Overcoming empathy failures to reduce inequality

Experimental evidence from Colombia

Sandra Polanía-Reyes[1] Angela Fonseca[2] Santiago Alonso[2]
Andrés Casas[2] Emile Bruneau[3]

[1]Universidad de Navarra, [2]Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, [3]University of Pennsylvania

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Prosocial behavior as a *desired* effect

1. Theory shows it as key for political and economic development
   - reduces social inefficiency in the presence of incomplete contracts, Arrow 1971, Becker 1976, Akerlof 1984
   - solves collective action problems Ostrom 1990
   - determines support and integration policies' success 3ie 2009, J-PAL 2013
2. Practice finds it highly valuable
   - determines economic behavior
   - improves efficiency, Heckman 2004, Miguel et al. 2012
3. **Empathy** among citizens is a prime mechanism Borman et al 2001, Jolliffle & Farrington 2004, Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018

e.g. Intra-group conflict and prosociality

- There is descriptive experimental evidence
  - Social psychology **alone** with ex combatants, ethnic groups in Europe Bruneau et al 2015, 2017 and migrants in US Moore-Berg et al 2021
  - Prosociality **alone** towards migrants in Europe
  - Prosociality within groups, exFarc, in Afghanistan Condra & Linardi 2019

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- On **preferences for redistribution towards specific groups**
  - classic determinants (perception and actual current position in income distribution Meltzer & Richard 1981, Cruces et al 2013, ideology Fehr et al 2020, migrant active presence Alesina et al 2020)

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  - classic determinants (perception and actual current position in income distribution Meltzer & Richard 1981, Cruces et al 2013, ideology Fehr et al 2020, migrant active presence Alesina et al 2020)
  - Perceptions and attitudes PNUD 2022 but not on other prosocial preferences

e.g. media interventions and preferences for redistribution

- Little evidence on the causal impact of interventions to reduce xenophobia and improve the integration
- Evidence that media interventions are effective in conveying information Banerjee et al 2016, Berg & Zia 2013, Ravallion, et al 2015
- Mixed results when it comes to preferences, social norms & behavior
  - Reconciliation in Rwanda Paluck 2009
  - Info and prosociality towards refugees in Germany Grimalda et al 2018, in Uruguay Gandelman & Lamé 2021
  - Info/labels/forcing interaction and empathy in Israel and Palestina
  - Media interventions towards exFarc Bruneau et al 2022, role models/information with migrants in LAC PNUD-IDB initiative 2022, RodríguezChatruc & Rozo 2021

A multidisciplinary approach to reduce inequality

- **Our mechanism**: A Social psychologically informed media intervention - tailor-made design Williams et al 2014, Bauer & Freitag 2018, Bruneau et al. 2022
- aiming to improve empathy, reduce prejudice and change beliefs about out-group members' willingness or ability to integrate with the in-group members.

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- A 5-minute media intervention from interviews conducted with ...
  - exFarc in a Colombian demobilization camp and non-FARC Colombians in neighbouring communities Bruneau et al. 2022
  - V migrants in a slum Bogota and Colombians

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- on prosociality: lab-in-the-field economic experiment
- and social biases: underlying cognitive processing behind pro-social judgements with movement tracking Song & Nakayama 2009, Freeman et al 2011: velocity, curvature, positions, changes of mind...

Research significance

Communities in Colombia face an inflow of *non desirable* out-group members Gallup 2019, WVS 2020, 2021

- IDPs and Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) ex-combatants
- Venezuela's migrant crisis is the largest in Latin American history and the second largest worldwide

755K IDPs after 2016
8.3M Total cumulative since 1985
UNHCR, june 2022

76K ex combatants (2001-2019)
27K completed reintegration process
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5.75M V migrants - refugees in LAC
6.81M worldwide
2.5M in Colombia

RV4, august 2022

Research significance

In order to test our psychologically informed media intervention...
A median Colombian vs. a Venezuelan migrant, an exFarc from a representative sample of **839 participants** in the main Colombian regions

1. use and low income colombians as comparison groups
2. social psychology measures empathy, prejudice AND incentivized measures of prosociality (i.e. altruism, trust and preferences for redistribution)
3. Effect on ALL empathy and prosociality + social biases
   - implemented on any device
4. Panel connected to the WVS 2018, 2020, 2021 with COVID perceptions.

Treatments

Control No video

Passive control exposure to a 5 min video on the coffee region in Colombia Bruneau et al 2022

Video TE exposure to a 5 min video that presents exFarc's willingness and ability to integrate Bruneau et al 2022

Video TM exposure to a 5 min video that presents V migrants' willingness and ability to integrate

Main hypotheses

H1 Citizens are less prosocial when interacting with a V migrant or exFarc

H2 Exposure to the intervention improves citizens' empathy and prosociality, and modifies movement vigor

Findings: Exposure to the V migrants video

1. Prosociality
   - ↑ Generosity → all: P 11%, ID 7%, E 24%, V 42%
   - ↑ Trust → all: P 9%, ID 7%, E 17%, V 26%
   - ↑ Preference for redistribution in case of **merit** → P 1%, V 17% and of **luck** → E 20%, V 35%
   - ↑ Empirical expectations for **generosity** 14%, and **trust** 10%, in general
2. Cognitive biases: ↑ velocity
3. Empathy Bruneau et al 2022
4. ↑ support for inclusive policies

Findings: Exposure to the ExFarc video

1. Prosociality
   - ↑ Generosity towards P 7%, E 29%, V 18%
   - ↑ Trust towards E 15%,
   - ↑ Preference for redistribution in case of **merit** towards P 1%, E %13, V 4%
   - ↑ Preference for redistribution towards in case of **luck** E 24%, V 16%
2. Cognitive biases: ↓ velocity in DG
3. Empathy Bruneau et al 2022
4. ↑ support for inclusive policies

The lab: Activities and decisions

- One token is USD$2

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- Four Activities in this order

  Dictator Game (DG) 5 tokens, 2 players
  Trust Game (TG) 3 tokens, 2 players
  Income Distribution Game with lottery (IDG-luck) 5 tokens, 3 players
  Income Distribution Game with salary (IDG-merit) 5 tokens, 3 players
- Players will only know identity of other player in terms of three characteristics Cárdenas et al 2008, Glaese et al 2000

Number of decisions in DG or TG

Player 1	*Player 2 (randomly assigned)*	*Decisions*
Any citizen from the sample of participants	low SES ($\leq$3) $\leq$ Incomplete Secondary education None, IDP, ExFarc OR VMigrant	4

The income distribution game Grimalda et al 2018, Almas et al 2020

IDG-luck P2 and P3 are hired to perform a task. Both receive the same payment. One player is randomly chosen to receive 5 extra tokens (for simplicity it will be always P2)

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- P1 receives 5 tokens and her re-allocation decision ranges from 0 to 5
- P1 knows P2 and P3's characteristics
  - P2 and P3 know each other's three characteristics

IDG-luck 7 decisions

None-None
IDP-None
ExFarc-None
Migrant-None
None-IDP
None-ExFarc
None-Migrant

IDG-merit 4 decisions

None-None
None-IDP
None-ExFarc
None-Migrant

The field: procedures

- **Phase 1. P2 and P3 Recruitment and implementation**:
  - Migrants, IDPs and low SES colombians who live in Ciudad Bolívar.
  - Ex combatants: referred by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) office.
- **Phase 2. P1 Sample**: online panel
- Qualtrics software
- P1 is randomly assigned to one treatment group
- 70 minutes duration average
- Two activity quizzes before each set of decisions
- **Payment**: 1 activity and 1 decision is randomly chosen for payment + show-fee + incentivized expectations: US$20 average

Outcomes: measuring empathy (UPenn Neuroscience lab)

- Dehumanization 
- Blatant dehumanization (refined, rational, primitive, aggressive)
- Feeling thermometer
- Meta-dehumanization (subhuman, animals, inferior, instinct driven)
- Meta-perceptions
- Collective blame
- Direct empathy (family related situations)
- Threat
- hypothetical hiring
- Malleability
- quantity and quality of interactions Capozza et al 2014
- exposure to violence

Conclusions

Lessons for how to address decreasing support for the welcoming of migrants and how to integrate *outsiders* into Colombian communities

Robust results Short exposure to a well-structured media intervention promotes prosociality towards out group members and a positive changes in internal representations

- demographics, soc cap measures, experimental variables
- multi hypothesis testing

Collaborative work among disciplines is key to fill the gaps in the literature

Behavioral measures help to clarify results in the literature

Mechanisms empathy, properly measured, is key for motivating prosocial behavior

Keep in touch with results on **ideology** (better improvement for lower levels), **income level**, exposure to out group members, attitudes during COVID and prosociality in Colombia

Medium term effects

Acknowledgments

Emile Bruneau UPenn



Universidad de Navarra

Pontificia Universidad JAVERIANA Bogotá

IDB

PEACE & CONFLICT NEUROSCIENCE LAB

Resultados Preliminares Dictador

Table: Dictator Game

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors DG	(2) C12 DG	(3) D DG	(4) E DG	(5) R DG
T = 1, neutral video	0.053***	0.023	0.039*	0.078***	0.073***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
T = 2, TE	0.059***	0.031*	0.027	0.109***	0.068***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)
T = 3, TR	0.084***	0.047***	0.038*	0.091***	0.161***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Constant	0.427***	0.425***	0.526***	0.373***	0.383***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	3,355	838	839	839	839
R-squared	0.035	0.011	0.006	0.035	0.071
Number of ID	839	838	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution by the participant over five tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4 and 5 restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R)
Fuente: (Invamer,2022)

Resultados Preliminares Confianza

Table: Trust Game

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TG	(2) C12 TG	(3) D TG	(4) E TG	(5) R TG
T = 1, neutral video	0.009	0.008	0.019	0.017	-0.009
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.026)
T = 2, TE	0.029	0.021	0.002	0.080***	0.012
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.027)
T = 3, TR	0.085***	0.053**	0.047**	0.090***	0.149***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Constant	0.591***	0.578***	0.694***	0.530***	0.563***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Observations	3,356	839	839	839	839
R-squared	0.026	0.007	0.007	0.019	0.053
Number of ID	839	839	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution by the participant over three tokens. The treatment variable represent the video shown to the participant that corresponds to control(neutral video), ExFarc(TE) or Migrants(TR). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4 and 5 restricts the sample to each of the actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(R) *Fuente*: (Invamer,2022)

Resultados Preliminares Redistribución 1

Third-Party Redistribution Game with Luck

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGL	(2) C12_C12 TRGL	(3) D_C12 TRGL	(4) E_C12 TRGL	(5) R_C12 TRGL	(6) C12_D TRGL	(7) C12_E TRGL	(8) C12_R TRGL
T = 1, neutral	-0.007	0.008	-0.029	-0.050***	-0.015	-0.005	0.019	0.023
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
T = 2, TE	-0.002	-0.010	-0.031	-0.025	-0.027	0.008	0.055***	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
T = 3, TR	0.014	0.006	-0.020	-0.011	-0.017	0.023	0.044**	0.074***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	0.460***	0.446***	0.455***	0.483***	0.466***	0.529***	0.411***	0.428***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	5,873	839	839	839	839	839	839	839
R-squared	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.010	0.002	0.003	0.011	0.019
Number of ID	839	839	839	839	839	839	839	839

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The Dependent variable is the percentage distribution by the participant over five tokens. The treatment variables represent the video shown to the participant like control(tourism), Ex-Farc or Migrants). Column 1 contains the total sample, Column 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 restricts the sample to each of pairs of actors that interacts with the participant:None(C12),Displaced(D),ExFarc(E)and Migrant(V)

Resultados Preliminares Redistribución 2

Table: Third-Party Redistribution Game with Merit

VARIABLES	(1) All_Actors TRGM	(2) C12_C12 TRGM	(3) C12_D TRGM	(4) C12_E TRGM	(5) C12_R TRGM
T = 1, neutral video	0.020	-0.001	0.010	0.028	0.041*
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
T = 2, TE	0.040*	0.023	0.030	0.062***	0.044*
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
T = 3, TR	0.052***	0.023	0.035	0.054**	0.096***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	0.299***	0.292***	0.357***	0.267***	0.280***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	3,356	839	839	839	839
R-squared	0.010	0.002	0.004	0.012	0.022
Number of ID	839	839	839	839	839

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Outcomes: measuring prosociality

- (incentivized) empirical expectations on altruism, trust and redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- (incentivized) altruism, trust, trustworthiness, redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- WVS trust, stereotypes, social capital

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- (incentivized) altruism, trust, trustworthiness, redistribution due to lottery and opportunity
- WVS trust, stereotypes, social capital
- BRIQ Institute's reciprocity, altruism measures and empirical expectations
- Support for integration policies

Next steps

- Hidden biases?

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- Hidden biases?
- Medium term effects?
- Robustness checks
- Key lessons for how to address decreasing support for the welcoming of migrants and how to integrate "outsiders" into Colombian communities