

Functional Verification of Tezos Smart Contracts in Coq

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Who am I

- deducteammate (2012-2016)
- postdoc at IRIF (2016-2018)
- research engineer at Nomadic Labs (2019-?)

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- Logipedia contributor (2020-?)

My PhD in one slide

Object-oriented mechanisms for interoperability between proof systems

- FoCaLiZe and Zenon (Modulo) → Dedukti
 - Focalide, Zenonide, Sukerujo
- operational semantics of an object-oriented calculus
 - Sigmaid, Meta Dedukti
- ITP interoperability methodology
 - automated theorem transfer
 - manual concept alignment in FoCaLiZe
 - no backward translation (final proof in Dedukti)
 - case study HOL and Coq on the sieve of Eratosthenes
- heuristic constructivisation of Zenon proofs

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
<https://nomadic-labs.com>

- parisian start-up
- 35 permanent employees
22 with a PhD in formal methods or programming languages
- R&D on the Tezos blockchain
- close to Inria and academia in general
- dedicated to free software

Blockchains

Blockchains are:

- linked lists where link = crypto hash
- distributed databases: each node
 - stores everything
 - validates new blocks
 - communicates toward consensus
- public ledgers for crypto-currencies



Tezos

<https://tezos.com>

<https://tezos.gitlab.io>

- in OCaml
- liquid proof of stake
- on-chain governance
- formal methods

Smart Contracts

In practice, we want our crypto-currency accounts to be programmable:

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These programs are called **smart contracts**

What is contractual about smart contracts?

Once deployed, a smart contract's code:

- is public
- cannot change

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we commit today on what we will do (and pay) in the future

The exploit of the Decentralized Autonomous Organisation

the DAO:

- a venture capital fund implemented as an Ethereum smart contract
- broke the crowdfunding world record
 - 15% of all Ethereum tokens (about 150 M\$)

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the DAO:

- a venture capital fund implemented as an Ethereum smart contract
- broke the crowdfunding world record
 - 15% of all Ethereum tokens (about 150 M\$)
- hacked in 2016
 - lead to a hard fork of the Ethereum blockchain

Smart contract verification

validating the chain \Rightarrow running all the smart contracts

- smart contracts are necessarily small!

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Perfect set-up for formal methods

Let's verify them!

Michelson: the smart contract language in Tezos

<https://michelson.nomadic-labs.com>

- small stack-based Turing-complete language
- designed with software verification in mind:
 - static typing
 - clear documentation (syntax, typing, semantics)
 - failure is explicit
 - integers do not overflow
 - division returns an option
- implemented using an OCaml GADT
 - subject reduction for free

Michelson example: vote

```

storage (map string int);
parameter string;
code {
    # Check that at least 5tz have been sent
    AMOUNT;
    PUSH mutez 5000000; COMPARE; GT; IF { FAIL } {};

    # Pair and stack manipulation
    DUP; DIP { CDR; DUP }; CAR; DUP;

    DIP { # Get the number of votes for the chosen option
          GET; IF_NONE { FAIL } {};
          # Increment
          PUSH int 1; ADD; SOME };
    UPDATE;
    NIL operation; PAIR
}

```



MI-CHO-COQ

Mi-Cho-Coq

<https://gitlab.com/nomadic-labs/mi-cho-coq/>

Deep embedding in Coq of the Michelson language

- lexer, Menhir parser, macro expander, type checker, evaluator, pretty-printer

Syntax: Types

```
Inductive comparable_type : Set :=  
| nat | int | string | bytes | bool  
| mutez | address | key_hash | timestamp.
```

```
Inductive type : Set :=  
| Comparable_type (_ : comparable_type)  
| unit | key | signature | operation  
| option (_ : type) | list (_ : type)  
| set (_ : comparable_type) | contract (_ : type)  
| pair (_ _ : type) | or (_ _ : type)  
| lambda (_ _ : type)  
| map (_ : comparable_type) (_ : type).
```

```
Coercion Comparable_type : comparable_type >-> type.
```

```
Definition stack_type := Datatypes.list type.
```

Syntax: Instructions

```

Inductive instruction : stack_type -> stack_type -> Set
| FAILWITH {A B a} : instruction (a :: A) B
| SEQ {A B C} : instruction A B -> instruction B C ->
    instruction A C
| IF {A B} : instruction A B -> instruction A B ->
    instruction (bool :: A) B
| LOOP {A} : instruction A (bool :: A) ->
    instruction (bool :: A) A
| COMPARE {a : comparable_type} {S} :
    instruction (a :: a :: S) (int :: S)
| ADD_nat {S} : instruction (nat :: nat :: S) (nat :: S)
| ADD_int {S} : instruction (int :: int :: S) (int :: S)
| ...

```


Semantics

```

Fixpoint eval {A B : stack_type}
  (i : instruction A B) : stack A -> stack B :=
match i in instruction A B
  return stack A -> stack B with
| FAILWITH x =>
  ...
| SEQ i1 i2 =>
  fun SA => eval i2 (eval i1 SA)
| IF bt bf =>
  fun SbA => let (b, SA) := SbA in
    if b then eval bt SA else eval bf SA
| LOOP body =>
  fun SbA => let (b, SA) := SbA in
    if b then eval (SEQ body (LOOP body)) SA
    else SA
  ...

```

Semantics

```

Fixpoint eval {A B : stack_type}
  (i : instruction A B) : stack A -> M (stack B) :=
match i in instruction A B
  return stack A -> M (stack B) with
| FAILWITH x =>
  fun SA => Failed _ (Assertion_Failure _ x)
| SEQ i1 i2 =>
  fun SA => bind (eval i2) (eval i1 SA)
| IF bt bf =>
  fun SbA => let (b, SA) := SbA in
    if b then eval bt SA else eval bf SA
| LOOP body =>
  fun SbA => let (b, SA) := SbA in
    if b then eval (SEQ body (LOOP body)) SA
    else Return _ SA
...

```

Semantics

```

Fixpoint eval {A B : stack_type}
  (i : instruction A B) (fuel : nat)
  {struct fuel} : stack A -> M (stack B) :=
match fuel with
| 0 => fun SA => Failed _ Out_of_fuel
| S n =>
  match i in instruction A B
  return stack A -> M (stack B) with
  | FAILWITH x =>
    fun _ => Failed _ (Assertion_Failure _ x)
  | SEQ i1 i2 =>
    fun SA => bind (eval i2 n) (eval i1 n SA)
  | IF bt bf =>
    ...
  | LOOP body =>
    ...

```

Verification

```
Definition correct_smart_contract {A B : stack_type}
  (i : instruction A B) min_fuel spec : Prop :=
forall (input : stack A) (output : stack B) fuel,
  fuel >= min_fuel input ->
  eval i fuel input = Return (stack B) output <->
  spec input output.
```

Verification

```

Definition correct_smart_contract {A B : stack_type}
  (i : instruction A B) min_fuel spec : Prop :=
forall (input : stack A) (output : stack B) fuel,
  fuel >= min_fuel input ->
  eval i fuel input = Return (stack B) output <->
  spec input output.

```

Full functional verification: we characterize the successful runs of the contract.

Computing weakest precondition

```

Fixpoint wp {A B} (i : instruction A B) fuel
  (psi : stack B -> Prop) : (stack A -> Prop) :=
match fuel with
| 0 => fun _ => False
| S fuel =>
  match i with
  | FAILWITH => fun _ => false
  | SEQ B C => wp B fuel (wp C fuel psi)
  | IF bt bf => fun '(b, SA) =>
    if b then wp bt fuel psi SA
    else wp bf fuel psi SA
  | LOOP body => fun '(b, SA) =>
    if b then wp (SEQ body (LOOP body)) fuel psi SA
    else psi SA
  | ...

```

Computing weakest precondition

```
Lemma wp_correct {A B} (i : instruction A B)
  fuel psi st :
  wp i fuel psi st <->
    exists output,
      eval i fuel st = Return _ output /\ psi output.
Proof. ... Qed.
```

Verified smart contracts

- vote example
- default "manager" smart contract
- multisig
 - n persons share the ownership of the contract.
 - they agree on a threshold t (an integer).
 - to do anything with the contract, at least t owners must agree.
 - possible actions:
 - transfer from the multisig contract to somewhere else
 - change the list of owners and the threshold
- spending limit
 - two roles: **admin** and **user**
 - **user** can spend the contract's tokens up-to a stored limit
 - **admin** can change the limit and authentication keys



High level smart contract languages

Many languages compiled to Michelson:

- Ligo, SmartPy, Fi, Archetype, Morley, Juvix, SCaml, Liquidity, lamtez, ...

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no certified compiler

The Albert intermediate language

`https://albert-lang.io`

Goals:

- common suffix of most compilers to Michelson
- optimizing
- certified

Choices:

- abstract the stack

The Albert intermediate language

`https://albert-lang.io`

Goals:

- common suffix of most compilers to Michelson
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Choices:

- abstract the stack
- and not much more

Type system

- same types as Michelson + n -ary variants and records
- explicit duplication
- explicit consumption
- implicit ordering

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linear type system

Example: vote in Albert

```
type storage_ty = { threshold : mutez; votes: map string nat }

def vote :
  { param : string ; store : storage_ty } →
  { operations : list operation ; store : storage_ty } =
    {votes = state; threshold = threshold } = store ;
    (state0, state1) = dup state;
    (param0, param1) = dup param;
    prevote_option = state0[param0];
    { res = prevote } = assert_some { opt = prevote_option };
    one = 1; postvote = prevote + one; postvote = Some postvote;
    final_state = update state1 param1 postvote;
    store = {threshold = threshold; votes = final_state};
    operations = ([] : list operation)
```


Example: vote in Albert

```


def guarded_vote :
  { param : string ; store : storage_ty } →
  { operations : list operation ; store : storage_ty } =
    (store0, store1) = dup store;
    threshold = store0.threshold;
    am = amount;
    ok = am >= threshold0;
    match ok with
      False f → failwith "you are so cheap!"
    | True t → drop t;
      voting_parameters = { param = param ; store = store1 };
      vote voting_parameters
end

```


Ott specification

- syntax, typing, and semantics specified in Ott
- modular specification (one file per language construction)
- from one source
 - OCaml AST
 - Menhir parser
 - Coq AST, typing, and semantic relations
 - \LaTeX documentation

Compiler

- 
- compiler written in Coq, certification in progress
 - compiler target = Mi-Cho-Coq untyped AST
 - proved optimisations at the Michelson level

Compiler pipeline

- 
- inlining of type definitions
 - sorting of record labels and variant constructors
 - type checking
 - function inlining + translation to Michelson

Meta theory

Subject reduction and progress proved on a fragment

$$(\Gamma \vdash instr : ty \rightarrow ty') \Rightarrow (\Gamma \vdash v : ty) \Rightarrow (E \models instr/v \Rightarrow v') \Rightarrow (\Gamma \vdash v : ty')$$

$$(\Gamma \vdash instr : ty \rightarrow ty') \Rightarrow (\Gamma \vdash v : ty) \Rightarrow (\exists v', E \models instr/v \Rightarrow v')$$

Conclusion

- The Michelson smart-contract language is formalized in Coq.
- This formalisation can be used to prove interesting Michelson smart-contracts
- and for certified compilation.

Ongoing and Future Work

- on Mi-Cho-Coq
 - formalize the Michelson cost model, contract life, mutual and recursive calls
 - prove smart contracts for other applications (security, finance, economy, ...)
 - prove equivalence between Mi-Cho-Coq and Michelson reference implementation
- on Albert
 - prove meta theory
 - improve and certify the compiler

Thank you!



Questions?

La Pile qui Chante