

Exorcising Spectres with Secure Compilers

(wip)




Marco Patrignani^{1,2} Marco Guarnieri³



9th March 2020



Talk Outline



Spectre v1

Slides courtesy of M.G.

Foundations of Secure Compilation

Exorcism via RSC

Spectre v1



Slides courtesy of M.G.

Speculative execution + branch prediction

Size of array **A**

```
if (x < A_size)
    y = B[A[x]]
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Branch predictor

Speculative execution + branch prediction

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if (x < A_size) {  
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```

Size of array **A**

Prediction based on **branch history** & **program structure**



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Speculative execution + branch prediction

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Prediction based on **branch history** & **program structure**



Wrong prediction? **Rollback changes!**



Architectural (ISA) state




Microarchitectural state

Spectre V1

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
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
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
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
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
Spectre V1



void *f*(int *x*)
if (*x* < *A_size*)
y = *B[A[x]]*




Spectre V1



What is in **A**[128]?



```
void f(int x)
if (x < A_size)
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
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B[B[0] B[1] ...]



What is in **A**[128]?

1) Training



Spectre V1




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


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What is in A[128]?

1) Training ↗ f(0);



Spectre V1



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
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


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
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What is in **A**[128]?



1) Training f(0);f(1);f(2); ...

2) Prepare cache

Spectre V1




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
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What is in **A[128]**?



1) Training $f(0); f(1); f(2); \dots$

2) Prepare cache

3) Run with $x = 128$

Spectre V1

The diagram illustrates the Spectre V1 attack flow through three main stages:

- 1) Training**: Shows the function `f(int x)` with the condition `(x < A_size)`. A call to `f(0); f(1); f(2); ...` is shown. A haloed smiley face icon is associated with this stage.
- 2) Prepare cache**: Shows the variable `A_size = 16` and memory layout for arrays `B` and `A`. It asks "What is in `A[128]`?". A blue ghost icon is associated with this stage.
- 3) Run with `x = 128`**: Shows the final step of running the function with `x = 128`.

Below the stages is a stylized illustration of a computer chip with red internal components and yellow pins.

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
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


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
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Spectre V1



What is in $A[128]$?

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Spectre V1




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A_size=16

B[B[0] B[1] ... B[A[128]]]



What is in **A**[128]?



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
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
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


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


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Depends on
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
Persistent across
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


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Persistent across
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1) Training $f(0); f(1); f(2); \dots$

2) Prepare cache

3) Run with $x = 128$

4) Extract from cache

Compiler-level countermeasures

Compiler-level countermeasures

For *Spectre V1*

Injecting speculation barriers

```
if (x < A_size)  
    y = B[A[x]]
```



```
if (x < A_size)  
    lfence  
    y = B[A[x]]
```

- In x86, **LFENCE** act as **speculation barrier**
- Compiler injects LFENCE after each branch instruction
 - Microsoft Visual C++
 - Intel ICC
- Effectively **stop speculative execution!**

Speculative load-hardening (SLH)

```
if (x < A_size)  
    y = B[A[x]]
```



```
if (x < A_size)  
    y = B[mask(A[x])]
```

- Injects ***data dependencies*** and ***masking operations***
- Combines ***conditional moves*** and ***binary operations***
- Stops ***speculative leaks***
- Does not block speculative execution!
- Implemented in Clang

Foundations of Secure Compilation

Secure Compilation Goals

ChaCha20

Poly1305

...

F^* HACL*: ...CCS'17

Asm

[[ChaCha20]]

[[Poly1305]]

[[...]]

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160x C/C++ code

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Preserve the security of

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when interoperating with

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when interoperating with

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Correct compilation

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Poly1305

...

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[[Poly1305]]

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Secure Compilation Goals

Secure compilation

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Poly1305

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Asm

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Secure Compilation Goals

Enable source-level security reasoning

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Poly1305

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
Robust Compilation Criteria

"Journey Beyond Full Abstraction..." CSF'19

Relational
Hyperproperties

Hyperproperties

Trace
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
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Exorcism via RSC

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1. formalise lfence & SLH compilers
2. **T** must capture speculative execution (\rightsquigarrow)
3. need a safety property capturing vulnerability to Spectre v1: *SS*
4. adapt RSC to preserve *SS*: RSSC
5. prove the compilers attain RSSC

Goal Up Next

2. **T** must capture speculative execution (\rightsquigarrow)
3. need a **safety property** capturing vulnerability to Spectre v1: *SS*
4. adapt RSC to preserve *SS*: RSSC

Speculative Semantics 101

“Spectector ...” S&P'20

```
void f (int x) ↳ if (x < A.size) { y = B[ A[ x ] ] }      // A.size=16, A[128]=3
```

call f 128

Speculative Semantics 101

“Spectector ...” S&P'20


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
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
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
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
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
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rdA[128]

rdB[3]

Speculative Safety (*SS*): Taint Tracking

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integrity lattice: $S \subset U$ $S \sqcap U = S$ U does not flow to S

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call f 128  
pc : S
```

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
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
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
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
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
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rdA[128] : S

rdB[3] : U

SS-Preserving Compiler: RSSC & RSSP

$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : \text{RSSP} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{if } \forall \textcolor{blue}{A}. A[P] : SS \text{ then } \forall \textcolor{red}{A}. A[\llbracket P \rrbracket] : SS$

SS-Preserving Compiler: RSSC & RSSP

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$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : \text{RSSC} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{if } \forall \textcolor{red}{A}.A[\llbracket P \rrbracket] \rightsquigarrow t \text{ then } \exists \textcolor{blue}{A}.A[P] \rightsquigarrow t \approx t$

$\approx =$ same traces, plus $\textcolor{red}{S}$ actions in t

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- RSSC & RSSP are equivalent
- lfence : RSSC because it has no speculation ($pc : S$ always)
- SLH : RSSC because masking taints as S


RSSC for lfence

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void f(int x) ↪ if(x < A.size){y = B[A[x]]}      // A.size=16, A[128]=3  
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```

```
call f 128  
pc : S
```


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
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
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
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```

call f 128
pc : S


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
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
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
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
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
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
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```



rd B[0] : S

Questions?

