

Fully Abstract Trace Semantics of Low-level Protection Mechanisms

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Outline

1 Introduction

- Secure Compilation
- Low-level Protection Mechanisms: FPMAC
- Proving Security of Compilation Scheme

2 A Fully Abstract Trace Semantics

- Syntax of the Low-level Model
- Operational and Trace Semantics

3 Proving Full Abstraction of the Trace Semantics

4 Conclusion


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
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
Secure Compilation, Informally




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
Secure Compilation, Informally




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
Secure Compilation, Informally




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
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
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
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
Secure Compilation, Informally




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
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
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FPMAC

```
⋮  
10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
    ⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
PC → 11 movi r1 14  
    12 jmp r1  
    13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
    ⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
    ⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
    ⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

⋮

▶ 10 jmp r₈
11 movi r₁ 14
PC → 12 jmp r₁
13 cmp r₁ r₂
▶ 14 jmp r₇

⋮

Unprotected Memory

⋮

100 jmp r₆
101 movi r₁ 10
102 jmp r₁
103 sub r₁ r₂
104 jmp r₉

⋮

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
    ⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
   11 movi r1 14  
PC → 12 jmp r1    r1=14  
      13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
    ⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
    ⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
    ⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
    ⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
   11 movi r1 14  
PC → 12 jmp r1    r1 = 14  
      13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
    ⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
    ⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
    ⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

⋮

▶ 10 jmp r₈
11 movi r₁ 14
12 jmp r₁
13 cmp r₁ r₂
PC → 14 jmp r₇

⋮

Unprotected Memory

⋮

100 jmp r₆
101 movi r₁ 10
102 jmp r₁
103 sub r₁ r₂
104 jmp r₉

⋮

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
    ⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
   11 movi r1 14  
   12 jmp r1  
   13 cmp r1 r2  
PC → 14 jmp r7    r7=100  
    ⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
    ⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
    ⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
    ⋮  
    10 jmp r8  
    11 movi r1 14  
    12 jmp r1  
    13 cmp r1 r2  
PC → 14 jmp r7    r7 = 100  
    ⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
    ⋮  
    100 jmp r6  
    101 movi r1 10  
    102 jmp r1  
    103 sub r1 r2  
    104 jmp r9  
    ⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
PC → 100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
PC → 100 jmp r6 r6=101  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
PC → 101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```


FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
PC → 102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
PC → 102 jmp r1 r1=10  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```

    ⋮
▶ 10 jmp r8
    11 movi r1 14
    12 jmp r1
    13 cmp r1 r2
▶ 14 jmp r7
    ⋮

```

Unprotected Memory

```

    ⋮
    100 jmp r6
    101 movi r1 10
PC → 102 jmp r1 r1=10
    103 sub r1 r2
    104 jmp r9
    ⋮

```

10 is an entry point

FPMAC

Protected Memory

PC →

```
⋮  
10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

PC →

```

  ⋮
10 jmp r8    r8=104
11 movi r1 14
12 jmp r1
13 cmp r1 r2
14 jmp r7
  ⋮

```

Unprotected Memory

```

  ⋮
100 jmp r6
101 movi r1 10
102 jmp r1
103 sub r1 r2
104 jmp r9
  ⋮

```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

PC →

```
⋮  
10 jmp r8    r8 = 104  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
PC → 104 jmp r9  
⋮
```

FPMAC

Protected Memory

```
⋮  
▶ 10 jmp r8  
11 movi r1 14  
12 jmp r1  
13 cmp r1 r2  
▶ 14 jmp r7  
⋮
```

Unprotected Memory

```
⋮  
100 jmp r6  
101 movi r1 10  
102 jmp r1  
103 sub r1 r2  
PC → 104 jmp r9 r9=11  
⋮
```


FPMAC

Protected Memory

```

    ⋮
▶ 10 jmp r8
    11 movi r1 14
    12 jmp r1
    13 cmp r1 r2
▶ 14 jmp r7
    ⋮

```

Unprotected Memory

```

    ⋮
    100 jmp r6
    101 movi r1 10
    102 jmp r1
    103 sub r1 r2
PC → 104 jmp r9  r9=11
    ⋮


```

11 is not an entry point


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
Secure Compilation, Informally



Secure Compilation, Informally



Secure Compilation, Informally



Secure Compilation, Formally

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation, Formally

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation, Formally

$$C_1 \circledast_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \circledast_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Contextual Equivalence

Contextual Equivalence

$$C_1 \simeq C_2 \triangleq \forall C. \mathbb{C}[C_1] \Uparrow \iff \mathbb{C}[C_2] \Uparrow$$

Contextual Equivalence

$$C_1 \simeq C_2 \triangleq \forall C. C[C_1] \uparrow \iff C[C_2] \uparrow$$

Contextual Equivalence

$$C_1 \simeq C_2 \triangleq \forall C. C[C_1] \uparrow \iff C[C_2] \uparrow$$

All contexts

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

$$(\forall C. \mathbb{C}[C_1]^\uparrow \iff \mathbb{C}[C_2]^\uparrow) \iff (\forall M. \mathbb{M}[C_1^\downarrow]^\uparrow \iff \mathbb{M}[C_2^\downarrow]^\uparrow)$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

NO WAY

$$(\forall C. C[C_1]^\uparrow \iff C[C_2]^\uparrow) \iff (\forall M. M[C_1^\downarrow]^\uparrow \iff M[C_2^\downarrow]^\uparrow)$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \quad \checkmark \quad C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \Rightarrow C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \simeq_H C_2 \Rightarrow$$

$$\begin{array}{c} C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow \\ \Updownarrow \\ \text{Traces}(C_1^\downarrow) = \text{Traces}(C_2^\downarrow) \end{array}$$

Fully Abstract Trace Semantics

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \not\approx_H C_2 \iff \text{Traces}(C_1^\downarrow) \neq \text{Traces}(C_2^\downarrow)$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \not\approx_H C_2 \quad \checkmark \quad \text{Traces}(C_1^\downarrow) \neq \text{Traces}(C_2^\downarrow)$$

Secure Compilation

$$C_1 \not\approx_H C_2$$



$$C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$



$$\text{Traces}(C_1^\downarrow) = \text{Traces}(C_2^\downarrow)$$

Fully Abstract Trace Semantics

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Syntax

`movl rd rs`

`movi rd i`

`sub rd rs`

`jmp ri`

`jle ri`

`ret`

`movs rd rs`

`add rd rs`

`cmp r1 r2`

`je ri`

`call ri`

`halt`

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Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

Trace Semantics

Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$\underbrace{(p, r, f, M, s)} \rightarrow\!\!\rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

$$M = \text{total}$$

Trace Semantics

Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$\underbrace{(p, r, f, M, s)} \rightarrow\!\!\rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

$$M = \text{total}$$

Trace Semantics

(Trace-internal)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow\!\!\rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{internalJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \xRightarrow{\tau_i} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$\underbrace{(p, r, f, M, s)} \rightarrow\!\!\rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

$$M = \text{total}$$

Trace Semantics

(Trace-internal)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow\!\!\rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{internalJump}(p, p')$$

$$\underbrace{(p, r, f, m, s)} \xrightarrow{\tau_i} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$m = \text{protected}$$

Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

Trace Semantics

(Trace-internal)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{internalJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \xrightarrow{\tau_i} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

(Eval-jump)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{jmp } r_d) \quad p' = r_d$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p', r, f, M, s)$$

Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

(Eval-jump)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{jmp } r_d) \quad p' = r_d$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p', r, f, M, s)$$

Trace Semantics

(Trace-internal)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{internalJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \xrightarrow{\tau_i} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

(Trace-callback)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{exitJump}(p, p') \quad m(p) \cong (\text{jmp})$$

$$\bar{v} = R_4 :: \dots :: R_{11}$$

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \xrightarrow{\text{call } p'(\bar{v})!} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

Operational and Trace Semantics

Operational Semantics

(Eval-movs)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{movs } r_d \ r_s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p+1)$$

$$s \vdash \text{writeAllowed}(p, *r_d)$$

$$M' = M[*r_d \mapsto r_s]$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p+1, r, f, M', s)$$

(Eval-jump)

$$M(p) \cong (\text{jmp } r_d) \quad p' = r_d$$

$$s \vdash \text{validJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, M, s) \rightarrow (p', r, f, M, s)$$

Trace Semantics

(Trace-internal)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{internalJump}(p, p')$$

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \xrightarrow{\tau_i} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

(Trace-callback)

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \rightarrow (p', r', f', m', s)$$

$$s \vdash \text{exitJump}(p, p') \quad m(p) \cong (\text{jmp})$$

$$\bar{v} = R_4 :: \dots :: R_{11}$$

$$(p, r, f, m, s) \xrightarrow{\text{call } p'(\bar{v})!} (p', r', f', m', s)$$

Full Abstraction of the Trace Semantics in General

$$\text{Traces}(C_1^\downarrow) = \text{Traces}(C_2^\downarrow) \iff C_1^\downarrow \simeq_L C_2^\downarrow$$

$$\alpha ::= \gamma? \mid \gamma!$$
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Change the semantics

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$$\text{Traces}(P_1) = \text{Traces}(P_2) \iff P_1 \simeq_L P_2$$

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- Secure Compilation
- Low-level Protection Mechanisms: FPMAC
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4 Conclusion

Main Theorem

$$\text{Traces}(P_1) = \text{Traces}(P_2) \iff P_1 \simeq P_2$$

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$$\text{Traces}(P_1) = \text{Traces}(P_2) \iff \forall \mathbb{M}. \mathbb{M}[P_1] \uparrow \iff \mathbb{M}[P_2] \uparrow$$

Proof that scales to both solutions

Soundness

Soundness:

$$\text{Trace}(P_1) = \text{Trace}(P_2) \Leftarrow P_1 \simeq P_2$$

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- Two traces have a different action at index i
- Create \mathbb{M} such that it replicates the traces until action i
- At action i , \mathbb{M} makes P_1 diverge and P_2 terminate

Completeness

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Proof strategy: coinduction

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} P_1 \text{ stuck} \wedge P_2 \text{ stuck} \\ P_1 \text{ terminated} \wedge P_2 \text{ terminated} \\ P_1\uparrow \text{ locally} \wedge P_2\uparrow \text{ locally} \\ P'_1 \simeq_L P'_2 \wedge P_1 \xRightarrow{\alpha} P'_1 \wedge P_2 \xRightarrow{\alpha} P'_2 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow P_1 \simeq_L P_2$$

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Conclusion

- A fully abstract trace semantics for FPMACs eliminates the need to use contextual equivalence

Conclusion

- A fully abstract trace semantics for FPMACs eliminates the need to use contextual equivalence
- This can be used to reason more easily about these systems (e.g. prove secure compilation to FPMACs)

Questions

