

Research Plan

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I use theory and experiments to study how limited cognition and psychological motives influence economic behavior across strategic and non-strategic settings. My general methodological approach is to integrate ideas from cognitive science and psychology into existing economic frameworks such as game theory and models of social preferences. In doing so, my work not only innovates upon existing theory but also directly tests the implications of the new hypotheses I develop.

As a faculty member, experimental research gives me a unique opportunity to mentor and engage with undergraduate students as well. This will be accomplished in three ways. First, students will be able to participate in incentivized experiments themselves. As someone who first learned about experimental research as an undergraduate subject in experiments at Ohio State University, I know firsthand how such an experience can lead to future engagement with the field. Second, students will be able to act as research assistants where they would help with experimental design, running experiments, and analyzing the results. Experimental economics research is extremely accessible, allowing students to be deeply engaged with the research as an assistant, and have meaningful impact on the research that far exceeds typical “data-cleaning” tasks present in many research assistantships. Finally, I would seek to mentor undergraduate students in their own experimental research.

My research plans have two large experimental focuses. First, I am interested in the topic of rational inattention and cognitive economics. This largely includes expanding upon the research presented in my job market paper. My primary agenda is to continue studying strategic implications of costly information. In both my job market paper and my theory paper, I consider a specific case of a game with asymmetric *costs* of information. I believe the broader class of games is the natural next step in games with asymmetric information. However, my job market paper reveals that further integrating theories of costly strategic sophistication and information acquisition will be highly necessary in such settings. Thus I am interested in pursuing this integration more deeply and both experimentally and theoretically studying information acquisition in the broader class of asymmetric cost of information games.

My second focus is on charitable giving and social preferences, and how these can interact with the models of information acquisition as described above. My existing charitable giving paper suggests that people may seek information about charities, even when doing so results in giving away more of their money. Understanding to what extent individuals are aware of this effect of information and examining how much effort they are willing to expend to acquire this information is a promising avenue of future research. Research in this field will involve both lab and field experiments—both of which provide ample opportunities for undergraduate involvement.