A financially accountable watching network

Patrick McCorry











A financially accountable watching network

Patrick McCorry













A financially accountable watching network

Patrick McCorry











A financially accountable watching network



Patrick McCorry

Sergi Delgado













A financially accountable watching network





Patrick McCorry

Sergi Delgado


















Bypass all blockchain latency and fees
While still retaining non-custodial security
quarantees


Only scaling solution that will exceed 10k tps 99% of transactions are LOCAL and never reach the global network


# But what does an "off-chain network" look like?




**P2P Routing Network** 









Settlement System and Root of Trust of all Layer 2









LIQUIDITY · NETWORK

**pg** Plasma Group

Settlement System and Root of Trust of all Layer 2

# We'll "briefly" talk about how replace-by-revocation works **before deep-diving into the watching network**



Alice and Bob always have a transaction ("state") that only they can broadcast to trigger a dispute






Authorising a payment is a two-step process





Both parties authorise a new state
 (a transaction only the counterparty can broadcast)



Either State 1 or State 2 can be broadcast...

Second step revokes old balance and confirms the new one



State 2A


State 1A




State 2B

State 1B


Both parties will "revoke" the old state (i.e. share preimage of hash)





Complete!
Both parties can always broadcast the latest state




... and a growing list of revoked states... as we will see, this will be problematic...













... Block 10

































#### JUSTICE TRANSACTION


Alice can steal all coins in the channel (i.e. spend the outputs) by signing a justice transaction































#### Alice wins!

Her JUSTICE TRANSACTION was accepted into the blockchain before the dispute process expired!

She punished Bob for trying to cheat by taking all coins in the channel


... Block 10 Block 11 ... ... Block 100





FAQ: Can Alice just keep a pre-signed justice tx around?

#### FAQ: Can Alice just keep a pre-signed justice tx around?



#### Why?


Bob has a LIST of REVOKED transactions that only HE can broadcast....


She must be ready to prove any of them are invalid...


Remember, UTXO!


FAQ: Under the hood - what does it look like (roughly speaking)

#### **Funding Transaction**










#### Bob broadcasts it

He can just sign and broadcast it at any time... to trigger the dispute period (up to time t)



Now we know how Lightning Channels (replace-by-revocation) roughly works...

Let's better understand this watching network








But what does she send to the watchtower?











#### Tx Locator

Let's watching service find transaction when dispute is triggered

### **Encryption Key**

Used to encryption Justice Transaction, only discoverable when a dispute is triggered



Leaning Watchtower

Bob's TX (State N)

TXID [32 bytes]

TxLocator = [16:0] Encryption Key = [16:32]




4410c8d14ff9f87ceeed1d65cb58e7c7b2422b2d7529afc675208ce2ce09ed7d

### **Encrypted Justice Transaction**

Alice encrypts the pre-signed justice transaction

It can ONLY be decrypted by watchtower if there is a dispute (or if bob leaks the key)




Leaning Watchtower

### **Encrypted Justice TX**

Bob's TX (State N)

TXID [32 bytes]


TxLocator = [16:0] Encryption Key = [16:32]





### Send to the Watching Service

TxLocator & Encrypted Justice
Transaction




Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator & Encrypted Justice Transaction







Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice

TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice

... Block 10





# Leaning Watchtower


TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice

TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice





### Watching Service - 5 Steps

- Extract Transaction ID
- 2. Compute TxLocator + Key
- 3. Find "encrypted blob"
- 4. Decrypt it!
- 5. Broadcast to the network



# Leaning Watchtower



TxLocator1:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice


TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice





### Watching Service - 5 Steps

- Extract Transaction ID
- 2. Compute TxLocator + Key
- 3. Find "encrypted blob"
- 4. Decrypt it!
- 5. Broadcast to the network





# Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator1:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice


TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice





Watching Service - 5 Steps

Let's look at the good, bad and the ugly



Watchtower

Leaning

cator1:ENCJustice


TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice

TxLocator4: ENCJustice TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6: ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice



Block 10

### Monitor - THE GOOD

#### Channel-Privacy

We don't know anything about channel until dispute.

(Can also send us junk)

### Responder, not trigger

We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.



### Simple Protocol

Just store encrypted blob and watch blockchain to retrieve decryption key.

### Monitor - THE GOOD, BAD

#### Channel-Privacy

We don't know anything about channel until dispute.


(Can also send us junk)

### O(N) Storage

Watching service must store a justice transaction for EVERY new state update.

### Responder, not trigger

We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.



Leaning Watchtower

#### Congestion BIG problem

Watching service only
has a pre-signed
transaction and very
very awkward to bump
fees.

### Simple Protocol

Just store encrypted blob and watch blockchain to retrieve decryption key.

### Monitor - THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY

#### Channel-Privacy

We don't know anything about channel until dispute (Can also send us junk)

### O(N) Storage

Watching service must store a justice transaction for EVERY new state update.

### Responder, not trigger

We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.



Leaning Watchtower

#### Congestion BIG problem

Watching service only
has a pre-signed
transaction and very
very awkward to bump
fees

### Simple Protocol


Just store encrypted blob and watch blockchain to retrieve decryption key

#### HOPES FOR AVAILABILITY

Hire hundreds of watchers and only 1 is rewarded.

What if they don't respond? Tough luck.

### View of how a "watching network" might work so far



### Hire multiple watchtowers

And hope one responds!


Goal for "Monitor" was CHANNEL

Privacy




### Reward Policy?

Only the one watchtower who gets
 their respective justice tx in
the blockchain will get rewarded



<sup>\*</sup>The actual construction is slightly different, it commits to the "version, randomness" which is revealed, but this is easier to explain.








### Watching Service - 5 Steps

- 1. Extract Transaction ID
- Look up the latest "i" received
- 3. Broadcast it!



Leaning Watchtower


 $TxLocator: \sigma_A$ ,  $\sigma_B$ , i

•••	Block 10	Block 11
		State 1



### Watching Service - 5 Steps

- 1. Extract Transaction ID
- Look up the latest "i" received
- 3. Broadcast it!



Leaning Watchtower

 $TxLocator: \sigma_A, \sigma_B, i$ 


 $\sigma_{A}$ ,  $\sigma_{B}$ , i

 Block 10	Block 11
	State 1



### Watching Service - 5 Steps

- 1. Extract Transaction ID
- Look up the latest "i" received
- 3. Broadcast it!



Leaning Watchtower

 $TxLocator: \sigma_A, \sigma_B, i$ 

 $\sigma_{A}$ ,  $\sigma_{B}$ , i

•••	Block 10	Block 11
		State 1



### Watching Service - 5 Steps


- 1. Extract Transaction ID
- Look up the latest "i" received
- 3. Broadcast it!




Leaning Watchtower

 $TxLocator: \sigma_A$ ,  $\sigma_B$ , i

 Block 10	Block 11	Block 12
	State 1	$\sigma_{A}$ , $\sigma_{B}$ , i





### WatchTower - THE GOOD

#### Verifiable Job

No longer store junk. We know it is a useful job.

### **Separates TX + State**

We are broadcasting the "latest state" and not necessarily a Bitcoin transaction. Cleaner solution.



### 0(1) Storage

Only store the job with the largest version.

### WatchTower - THE GOOD, BAD

#### Verifiable Job

No longer store junk. We know it is a useful job.

#### Accountability? No

No evidence a watch tower was hired and if they don't do their job, no way to prove it.

#### **Separates TX + State**

We are broadcasting the "latest state" and not necessarily a Bitcoin transaction. Cleaner solution.



Watchtower

#### No financial deterrent

We need to rely on the reputation of a watching service (or hire multiple) since no skin-in-the-game

### 0(1) Storage

Only store the job with the largest version.

### WatchTower - THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY

#### Verifiable Job

No longer store junk. We know it is a useful job.

#### Accountability? No

No evidence a watch tower was hired and if they don't do their job, no way to prove it.

#### **Separates TX + State**

We are broadcasting the "latest state" and not necessarily a Bitcoin transaction. Cleaner solution.



Watchtower

### No financial deterrent

We need to rely on the reputation of a watching service (or hire multiple) since no skin-in-the-game

#### 0(1) Storage

Only store the job with the largest version.

#### Consensus Upgrade

We need a new OP\_CODE for eltoo to work, so we don't get the benefits of watchtower.

### PISA @ Scaling Bitcoin '19

We don't care too much about the underlying payment channel construction.

It can be replace-by-revocation (today) or replace-by-version (eltoo).



Leaning Watchtower

### Monitor-style Jobs

TxLocator + Encrypted TX

### Eltoo-style Jobs

TxLocator &
Authorised State
Version

### Outpost-style Jobs

TxLocator +
Decryption Key



### PISA @ Scaling Bitcoin '19

#### On-chain evidence

If PISA doesn't respond, clear on-chain evidence.

#### Signed Receipt


An acknowledgement that PISA accepted a job








Requires a new OPCODE to support SPV Proof, parsing receipt & covenants
















Bob triggered a dispute, PISA failed to respond, Bob gets the coins.

How can Alice prove wrongdoing?



Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator1:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice

... Block 10 B

Block 11

...

... Block 110

State 1 Bob wins

...



#### In-depth Signed Receipt

Encrypted Justice: ENCJustice
Transaction Locator: TxLocator1
Appointment Start: Block 10
Appointment Expiry: Block 500

Minimum Dispute Period: 50 blocks

Signature by PISA:  $\sigma_{\text{PISA}}$ 



- TxLocator1 FOUND
- Dispute triggered between block 10 and 500
- Assume for now dispute time is >50 blocks





# Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator1:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice

TxLocator7:ENCJustice



#### In-depth Signed Receipt

Encrypted Justice: ENCJustice
Transaction Locator: TxLocator1
Appointment Start: Block 10
Appointment Expiry: Block 500


Minimum Dispute Period: 50 blocks

Signature by PISA:  $\sigma_{\text{PISA}}$ 



- Valid justice transaction
- Not included in the blockchain at all







# Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator1:ENCJustice


TxLocator2:ENCJustice TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice


TxLocator7:ENCJustice



#### Reputational Accountability, not Financial

Publicly verifiable that PISA accepted the job and failed to do its duty by the customer.

With a consensus upgrade, the evidence of SPV proof for dispute + Bob's spend transaction, could be used to slash/refund customer.



# Leaning Watchtower

TxLocator1:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice

TxLocator3:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

... Block 10 Block 11 ... ... Block 110

State

Bob wins



Block 10


Block 11

State 1

. . .

Reputational Accountability, not Financial

Let's look at the good, bad and the ugly



Leaning Watchtower

cator1:ENCJustice

TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice

TxLocator2:ENCJustice

TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice

TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

Bob wins

. . .

Block 110

Π`

### PISA - THE GOOD

#### Channel-Privacy

By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!

#### Accountability

We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.



#### Simple Protocol

Adopting a signed receipt for different channel constructions is relatively straight-forward.

### PISA - THE GOOD, BAD

#### Channel-Privacy


By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!

#### O(1) OR O(N) Storage

Depends on the underlying channel construction (or if ENCJustice is stored on-chain via OUTPOST)

#### Accountability

We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.



Leaning Watchtower

#### Security Deposit hard

While there is "skin in the game", it may be under-collateralized. Provisions (2015) can help.

#### Simple Protocol

Adopting a signed receipt for different channel constructions is relatively straight-forward.

### PISA - THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY

#### Channel-Privacy

By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!

#### O(1) OR O(N) Storage

Depends on the underlying channel construction (or if ENCJustice is stored on-chain via OUTPOST)

#### **Accountability**

We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.



Watchtower

#### Security Deposit hard

While there is "skin in the game", it may be under-collateralized. Provisions (2015) can help.

#### Simple Protocol

Adopting a signed receipt for different channel constructions is relatively straight-forward.

#### Consensus Upgrade

We need a new OP\_CODE for the slashing condition. Very likely, will not get into Bitcoin soon.

Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)

No way for the blockchain to self-enforce that via slashing.	By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!	Depends in Monitor or Outpost. O(N) implies we need N-1 encrypted blobs, so it leaks number of transfers.	Accountability via Signed Receipt  We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.			
Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)						

O(N) Storage/Updates

Reputation

Channel-Privacy

No financial deterrent

No financial deterrent  No way for the blockchain to self-enforce that via slashing.	Channel-Privacy  By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!	O(N) Storage/Updates  Depends in Monitor or Outpost. O(N) implies we need N-1 encrypted blobs, so it leaks number of transfers.	Reputation Accountability via Signed Receipt  We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.
Fair exchange payment + job via offchain tx  PISA can be hired via the lightning network. Not knowing which channel hired it.	Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)		TX + State Intertwined == bumping fee is HARD  PISA can't sign state & broadcast it, must get a "pre-signed" justice tx.

No financial deterrent  No way for the blockchain to self-enforce that via slashing.	Channel-Privacy  By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!	O(N) Storage/Updates  Depends in Monitor or Outpost. O(N) implies we need N-1 encrypted blobs, so it leaks number of transfers.	Reputation Accountability via Signed Receipt  We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.
Fair exchange payment + job via offchain tx  PISA can be hired via the lightning network. Not knowing which channel hired it.	Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)		TX + State Intertwined == bumping fee is HARD  PISA can't sign state & broadcast it, must get a "pre-signed" justice tx.
Consensus upgrades required  A lot of problems can be fixed. We, as a community, must seriously consider them.	Responder, not trigger  We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.	No Verifiable Jobs (May store junk)  Important that PISA is paid up-front for storing "blobs" and not via bounties.	Encrypting and decrypting blobs is straight forward, but reducing O(N) storage "constant" is ugly.

### PISA - Final word about "watchers" and their emerging role



#### **Responder of LAST resort**

#### Financial Liability & Insurance

Watchers take on the "financial liability" for users who go offline.

The "cost" of a watcher is some function of financial liability, number of updates & number of channels watched.

#### What can a watchtower do?

Protect hubs against crashes + dos attacks by responding to malicious customer closures

#### What can a watchtower NOT do?

Protect hubs against insider threats, theft of signing keys, etc.

### PISA - WHERE ARE WE NOW?

#### PRIVATE TEST

We have a working basic PISA implementation.

#### Signed Receipt BOLT

Coming soon to a wallet near you!

(after guinea pigs try out our demo)

# Do you want to try out our watchtower?

Please contact us!

- ❤ @sr\_gi
- y @paddypisa
- @PisaResearch

https://pisa.watch