased reallocation to Migrants and ExFarc in IDG-luck and higher for transfers to Migrants (ExFarc) under the TM (TE) treatment
- TM improved trust towards all actors in TG
- In the IDG-luck, TM and TR increased reallocation to all actors without tokens regardless of the group.

Preliminary Findings

- Across all actors TE and TM increased transfers in DG and TG, increased reallocation to Migrants and ExFarc in IDG-luck and higher for transfers to Migrants (ExFarc) under the TM (TE) treatment
- TM improved trust towards all actors in TG
- In the IDG-luck, TM and TR increased reallocation to all actors without tokens regardless of the group.
- Exposure to TM (TR) humanizes migrants (ExFarc), affected both attitudes (e.g., support for inclusive policies) and empathy measures

Preliminary Results: Dictator

Table: Dictator Game

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) C12 DG	(3) D DG	(4) E DG	(5) R DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.053***	0.023	0.039*	0.078***	0.073***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
T = 2, TE	0.059***	0.031*	0.027	0.109***	0.068***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)
T = 3, TR	0.084***	0.047***	0.038*	0.091***	0.161***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Constant	0.427***	0.425***	0.526***	0.373***	0.383***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	3,355	838	839	839	839
R-squared	0.035	0.011	0.006	0.035	0.071
Number of ID	839	838	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution by the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4 and 5 restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R)
Fuente: (Invamer,2022)

Preliminary Results: Trust

Table: Trust Game

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TG	(2) C12 TG	(3) D TG	(4) E TG	(5) R TG
T = 1, neutral video	0.009	0.008	0.019	0.017	-0.009
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.026)
T = 2, TE	0.029	0.021	0.002	0.080***	0.012
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.027)
T = 3, TR	0.085***	0.053**	0.047**	0.090***	0.149***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Constant	0.591***	0.578***	0.694***	0.530***	0.563***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Observations	3,356	839	839	839	839
R-squared	0.026	0.007	0.007	0.019	0.053
Number of ID	839	839	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution by the participant over three tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4 and 5 restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R) *Fuente*: (Invamer,2022)

Preliminary Results: Redistribution with Luck

Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGL	(2) C12_C12 TRGL	(3) D_C12 TRGL	(4) E_C12 TRGL	(5) R_C12 TRGL	(6) C12_D TRGL	(7) C12_E TRGL	(8) C12_R TRGL
T = 1, neutral	-0.007	0.008	-0.029	-0.050***	-0.015	-0.005	0.019	0.023
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
T = 2, TE	-0.002	-0.010	-0.031	-0.025	-0.027	0.008	0.055***	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
T = 3, TR	0.014	0.006	-0.020	-0.011	-0.017	0.023	0.044**	0.074***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	0.460***	0.446***	0.455***	0.483***	0.466***	0.529***	0.411***	0.428***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	5,873	839	839	839	839	839	839	839
R-squared	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.010	0.002	0.003	0.011	0.019
Number of ID	839	839	839	839	839	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution by the participant over five tokens. The treatment variables represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 restricts the sample to each of pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R) *Fuente*: (Invamer,2022)

Preliminary Results: Redistribution with Merit

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGM	(2) C12_C12 TRGM	(3) C12_D TRGM	(4) C12_E TRGM	(5) C12_R TRGM
T = 1, neutral video	0.020	-0.001	0.010	0.028	0.041*
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
T = 2, TE	0.040*	0.023	0.030	0.062***	0.044*
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
T = 3, TR	0.052***	0.023	0.035	0.054**	0.096***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	0.299***	0.292***	0.357***	0.267***	0.280***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	3,356	839	839	839	839
R-squared	0.010	0.002	0.004	0.012	0.022
Number of ID	839	839	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4 and 5 restricts the sample to each of the pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R) *Fuente*: (Invamer,2022)

What factors determine preferences for redistribution?

- We included a question of household income, as well as asked respondents to identify their position on the left-right scale.
- We asked questions about trust in different institutions, such as local and national governments, etc.

Table: Dictator Game-Heterogeneous effects with income variable

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_controls DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_controls DG	(5) D DG	(6) D_controls DG	(7) E DG	(8) E_controls DG	(9) R DG	(10) R_controls DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.060***	0.047	0.028*	0.001	0.049**	0.026	0.087***	0.085**	0.075***	0.080**
	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.038)
T = 2, TE	0.059***	0.007	0.028	-0.010	0.027	-0.061	0.111***	0.065	0.070***	0.035
	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.041)
T = 3, TR	0.082***	0.064**	0.046***	0.012	0.038*	0.001	0.085***	0.083**	0.159***	0.164***
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.036)
income	0.010**	0.001	0.014***	0.002	0.018***	0.001	0.004	-0.001	0.005	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.011)
1.T#c.income		0.005		0.013		0.010		0.000		-0.002
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
2.T#c.income		0.023**		0.017		0.039***		0.021		0.016
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.015)
3.T#c.income		0.008		0.016		0.017		0.000		-0.003
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Constant	-1.721	-1.743	-1.879	-1.770	-1.976	-1.979	-1.078	-1.168	-1.950	-2.058
	(1.141)	(1.145)	(1.188)	(1.194)	(1.465)	(1.467)	(1.547)	(1.555)	(1.488)	(1.496)
Observations	3,347	3,347	836	836	837	837	837	837	837	837
R-squared	0.108	0.113	0.071	0.074	0.100	0.108	0.101	0.103	0.134	0.136
Number of ID	837	837	836	836	837	837	837	837	837	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table shows 10 columns from the Dictator Game results applying Random effects using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample,the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R).For each sample segmentation all sociodemographic variables are included.
Source: Own calculations.

Table: Trust Game-Heterogeneous effects with income variable

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TG	(2) All_Actors_controls TG	(3) C12 TG	(4) C12_controls TG	(5) D TG	(6) D_controls TG	(7) E TG	(8) E_controls TG	(9) R TG	(10) R_controls TG
T = 1, neutral video	0.014	-0.018	0.017	-0.010	0.021	0.008	0.028	-0.025	-0.008	-0.045
	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.050)	(0.027)	(0.049)
T = 2, TE	0.031	-0.035	0.020	-0.003	0.000	-0.013	0.082***	-0.037	0.021	-0.088*
	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.052)
T = 3, TR	0.086***	0.047	0.053**	0.030	0.050**	0.029	0.088***	0.019	0.152***	0.110**
	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.047)
income	0.013**	-0.003	0.006	-0.002	0.012*	0.007	0.017**	-0.011	0.015*	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)
1.T#c.income		0.015		0.012		0.006		0.024		0.016
		(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.019)
2.T#c.income		0.030**		0.010		0.006		0.054***		0.049**
		(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.020)
3.T#c.income		0.018		0.011		0.010		0.032*		0.019
		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.019)		(0.018)
Constant	-0.472	-0.396	1.517	1.619	0.540	0.618	-2.606	-2.488	-1.341	-1.333
	(1.436)	(1.441)	(1.681)	(1.691)	(1.650)	(1.660)	(1.957)	(1.960)	(1.906)	(1.910)
Observations	3,348	3,348	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837
R-squared	0.085	0.089	0.082	0.083	0.057	0.057	0.095	0.104	0.117	0.124
Number of ID	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 10 columns shows the Trust Game results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over three tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample, the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R).For each sample segmentation all sociodemographic variables are included. .
Source: Own calculations.

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck-Heterogeneous effects with income variable

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGL	(2) All_Actors_controls TRGL	(3) C12_C12 TRGL	(4) C12_C12_controls TRGL	(5) D_C12 TRGL	(6) D_C12_controls TRGL	(7) E_C12 TRGL	(8) E_C12_controls TRGL	(9) R_C12 TRGL	(10) R_C12_controls TRGL	(11) C12_D TRGL	(12) C12_D_controls TRGL	(13) C12_E TRGL	(14) C12_E_controls TRGL	(15) C12_R TRGL	(16) C12_R_controls TRGL
T = 1, neutral video	-0.007	-0.025	0.009	0.005	-0.032*	-0.071**	-0.048***	-0.037	-0.014	-0.045	-0.005	0.002	0.020	-0.026	0.020	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.036)
T = 2, TE	-0.003	-0.032	-0.006	-0.016	-0.035*	-0.090**	-0.026	-0.037	-0.032	-0.063*	0.006	-0.018	0.052**	-0.002	0.018	-0.000
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.038)
T = 3, TR	0.010	-0.000	0.006	-0.009	-0.030	-0.055*	-0.013	-0.034	-0.023	-0.016	0.018	0.017	0.035*	0.025	0.077***	0.070**
	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.034)
income	-0.002	-0.008	-0.002	-0.005	-0.007	-0.021**	-0.001	-0.004	0.001	-0.005	-0.002	-0.004	0.001	-0.011	-0.002	-0.008
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)
1.T#c.income		0.008		0.002		0.018		-0.006		0.015		-0.004		0.021		0.011
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.014)
2.T#c.income		0.013		0.005		0.025*		0.005		0.014		0.011		0.024*		0.008
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.014)
3.T#c.income		0.004		0.007		0.011		0.010		-0.004		0.000		0.004		0.003
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.013)
Constant	1.047	1.067	1.217	1.255	2.518*	2.591*	0.974	0.985	0.641	0.642	-0.080	-0.152	0.348	0.396	1.708	1.756
	(0.894)	(0.898)	(1.089)	(1.096)	(1.318)	(1.323)	(1.313)	(1.320)	(1.347)	(1.353)	(1.273)	(1.280)	(1.378)	(1.382)	(1.387)	(1.395)
Observations	5,859	5,859	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837
R-squared	0.070	0.072	0.061	0.061	0.069	0.073	0.069	0.071	0.060	0.064	0.065	0.066	0.090	0.096	0.085	0.086
Number of ID	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 16 columns shows Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variables represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants) All the coefficients are read against non video shown. Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 restricts the sample to each of pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R).For each sample segmentation all sociodemographic variables are included.
Source: Own calculations.

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit-Heterogeneous effects with income variable

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGM	(2) All_Actors_controls TRGM	(3) C12_C12 TRGM	(4) C12_C12_controls TRGM	(5) C12_D TRGM	(6) C12_D_controls TRGM	(7) C12_E TRGM	(8) C12_E_controls TRGM	(9) C12_R TRGM	(10) C12_R_controls TRGM
T = 1, neutral video	0.014	-0.033	-0.007	-0.060	0.005	-0.030	0.021	-0.018	0.036	-0.022
	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.041)
T = 2, TE	0.042**	0.007	0.024	-0.001	0.035	0.000	0.061***	0.028	0.046*	-0.001
	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.044)
T = 3, TR	0.044**	0.017	0.017	-0.026	0.029	-0.012	0.042*	0.034	0.087***	0.071*
	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.039)
income	-0.021***	-0.033***	-0.022***	-0.036***	-0.025***	-0.038***	-0.021***	-0.030**	-0.015**	-0.029**
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)
1.T#c.income		0.022		0.025		0.016		0.019		0.027*
		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
2.T#c.income		0.016		0.011		0.016		0.015		0.022
		(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.017)
3.T#c.income		0.012		0.020		0.019		0.003		0.006
		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Constant	3.824***	3.971***	3.171*	3.412**	4.623***	4.780***	4.554***	4.625***	2.949*	3.065*
	(1.415)	(1.421)	(1.624)	(1.631)	(1.585)	(1.594)	(1.583)	(1.591)	(1.603)	(1.609)
Observations	3,348	3,348	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837
R-squared	0.098	0.100	0.089	0.092	0.091	0.093	0.085	0.087	0.117	0.121
Number of ID	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

*T*he 10 columns shows the Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants. All the coefficients are read against non video shown. Column 1 an 2 contains the total sample, the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12), Displaced(D), Ex-Farc(E) and Migrant(R). For each sample segmentation all sociodemographic variables are included.
Source: Own calculations.

Table: Dictator Game with Income Controls

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_controls DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_controls DG	(5) D DG	(6) D_controls DG	(7) E DG	(8) E_controls DG	(9) R DG	(10) R_controls DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.053***	0.060***	0.023	0.029*	0.039*	0.050**	0.078***	0.086***	0.073***	0.077***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)
T = 2, TE	0.059***	0.058***	0.031*	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.109***	0.110***	0.068***	0.070***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)
T = 3, TR	0.085***	0.079***	0.048***	0.043**	0.040**	0.035*	0.092***	0.082***	0.162***	0.158***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Income: $1 a $2 mill.		-0.004		0.007		-0.003		0.008		-0.027
		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.025)		(0.027)		(0.026)
Income: $2 a $3 mill.		0.000		0.014		0.014		-0.008		-0.019
		(0.023)		(0.024)		(0.029)		(0.031)		(0.030)
Income: $3 a $5 mill.		0.013		0.026		0.030		0.016		-0.017
		(0.022)		(0.023)		(0.028)		(0.029)		(0.028)
Income: $5 a $8 mill.		0.019		0.032		0.038		0.005		0.002
		(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.033)		(0.034)		(0.033)
Income: > $8 millones		0.085**		0.119***		0.141***		0.044		0.038
		(0.034)		(0.036)		(0.044)		(0.047)		(0.045)
Constant	0.427***	-1.631	0.425***	-1.780	0.526***	-1.844	0.373***	-1.013	0.383***	-1.883
	(0.011)	(1.142)	(0.011)	(1.189)	(0.014)	(1.465)	(0.015)	(1.552)	(0.014)	(1.491)
Observations	3,351	3,347	837	836	838	837	838	837	838	837
R-squared	0.036	0.113	0.011	0.078	0.006	0.106	0.035	0.102	0.071	0.138
Number of ID	838	837	837	836	838	837	838	837	838	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table shows 10 columns from the Dictator Game results applying Random effects using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample,the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R).For each sample segmentation there is a specification without controls and another with all the sociodemographic variables.
Source: Own calculations.

Table: Trust Game

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TG	(2) All_Actors_controls TG	(3) C12 TG	(4) C12_controls TG	(5) D TG	(6) D_controls TG	(7) E TG	(8) E_controls TG	(9) R TG	(10) R_controls TG
T = 1, neutral video	0.009	0.013	0.008	0.017	0.019	0.020	0.017	0.027	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
T = 2, TE	0.029	0.031	0.021	0.019	0.002	0.001	0.080***	0.082***	0.012	0.021
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
T = 3, TR	0.085***	0.079***	0.056**	0.045*	0.049**	0.043*	0.090***	0.082***	0.147***	0.145***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Income: $1 a $2 mill.		0.051**		0.008		0.062**		0.067**		0.068**
		(0.024)		(0.029)		(0.028)		(0.034)		(0.033)
Income: $2 a $3 mill.		0.034		-0.025		0.047		0.067*		0.046
		(0.028)		(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.039)		(0.038)
Income: $3 a $5 mill.		0.050*		0.003		0.052*		0.091**		0.056
		(0.027)		(0.032)		(0.031)		(0.037)		(0.036)
Income: $5 a $8 mill.		0.026		-0.022		0.034		0.046		0.048
		(0.032)		(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.043)		(0.042)
Income: > $8 mill.		0.175***		0.135***		0.182***		0.179***		0.203***
		(0.043)		(0.050)		(0.049)		(0.059)		(0.057)
Constant	0.591***	-0.326	0.578***	1.740	0.694***	0.659	0.530***	-2.481	0.563***	-1.223
	(0.014)	(1.428)	(0.016)	(1.674)	(0.016)	(1.643)	(0.019)	(1.955)	(0.018)	(1.899)
Observations	3,352	3,348	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837
R-squared	0.027	0.102	0.008	0.097	0.007	0.072	0.019	0.104	0.052	0.129
Number of ID	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 10 columns shows the Trust Game results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over three tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample, the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R)For each sample segmentation there is a specification without controls and another with all the sociodemographic variables.

Source: Own calculations.

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGL	(2) All_Actors_controls TRGL	(3) C12_C12 TRGL	(4) C12_C12_controls TRGL	(5) D_C12 TRGL	(6) D_C12_controls TRGL	(7) E_C12 TRGL	(8) E_C12_controls TRGL	(9) R_C12 TRGL	(10) R_C12_controls TRGL	(11) C12_D TRGL	(12) C12_D_controls TRGL	(13) C12_E TRGL	(14) C12_E_controls TRGL	(15) C12_R TRGL	(16) C12_R_controls TRGL
T = 1, neutral video	-0.007	-0.007	0.008	0.009	-0.029	-0.031*	-0.050***	-0.048***	-0.015	-0.015	-0.005	-0.005	0.019	0.019	0.023	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
T = 2, TE	-0.002	-0.003	-0.010	-0.006	-0.031	-0.035*	-0.025	-0.026	-0.027	-0.032	0.008	0.006	0.055***	0.051**	0.016	0.019
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
T = 3, TR	0.014	0.011	0.008	0.005	-0.018	-0.030	-0.011	-0.011	-0.018	-0.021	0.022	0.020	0.041**	0.035*	0.076***	0.077***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Income: $1 a $2 mill.		-0.002		0.002		-0.022		-0.012		0.009		-0.006		0.006		0.007
		(0.015)		(0.019)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.022)		(0.024)		(0.024)
Income: $2 a $3 mill.		-0.000		-0.003		-0.028		-0.003		0.015		0.007		0.001		0.008
		(0.018)		(0.022)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.027)		(0.025)		(0.027)		(0.028)
Income: $3 a $5 mill.		-0.003		-0.005		-0.035		-0.000		0.009		0.000		0.017		-0.005
		(0.017)		(0.021)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.024)		(0.026)		(0.026)
Income: $5 a $8 mill.		-0.003		-0.008		-0.036		-0.007		0.024		-0.002		0.007		0.004
		(0.020)		(0.024)		(0.029)		(0.029)		(0.030)		(0.028)		(0.031)		(0.031)
Income: > $8 mill.		-0.021		0.005		-0.032		-0.033		-0.021		-0.042		-0.011		-0.014
		(0.027)		(0.033)		(0.040)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.038)		(0.042)		(0.042)
Constant	0.460***	1.025	0.446***	1.231	0.455***	2.547*	0.483***	0.964	0.466***	0.560	0.529***	-0.127	0.411***	0.339	0.428***	1.660
	(0.008)	(0.897)	(0.010)	(1.093)	(0.012)	(1.322)	(0.012)	(1.317)	(0.013)	(1.351)	(0.012)	(1.276)	(0.013)	(1.382)	(0.013)	(1.391)
Observations	5,866	5,859	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837
R-squared	0.004	0.070	0.002	0.061	0.004	0.070	0.010	0.070	0.003	0.062	0.003	0.067	0.011	0.092	0.021	0.086
Number of ID	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 16 columns shows the Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variables represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants) All the coefficients are read against non video shown. Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 restricts the sample to each of pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R). For each sample segmentation there is a specification without controls and another with all the sociodemographic variables.
Source: Own calculations.

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGM	(2) All_Actors_controls TRGM	(3) C12_C12 TRGM	(4) C12_C12_controls TRGM	(5) C12_D TRGM	(6) C12_D_controls TRGM	(7) C12_E TRGM	(8) C12_E_controls TRGM	(9) C12_R TRGM	(10) C12_R_controls TRGM
T = 1, neutral video	0.020	0.013	-0.001	-0.009	0.010	0.005	0.028	0.020	0.041*	0.035
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
T = 2, TE	0.040*	0.042**	0.023	0.024	0.030	0.035	0.062***	0.061***	0.044*	0.047**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
T = 3, TR	0.053***	0.042**	0.025	0.015	0.036*	0.026	0.054**	0.042*	0.095***	0.087***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Income: $1 a $2 mill.		0.001		0.015		-0.019		-0.001		0.011
		(0.024)		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.028)
Income: $2 a $3 mill.		-0.029		-0.029		-0.051		-0.034		-0.004
		(0.028)		(0.032)		(0.031)		(0.031)		(0.032)
Income: $3 a $5 mill.		-0.052*		-0.049		-0.075**		-0.054*		-0.029
		(0.027)		(0.031)		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)
Income: $5 a $8 mill.		-0.075**		-0.069*		-0.115***		-0.070**		-0.044
		(0.032)		(0.036)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.036)
Income: > $8 mill.		-0.083*		-0.082*		-0.088*		-0.095**		-0.066
		(0.043)		(0.049)		(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.048)
Constant	0.299***	3.813***	0.292***	3.139*	0.357***	4.689***	0.267***	4.524***	0.280***	2.900*
	(0.014)	(1.419)	(0.016)	(1.628)	(0.015)	(1.590)	(0.015)	(1.589)	(0.015)	(1.608)
Observations	3,352	3,348	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837
R-squared	0.010	0.099	0.003	0.091	0.004	0.093	0.011	0.086	0.021	0.119
Number of ID	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837	838	837

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 10 columns shows the Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants. All the coefficients are read against non video shown. Column 1 an 2 contains the total sample, the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12), Displaced(D), Ex-Farc(E) and Migrant(R). For each sample segmentation there is a specification without controls and another with all the sociodemographic variables.
Source: Own calculations.

Concluding Remarks

- Both treatment videos increase altruism and trust in favor of Migrants and ExFarc
- In the two redistribution games the TE video increases reallocation towards ExFarc, and the TR video increases reallocation towards Migrants
- Higher income people transfer more in the DG and TG, but less in the redistribution game with merit.
- Next steps? Robustness checks, explore income-ideology-trust connection

Table: Dictator Game with Ideology

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) All_Actors_ DG	(3) C12 DG	(4) C12_ DG	(5) D DG	(6) D_ DG	(7) E DG	(8) E_ DG	(9) R DG	(10) R_ DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.052***	0.051	0.021	0.001	0.038*	0.030	0.079***	0.084	0.072***	0.097*
	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.052)
T = 2, TE	0.056***	0.008	0.030*	0.005	0.023	-0.004	0.106***	0.066	0.065***	-0.030
	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.017)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.055)	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.054)
T = 3, TR	0.087***	0.080*	0.046***	0.051	0.045**	0.012	0.094***	0.117**	0.163***	0.146***
	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.021)	(0.055)
Ideology_1	-0.006**	-0.008	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.018***	-0.019***	-0.004	-0.007
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)
1.T#c.Ideology_1		0.000		0.004		0.001		-0.001		-0.005
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)
2.T#c.Ideology_1		0.009		0.005		0.005		0.008		0.019*
		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
3.T#c.Ideology_1		0.001		-0.001		0.006		-0.005		0.003
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
Constant	0.457***	0.469***	0.425***	0.436***	0.529***	0.544***	0.466***	0.469***	0.404***	0.423***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.037)
Observations	3,267	3,267	816	816	817	817	817	817	817	817
R-squared	0.044	0.046	0.010	0.011	0.007	0.008	0.069	0.071	0.074	0.082
Number of ID	817	817	816	816	817	817	817	817	817	817

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table shows 10 columns from the Dictator Game results applying Random effects using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample,the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R).For each sample restriction, there is a column showing the Ideology variable as control and other adding the interaction with the Treatment Variable. The Ideology is a auto report scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means to be more in right party and 0 to the left party.

Table: Trust Game with Ideology

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TG	(2) All_Actors_ TG	(3) C12 TG	(4) C12_ TG	(5) D TG	(6) D_ TG	(7) E TG	(8) E_ TG	(9) R TG	(10) R_ TG
T = 1, neutral video	0.010	0.045	0.010	0.007	0.018	0.078	0.019	0.127*	-0.005	-0.033
	(0.020)	(0.050)	(0.024)	(0.059)	(0.023)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.067)
T = 2, TE	0.030	0.039	0.023	0.049	-0.000	0.010	0.081***	0.110	0.015	-0.012
	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.063)	(0.024)	(0.061)	(0.028)	(0.072)	(0.028)	(0.070)
T = 3, TR	0.085***	0.116**	0.054**	0.089	0.048**	0.084	0.087***	0.126*	0.150***	0.165**
	(0.020)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.064)	(0.023)	(0.062)	(0.027)	(0.074)	(0.027)	(0.072)
Ideology_1	-0.004	-0.000	0.002	0.004	-0.003	0.002	-0.016***	-0.008	0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)
1.T#c.Ideology_1		-0.007		0.001		-0.011		-0.021*		0.005
		(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.012)
2.T#c.Ideology_1		-0.002		-0.005		-0.002		-0.005		0.005
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.013)		(0.012)
3.T#c.Ideology_1		-0.006		-0.007		-0.007		-0.007		-0.003
		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.013)		(0.013)
Constant	0.609***	0.591***	0.565***	0.552***	0.709***	0.681***	0.611***	0.565***	0.553***	0.564***
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.048)
Observations	3,268	3,268	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817
R-squared	0.027	0.028	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.035	0.039	0.052	0.053
Number of ID	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 10 columns shows the Trust Game results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over three tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample, the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R). For each sample restriction, there is a column showing the Ideology variable as control and other adding the interaction with the Treatment Variable. The Ideology is a auto report scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means to be more in right party and 0 to the left party. *Fuente*: (Invamer,2022)

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck Interacted with Ideology (Part 1)

and Ideology

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGL	(2) All_Actors_ TRGL	(3) C12_C12 TRGL	(4) C12_C12_ TRGL	(5) D_C12 TRGL	(6) D_C12_ TRGL	(7) E_C12 TRGL	(8) E_C12_ TRGL
T = 1, neutral video	-0.004	-0.008	0.010	0.018	-0.027	-0.060	-0.047***	0.050
	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.046)
T = 2, TE	-0.002	-0.010	-0.010	0.023	-0.033*	-0.048	-0.023	0.041
	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.019)	(0.048)
T = 3, TR	0.018	0.005	0.011	0.022	-0.017	-0.080	-0.006	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.018)	(0.049)
Ideology_1	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	-0.001	0.005	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
1.T#c.Ideology_1		0.001		-0.002		0.006		-0.019**
		(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.008)
2.T#c.Ideology_1		0.002		-0.006		0.003		-0.012
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.008)
3.T#c.Ideology_1		0.002		-0.002		0.012		-0.003
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.009)
Constant	0.465***	0.470***	0.440***	0.428***	0.437***	0.463***	0.457***	0.411***
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.033)
Observations	5,719	5,719	817	817	817	817	817	817
R-squared	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.009	0.013	0.021
Number of ID	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck Interacted with Ideology (Part 2)

and Ideology

VARIABLES	(1) R_C12 TRGL	(2) R_C12_ TRGL	(3) C12_D TRGL	(4) C12_D_ TRGL	(5) C12_E TRGL	(6) C12_E_ TRGL	(7) C12_R TRGL	(8) C12_R_ TRGL
T = 1, neutral video	-0.012	-0.028	-0.005	0.032	0.021	-0.043	0.029	-0.028
	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.019)	(0.048)
T = 2, TE	-0.026	-0.063	0.005	-0.014	0.053***	0.006	0.020	-0.017
	(0.019)	(0.049)	(0.018)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.051)
T = 3, TR	-0.014	-0.039	0.022	0.034	0.046**	0.017	0.082***	0.074
	(0.019)	(0.050)	(0.018)	(0.048)	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.052)
Ideology_1	-0.002	-0.006	-0.005*	-0.004	-0.010***	-0.017***	0.000	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
1.T#c.Ideology_1		0.003		-0.007		0.012		0.011
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)
2.T#c.Ideology_1		0.007		0.004		0.009		0.007
		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.009)
3.T#c.Ideology_1		0.005		-0.002		0.005		0.001
		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)
Constant	0.476***	0.494***	0.557***	0.548***	0.462***	0.497***	0.423***	0.450***
	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Observations	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817
R-squared	0.003	0.004	0.007	0.010	0.025	0.028	0.024	0.026
Number of ID	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817

Standard errors in parentheses

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit and Ideology

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGM	(2) All_Actors_ TRGM	(3) C12_C12 TRGM	(4) C12_C12_ TRGM	(5) C12_D TRGM	(6) C12_D_ TRGM	(7) C12_E TRGM	(8) C12_E_ TRGM	(9) C12_R TRGM	(10) C12_R_ TRGM
T = 1, neutral video	0.026	-0.039	0.007	-0.077	0.018	-0.033	0.032	-0.014	0.046**	-0.030
	(0.020)	(0.050)	(0.023)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.022)	(0.056)	(0.023)	(0.057)
T = 2, TE	0.042**	-0.049	0.029	-0.080	0.032	0.005	0.064***	-0.033	0.044*	-0.089
	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.059)	(0.023)	(0.059)	(0.023)	(0.060)
T = 3, TR	0.057***	-0.001	0.032	-0.039	0.042*	0.026	0.055**	0.027	0.098***	-0.019
	(0.020)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.061)
Ideology_1	0.005	-0.005	0.009**	-0.003	0.004	-0.000	-0.003	-0.011	0.010***	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)
1.T#c.Ideology_1		0.012		0.016		0.010		0.009		0.014
		(0.009)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
2.T#c.Ideology_1		0.017*		0.021*		0.005		0.019*		0.025**
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.011)
3.T#c.Ideology_1		0.011		0.013		0.003		0.005		0.022**
		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Constant	0.268***	0.320***	0.239***	0.304***	0.331***	0.355***	0.278***	0.320***	0.225***	0.302***
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.041)
Observations	3,268	3,268	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817
R-squared	0.013	0.018	0.010	0.015	0.006	0.007	0.013	0.017	0.030	0.039
Number of ID	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	817

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The 10 columns shows the Allocation B Game results applying Random effects Models using between regression estimators, The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution of the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants) All the coefficients are read against non video shown.Column 1 and 2 contains the total sample, the rest of them restricts the sample to each of the pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R). For each sample restriction, there is a column showing the Ideology variable as control and other adding the interaction with the Treatment Variable. The Ideology is a auto report scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means to be more in right party and 0 to the left party. *Fuente*: (Invamer,2022)